An American columnist goes back to Europe after many years, and is surprised by Europeans feelings about the US, and Bush in particular. Sensitive to a traditional understanding of power (he cites Kagan) he writes that: "Europe is too weak to lead and too proud to follow." Nevertheless, he understands that Europeans attitude towards netotiations comes from their capacity to "control historical hatreds through the EU."
There a re a lot of interesting considerations in this column, starting with the basic one which is that "we are drifiting."
The Washington Post - Drifting Apart
Drifting Apart
By Robert J. Samuelson
Wednesday, May 5, 2004; Page A29
BRUSSELS -- This ought to be a moment of great triumph for Europe and America together. Instead there is mutual disenchantment. On May 1 the European Union accepted 10 countries -- most of them remnants of the Soviet empire -- into membership. The EU is now a massive free-trade area and loose political union with 25 countries, 455 million people and an $11.6 trillion economy. After World War II, farsighted Europeans and Americans promoted European unification to end a history of ruinous continental wars. The vision has succeeded spectacularly, and yet there's no common celebration.
You can see this in coverage of the "enlargement" (the new members are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta). The U.S. media paid scant attention; it was no big deal. In Europe it was a gargantuan deal. But the self-congratulation virtually ignored the huge American role in European unification: in encouraging it after World War II; in providing a defense shield against Soviet invasion and intimidation, permitting the EU to grow; and in maintaining the military and economic pressure that led to the Soviet Union's ultimate collapse.
This was my first European visit in several years. I knew, of course, that widespread opposition to the war in Iraq had darkened opinion toward America. In a March poll, the Pew Research Center found that only 38 percent of Germans and 37 percent of the French had "favorable" views of the United States. In mid-2002, the comparable figures were 61 percent and 63 percent. Still, I was not prepared for the depth of feeling. "Even my parents, who are part of the World War II generation and always supported the United States, think Bush is a war criminal," a 48-year-old German, a mid-level EU official, told me. War criminal?
It's not just that many Europeans oppose Bush's Iraq policies. They mistake the motives -- and that's scarier. The implication is not simply that the United States made an error. It's that something about Bush or America (it's not clear which) represents a permanent menace. One view is that Bush went into Iraq for oil. About 60 percent of the French and Germans believe that, says Pew. Another view is that U.S. foreign policy has fallen hostage to Bush's religious fervor. Militarism becomes a heavenly mission.
"We've been much more used to a distinction between the state and God," says John Palmer of the European Policy Centre, a Brussels think tank. It's "deeply worrying . . . for the major superpower to be deriving its strategy from fundamentalism." By labeling these views distorted, I don't mean that Bush is bound to prove his critics -- at home and abroad -- wrong. The outcome in Iraq is unknown; the administration may fail. What I do mean is that prevailing European readings of Bush represent dangerous misunderstandings.
His motives were upfront: finding weapons of mass destruction, fighting terrorism, ending tyranny -- and not oil. Although Bush advertises his religious faith, his good-guys-and-bad-guys rhetoric remains firmly in the moralistic tradition of U.S. foreign policy. Enemies (the Nazis, the Japanese, the commies, al Qaeda) represent evil. Wars become moral crusades -- to save the world for democracy, to establish universal peace. Missionary zeal is routine. Indeed, it buttressed the post-World War II U.S. enthusiasm for European unity.
Bush, it's said, created this rift -- and can end it by embracing cooperation or (involuntarily) retiring. There's something to this. Love him or hate him, Bush has a knack for offending critics. But the roots of disagreement, I suspect, go much deeper.
In his book "Of Paradise and Power," Robert Kagan argued that Americans and Europeans have divergent views of military power. Americans believe that only raw power can defeat evil, he wrote. Having controlled historical hatreds through the EU, Europeans prefer negotiation and compromise.
Not surprisingly, Europeans and Americans see Sept. 11, 2001, differently. "Americans felt this was the beginning of a war," says Roland Koch, a leading German politician. "This is not the feeling of Europeans." The terrorist threat is seen as "more or less far away." In the Pew poll, 57 percent of the French and 49 percent of Germans said Americans overreacted to terrorism. Even the Madrid bombing didn't much change opinion, Koch says.
Opposition to the United States also distracts from Europe's own problems. There's a growing collision between generous welfare benefits and poor economic growth. From 1996 to 2003, economic growth averaged 1.3 percent annually in Germany, 1.5 percent in Italy and 2.2 percent in France (the U.S. rate: 3.3 percent). Many EU countries have taxes between 40 percent and 50 percent of national income. Aging populations intensify upward pressures on benefits. From 2000 to 2020, the over-65 population in the 15 countries of the "old" EU is projected to rise 38 percent, while the number of people between 25 and 49 falls 14 percent. These economic tensions even affected the "enlargement" process. The 10 countries received membership on grudging terms: Economic aid and farm subsidies were limited; immigration rights were curtailed.
The truth is that Europe is too weak to lead and too proud to follow. It doesn't want to undertake costly new commitments. It's already got more than it can handle. In some ways, George Bush is a political godsend. His style and language offend so many Europeans -- he seems simplistic, trigger-happy, uneducated -- that opposition to him camouflages more basic conflicts. I've been repeatedly reminded here that Europe and America share too much (common cultures, political systems and economic interests) to drift apart. Maybe. But we're still drifting.
This article by Roger Cohen, on The New York Times' Week in Review of Sunday, May 2nd, explains the changing attitudes of the US towards "Europe at 25".
'WHOLE AND FREE' AT LAST
By ROGER COHEN
WASHINGTON — The expansion of the European Union this weekend from 15 members to 25, marking the formal end of Europe's postwar division, presents America with a choice. Should it embrace this new union that stretches to the Russian border or try to foster Europe's many fissures in order to divide and rule?
For the moment, there is scant official comment, but perhaps Europe should not take this personally. The United States has shifted paradigms: Europe is old news. Still, the less-than-benign neglect surrounding the European Union's addition of 10 members, 8 of them once part of the Soviet bloc, reflects a moment of great difficulty.
"The situation has never been so bad in 50 years," Gunter Burghardt, the union's ambassador in Washington, said in an interview. "It is a fact of life that America is a hegemonic power, but the question is how that power is used. We need to know that America is open to a confident relationship, not just with certain member states but with the E.U. as such."
This assessment reflects the enduring wounds of the Iraq war and the feeling among many European officials that an American administration has determined that its interests may lie more in division within Europe than in unity, more in forging improvised coalitions of the willing than in honoring a partnership of the wedded.
"This is an administration that simply does not care about Europe," said Philip H. Gordon, an expert on European affairs at the Brookings Institution. "I don't think they do anything solely to divide Europe, but if that's a consequence of an action, fine, because they don't want a counterweight to American power emerging."
In many respects, the new European Union is a potential major power. Its highly educated population of 455 million people is far larger than America's and it accounts for 28 percent of world trade.
But it is also divided between formerly Communist states in Central Europe that are enthusiastic about Atlanticism, and other countries, led by France, where dislike of President Bush's America is intense. This is the basic ideological split that America could choose to quicken or quiet.
America might, for example, try to use the sympathies of Poland, Slovakia or Hungary to undermine European unity and pursue its own goals, which may include the establishment of military bases in at least one of these countries, quiet attempts to assure that Europe's military identity remains muted or the obstruction of moves toward a more federal United States of Europe.
But Iraq has been a sobering experience, and American officials seem, for now, to have dropped talk of "old" and "new" Europe in favor of a rediscovered pragmatism.
"Whatever the differences over the past year, we know that a Europe that is open, at peace, broadly united and reaching out toward Turkey is in the American interest," one State Department official said.
The mention of Turkey is significant. Faced by the union's expansion, many Americans respond by asking why Turkey is not included.
The question, of course, reflects America's shift from a focus on uniting Europe to the overriding quest to change the Middle East. Admitting Turkey, a Muslim country, to a core institution of the West like the European Union would, in the American view, provide an important example of bridge building to the Islamic world. It is therefore vital, American officials argue, that the union decide at the end of this year to begin negotiations on membership.
But the impatience over bringing Turkey into Europe also betrays enduring American misunderstanding over the nature of the European Union. The immense complexity and cost of offering membership to a country as big and poor as Turkey are not widely appreciated here.
The extent of integration within the union, and the surrender of sovereignty involved, are blurry ideas in America, perhaps because the notion of such transnational merging is anathema to a country at or close to the apogee of its power. If America, Mexico and Canada were as integrated as Europe's states, it would be possible to have a Mexican in Ottawa setting United States interest rates. But that, of course, is unthinkable.
This European indivisibility, despite all the continent's difficulties, makes it inevitable that new members like Poland will tend to seek shared European positions, whatever their strong American sympathies.
At the same time, these institutional differences complicate trans-Atlantic understanding because a sovereign America run by an administration for which power is the coin of the realm faces European states that have put their faith in international institutions like the European Union or the United Nations or an international criminal court.
But a lot is at stake in trying to overcome the current crisis of confidence. Between them, the European Union and the United States account for 40 percent of world trade. They are each other's largest trading partners. Business transactions between them run at close to $3 billion a day.
This web of economic interests is so rich that it tends to compel a quest to resolve differences and harmonize regulations. The problem is that, in the strategic area, the common purpose that long drove America's broad support of European unity - delivering stability to a continent with a debilitating penchant for war - has been lost.
It is not delight but some dismay that is accompanying the arrival of the Europe "whole and free" sought by the elder George Bush and reiterated as an objective by President Bush, who said in Warsaw in June 2001 that "our goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe for too long."
Europe has worked hard on eliminating those divisions. But Mr. Burghardt believes recognition of this is scant in an America whose attention has moved elsewhere."The E.U. delivered on Nov. 9, that is the fall of the Berlin Wall," he said. "But we got hit by the geopolitical earthquake of Sept. 11." In other words, 9/11 trumped 11/9.
In his Warsaw speech three months before Sept. 11, President Bush also said something else: "When Europe and America are divided, history tends to tragedy."
This is a little peach of a story. As I run around reporting on static between U.S. and European defense constractors, here's a nice piece in the New York Times and the BBC about NATO awarding a contract for 4 billion euros to a trans-Atlantic consortium, led by EADS and Northrup Grumman. Perhaps this will usher in a new dawn of joint procurement for the alliance, the Times reports.
Cooperation throughout Europe is something we've heard, European companies wanting in on juicy U.S. defense contracts, but is this really a new cooperation across the Atlantic?
There was another bidder, also a trans-Atlantic consortium.
New York Times - New Unity on Contracts Seen in NATO
BBC - EADS wins 'eye in sky' contract
April 16, 2004
New Unity on Contracts Seen in NATO
By KATRIN BENHOLD
ARIS, April 15 - With NATO member states just days away from awarding a military contract for 4 billion euros to a trans-Atlantic consortium of aerospace companies, a new era of joint procurement may be dawning for the alliance, defense experts said on Thursday.
A group of six companies, led by the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, known as EADS, and Northrop Grumman of the United States, looks set to win the contract, worth $4.8 billion, to build a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft for the alliance by 2010, said a NATO official close to the selection process.
Since procurement experts at NATO's Brussels headquarters put their support behind the EADS-Northrop consortium, officials in national capitals are expected to approve that decision "within days,'' the official said.
"It seems to be a genuine multinational procurement decision, and that is quite a significant step for cooperation in this area," said Steven Everts, a military expert at the Center for European Reform, a research group in London. "There is an acceleration of the desire to cooperate more closely within the E.U. and across the Atlantic.''
Against a backdrop of violence in Iraq and heightened concerns that terrorists may be aiming at Europe after the Madrid train bombings, pragmatism may be gaining the upper hand over the political procurement decisions of the past, analysts said. While some major European governments continue to disagree with the United States on a wide range of issues, including the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the willingness to deepen their cooperation within NATO may herald a renewed commitment to the alliance.
James Appathurai, a spokesman for NATO, called the decision "historic,'' confirming a report on Thursday in The Financial Times.
"This is only the second time in NATO's history that members join forces in procurement on this scale,'' he said. The first time, he said, was the Awacs surveillance system developed in the 1960's.
"The decision was reached pragmatically on the basis of price, capability and scheduling considerations - not necessarily three factors that have determined procurement decisions in the past,'' Mr. Appathurai said.
Governments have preferred to keep national control of procurement, both to determine the exact nature of a project and to award contracts to the titans of a country's military industry.
As a result, military capacities within the European Union, where most countries also belong to NATO, have often been duplicated.
The idea for a joint fleet of air-to-ground surveillance aircraft has been considered for about a decade at NATO, Mr. Appathurai said. Recent progress on the matter "reflects a realization on the part of NATO nations that our troops are out there in the field, and they need this type of cooperation,'' he said.
This evolving pragmatism is rooted at least in part in financial reality. With technology becoming more sophisticated and expensive, collective procurement makes financial sense, analysts said. In addition, recent sluggishness in the global economy has depleted national coffers, leaving less room for governments to bolster military budgets.
"Pooling is the way to go,'' Mr. Everts of the Center for European Reform said. "It's good news for taxpayers and also good news for political cooperation that common sense has won.''
The EADS-Northrop consortium includes Galileo Avionica of Italy, General Dynamics Canada, Indra of Spain, and Thales of France. In addition, more than 80 other companies from NATO countries support the joint proposal, which would provide a mixed fleet of manned A320 Airbus planes and unmanned Global Hawk planes.
According to Alexander Reinhardt, an EADS spokesman, the price for an A320 is about 50 million euros, or $59.8 million, though a modified version for intelligence purposes might vary in price. The Global Hawk aircraft that Northrop has been building for the United States Air Force costs about $30 million, James Stratford, a spokesman for the company, said.
A competing consortium, led by Raytheon of the United States and including Siemens of Germany and Marconi of Britain, has complained that NATO's procurement officials took too little time to examine the two proposals, which were submitted four months ago. Mr. Appathurai of NATO rejected the complaint.
BBC
EADS wins 'eye in sky' contract
A consortium led by European aerospace company EADS has won a contract to supply a multi-billion-dollar surveillance system to Nato.
The alliance said it aimed to sign a contract for the "eye in the sky" programme - which is expected to enter service in 2010 - by spring next year.
Under the deal, the group will supply Nato with a system that uses aircraft, unmanned drones and ground systems.
The deal is though to be worth up to four billion euros ($4.9bn, £2.7bn).
Nato said the new equipment "will be essential enabling capability for the Nato Response Force and will provide... an invaluable Eye in the Sky".
It added that the system would gather information about what was happening on the ground during peacetime, crisis or war.
EADS Airbus A321 planes will be among those provided as part of the surveillance system.
Good news
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics Canada, French defence firm Thales, Spain's Indra and Italy's Galileo Avionica were among the companies in the winning EADS-led consortium.
A spokesman for EADS - the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company - in Munich said: "We are pleased with this decision."
He declined to give financial details but said further information would be released next week.
US rival Raytheon had led another consortium bidding for the contract. That included Siemens and Alenia Marconi Systems - a joint venture between the UK's BAE Systems and Italy's Finmeccanica.
The contract is further good news for EADS - home of the Airbus passenger jets - which has recently pulled ahead of US rival Boeing for the first time in its 30-year history.
Last month, the firm revealed it had returned to the black in 2003, unveiling net profits of 152m euros ($188m; £102m) for the year, driven by a late surge in deliveries.
EADS, along with other aerospace companies, had suffered in the wake of the 11 September 2001 US terrorist attacks and was driven into the red in 2002.
Is Spain like a ship passing France and Germany in the night? As Zapatero follows through on his pledge to remove Spanish troops from Iraq, and others (okay, Honduras) pledge to do the same, Germany and France are heading toward rapproachement, according to this piece.
This story, although a little over a week old, focuses on Franco-German efforts to narrow the rift of trans-Atlantic relations.
Here we've talked about the push for more autonomy, for a greater presence in global security but as this writer points out, the rest of Europe is not ready for the "French-German drive for European pre-eminence."
Consider this Védrine comment on France and other countries intervening "if the Iraqis ask for it."
If there were a new French role in relation to Iraq, he said, it would not "simply be to help the Americans, but the Iraqis."
Iraq needs help, and that means the U.S. needs help, but when are the Iraqis going to ask for it?
Some French newspapers already see the need to step in, Vinokur points out:
Le Figaro, in an editorial, said that since the United States was not going to clear out of Iraq, "France would be well advised to abstain from diplomatically harassing its ally on the question of the handover of power, and to stop continuously referring everything to the United Nations."
http://www.iht.com/articles/514175.html
International Herald Tribune - News Analysis: Germany and France staying mum
News Analysis: Germany and France staying mum
John Vinocur/IHT IHT
Saturday, April 10, 2004
PARIS France and Germany have been strikingly discreet about America's new troubles in Iraq, reflecting what appears to be their judgment that the country's instability threatens any positive development in the Middle East over the long term.
"No one has any interest in an American fiasco," the former French foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, said Friday. That did not take in the schadenfreude of some French and German commentary, but it had the sound of an operative formula to describe a situation in which Washington's misery did not objectively equal Paris' or Berlin's gain.
In attempting to draw closer to the United States over the past months - the Germans actively, with American backing; the French in a less public mode - the two countries set courses for improving trans-Atlantic relations that would be destroyed by Iraq-related ironies or we-told-you-so's from ranking officials.
Besides, the French and Germans shared an absence of alternatives and an element of direct self-interest. With time, France and Germany's attempt to turn Europe against the United States in the run-up to the war has come to be regarded by strategists in both countries' capitals as a tactical mistake that resulted instead in a majority of the 25 European Union countries opposing the French-German drive for European pre-eminence.
In a Europe greatly weakened by its fractures over the war, and frightened now by terrorism on its soil, the error of trying to turn the Americans into the ultimate villains in Iraq while they are still the ultimate guarantors of European security was clearly not one the French and Germans would repeat.
In Germany, where a poll on Thursday found that 53 percent wanted the Americans to pull out of Iraq, the government had a rather different stance. Weeks ago, Defense Minister Peter Struck, in suggesting that a Spanish troop withdrawal would be unwise, said an American pullback would mean total instability.
Since January, while refusing to supply troops for Iraq, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government has given its approval to the grand lines of a Bush administration initiative for the Greater Middle East, signed a German-American Alliance for the 21st Century that stresses common goals in the region, and, through Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, defined "Jihadist terrorism" as "the new totalitarianism" that constitutes the greatest threat to global security.
In France, in a context of newspaper headlines swimming with quagmire-chaos-Vietnam references, there was palpable official caution, with President Jacques Chirac's office describing the French leader as being "very concerned" about the insurgency's intensification.
Védrine, who began France's systematic attacks on American "unilateralism" and "hyperpower" status while serving as Chirac's foreign minister, did not resist saying in a radio interview that the United States was paying for its errors, including what he called "ideological blindness."
At the same time, he also stated that he believed France and other countries could intervene "if the Iraqis ask for it." Indeed, a rapprochement between France and the United States was "underway," Védrine asserted.
If there were a new French role in relation to Iraq, he said, it would not "simply be to help the Americans, but the Iraqis."
In general, the French have suggested that a change in their posture could come through the vehicle of the United Nations and after a U.S. turnover of power to an Iraqi administration on June 30.
But Chirac's opportunities to maneuver were limited.
He is hemmed in by the reality that his surge in popularity at home during the 2003 Iraq debate has dissipated into his current grief-filled domestic political situation.
At the same time, he faces a series of encounters with President George W. Bush and other leaders at four major international meetings through the month of June - with sentiment in favor of righting the situation in Iraq unmistakably outweighing interest in doling out blame.
In a sense, Germany and France's options were also limited by the reality that it was no longer possible to justify countering American policy by the selective demonization of the Bush Administration.
Just as John Kerry had called on the new Socialist prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, to reconsider his pledge to bring Spanish forces home from Iraq, the Democratic candidate's reaction on Thursday to the worsening military situation hardly let Europe off the hook from its faulty presumption that no unified American view existed on Europe's ongoing share of Iraqi responsibilities.
"No European country," said Kerry, "is made safe by a failed Iraq, yet those countries are distinctly absent from the risk bearing."
Perhaps remarkably, some French commentators appeared to be taking the idea to heart that assisting the Americans, however passively, in Iraq is the best alternative to chaos in the Middle East.
Le Figaro, in an editorial, said that since the United States was not going to clear out of Iraq, "France would be well advised to abstain from diplomatically harassing its ally on the question of the handover of power, and to stop continuously referring everything to the United Nations."
Another newspaper, Le Journal du Dimanche, an exceptionally persistent critic of the United States, even wrote last week that Iraqis "would not understand if France uses Iraq to pursue its disagreements with the United States." Before the latest fighting, Le Monde's correspondent in Baghdad had gone further still in presenting a revisionist account of where France's excellent view of its own record stops in explaining how Iraq had gotten to where it was.
Without directly touching on it, the report presaged French discretion on America's grief of the moment.
It said: "Iraqis remain exceedingly critical of French policy. Contrary to what Europeans often think, the fact of having opposed the American occupation does absolutely nothing to boost the popularity of Europe or of a given country in Iraq."
"French policy over the past year is severely criticized," the correspondent continued. "It's impossible to find anyone, apart from a few out-of-work Baathist officials, who support the French position over the Iraq crisis."
International Herald Tribune
This is a couple of weeks old, but it came up as I searched on defense and security policy. It takes a longer view of transatlantic relations and postulates that the rift between the two continents, particularly focusing on Frano-American relations, is not long term. That is, of course, without taking into consideration who is in the White House.
But, Noelle Lenoir, the French minister for Europe Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues again what we have heard as the official line from the French government, and from what I've gathered talking to defense experts -- Europe and the United States must cooperate, that our aims overlap, and Europe must have autonomy with military planning and capacities.
Basically, it's the message that Europe is ready to step up militarily in the world, but it needs US cooperation while preparing to step out from America's shadow.
Taipei Times - West against the rest?
The West against the rest?
Europe and the US have reacted differently to the threat of terrorism in their midst, but that does not mean Europeans are anti-American
By Noelle Lenoir
Wednesday, Mar 24, 2004,Page 9
The Madrid bombings have made Europeans feel the scourge of terrorism in their bones. March 11 is now Europe's version of Sept. 11 in the US. Yet the US and Europe often do not seem to see the world through the same glasses: Spain's response to the terrorist attacks -- a threat common to all democracies -- was to vote in a government promising an end to pro-US policy on Iraq. Does this mean that Europe and the US have dramatically different visions?
Part of the seeming disconnect on foreign policy emerges from a misunderstanding about what "Europe" is about. The European project is a realist's response to globalization and its challenges. It was initiated to create "solidarites de fait," promote political stability, and consolidate democracy and Europe's social model. Having achieved these goals, Europe now wants to make a positive contribution to world developments.
This is not nostalgia for past glory. An unprecedented degree of solidarity now exists across Europe, as was apparent in the collective mourning and outpouring of sympathy toward Spain; we must build on that huge potential to create a logic of solidarity in the world.
The US, also victim of a horrendous attack, feels drawn to the world, but not to promote a similar model of cooperation. Rather, in defending their values and security, Americans strive to defend the world, especially the Western world, from dark new threats. The messianic idealism that liberated Europe from Nazism and protected Western Europe from communism is now directed at other enemies.
With all the attention devoted to strained transatlantic relations, it is easy to overlook how often our preoccupations overlap. On issues such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan (where we jointly train the country's future army), and Africa (where French initiatives with US support recently succeeded in stabilizing the Ivory Coast and Congo), Europe and the US speak with a common voice. But on some issues, such as the Iraq war, Europeans are not all ready to follow the US blindly.
The world -- Europe in particular -- has fascination and admiration for the US. But today we must move away from fascination and gratitude and realize that the pursuit of European integration remains in the best interest of the US, which has supported it for 50 years. In today's world, there is clearly work for two to bring about stability and security, and in promoting common values.
In particular, the Franco-German "engine" of Europe should not be seen as a potential rival to the US. France and Germany are not an axis aspiring to be some sort of an alternative leadership to the US. Rather, the two countries form a laboratory needed for the internal working of the EU. Anyone who thinks we are building a European rival to the US has not looked properly at the facts.
Indeed, France and Germany do not get along naturally. Much sets us apart: EU enlargement, agriculture and domestic market issues. So it is not the sum of the two that matters, but the deal between the two, which should be viewed as a prototype of the emerging Europe. It is in that process, mostly inward looking, that France and Germany claim to make Europe advance.
So I do not believe that a lasting rift looms. Most Americans still see in Europe a partner with largely the same aims in the world. Most Europeans see in the US a strong friend. We are all allies of the US; our draft constitution restates the importance of the NATO link; our strategy for growth and our contribution to global stability depend on the irreplaceable nature of our relationship with the US.
This is why the US should encourage the development of a common European security and defense policy, which is merely the burden-sharing that the US has been pressing on Europe for decades. We must forge greater European military capacities simply to put in place a mechanism that allows us to stand effectively shoulder to shoulder when terrorism or other catastrophes strike one of our democracies, as just happened.
But we must also establish an autonomous European military planning capacity, because the EU might need to lead its own operations, perhaps because NATO is unwilling to. We French are opposed to building a "two-speed" Europe. But we want structured co-operation -- meaning that some European states may press ahead in defense capacity -- because we are not prepared to let the more cautious and hesitant dictate a recurrence of the Balkan tragedy of the 1990s, when Europeans couldn't act and the US wouldn't (for a while). The creation of such a capacity will make the EU a more effective transatlantic partner.
So it is hard for Europeans to understand why plans for closer European integration should be seen as anti-American. The only way to arrest such fears is through closer and more frequent dialogue. On defense and security matters, the EU's security doctrine provides a great opportunity to build on our common worries: terrorism and non-proliferation, but also the need to ensure sustainable development in all quarters of the world.
Europe and the US must pursue their aims in cooperation, while ensuring that such cooperation never becomes an alliance of the "West against the Rest." Some in the West have tried to conjure a "Clash of Civilizations" out of our troubled times. Our task is to find a way to stand together without standing against anybody in particular.
Noelle Lenoir is France's minister for Europe and a former member of the Constitutional Court, France's highest court, and has taught law at Yale University and the University of London.
This is a couple of weeks old, but it came up as I searched on defense and security policy. It takes a longer view of transatlantic relations and postulates that the rift between the two continents, particularly focusing on Frano-American relations, is not long term. That is, of course, without taking into consideration who is in the White House.
But, Noelle Lenoir, the French minister for Europe Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues again what we have heard as the official line from the French government, and from what I've gathered talking to defense experts -- Europe and the United States must cooperate, that our aims overlap, and Europe must have autonomy with military planning and capacities.
Basically, it's the message that Europe is ready to step up militarily in the world, but it needs US cooperation while preparing to step out from America's shadow.
Taipei Times - West against the rest?
The West against the rest?
Europe and the US have reacted differently to the threat of terrorism in their midst, but that does not mean Europeans are anti-American
By Noelle Lenoir
Wednesday, Mar 24, 2004,Page 9
The Madrid bombings have made Europeans feel the scourge of terrorism in their bones. March 11 is now Europe's version of Sept. 11 in the US. Yet the US and Europe often do not seem to see the world through the same glasses: Spain's response to the terrorist attacks -- a threat common to all democracies -- was to vote in a government promising an end to pro-US policy on Iraq. Does this mean that Europe and the US have dramatically different visions?
Part of the seeming disconnect on foreign policy emerges from a misunderstanding about what "Europe" is about. The European project is a realist's response to globalization and its challenges. It was initiated to create "solidarites de fait," promote political stability, and consolidate democracy and Europe's social model. Having achieved these goals, Europe now wants to make a positive contribution to world developments.
This is not nostalgia for past glory. An unprecedented degree of solidarity now exists across Europe, as was apparent in the collective mourning and outpouring of sympathy toward Spain; we must build on that huge potential to create a logic of solidarity in the world.
The US, also victim of a horrendous attack, feels drawn to the world, but not to promote a similar model of cooperation. Rather, in defending their values and security, Americans strive to defend the world, especially the Western world, from dark new threats. The messianic idealism that liberated Europe from Nazism and protected Western Europe from communism is now directed at other enemies.
With all the attention devoted to strained transatlantic relations, it is easy to overlook how often our preoccupations overlap. On issues such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan (where we jointly train the country's future army), and Africa (where French initiatives with US support recently succeeded in stabilizing the Ivory Coast and Congo), Europe and the US speak with a common voice. But on some issues, such as the Iraq war, Europeans are not all ready to follow the US blindly.
The world -- Europe in particular -- has fascination and admiration for the US. But today we must move away from fascination and gratitude and realize that the pursuit of European integration remains in the best interest of the US, which has supported it for 50 years. In today's world, there is clearly work for two to bring about stability and security, and in promoting common values.
In particular, the Franco-German "engine" of Europe should not be seen as a potential rival to the US. France and Germany are not an axis aspiring to be some sort of an alternative leadership to the US. Rather, the two countries form a laboratory needed for the internal working of the EU. Anyone who thinks we are building a European rival to the US has not looked properly at the facts.
Indeed, France and Germany do not get along naturally. Much sets us apart: EU enlargement, agriculture and domestic market issues. So it is not the sum of the two that matters, but the deal between the two, which should be viewed as a prototype of the emerging Europe. It is in that process, mostly inward looking, that France and Germany claim to make Europe advance.
So I do not believe that a lasting rift looms. Most Americans still see in Europe a partner with largely the same aims in the world. Most Europeans see in the US a strong friend. We are all allies of the US; our draft constitution restates the importance of the NATO link; our strategy for growth and our contribution to global stability depend on the irreplaceable nature of our relationship with the US.
This is why the US should encourage the development of a common European security and defense policy, which is merely the burden-sharing that the US has been pressing on Europe for decades. We must forge greater European military capacities simply to put in place a mechanism that allows us to stand effectively shoulder to shoulder when terrorism or other catastrophes strike one of our democracies, as just happened.
But we must also establish an autonomous European military planning capacity, because the EU might need to lead its own operations, perhaps because NATO is unwilling to. We French are opposed to building a "two-speed" Europe. But we want structured co-operation -- meaning that some European states may press ahead in defense capacity -- because we are not prepared to let the more cautious and hesitant dictate a recurrence of the Balkan tragedy of the 1990s, when Europeans couldn't act and the US wouldn't (for a while). The creation of such a capacity will make the EU a more effective transatlantic partner.
So it is hard for Europeans to understand why plans for closer European integration should be seen as anti-American. The only way to arrest such fears is through closer and more frequent dialogue. On defense and security matters, the EU's security doctrine provides a great opportunity to build on our common worries: terrorism and non-proliferation, but also the need to ensure sustainable development in all quarters of the world.
Europe and the US must pursue their aims in cooperation, while ensuring that such cooperation never becomes an alliance of the "West against the Rest." Some in the West have tried to conjure a "Clash of Civilizations" out of our troubled times. Our task is to find a way to stand together without standing against anybody in particular.
Noelle Lenoir is France's minister for Europe and a former member of the Constitutional Court, France's highest court, and has taught law at Yale University and the University of London.
Last week Robert E. Hunter, who was the U.S. ambassador to NATO under Clinton, answered questions regarding the expansion of NATO to 26 countries with the addition of seven new members. He responded to a question from Post editors whether an ESDP would leave NATO irrelevant. His response was basically "Yeah, right."
Europe doesn't have the capabilities - yet - he argued to go it alone in security matters. His argument is that Europe still needs the United States and NATO in Europe and will for many years to come. Eventually, however, the US might be able to "go home" and let Europe deal with itself. For now, an ESDP would be a complement to NATO.
This is a slightly different picture than officials we spoke with portrayed. While I think they'd all agree that NATO will continue to be the dominant player for some time, an ESDP wouldn't necessarily be a complementary entity. The view is that NATO is just another option in the great big European toolbox of defense. Hunter argues that Europe still doesn't have the tools.
Washington Post.com - NATO conversation with Amb. Robert E. Hunter
washingtonpost.com
World: NATO
Amb. Robert E. Hunter
NATO Ambassador Under President Clinton
Monday, March 29, 2004; 4:00 PM
The prime ministers of seven new NATO member nations are being welcomed to the White House by President Bush today. The leaders of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, expand the alliance to 26 countries.
Robert E. Hunter, NATO ambassador under President Clinton and Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, will be online to discuss the expansion of NATO and today's White House ceremony.
Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: This afternoon, President Bush welcomed 7 new countries to NATO -- bringing the total to 26. That is 10 new countries from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the last five years. Clearly, NATO will be different; but just how different is the critical question. Much is already known -- for instance, that all members have the same rights and responsibilities, that all will join the integrated command structure, Allied Command Operations, that all will be covered by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all allies to come to the defense of any any that is attacked, and that all must now also look beyond Europe -- "out of area" in NATO jargon -- to new challenges as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq. As before, US engagement and leadership are critical; as before, the US needs to sustain its involvement on a bipartisan basis.
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Lyme, Conn.: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes -- as of today, it has 26 members, only 5 years ago it had only 16 -- the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members -- in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about it should do -- and not do -- against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular counse of action is important; and for their to be effective leadership -- and particularly American leadership. This leadership -- and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security -- remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so -- in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.
At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end. But one thing is clear: one of the key elements of NATO is its consensus rule, which stimulates all the allies to take critical matters seriously, and to work together to preserve the alliance for all the tasks ahead.
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washingtonpost.com: Would a coordinated EU foreign and defense policy replace NATO for many European nations and thus render the alliance irrelevant?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Wouldn't it be wonderful if the EU had a foreign and security policy that would lead Europeans to take full responsibility for European security, and let the US just go home?! But that is not likely to happen, at least not for many years. The Europeans are not yet so organized that they can "do security" by themselves, and they do not have the tools needed, as are found in the NATO integrated command structure and more than half a century of working together, a precious asset that is not easily duplicated. But the EU is beginning to do more -- in Macedonia, for instance, and later this year to take over full responsibility for security from NATO in Bosnia.
America is still needed in Europe -- and that means NATO is still needed -- in terms of the great historic imponderables, including insurance that the 20th century, the worst century ever for war and human suffering, is well and truly in the past; and working to ensure that the future of Russia will not again lead to a fundamental rupture in arrangements for European security. In addition, the European Union does not have the capacity -- and is unlikely anytime soon to gain the capacity -- to act beyond Europe, as NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is likely to do in Iraq. Thus the European Security and Defense Policy (an adjunct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) can be a useful complement to NATO, but the EU will not replace NATO, and certainly not US power and engagement, at least for many years to come.
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washingtonpost.com: Will Russia ever join NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Russia in NATO? In theory, yes. Indeed, officially, NATO membership is open to any member of the OSCE that is "ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership." But for Russia to join would require major changes in that country, including assurance that democracy is well rooted; and it would require Russia to meet all the other aspects of NATO membership, measured also in terms of its relations with other countries.
More important, would the rest of the alliance be prepared to extend to Russia guarantees of all its borders against external armed attack -- for example, some day against China? If the Western nations were so disposed, it is very likely that they would work out this business with Russia by other means; and, indeed, they would want to do all that is possible so that this eventuality did not come to pass.
At heart, if the security situation in Eurasia reached the point where Russia could be considered for membership in NATO to be a serious proposition, things would probably be so positive that NATO would not any longer be needed!
Because of all of these argument, Russia has not suggested joining NATO, and no one in the West has proposed it. Instead, there is now a NATO-Russia Council, which seeks to treat Russia like an equal, to bring it into NATO deliberations when its interests are truly engaged, to build cooperation, including in areas like peacekeeping and -- in time -- security for the Middle East, and to extend security truly in a "Europe whole and free." But Russia does not have to be in NATO to be part of NATO -- and the test will be how all these countries work together to build security across Eurasia.
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Cumberland, Md.: While it is nice to have new members in NATO -- it is doubtful if they can carry their weight militarily or even spend the money on defense that is required to upgrade their out-of-date equipement. I question the value of accepting new members in NATO who are militarily underpowered. Your comments please?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: When we set out to take in new NATO members a decade ago, I invented a slogan to put this point: a country to join NATO would have to be a "produce and not just a consumer of security." Now, that does not mean being able to mount a defense like that of the Cold War. None of these new countries, or any of the "old" NATO allies (with the possible exception of Turkey, on the Iraqi border) faces an external military threat. What we need from the new countries is that they democratize their military forces, that they adopt NATO standards in equipment and practice, that they take part in Allied Command Operations (however little), that they be able to coordinate their activities, their equipment, and their training with NATO -- and that the continue efforts to deepen democracy and market economies, and continue their renunciation of claims against neighbors. At the same time, there is an interest in having these countries make some contribution to the newer tasks, including doing what they can to counter terrorism (and that can including police work, intelligence, and border control within their own countries) and to join, in however limited a way, in common decisions NATO takes to be engaged in places like Afghnistan and Iraq. This is part of a total security concept: and the amount of money spent on military forces is not the key point -- indeed, NATO does not want Central European countries to spend so much money that they may retard the development of their economies.
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Little Rock, Ark.: Will or should NATO ever get increasingly involved in the Iraqi conflict like it has in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: I predict that, within a year, NATO will have taken over responsibility for much if not all external military engagement in Iraq, under a UN mandate. This is a logical extension of what NATO has already done successfully in the Balkans (neither Bosnia or Kosovo is yet successful politically and economically but, except for the recent violence in Kosovo, neither has experienced the conflict of the pre-NATO period), and is beginning to do in Afghanistan. The US is reaching the point of acknowledging that we would like help in Iraq -- in military deployments, in reconstruction, in development of post-Saddam politics -- and that many of the allied countries have capabilities that can be of significan benefit. What is required is that we be willing to share influence and decision-making as well as responsibility and burdens: something that may seem obvious, but which official Washington has not yet been prepared to do.
At heart, whether or not we should have gone to war in Iraq, it is over. The old security system has been shattered. Both we and the Europeans have a vital interest -- vital self-interests -- in putting something viable in its place. And how better to do that, from the point of view of all concerned, than through NATO?
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washingtonpost.com: How has perceived unilateralism affected the United States' leadership role in NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: NATO is now slowly emerging from the worst crisis in its history, occasioned in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so, and certainly without being able to bring along the NATO allies as a whole. Even if the US could be argued to have had no choice, the way we went about it gratuitously weakened our reputation for probity, cooperation, consultation, and sound judgement. But the Alliance is, in the end, about what countries either do or do not do together in their common interests -- and common values -- for the future. And if wiser heads prevail, on both sides of the Atlantic -- and there is evidence this is beginning to happen -- then the Western alliance can regain must of its former strength. And the US can gain much of its former leadership: but that must be on the basis of looking to others for counsel rather than obedience; seeking to build cooperation and common understanding rather than an assertion of "our way or the highway." The latter method has been tried and found wanting. We know now that we have to have allies and partners to shape the world to our (and their) liking; and if we act on that insight, we can regain the highground that was so woefully lost last year. In sum, the US disposes of great incipient power, unrivalled, perhaps, in history; but to change that incipient power into lasting influence, we must create institutions, attitudes, practices, and policies that work for us....because they also work for others.
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Washington, D.C.: If there is no threat to these new members, why is NATO installing air defense over the Baltics, thus to treat Russia as the enemy? While Putin has much more important things to do, like growing the Russian economy, and the level-headed Russians I talk to don't get too excited over the Baltics (though they think this "Article 5 protection" emboldens the Baltics on the language question), it merely encourages the unreformed Russian military to keep trumpeting the threat from the West and the need to keep their old formations. So is this air defense gesture really necessary?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: You put your finger on a key problem. On the one hand, countries have to be able to do at least a minium to guarantee the sanctity of their borders and their air space. As NATO members, there at least needs to be some means for what is called "air policing" -- hence, the four F-16s (and some limited other equipments) that will be deployed in Lithuania: these are no threat to Russia, and cannot be so represented. Indeed, nothing that has been done in any of the new allied states, or that anyone contemplates doing, can pose such a treat or honestly be represented as doing so. But on the other hand, it is also important that, with the expansion of NATO, Russia not be pushed away or even have a sense is it being pushed away. That is one reason Lithuania has worked out arrangements with Russia (and Belarus) for the movement of people to/from Kaliningrad, a part of Russia now separated from it by NATO territory. That is why NATO is pressing Latvia to treat is major Russian minority with dignity. It is why NATO and Russia have created the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, in which Russia is equal with the now 26 NATO allies. And it is why NATO has sought to engage Russia in peacekeeping (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), and has a raft of common activities (see the NATO website for a list). But this must all be done deftly; there has since NATO began its venture of playing a lead role in crafting a "Europe whole and free," it has had to be sure that it advaces the legitimate security interests both of Central European states and of Russia; and it must continue to do this. (This is particular true with regard to any bases and permenent deployments in former Warsaw Pact territory: in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO included a unilateral statement that imposed a number of limitations on what it would do in this regard. It is not violating the letter of these pledges; but it must be careful, as well, to honor the spirit).
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Kansas City, Mo.: For some time, I have heard a Russian point-of-view that the US made commitments at the end of the Cold War to limit NATO enlargement. Michael Mandelbaum has referred to such commitments in his opposition to NATO expansion. I've heard other policymakers and scholars say that no such commitments were made, and that NATO is free to enlarge. Apparently the US would also be free to restructure its military deployments, away from Germany and to "New Europe."
What's the right story here?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: No such commitments were made. When I was US ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, we researched the case thoroughly, to be sure that we were honoring all pledges made. At the same time, NATO enlargement has not taken place in a vacuum, as though Russia has no importance. Quite the contrary: it is engaged in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO peacekeeping (at one point in both Bosnia and Kosovo), in exercises, and even now moving in the direction of "interoperability" with NATO equipment.
The US redeployments easterward are ostensibly to have different kinds of bases -- some just for runways and storage of supplies -- that would make deployments farther east, for instance to Middle East crisis regions, easier. This is still being debated. And it needs to be undertaken with several points in mind: military efficiency and cost are only one factor. We also have to reassure the Germans and others in West Europe that we are not shifting our focus decisively away from Europe; and we have to assure the Russians that we are not taking advantage of their weakness. In fact, nothing the US is thinking of doing could pose a threat to Russia, but it is critical that whatever is done be done in full "transparence" -- indeed in consultations -- with Russia, which does, indeed, share many of the US and allied objectives with regard to countering terrorism and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
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Alexandria, Va.: Are there other countries that wish to join NATO? Now that the Cold War is behind us what is the rational for joining the group?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Secretary countries in the Balkans want to join NATO -- Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania -- and all may do so. Their reasoning is the same as that of the countries that have already joined: to "bring history to an end," in the sense of being the playthings of the Great Powers; to have an association with the EU (with tends to follow) and with the US; to have an added incentive domestically to put down deep democrtic roots; and to gain -- they believe -- the benefits in terms of foreign investment and confidence that can come with NATO membership. In addition, Ukraine has expressed an interest in joining NATO -- in its case to become mroe certain of its relationship with Russia, as well as to gain economic benefits. Georgia has said it will apply for membership and Azerbaijan is moving in that direction. But beyond the Balkans and perhasp Ukraine (leading aside, for some time, Belarua and Moldova), one has to ask just how big NATO can become and still retain a sense of common purpose, and also a willingness of each of its members to give security guarantees -- and NATO's security guarantees must always be real -- to farflung states. The Caucasus is a long way away from NATO-Europe, strategically and politically; most allies would be reluctant to take on the burdens of potentially having to defense Georgia; and they would not want to do so regarding Azerbaijan while it is still at war with Armenia: and yet, these are precisely reasons these two countries are interested in NATO -- and Azerbaijan also speaks both of Russia and Iran in terms of its concerns, something that most if not all the European NATO allies shy away from getting involved in. So -- NATO is a successful venture; but it must not be seen as the be-all and end-all for everyone. The farther from Europe, the more there needs to be creativity about something else -- e.g., a new security system, crafted on 21st century lines, for at least major parts of what is being called the "Greater Middle East."
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Warsaw, Poland: What role will NATO play in the war against terrorism?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Counter-terrorism is most about non-military activities -- as Secretary of Defense and others have said. It is about intelligence, policy work, border control, etc., etc. -- most of which are activities carried out by other institutions and relationships, both singly and in groups. There is also the task of trying to "dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim," which, if anything, is the task of institutions like the European Union (in a new strategic partnership with the US). Militarily, there is work to do, of course, and most of that is in the realm of either special forces or of the kind of "reconstruction" and "stabilization" work that is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq (which becamse a terrorism problem only after the war). This is not about high intensity warfare, except in rare circumstances (such as the anti-Taliban period after 9/11).
Thus NATO has already assumed command of ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, and it is developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Indeed, if NATO gets more deeply engaged in Afghanisan to do what is needed so that it will cease being a base for the export of terrorism (if "cease" can be achieved, which is a daunting task), then this could become the most ambitous task the Alliance has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is likely to take over major responsibilities in Iraq, which have their own counter-terrorism aspects.
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Cumberland, Md.: NATO is more and more becoming relatively useless as a military alliance for the U.S.
Too many members, including France and Germany, are unwilling to spend the money for up-to-date military hardware. These countries cannot keep up with the US on the battlefield -- Should we not compel them to assume peacekeeping duties and take over from the U.S. in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: We have to be careful about reading too much into what we read in the newspapers, especially at a time when there has been so much bad blood across the Atlantic.
As we look down the road, it is not clear that there is a signficant range of possibilities where the "big batallions" will be needed, at least in terms of Allied engagement militarily. What is needed, clearly, is special forces, in particular for counter-terrorism; the kinds of stabilization forces that are now going into Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ability of allied forces to be able to fight together -- which means truly compatible C4ISR -- an abbreviation for command, control, communications, computors, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It will also mean a sharing of high technology so that allies can field these equipments that can work together (here, the US has been especially laggard in easing restrictions in the flow of high technology -- we can't have it both ways!).
This does mean more capabilities by many of the Europeans; but less in terms of major power projection at the high end of combat than in the ability to get appropriate forces to a theater, quickly (air and sea lift) and to keep them there for a period of time (logisitics and support). The EU has been creating a Rapid Reaction Force, one of whose virtues is that it simulates some of the governments to spend money on defense, in order to promote European unity, that they might not otherwise spend. And NATO is developing a NATO Response Force, which will be able to deploy forces in as little as 5 days and keep them deployed for a signficant period of time.
Note also that one country we have been criticizing -- France -- has been engaged in NATO's major activities: it has more resources committed to the NATO Response Force than any other European ally; it is sending more officers to Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation; and it has about 250 special forces fighting in Afganistan, under US command! And before NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan, the Germans (and the Dutch) had the command.
Yes, the allies can do more -- and will also be doing more in Macedonia (an EU operation) and later this year in Bosnia (taking over from NATO). And most if not all will be willing to engage with the US, Britain, etc., in Iraq, as a NATO operation, if we are prepared to have an appropriate UN resolution (which would also lead Spain to keep its troops there, as the new prime minister has made clear) -- which means our being prepared to share some of the decision-making and influence as well as the responsibility and the burdens (understanding, of course, that we would still be the "800-pound gorilla" in terms of influence.)
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Tallahassee, Fla.: ".....in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so..."
I must say I am a bit shocked by your comment here. Especially since the 911 commission has been grilling everyone on the cost of inaction against the Taliban. Why do you think these new member countries, that lived under supression for so long, joined the coalition and supported the war in Iraq? Or would you, like Senator Kerry, just say they were bribed or coerced?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: "Cost of inaction against the Taliban." Yes. But it is not clear that a war in Iraq helped against the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or terrorism, or what was done to us on 9/11.
Be that as it may, we are in Iraq, and the Middle East, for the next generation. No matter who is president will have to face that fact. And the Europeans, too. This is our engagement for as far ahead as we can see. But we must not in the process lose sight of what we as Americans are most concerned about: terrorism here, against our people, and potentially being visited here, again. That is the priority, and going into Iraq did little to advance that cause.
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Virginia: What must a country do to be offered NATO membership?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Be a democracy with firm roots. Be committed to a market economy (success upfront not required: that can be aided by belonging to NATO). Renunciation of any claims against neighbors (note the achievement of Hungary and Romania). Reform (including democratization) of the military. Adaptation to NATO methods and standards. And geographic relevance (i.e., not so far distant that existing allies will be reluctant to provide the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
It is a tribute to NATO's past, its future, and the role of American leadership and engagement that so many countries want to join this alliance -- of both interests and values.
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Falls Church, Va.: Is there a list of countries that have especially close ties with NATO, so that they can be more easily included in intra-NATO agreements and exercises? Are NATO standards pushed to non-NATO countries (for example, Australia or Sweden)?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Sweden (and Finland) yes -- indeed, they could join anytime they wanted to, as meeting every conceivable criterion (including being "producers and not just consumers of security.") Australia (etc.), no: can one see that it would give a commitment to fight for countries in Europe? (It did do so in WWI and WWII, along with New Zealand, but more was involved than geopolitics).
For NATO to have relevance, in terms of members being willing freely to make the commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to mutual self-defense, there has to be a solid basis for doing so and meaning it. Geography is at least one element of that. Some other form of engagement that includes Australia (etc)? Fine, and a number exist.....
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: In sum: what we are seeing, today, in taking in 7 more countries to NATO, is a further step in fulfilling the potential -- and the promise -- of a "Europe whole and free" -- the first time in all of European history when there has been a chance of creating a security system from which all countries in "Europe" (and that includes the US and Canada) can benefit and which will penalize none. NATO is many elements, and all are critical. As devised in the 1990s -- and I was honored to have the chance to play a role -- NATO crafted a coherent strategy, consisting of several parts:
o the US as a permanent "European power"
o preservation of the integrated military command structure;
o continued support for the "European Civil Space" and the end of the "German problem"
o enlargement to Central Europe
o Partnership for Peace, to get countries ready for membership and provide security and involvement for those who do not join
o Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
o NATO-Russia Council
o NATO-Ukraine Commission
o NATO-ESDP relationship (European Union)
o new command structures
o Bosnia-Kosovo-Afghanistan-Iraq.
"something for everyone." But requiring robust common action, no "something for nothing." And firmly dependent on US leadership, commitment, and wisdom.
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© 2004 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive
Of course, many of the people we spoke to in Europe want Bush out of the White House. I heard no support for the Bush White House in Europe except for the wife of a U.S. State Department bureaucrat living in Brussels.
But, that doesn't mean that trans-Atlantic relations will be any better, according to this article. Kerry might not be so blunt, he may be able to discuss nuances of European politics in French, but, as this article points out, the US and Europe will likely continue to approach the world's problems differently.
The comments from Sen. Joe Biden amplify this. He doesn't believe the Europeans are willing to do what it takes (i.e. spend the money) to create a ESDP and the prospect of an EU army is risible, to him. (He needs to listen to Sarah's report.)
International Herald Tribune - Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
Politicus: Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
John Vinocur IHT
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
WASHINGTON At one end of a marble hall in the U.S. House of Representatives' Sam Rayburn office building, George W. Bush's re-election aspirations were taking a jostling. Testimony before the Sept. 11 commission contended that the self-described war president had not paid attention early or fully enough to warnings about Al Qaeda's murderous capabilities.
About 100 strides down the hall, at the same time last week, some of Europe's grandest illusions about what a new Democratic administration might mean to the European Union were also being jarred, minus the din and camera lights next door. Congress's leading Democratic voices on foreign policy, with a trace of the disdain that so rankles Europeans, suggested that their critical view of the European Union's weaknesses was intact, and that in puckering up for a November embrace Europe might have to settle for a formalistic kiss.
This may come as a surprise in Europe, where wide segments of opinion, official and public, confidential or boisterous, want Bush beaten. Many influential Europeans seem to believe that Senator John Kerry in a Democratic White House would restore both respectful equanimity to the American side of the trans-Atlantic relationship and, perhaps more naïvely, aim to redefine U.S. interests in a way that did not seem so self-interestedly American.
Pushed to the extreme, this might be called the European School for Reforming America. In this notion, a needy United States seeks out European counsel, converts to multilateralism and submits get-tough inclinations to the United Nations for the veto-ready muster of China, Russia and France. In the Rayburn Building's Gold Room, such tones were unmistakably absent from the remarks of Senator Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and of Representative Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. At a seminar sponsored by the University of Michigan, Biden and Lantos were joined by Henry Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House committee, and Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under Bill Clinton, to talk about the European Union and the United States before a group that included the German and French ambassadors in Washington.
In looking eternally inward, Biden said, the European Union's leading members had for the most part had taken their eye off the ball about the rest of the world. Europeans misguidedly tended to regard the United States as an imperial power, he added. And their leaders offered no really constructive alternatives to the Iraq war.
Recalling that he had talked to six European government chiefs about the war, Biden caricatured how they would have done things better. "Blah blah blah, international cooperation," the senator mimicked. He added, in his own voice, "Give me a break, huh."
When Biden offered the possibility, beyond more civility, of a future in contrast to the Bush administration, it was in a plague-on-your-houses context. He said of the two, Europe and Bush, "You have fallen in love with international institutions to the extent that this administration has fallen in love with unilateral action."
For good measure, Biden threw in the view that the European Union will not have a unified foreign policy, and with it, the phrase, "I hope you do, I wish you well, but I see no evidence you're going to spend the money needed" to create a serious European military force either.
Biden left the prospect of a trans-Atlantic emotional healing to Lantos, who was born in Europe. He saw none at hand. There was no hatred in America for Europe, he said, just "disenchantment and disillusion." The new American college generation "couldn't care less" about Europe.
Indeed, for Lantos, the European-American bond was now "a cold-blooded, cynical relationship." Perhaps a bit ironically, he then explained the situation as a basis for optimism in that it perhaps made for more rationality on both sides.
All this, word for word, might not be Kerry's party's message in the strictest sense. Yet it came from the mouths of two influential Democrats who did not get to their leading roles in forming congressional opinion on foreign affairs by nonconsensual posturing or freaky one-man crusades. Indeed, Kerry would very much need their support if he wanted to reverse the Bush administration and participate in the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol on the environment - symbolic issues for Europe that European ambassadors here do not expect to rank high among the candidate's priorities if elected. In fact, since getting cornered with a remark that many foreign leaders wanted him to win (and for reasons of discretion, not being able to identify them when pressed by the Bush campaign), Kerry has had effectively to disavow two such endorsements with an advisory that he would neither seek nor accept support from overseas.
Part of this was a no-brainer in the American political context: A statement of backing for Kerry from former Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia prompted Rand Beers, Kerry's foreign policy adviser, to describe the ex-leader as "an avowed anti-Semite whose views are totally deplorable."
The other pledge of support required much more subtlety, bearing as it did the mark of those in Europe who would cast Kerry as an American flagellant, ready for a virtual apology to all for America's size, strength, and national instincts. Before he was elected prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero said he was "aligning" himself with the Democrat. After Zapatero's victory and his statement that Spain would pull its troops out of Iraq if UN authorization was not forthcoming, Kerry was caught in the position of having to deal with a self-appointed European ally apparently clueless about American politics. Kerry urged Zapatero to reconsider on Iraq and said he should "send a message that terrorists cannot win by their acts of terror."
Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, who served as foreign policy adviser to the Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic nomination, verbally shrugged. If Kerry wins, he said, there may be a new effort at better understanding, but "there's going to be real disappointment in Europe, in terms of their expectations, about everything being hunky-dory again. I don't think many Europeans understand U.S. politics."
Biden suggested at least one did. He told his audience of visiting an unnamed European leader whose government opposed the war in Iraq. Do you think it's more important to have the situation in Iraq righted than to see Bush defeated, the senator asked the European.
The leader cleared his throat, hemmed and hawed, began three different sentences, and, according to Biden, finally gave an answer. "Yes," he said.
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune
Of course, many of the people we spoke to in Europe want Bush out of the White House. I heard no support for the Bush White House in Europe except for the wife of a U.S. State Department bureaucrat living in Brussels.
But, that doesn't mean that trans-Atlantic relations will be any better, according to this article. Kerry might not be so blunt, he may be able to discuss nuances of European politics in French, but, as this article points out, the US and Europe will likely continue to approach the world's problems differently.
The comments from Sen. Joe Biden amplify this. He doesn't believe the Europeans are willing to do what it takes (i.e. spend the money) to create a ESDP and the prospect of an EU army is risible, to him. (He needs to listen to Sarah's report.)
International Herald Tribune - Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
Politicus: Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
John Vinocur IHT
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
WASHINGTON At one end of a marble hall in the U.S. House of Representatives' Sam Rayburn office building, George W. Bush's re-election aspirations were taking a jostling. Testimony before the Sept. 11 commission contended that the self-described war president had not paid attention early or fully enough to warnings about Al Qaeda's murderous capabilities.
About 100 strides down the hall, at the same time last week, some of Europe's grandest illusions about what a new Democratic administration might mean to the European Union were also being jarred, minus the din and camera lights next door. Congress's leading Democratic voices on foreign policy, with a trace of the disdain that so rankles Europeans, suggested that their critical view of the European Union's weaknesses was intact, and that in puckering up for a November embrace Europe might have to settle for a formalistic kiss.
This may come as a surprise in Europe, where wide segments of opinion, official and public, confidential or boisterous, want Bush beaten. Many influential Europeans seem to believe that Senator John Kerry in a Democratic White House would restore both respectful equanimity to the American side of the trans-Atlantic relationship and, perhaps more naïvely, aim to redefine U.S. interests in a way that did not seem so self-interestedly American.
Pushed to the extreme, this might be called the European School for Reforming America. In this notion, a needy United States seeks out European counsel, converts to multilateralism and submits get-tough inclinations to the United Nations for the veto-ready muster of China, Russia and France. In the Rayburn Building's Gold Room, such tones were unmistakably absent from the remarks of Senator Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and of Representative Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. At a seminar sponsored by the University of Michigan, Biden and Lantos were joined by Henry Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House committee, and Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under Bill Clinton, to talk about the European Union and the United States before a group that included the German and French ambassadors in Washington.
In looking eternally inward, Biden said, the European Union's leading members had for the most part had taken their eye off the ball about the rest of the world. Europeans misguidedly tended to regard the United States as an imperial power, he added. And their leaders offered no really constructive alternatives to the Iraq war.
Recalling that he had talked to six European government chiefs about the war, Biden caricatured how they would have done things better. "Blah blah blah, international cooperation," the senator mimicked. He added, in his own voice, "Give me a break, huh."
When Biden offered the possibility, beyond more civility, of a future in contrast to the Bush administration, it was in a plague-on-your-houses context. He said of the two, Europe and Bush, "You have fallen in love with international institutions to the extent that this administration has fallen in love with unilateral action."
For good measure, Biden threw in the view that the European Union will not have a unified foreign policy, and with it, the phrase, "I hope you do, I wish you well, but I see no evidence you're going to spend the money needed" to create a serious European military force either.
Biden left the prospect of a trans-Atlantic emotional healing to Lantos, who was born in Europe. He saw none at hand. There was no hatred in America for Europe, he said, just "disenchantment and disillusion." The new American college generation "couldn't care less" about Europe.
Indeed, for Lantos, the European-American bond was now "a cold-blooded, cynical relationship." Perhaps a bit ironically, he then explained the situation as a basis for optimism in that it perhaps made for more rationality on both sides.
All this, word for word, might not be Kerry's party's message in the strictest sense. Yet it came from the mouths of two influential Democrats who did not get to their leading roles in forming congressional opinion on foreign affairs by nonconsensual posturing or freaky one-man crusades. Indeed, Kerry would very much need their support if he wanted to reverse the Bush administration and participate in the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol on the environment - symbolic issues for Europe that European ambassadors here do not expect to rank high among the candidate's priorities if elected. In fact, since getting cornered with a remark that many foreign leaders wanted him to win (and for reasons of discretion, not being able to identify them when pressed by the Bush campaign), Kerry has had effectively to disavow two such endorsements with an advisory that he would neither seek nor accept support from overseas.
Part of this was a no-brainer in the American political context: A statement of backing for Kerry from former Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia prompted Rand Beers, Kerry's foreign policy adviser, to describe the ex-leader as "an avowed anti-Semite whose views are totally deplorable."
The other pledge of support required much more subtlety, bearing as it did the mark of those in Europe who would cast Kerry as an American flagellant, ready for a virtual apology to all for America's size, strength, and national instincts. Before he was elected prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero said he was "aligning" himself with the Democrat. After Zapatero's victory and his statement that Spain would pull its troops out of Iraq if UN authorization was not forthcoming, Kerry was caught in the position of having to deal with a self-appointed European ally apparently clueless about American politics. Kerry urged Zapatero to reconsider on Iraq and said he should "send a message that terrorists cannot win by their acts of terror."
Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, who served as foreign policy adviser to the Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic nomination, verbally shrugged. If Kerry wins, he said, there may be a new effort at better understanding, but "there's going to be real disappointment in Europe, in terms of their expectations, about everything being hunky-dory again. I don't think many Europeans understand U.S. politics."
Biden suggested at least one did. He told his audience of visiting an unnamed European leader whose government opposed the war in Iraq. Do you think it's more important to have the situation in Iraq righted than to see Bush defeated, the senator asked the European.
The leader cleared his throat, hemmed and hawed, began three different sentences, and, according to Biden, finally gave an answer. "Yes," he said.
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune
These are only two of the many recent articles where Senator John Kerry is accused of being too French and of his cousin trying to distance Kerry from his Gallic relations and tendencies, presumably for his benefit.
But the undercurrents of such accusations tend to suggest that rift between the U.S. and France, at least with the Bush administration in the White House, isn't showing any signs of mending.
On the other hand, as the article mentions, the editor of Le Monde approvingly told a New York audience that Kerry "looks French."
International Herald Tribune - Globalist: If Kerry 'looks French,' look for an ugly fight
Chicago Tribune - Sen. Kerry's French connection
Globalist: If Kerry 'looks French,' look for an ugly fight
Roger Cohen IHT
Saturday, April 3, 2004
PARIS It is not going to be a pretty American election. Already the Bush administration has embarked on a campaign to portray John Kerry as a flip-flopping, tax-raising, European-educated wimp. The presumptive Democratic candidate has responded by describing the president as a job-destroying, budget-busting, alliance-breaking unilateralist.
But perhaps the surest indication that the looming political season will be ugly has come from repeated Republican suggestions that Kerry “looks French.”
Not only that: the senator is said to betray a dubious fondness for things French, even the language. A recent comment from Commerce Secretary Don Evans that the Massachusetts Democrat is “of a different political stripe and looks French” was only the latest of several jibes, mainly from conservative talk-show hosts and columnists, that have included allusions to “Monsieur Kerry” and “Jean Chéri.”
For some months now, the Republican House majority leader, Tom DeLay, has been opening speeches to supporters with an occasional routine. He says hi, then adds: “Or, as John Kerry might say, 'Bonjour.'”
The remark “always brings the house down,” said DeLay's spokesman, Stuart Roy, who added that its purpose was to highlight “Mr. Kerry's lack of support for the war on terror and the way he seems to be in agreement with the arguments of the French.” What is going on here? Ever since the Iraq war divided the Atlantic Alliance and the French government emerged as its most vociferous opponent, France has become a dirty word in some Republican circles. The France-bashing has had its lighter side - French fries disappearing from menus - but it has been no laughing matter. The criticism has carried the serious suggestion that France is not to be trusted. So if Kerry “looks French," the inference is clear enough.
Impugning the patriotism of a Vietnam war hero may seem an outlandish political tactic. But the Republicans have focused on other aspects of Kerry's life. He attended a Swiss boarding school and speaks good French; his maternal grandparents had a house in a village in Brittany, Saint-Briac-sur-Mer, where he spent several vacations; he has a French first cousin, the ecologist politician Brice Lalonde. The Republican National Committee recently circulated this last fact. Asked why, Christine Iverson, a committee spokeswoman, said the French family was not a big issue because Kerry would “be judged on his support for tax increases, not on his fondness for brie and Evian.” As for Lalonde, now the mayor of Saint-Briac, he is reluctant to be drawn into his cousin's campaign.
Many others in France have been less reticent. The broad French hope that Kerry will replace Bush in the White House is no secret. The Democratic candidate has been getting very good press; Jean-Marie Colombani, the editor of Le Monde, recently told a New York audience that Kerry “even looks French.” This time, the tone was one of approval.
Nicole Bacharan, a political scientist, sees several reasons for the French embrace of Kerry. A conviction that Americans will not re-elect a president widely seen in France as arrogant, simplistic and dangerous. A belief that Kerry will embrace old allies like France. Neglect and incomprehension of the large swathe of American society that finds Bush attractive. A subliminal association of John Forbes Kerry with another JFK, one beloved in France.
“There is a nostalgia for the Kennedy years and a hatred of Mr. Bush that I have never known for another American president,” Bacharan said. “So the French have just blocked out the America of religious faith and straight talk that likes Bush.” Much, it seems, is being blocked out in the talk of Kerry's French side. It is true that some of his promised policies seem attractive to many Europeans. He favors diplomatic engagement - in the past with Vietnam, today with Iran. He has castigated the Bush administration for its “intoxication with the pre-eminence of American power.” He has said he understands the need to “cooperate and compromise with our allies and friends.” He has vowed “to replace unilateral action with collective security.”
But Kerry also voted in favor of the war in Iraq - a fact not much aired in France - and urged the new Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, to refrain from withdrawing Spain's troops from Iraq.
The fact is that Kerry understands the reality of post-9/11 America, one often only dimly perceived in Europe. The attack, like Pearl Harbor, changed the country, pushed national security back to the center of the political agenda for the first time since the end of the cold war, and almost certainly made any candidate not strong on defense and tackling terrorism unelectable.
As a result, the differences on foreign policy between Bush and Kerry, while distinct, may be less radical than they appear. The president is not as isolated or as isolationist as he is sometimes portrayed, and Kerry is not as beholden to his multilateralist convictions as the French might wish. “Multilateralist when you can, unilateralist when you must” is how Richard Holbrooke, an adviser to Kerry, describes the candidate.
Still, in an election as tight as this one, the Republicans will do all they can to associate Kerry with what they see as the French penchant for conciliatory weakness and slow-moving international institutions.
The French theme in the campaign is likely to endure, much to the displeasure of Nathalie Loiseau, a French Embassy spokeswoman in Washington. “I regret that anyone would consider that portraying someone as French is negative,” she said. “This is a country of immigrants, after all.” Indeed: Kerry's paternal grandfather Frederick Kerry (born Fritz Kohn) arrived in America from Europe in 1905.
As for the Kerry campaign, it is adopting a certain hauteur in the French affair. “There are more important things to talk about, like affordable health care,” said Stephanie Cutter, a Kerry spokeswoman. “Mr. Kerry is an American citizen.”
Chicago Tribune
Sen. Kerry's French connection
Not wanting to hurt his election chances, relatives in Brittany downplay affiliations
By Jocelyn Gecker
Associated Press
Published April 5, 2004
ST.-BRIAC-SUR-MER, France -- John Kerry's relatives in France bristle at jabs from across the Atlantic that the presidential contender has a French connection.
They say Kerry has no link to France other than the home his grandparents bought here.
"John Kerry is incredibly American," says Brice Lalonde, Kerry's cousin and mayor of this seaside Brittany village. "He has absolutely nothing French about him."
For another cousin, Christopher Curtis: "This is an American story. John is an all-American guy with the benefit of having spent some time overseas."
With the race for the White House turning nasty--and France-U.S. ties not quite mended from the Iraq war--Kerry's Gallic clan, when questioned, talks up his American-ness. Some are keeping a low profile, saying too much talk about France could be political arsenic.
As Lalonde puts it: "I'm afraid to hurt him."
But that hasn't stopped the Frenchman from pasting Kerry bumper stickers on his car--hardly a common sight in this 16th Century village.
St. Briac, near the port city of St. Malo, is a place of rugged seascapes and narrow, cobbled lanes that inspired Renoir and other Impressionists. It was here that the senator from Massachusetts spent boyhood summers and has said he traced his first inspiration to become a politician.
But nowhere on Kerry's Web site does he mention his summers in France or the family estate, known as Les Essarts, a sprawling property on a bluff over the sea.
"Monsieur Bush is angry with France," says Ian Forbes, an 85-year-old Kerry uncle who lives at Les Essarts. "We don't want to accentuate the connection between Johnny and France."
Kerry's maternal grandparents, James Grant Forbes and Margaret Winthrop--a descendant of Massachusetts' first governor, John Winthrop--bought the estate in the 1920s. They had 11 children, including the mothers of Kerry, Lalonde and Curtis, a British-American who lives in Paris. The home served as a summer hub for their cosmopolitan clan.
In his youth, Kerry joined the family gatherings while his father, a U.S. diplomat, was posted in Europe. Young Kerry also attended a Swiss boarding school and brought a touch of America to this corner of northwestern France.
"He introduced us to games like capture the flag. We still play something called kick the can," said Lalonde, who at 58 is two years Kerry's junior.
Politics also run in the family here. Lalonde was environment minister under then-President Francois Mitterrand. Like his American cousin, Lalonde ran for president. But that was 1981 and he received less than 4 percent of the French vote.
Kerry's campaign and his days in France have been widely reported here. A recent story in Liberation newspaper was headlined, "John Kerry, too Frenchy for the Republicans." It catalogued insults by allies of President Bush and the tendency of House Majority Leader Tom DeLay to start speeches with: "Good afternoon, or as John Kerry might say, `Bonjour.'"
For Lalonde, Kerry's long, angular face "resembles Abraham Lincoln, without the beard."
The French media like to compare John Forbes Kerry, who speaks fluent French, to John F. Kennedy.
This is an argument that has received some attention outside of the mainstream media, but has been derided by many critics as essentially flawed.
Being a little shaky on global economics, its hard for me to really weigh in here, but it does seem interesting.
Basically, the argument is that in 2000 when Iraq switched its currency for oil transactions to euros from dollars (in its oil for food transacations), that was a key reason why the US became obsessed with taking over the country. Because Iran and Venezuela had also voiced similar sentiments, and due to unsurity about the political situation in Saudi Arabia, its key OPEC ally, the US wanted to stave off a move to the euro by these 3 OPEC countries and perhaps others following suit.
So, to protect the hegemony of the dollar as the international reserve currency b/c of the huge volume of oil transactions, it was in the US interest to try to preserve all these petrodollars around the world.
Anyway, like I said, I dont really understand what the impact of turning all those dollars into euros would be, and how that would affect the overall value of the dollar, etc., but I wonder how oil politics play into the respecitve attitudes of the US and European countries towards Iraq. Heres some perspectives on the issue. If you like long conspiracy theories, check out the last link.
The Globalist - Iraq, the Dollar and the Euro
NY Times - Whos Afraid of the Euro?
Revisited - The Real Reasons for the War with Iraq
Iraq, the Dollar and the Euro
By Hazel Henderson | Monday, June 02, 2003
The euro is finally taking its place alongside the U.S. dollar as a new global reserve currency. This has been further enhanced by the euro's recent gains against the dollar. But what would happen to the U.S. economy if OPEC decided to use euros, instead of dollars, to price oil? Hazel Henderson explores the consequences.
uturists like me specialize in “what if” scenarios, outside the box thinking and trying to anticipate surprises. In even the best-laid human plans, events rarely unfold as predicted — even by experts.
Blind spots
Mostly, these surprises are the result of “blind spots”, or because experts use different models or specialized approaches and languages — making communication difficult.
As countries diversify into euros, the currency has taken its place alongside the dollar as the world’s other global reserve currency.
One such surprise scenario is rooted in the close relationship between oil, dollars, gold and Europe’s euro currency. Remember back in 1973, OPEC countries quadrupled the price of their oil and tied it to the U.S. dollar.
Over the years, this flooded the world with “petro-dollars”, which were recycled through banks as loans. The U.S. dollar reigned supreme as the world’s de facto reserve currency.
A history of dollars
Everyone wanted to own dollars, which were considered as good as gold (even though, since 1971, dollars cannot be redeemed for gold, after President Nixon shut the gold window).
Gold no longer backs the dollar — or any other currency. All currencies since 1973 are called “fiat” currencies — backed only by the faith markets have in a country’s government and its economic fundamentals.
Volatile markets
Central banks that used to keep gold bars in their vaults have sold much of their precious metal. Now, they try to “manage” their currencies by raising or lowering interest rates, buying and selling them in the open market and other techniques.
A strong euro makes for a more stable world — and takes the burden of the sole reserve currency status off the U.S. dollar.
Gold is still popular for jewelry and as a safe haven. It trades actively on the world’s commodity and futures exchanges, along with platinum, oil, hogs, coffee, sugar — and fiat currencies themselves.
These currency markets, oil and gold markets are very volatile — dependent on the expectations about the future of millions of their investors and speculators.
What drives the markets?
These markets reflect a collective speculation on the future of such items as Iraq, U.S. foreign policy, the Middle East, oil supplies, alternative energy sources and technologies, the rise of China, the expansion of the EU — and the weather.
They all drive today’s global financial markets, including the $1.5 trillion of daily currency trading.
Losing ground
In the past 12 months, the U.S. dollar has lost some 30% of its value against the European euro. The Bush Administration has played up the bright side. The cheaper dollar makes it easier for U.S. exporters to sell abroad.
Many believe that deeper reasons for the U.S. attack on Iraq were its decision in 1999 to require payments for its oil for food program in euros.
The United States needs to increase its exports because it has a whopping trade deficit (currently reading 5.2% of our GDP). Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill dismissed this as “a meaningless concept.”
But global investors and currency speculators take it seriously — along with the bursting of the U.S. stock market bubble, accounting scandals and heavily indebted corporations and consumers.
No surprise
The list goes on, and includes the U.S. savings rate at almost 0%, the increasing budget deficits due to President Bush’s tax cuts and his build-up of military spending, the Iraq war and the new Bush doctrine of preemptive attacks on any country that might threaten our future national security.
In light of all that, global investors started unloading dollars and U.S. assets. No surprises here.
A new global reserve currency
But as countries that formerly held mostly U.S. dollars in their currency reserves begin to diversify into euros, the currency has taken its place alongside the dollar, as the world’s other global reserve currency.
Back in 1973, OPEC countries quadrupled the price of their oil and tied it to the U.S. dollar. The dollar reigned supreme as the world’s de facto reserve currency.
While current data are hard to come by, the euro now accounts for as much as 35% of global trade and reserve holdings. This new reality makes for a more stable world — and takes the unsustainable burden of the sole reserve currency status off the U.S. dollar.
Clearly, with its enormous, open-ended commitments in the global war on terrorism, the U.S. economy cannot at the same time, continue to absorb most of the world’s exports — and remain the locomotive of the world’s economic growth.
An oblivious administration?
This new situation seems a surprise to the Bush Administration. It is still keen on expanding its overseas commitments, re-building Iraq — and offering aid packages to Turkey, Pakistan and other countries whose support is sought. In the meantime, it has passed a $350 billion tax cut package in late May, 2003.
While Mr. Bush tells Americans to continue shopping, traveling and enjoying the American way of life, federal deficits grow, domestic programs are cut — and half of all U.S. states are engulfed in budget crises.
Dropping the other shoe
What happens if global investors continue pulling out of the United States — and the dollar keeps falling? Many market players expect it to fall another 20%. Other countries that have lost money in the dollar’s fall may continue buying more euros.
In the past 12 months, the U.S. dollar has lost some 30% of its value against the European euro.
The other shoe may drop, too. OPEC may decide to officially re-denominate their oil in euros (since most of the organization’s customers are in Europe anyway).
OPEC economists have been considering this “no-brainer” scenario for sound financial reasons — even though they feared U.S. wrath and retaliation.
War speculation
Indeed, many believe that a deeper reason for the U.S. attack on Iraq was its decision in 1999 to require payments for its oil for food program in euros.
The United States — heavily dependent on imported oil — benefits price-wise and in influencing markets through OPEC’s U.S. dollar pricing. Iraq’s dinar will also be replaced by dollars — if the United States has its way.
A major adjustment
Thwarting President Bush’s global dollar diplomacy and its designs on breaking OPEC’s oil pricing power provide additional reasons for OPEC to switch to payments in euros. This would mean that the United States would have to buy euros with dollars before it could buy OPEC oil.
The Bush Administration has played up the bright side. The cheaper dollar makes it easier for U.S. exporters to sell abroad.
The dollar would fall further — and the euro would rise. The U.S. economy would eventually have to adjust to $5-a-gallon gasoline (the average world price).
The bad news would be a deeper U.S. recession, SUV owners would suffer while Toyota and Honda would grab more market-share with their 50-60 mpg hybrid cars.
Good news?
The good news would be that U.S. exports would flourish and that Detroit would accelerate its own fuel-efficient car production. The solar and renewable energy technologies would be fully capitalized as a new sustainability sector of the U.S. economy, providing millions of new jobs.
And the Bush Administration would have to pull back from its over-commitment to the global war on “evil” — and shift its priorities to funding education, homeland security and federal grants to help states fund their new mandates.
Who's Afraid Of The Euro ?
Paul Krugman
I once attended a conference at which a senior Japanese official made an impassioned speech about the need to establish the yen as an international reserve currency. When my turn came, I explained that this was silly; even if the yen did become a reserve currency, it would make virtually no difference to Japan or to anyone else. At the end of the session, the moderator thanked me for my contribution--which, he said, emphasized once again the crucial importance of the yen's role as a reserve currency. I never figured out whether this was a case of the translator having trouble with my accent, or whether it was a polite way of telling me I had said something unacceptable. But I do know that people almost always attach far more importance to the issue of reserve currencies--the role of the dollar and its rivals in international trade and finance- -than the subject deserves.
And so it was inevitable that the coming of the euro --the common European currency that seems set to be introduced next year, and that may eventually challenge the dollar's dominance--would inspire irrational fear. Sure enough, a few weeks ago the intellectual fashion victims at one of those other business magazines ran an editorial entitled "The euro makes trade a new game." "Thanks to the dollar's role as reserve currency in world financial markets," they opined, "the U.S. has been able to do what no other country can-- consistently import more goods than it exports.... The U.S. owes some $5 trillion to dollar holders abroad, thanks to three decades of trade deficits." Gosh, what happens if those people switch to euros?
Well, not to worry. It just isn't true that America's ability to import more than it exports is unique. Since 1980 the U.S. current- account deficit (which includes services and investment income as well as goods) has averaged 1.5% of GDP. That's about the same as Britain's average, less than Canada's 2.2%, and nothing like Australia's 4.2%. These countries paid for their excess imports the same way we did: by selling foreigners stocks, bonds, real estate, and so on. The only difference is that because their deficits were bigger, their debts are also bigger as a share of GDP. Ours, it turns out, aren't that large--at least on a net basis. While it's true we owe foreigners about $5 trillion, they owe us more than $4 trillion; the difference is about $800 billion, or 10% of GDP.
But doesn't the dollar's special role give us some advantage? Most of the international role of the dollar comes from its use as a "unit of account"--the measuring stick for international business. When a Japanese refiner buys Kuwaiti oil, say, the contracts are in dollars. This is a testament to U.S. economic influence, but flattery aside, it's hard to see what we get out of it.
What about our ability to borrow in dollars, to sell dollar- denominated bonds to foreigners? Hey, other countries do that too. But our debts are in our own currency! So? We still pay interest on them. True, we could inflate away our foreign debt. But we won't--and if investors thought we would, they would demand higher interest rates.
Well, then, you may say, surely the international role of the dollar forces people out there to hold dollars for transaction purposes. Yes, but not so you'd notice. When Daewoo repays a dollar loan from Sanwa, it writes a check on its account with some international bank. True, that bank itself surely maintains an account in New York, backed in part by non-interest-bearing reserves held at the Fed. So the U.S. does in effect get a zero-interest loan out of the dollar's international role--but it probably amounts to only a few billion dollars, small change for an $8 trillion economy.
Where the U.S. does get a significant free ride is from the willingness of foreigners to accept our currency--actual bills. Foreigners hold more than $200 billion of American money. Guess what kind of business requires payments of large sums in cash, by people unconstrained by official restrictions on possession of foreign exchange? That's right: the dollar is the world's premier medium of illicit exchange. Every year the U.S. ships foreigners $15 billion in cash (about 0.2% of GDP), and gets real goods and services in return. Better not ask what kind.
So the threat to the U.S. from the rise of the euro is this: five years from now, when wise guys in Vladivostok make offers you can't refuse, the payoffs may be in 100- euro notes instead of $100 bills. The loss of such business might cost the U.S. economy as much as 0.1% of GDP. Somehow, I think we can live with that.
This is a survey published on the front page of The Los Angeles Times in the anniversary of the war on Iraq. It is an example of how the US media coverage of Europe is evolving. The terrorist attacks in Madrid seem to have somehow increased the attention of US media on the European Union. Will it last?
IRAQ: ONE YEAR LATER
Strained U.S.-European Relations Turn Pragmatic
By Jeffrey Fleishman
Times Staff Writer
March 19, 2004
He's as ubiquitous as the Big Mac.
Europe can't shake the bowlegged cowboy peeking out from a too-big Stetson, arms bent and ready to draw. This political caricature of President Bush endures, even as transatlantic relations have improved from the derision and backbiting that one year ago marked the beginning of the Iraq war.
A lot has happened in that year. While the U.S. has been preoccupied with securing Iraq, Europe, in many ways, has set its own course. Perhaps more than the U.S. itself, Europe understands that the Sept. 11 attacks changed U.S. priorities and that Washington's old friends are often overshadowed by new strategic alliances.
The terrorist bombings in Madrid last week — possibly orchestrated by Islamic extremists to punish Spain for supporting the Iraq war — are forcing some European nations to reevaluate their partnerships with the U.S. The leader of the newly elected Socialist Workers Party in Spain has vowed to withdraw the nation's 1,300 troops from Iraq, a prospect that would undermine U.S. efforts to build an international coalition.
The specter of terrorism and differences over world security are turning the Cold War-era transatlantic friendship into steely pragmatism. The continent has a two-dimensional view of the U.S. Although most people in London, Paris, Berlin and other capitals feel an affinity for Americans, that closeness does not extend to a White House seen as rash and militaristic at a time when globalization needs patience and diplomacy.
"The last four years have been hell," said Francois Heisbourg, a foreign policy expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. "The Bush administration's view of things is, 'You're either a poodle or an enemy.' The Bushies don't tend to forget."
Such widespread attitudes are softened by nostalgia many Europeans have for U.S. forces who liberated them more than half a century ago.
"If you go to the American cemetery in Cassino or the cemetery in nearby Anzio," said Italian waiter Dario Di Tiello, 40, speaking of his nation's World War II battlefields, "you can see how many Americans are buried there, how many came to save us from hell. We always forget these things. For me, the American people were a great people, they still are a great people."
The spate of across-the-pond name calling — Euroweenies versus cultural bimbos — has largely subsided. But Europeans have been reminded that they are more different from Americans than they once thought. Attitudes toward gay marriage, capital punishment and other social issues reveal the chasm between a liberal-leaning Europe and a conservative-tilting America.
And the Bush administration's weaving of religion through politics — especially when the president invoked God as he was going to war — unnerves European secularism.
"There's an extraordinary element of fundamentalist type of religion in American life," said Roger Duclaud-Williams, a political science professor at the University of Warwick in Britain, adding that he was bemused that Janet Jackson's flashed breast at the Super Bowl caused so much hand-wringing. "It's a kind of Christian-based Puritanism for which our educated governing class doesn't have much sympathy."
Europeans have tried to move beyond rancor when discussing Washington. Conversation is as dignified and proper as a tea party on the Thames. There are the occasional snide asides about Europe's moral authority and the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been unearthed in Iraq. But when the brandy is poured in the anterooms, or pints are hoisted in pubs, Europeans swoon and giggle over John Kerry, the continent's new poster boy.
"Kerry has Europe's Vote," said a headline in the Economist.
The Financial Times Germany has written of Kerry: "His first cousin is a French mayor. His father was a diplomat. He spent school years in Switzerland. He thinks the death penalty is bad and thinks the Kyoto Protocol, intended to protect the global climate, is good. If the Europeans were allowed to vote for the U.S. president this coming November, a triumph for the Democratic challenger John Kerry would be assured. Never has a U.S. president been so disliked in Europe as George W. Bush."
Some Europeans are quick to add that Kerry would be a pleasant change of personality, but that terrorism and shifting world hotspots would prevent him from significantly altering U.S. foreign policy.
The Madrid bombings have given Europe a keener understanding of acting within one's own interests and have raised challenging questions: Does supporting the U.S. mean bringing Islamic terrorism to European cities? If Spain withdraws troops from Iraq, what domestic pressures will Britain, Italy and Poland face to do the same?
"It comes down to fundamental differences in our societies," said Bernhard May, an analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations. "American society seems to be more inspired, a society with a mission. But Europe doesn't want to go around the world telling people how to live.
"What really is going on now between Europe and America is a working out of a relationship for the post-Cold War era. We should have had this discussion back in the 1990s, but we didn't. The fundamental question is, what kind of world order do we want?"
The iconic images of a gunslinger Texan helped change the political dynamics of the continent.
Antiwar fervor strengthened the Berlin-Paris axis. But it created animosity with countries that supported the war, such as Spain and Poland, and has strained the atmosphere as the European Union prepares to expand from 15 to 25 nations this year. Despite the EU's goal of cohesion, the continent is increasingly discovering that it can be compared less to a chorus than to a jazz ensemble, with each player fighting for his own solo.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair — whose backing of Bush cost him in the polls — these days wants to be known as a statesman "at the heart of Europe." Many in Blair's liberal-leaning Labor Party believe that staying cozy with Washington is political peril.
"We need to get George Bush out of the White House," Anthony Giddens, an unofficial Blair advisor, told a recent Labor Party gathering. Even members of the conservative Tories, who bonded so well with Ronald Reagan, see Bush as an impediment to transatlantic relations.
"Some of it's jealousy, the frustration that after [Bill] Clinton we thought we'd have our own guy in the White House and then it didn't turn out that way," said George Osborne, a Tory member of Parliament who supports Bush. "But the Bush frontier-style talk just doesn't go down well among Tories."
Europe's own problems often eclipse its worry about U.S. relations. The French and German economies are struggling. Health and social reforms are triggering voter anger. Immigration problems are roiling governments. Many wonder what will happen to the EU — once a privileged Western club — when it admits the Czech Republic and other former Soviet Bloc countries in May.
"The relations with the United States should not be our priority today," said Jean-Luc Turcouin, a French retiree. "We have to deal with our own national problems, the elections, the euro, the unemployment, the terrorism. This is what we should worry about."
But the U.S. is the new hyper-power, and Europeans acknowledge that the harsh rhetoric against Bush's military policies should not jeopardize the transatlantic alliance. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, for example, has declined French President Jacques Chirac's suggestion that Europe form a counterbalance to Washington. Analysts say the U.S. and Europe need each other, especially in the Middle East and in fighting terrorism.
For all the recent nastiness, Europe and the U.S. often complement each other. European diplomacy backed by a veiled threat of U.S. military prowess helped defuse the Iranian nuclear crisis and prompted Libya to renounce its chemical weapons programs. The continent and Washington are cooperating on a new role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as strategic interests move eastward. And Paris — the major European capital most estranged from Washington — is working with the Bush administration in Haiti.
"We have come to the conclusion that we went too far in the divorce," said Dominique Moisi, an analyst at the French Institute for International Relations.
It may never be a love fest. Europe and America have had more than 200 years of skirmishes and spats. America has been cast as the ambitious upstart less concerned with high culture than with making a buck, Europe as a bit of a relic that speaks eloquently but is skittish when it comes to action. The Cold War put a veneer over the rifts as Europe and the U.S. faced a common enemy. Now there are more mercurial foes — as the recent Madrid bombing reaffirmed — and the bonds of friendship are being recast.
Moisi said Europe and the U.S. might grow closer in coming years through an ironic twist. Under Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, Moscow is growing autocratic and restive as Europe integrates and becomes more of an economic power. This trend concerns European officials, some of whom believe Cold War ghosts are stirring.
"You suddenly start to be worried," Moisi said, "and you start to want a blend of U.S. and European cooperation."
*
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Times staff writers Janet Stobart in London and Achrene Sicakyuz in Paris, and special correspondents Nancy Meiman in Rome and Bruce Wallace in London contributed to this report.
Even before the Madrid attacks, and despite hints that US-EU relations were starting to thaw, global public opinion voiced increasing distrust of the United States.
According to a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in association with the International Herald Tribune, nearly a third of respondents in Turkey thought that suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq was justifiable.
Support for the U.S. since the "end" of Iraq war continues to drop in Britain, France and Germany and nearly 60 percent of Brits responded that they had mistrust for Uncle Sam.
Americans, however, still think that they are merely viewed as misunderstood crusaders for good, and 70 percent believe the U.S. considers other countries' interests. American opinion of the French and Germans have even improved slightly since the end of the war.
But with Rodriguez Zapatero's strong stand and move back toward Europe the unilateral approach the Bush administration took seems to be pretty cold. The survey found that the majority of respondents in Britain, Germany and France (in, as can be expected, ascending order) believe Europe should be more independent.
These sentiments have led to increasing support, it appears, to make the EU as powerful as the U.S., and perhaps, the establishment of its constitution.
International Herald Tribune - European distrust of U.S. role sharpens
European distrust of U.S. role sharpens
Meg Bortin/IHT IHT
Wednesday, March 17, 2004
'No healing of the wounds' a year after Iraq war, global survey finds
PARIS One year after the war in Iraq, European distrust of the United States has intensified, with sharp doubts among America's closest allies of the Bush administration's motives in the war on terror, a global opinion survey has found.
The poll of more than 7,500 people in nine countries, conducted in late February and early March by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center, before the bombings in Spain, showed that anger toward America is still fierce in Muslim countries, too, 12 months after the war began.
Resentment is so strong that majorities in three Muslim countries surveyed - Jordan, Pakistan and Morocco - feel that suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.
The poll, carried out in association with the International Herald Tribune, found that even in Turkey, an American partner in NATO, 31 percent felt such attacks were justifiable.
Still more worrisome perhaps for Washington in an election year, however, the trans-Atlantic confidence gap has deepened since a Pew survey carried out in the immediate aftermath of the war, when public ire over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was still hot in Europe.
"There has been no healing of the wounds," said Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center in Washington.
Unfavorable opinion of the United States, which skyrocketed in the run-up to the war, has become still more negative in France, Germany and Britain since President George W. Bush declared hostilities over in May, the survey found.
British views in particular are more critical, with a 12 percent slide in favorable opinion of the United States. The decrease, from 70 percent last May to 58 percent now, "reflects dropping support for the war" in Britain, Kohut said.
In France, favorable views dropped to 37 percent from 43 percent in May; in Germany positive opinion fell to 38 percent from 45 percent 10 months ago.
Majorities in the three countries - historically Washington's closest NATO partners - also said that as a consequence of the war they had less confidence that the United States is trustworthy. Mistrust was expressed by 82 percent in Germany, 78 percent in France and 58 percent in Britain.
According to François Heisbourg, director of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, alienation is increasing in Europe "because there's been no give on the Bush side."
"There is a widespread perception in Europe that we have the choice of being treated as a vassal - a poodle in the case of Britain - or being treated as an antagonist," Heisbourg said.
As grounds for resentment, he cited continuing American neglect of European sentiment on issues ranging from the Kyoto Protocol on the environment to the treatment of prisoners at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In France, he noted, anger flared anew recently when the State Department came out against the banning of the Islamic head scarf in French schools.
The survey results also indicate that there has been no rebound among America's allies of post-Sept. 11 sympathy for the United States, which dissipated in the glare of European disapproval during the build-up to war.
Quite the contrary: Majorities in France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco said they thought the U.S.-led war on terrorism was not sincere. Instead, most said it was an effort "to control Mideast oil" or "to dominate the world." Even in Britain only the slimmest majority - 51 percent - viewed the war on terror as sincere.
In fact, people in many countries were dismissive of U.S. attitudes toward the threat of international terrorism.
While fully 84 percent of Americans questioned said the United States was right to be concerned, majorities in France and the four Muslim countries in the survey - Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco - said America was overreacting.
Kohut said the survey results might have differed had the question been asked after the March 11 carnage in Spain.
William Kristol, editor of the conservative Weekly Standard and a strong supporter of the war on terrorism, said the Madrid attacks "could even widen the rift."
Kristol cited remarks this week by Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission, that the U.S. approach to fighting terrorism had failed, and added: "If that's going to be the European conclusion of the past two and a half years, I think Americans, and not just Bush, are going to reject that."
In foreign policy in general, the view that the United States acts unilaterally is more widespread now than at the war's end, the survey found.
In France, 84 percent said they felt the United States did not take their country's interests into account in international policy decisions, up from 76 percent last May. Similar strong feelings were expressed in Turkey (79 percent), Jordan (77 percent), Russia (73 percent), and Germany (69 percent).
In contrast, 70 percent of Americans surveyed felt that the United States takes other countries' interests into account.
"Americans think we're cooperative and popular," Kohut said of the perception gap. "Americans think, 'We're the ones on the white horse who do good things for the planet, like dealing with terrorism and evil dictators, and we're misunderstood.'"
The trans-Atlantic chasm in thinking translated into desire in Europe for looser ties with the United States in security and diplomatic affairs, the survey found. Majorities in France (75 percent), Germany (63 percent), Turkey (60 percent) and Britain (56 percent) said Europe should be more independent.
Majorities in the five European countries in the survey - Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Turkey - said it would be a good thing if the European Union became as powerful as the United States. In France, 90 percent expressed this view.
European dislike of President George W. Bush, too, has not diminished. Majorities in every country surveyed expressed unfavorable views, with negative opinion of Bush in France and Germany - 85 percent - higher than in Muslim countries like Pakistan and Turkey.
"I think what has hurt Bush the most, both in Europe and the United States, is his failure to explain why no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq," Kristol said. "We're paying a real price for that."
Most people questioned in the survey said they felt that Bush and Tony Blair, the British prime minister, had lied about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to have a pretext for war.
Only in the United States and Britain did a majority say their leaders had been misinformed by bad intelligence, and even there sizable minorities said the two leaders had lied: 31 percent in the United States and 41 percent in Britain.
Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden is still viewed as a hero in parts of the Muslim world. Sixty-five percent in Pakistan and 55 percent in Jordan expressed favorable views of the Qaeda leader. In Turkey, however, 75 percent expressed unfavorable views.
As for American attitudes, the anger felt toward the "coalition of the unwilling" - notably France and Germany - has subsided slightly since the war's end, but is still strong.
Thirty-three percent in the United States now express favorable views of France, up from 29 percent in May; 50 percent hold positive views of Germany, up from 44 percent. Enthusiasm for Britain is declining, however, with 73 percent now holding favorable views, down from 82 percent in May.
Given the intense media coverage of the Iraq war and the resulting tensions between the United States and Europe, another surprising finding is that 7 percent of Americans surveyed have never heard of the European Union. That figure, however, is an improvement since early September 2001, when one-fifth of Americans surveyed - 20 percent - said they had never heard of the allied bloc across the Atlantic.
International Herald Tribune
Copyright © 2003 The International Herald Tribune
According to this article published in Le Monde, the impact of Aznar's defeat is much wider than the loss of an ally for Bush.
Many stories show that those who favor "Old Europe," and the space for an independent voice might come out stronger. We should not forget though that this happens at a moment of high emotion, and should wait until it translates in a different policy.
Le Monde - Sous le choc des attentats, l'Europe reconsidère sa relation avec Washington
Sous le choc des attentats, l'Europe reconsidère sa relation avec Washington
LE MONDE | 16.03.04 | 14h24
En écho aux propos de José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero sur le "désastre" de la guerre en Irak, des diplomates européens s'en prennent à la politique étrangère menée par les Etats-Unis depuis plus d'un an. La mécanique atlantiste de Blair-Aznar-Berlusconi s'est cassée
L'europe en quelques jours a changé. Les attentats du 11 mars ont ébranlé tout le continent. Les événements qui ont suivi à Madrid modifient d'ores et déjà de façon irréversible l'équilibre des relations euro-américaines. George Bush a perdu beaucoup plus que le soutien indéfectible dont le gratifiait José Maria Aznar. Dès lundi, les langues se sont déliées.
En écho à José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero déclarant que "la guerre en Irak a été un désastre et -que- l'occupation continue d'être un désastre", le ministre français des affaires étrangères s'est totalement départi de sa retenue de langage habituelle. "La guerre en Irak était une erreur, je dirais même une faute, a déclaré lundi matin Dominique de Villepin. Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas voir qu'il y a aujourd'hui deux foyers qui nourrissent le terrorisme dans le monde : le premier, c'est la crise au Proche-Orient, et le deuxième, c'est l'Irak."
Le président de la Commission européenne, Romano Prodi, n'a pas été moins direct dans l'interview qu'il a donnée lundi à La Stampa. "Cela se passe en Irak comme au dehors. Istanbul, Moscou, Madrid. Le terrorisme que la guerre en Irak était censée faire cesser est infiniment plus puissant aujourd'hui qu'il y a un an", dit-il. On ne saurait être plus clair, à moins d'enfoncer le clou, comme l'a fait M. Zapatero, qui a invité lundi George Bush et Tony Blair à "faire leur autocritique".
Des dirigeants européens osent donc qualifier d'échec la politique étrangère menée par Washington depuis plus d'un an. MM. de Villepin et Prodi n'ont certes jamais été partisans de cette politique. Ils l'ont ouvertement combattue à ses débuts puis discutée pied à pied au fil des mois. Mais le ton a changé et l'heure du bilan a sonné.
La garde atlantiste en Europe s'est moyennement mobilisée. Une partie de la presse britannique s'est érigée contre l'idée que des terroristes puissent dicter le verdict des urnes dans un pays européen. Le ministre britannique des affaires étrangères, Jack Straw, a cru devoir rappeler à ses partenaires de l'Union que nul ne se protège du terrorisme islamiste en s'opposant à la guerre en Irak. Mais les électeurs espagnols sont moins soupçonnables que quiconque d'avoir cédé au terrorisme.
Quelques gouvernements européens, membres de la coalition en Irak - la Pologne, le Danemark, la Grande-Bretagne -, ont fait savoir dès lundi que la défection annoncée de l'Espagne ne remettrait pas en cause leur propre engagement militaire sur le terrain. Mais, outre que leur opinion publique n'est pas forcément du même avis, la question pour Washington n'est pas seulement celle du maintien des effectifs actuels en Irak. C'est celle de la relève des troupes américaines, que George Bush souhaite rapatrier en temps voulu pour en tirer un bénéfice électoral.
La relève au moins partielle par l'OTAN était au menu du sommet que l'Alliance atlantique doit tenir fin juin à Istanbul. Qui pourrait répondre à l'appel ? Le ministre allemand des affaires étrangères, Jochka Fischer, a longuement expliqué, dans un discours à Munich le mois dernier, que c'était une mauvaise idée. L'Allemagne ne s'y opposera pas mais, même dans ce cadre, elle n'enverra aucun soldat en Irak. Les Britanniques ne peuvent guère faire plus que ce qu'ils font déjà. José Maria Aznar ne sera plus là pour suggérer une "assistance technique" de l'OTAN qui aurait pu introduire cette dernière en Irak.
Par la voix de Dominique de Villepin, la France fait savoir depuis des semaines qu'elle mettra "des conditions" à une telle extension du rôle de l'OTAN en Irak et laisse entendre qu'elle n'en serait pas. Les "conditions"que le ministre des affaires étrangères français avait répétées après son dernier entretien avec Colin Powell, début février, ce serait qu'"un gouvernement irakien pleinement souverain en fasse la demande" et que le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU en décide. "La question n'est pas d'actualité pour le moment", avait dit alors Dominique de Villepin. Elle l'est de moins en moins.
"PÉCHÉ ORIGINEL"
Depuis, le ministre a expliqué les doutes de la France sur l'opportunité politique d'un tel transfert à l'OTAN. Cela aiderait-il ou cela aggraverait-il la situation sur place, demande-t-il ? Contrairement à l'Afghanistan - où on manque déjà de volontaires pour la prochaine relève -, la présence de troupes étrangères en Irak est pour l'instant frappée d'une sorte de "péché originel", explique un proche du ministre.
L'ONU est-elle prête à s'engager en Irak ? Serait-elle prête à mandater l'OTAN ? Un gouvernement irakien véritablement souverain verra-t-il vraiment le jour en Irak au 30 juin ? De tout cela, on doute fort à Paris.
Les attentats de Madrid ont fait que désormais on en doute fortement ailleurs aussi. La mécanique atlantiste de Blair-Aznar-Berlusconi s'est cassée. D'une certaine manière, la "nouvelle Europe" de Donald Rumsfeld a rendu l'âme en gare d'Atocha, le 11 mars. Restent, pour les Européens, l'urgence sécuritaire et la nécessité d'imaginer une suite en Irak, après le 30 juin comme le dit le calendrier officiel américain, ou plus probablement après les élections présidentielles américaines de novembre.
La Maison Blanche a laissé paraître, vendredi, un manifeste énervement en demandant à John Kerry de citer nommément ses alliés dans le monde s'il en a. George Bush n'en a plus guère de fiables pour l'instant en Europe.
Claire Tréan
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 17.03.04
This is a fascinating reaction to the M11 bombings in that instead of bringing EU-US relations together, it could possibly create a wider chasm.
It could very well be a hair-trigger reaction to the bombings by a new Spanish government, and, in the long run, Britain and the US will make efforts to assuage Spain's anger and hurt.
But in essence it charges the U.S. with some culpability for these attacks, if not complicity -- the U.S. precipitated these bombings in its role as aggressive "liberator" and Spain, as a member of the "Coalition of the Willing," has paid the price.
Of course, the U.S., British and perhaps other members of the coalition of the willing will see the removal of Spanish troops as appeasement — a dirty word in Europe as it is a reminder of British PM Neville Chamberlain's policy toward Mussolini and Hitler's march through Ethiopia and Czechoslavakia, respectively, in the mid to late 1930s.
At a time when U.S.-EU relations appeared to be brightening ever so slightly, it will be interesting to see how the mood of Europe will be swayed, and if the Summit will be fractious.
BBC - Spain to re-join 'Old Europe'
Spain to re-join 'Old Europe'
By William Horsley
BBC European Affairs correspondent
The winner of the Spanish general election, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has promised to end Spain's close alliance with the US over Iraq and to revive its traditional ties with France and Germany.
The political landscape of Europe may again be split in two.
Within hours of the election result, Mr Zapatero condemned the Iraq war and its US-led occupation as "disasters".
He said President George Bush and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair should engage in "self-criticism" for their mistakes.
He promised to bring home Spain's 1300-strong contingent of peacekeeping troops in Iraq.
He is to announce the date after his inauguration, in a few weeks.
Valuable ally
These outbursts may reflect Mr Zapatero's political inexperience, or his strong convictions.
Either way, they point to a re-heating of a cauldron of old arguments within Europe and across the Atlantic.
Under Jose Maria Aznar, Spain became - along with Britain - a pillar of the pro-American group of nations in western Europe.
Its main contributions were:
internationally, giving diplomatic support to the US and UK over the use of military force in Iraq
in Iraq, deploying highly-skilled peacekeepers to help with the physical and political re-building of the country
in the European Union, standing up for Nato and the vital importance of Europe's relations with America.
Along with Spain, the closest European allies of the US over Iraq and its strategy against terrorism are Britain, Denmark, Italy, Poland and most of the other eastern European countries which will join the European Union in May.
On the other side, France leads another group of European states which opposed the US-led war in Iraq and which still refuse to contribute directly to the coalition's work in Iraq.
Germany and Belgium are in this group. Spain may now join them.
For 18 months, from August 2002 up to last month, efforts to forge a credible common foreign policy for the EU were stymied as these two rival camps clashed in a series of public wrangles.
The divide helped to poison the atmosphere as leaders from 25 governments in Western and Eastern Europe struggled last year to agree on the text of a new EU constitution, which was meant to demonstrate the unity and common purpose of Europe as a whole.
'Appeasement of terror'
Instead, the talks on a constitution collapsed at an EU summit meeting in Brussels last December.
Mr Zapatero has promised to revive Spain's traditional "pro-European" foreign policy.
Its main points are:
to compromise over Spain's defence of its national interests - especially over its relative voting strength - for the sake of early agreement on the EU constitution
to bring back Spanish troops from Iraq to show the new government's disapproval of a "unjustified" war
to call for a new "international alliance" against terrorism, based on the authority of the United Nations, not "unilateral actions" by the US and UK.
This set of proposals has been welcomed by France, but brought a cool response from the British government.
The European Commission President Romano Prodi, a champion of a stronger Europe, told the Italian newspaper La Stampa that the US strategy had failed, as it had led to international terrorism growing "infinitely more powerful".
But a long-standing friend of the US, the German Christian Democrat Freidbert Pflueger, told BBC Radio that the new Spanish government was engaged in "appeasement" of terrorism.
Al-Qaeda appeared to have succeeded in changing the government of one European country through terror.
"That must never happen again," he said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3513898.stm
Published: 2004/03/15 17:15:49 GMT
© BBC MMIV
In the same way as 9/11 has changed the US, 11-M (March 11th) will change Europe (and its relation with the US.) Our class must pay very close attention to this event and its consequences.
First, there are signs that it may contribute to bring people closer on an emotional basis. "Nobody thinks that it's Spain that has been attacked," a Parisian friend told me over the phone.
Several European head of government took part in the gigantic march held in Madrid's street to denounce terrorism. Romano Prodi, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Silvio Berlusconi, José Manuel Durão Barroso were there, as were prominent members from several governments, Joschka Fischer among others. Denis MacShane, British Secretary of State for European Affairs declared to El País: "It's the first time I have seen all Europe united, left and right, in an expression of total solidarity in front of the third historic totalitarism after Communism and Fascism."
In front of the attack, many Europeans turn to Europe and 11-M might contribute to the emergence of a more tightly woven European identity. If ETA was to be recognized as the perpetrator, it might be seen as a horrendous local Spanish affair. But an attack by Al Qaeda is seen as an attack against Europe. Germany has already called for an urgent reassessment of European security in front of what is seen as a "terrorist threat against Europe."
Second, this attack will affect the US-EU relationships. On one hand, Europeans should become more sensitive to Washington's call to fight terrorism world wide. On the other, it is significant that Spanish voters dismissed the government that brought Spanish soldiers into Iraq. After Schroeder's victory in Germany last year on the basis of his opposition to the war, it is the second government elected by Europeans opposed to Bush's policy.
Finally Bin Laden has just proven that he holds the capacity to affect the course of elections in major democratic countries. It has happened in Spain. It could happen in the United States.
"Given what is known from the strikes that continue to be mounted in other parts of the world, it seems likely that al Qaeda and its affiliates still command the resources and manpower necessary for conducting a major attack in the United States," wrote John Arquilla (who will come and visit us on April 20th) in an article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on February 1st.
Will Al Qaeda do it? Asked Arquilla and his answer was: "The outcome of the November election hinges on the answer."
San Francisco Chronicle – Will Osama rock the vote?
The piece is very short and includes some important information of Galileo, and I think it will be helpful to people who are pursuing defense stories as well as others, as Galileo is not only an EU issue but is also connected to the EU-US relations.
It is from European Voice. By David Cronin and Dana Spinant
JAVIER Solana, the EU’s foreign policy supremo, would be given the power to switch off the Galileo satellite system if it is misused in a way that endangers the security of the European Union, under a plan due to be discussed by member states’ diplomats in the coming weeks.
According to the blueprint, seen by European Voice, the high representative for foreign affairs would issue instructions “to take any measure necessary to safeguard the security” of the EU. The concession holder of the system “shall immediately execute any instructions addressed to him”.
Solana “would be responsible for matters where the operation of the system affects the security of the Union or the member states”, “in particular as a result of an international crisis, a threat to the proper operation or actual misuse of the system”.
The plan states that all aspects of Galileo “relating to the security of the Union or of the member states are handled by the Council”. Management “of all aspects relating to the system’s safety” would be given to a supervisory authority, which has representatives from member states and the European Commission.
However, the high representative would have the power to intervene in “exceptional cases, where the urgency of the situation is such that it requires immediate action”.
A diplomat involved in the drafting of the paper said that was a proof member states “genuinely trust” Solana.
“But at the same time,” he added, “somebody must be in charge of it [Galileo], somebody that can take decisions quickly.
“It is not a responsibility you can give to the presidency – in the future maybe a collective presidency – or to the Commission.
“Like it or not, it must be Solana.”
A network of 30 satellites, Galileo is principally a civilian navigation system, designed for such tasks as locating distressed mountaineers or ships in danger of capsizing. However, defence experts have pointed out the €3.2 billion system could be used by military planners to manage troops and munitions more effectively.
In a recent study, the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies said that “even if Galileo remains a civilian project, security issues will persist”. Because the system will have global coverage and will offer much of its services to private firms, it could have unintended users and uses, “with implications for the EU and its allies”.
The US had harboured reservations about Galileo for some time, viewing the project as a rival to its Global Positioning System (GPS).
But a deal was struck between the Commission and Washington on the project last week (25 February), under which Galileo would use the same ‘free signal’ as the GPS.
The Americans have insisted this signal would be better to avoid potential interference with the GPS military signal.
Romano Prodi, the Commission president, has been one of the strongest advocates of Galileo, which he regards as essential to strengthen the Union’s status as an economic superpower.
The system, designed by the Commission and the European Space Agency, received a major boost in September last when China agreed to contribute €203 million towards its cost.
This article considers the political personality of Iran and concludes that it’s further away from a democratic government than the western public has hoped – hinting darkly that the Bush administration knew more than they said when they included Iran in “the axis of evil.” What they knew, the article infers, is two-fold – first, that Iran has a secret program to enrich uranium – second, that conservative groups have the power to undermine the democratic process – as they just did on February 20th.
After doing this, the article tries to predict the EU’s reaction. This is interesting for two reasons, first – it assumes it will be uniform – second – it starts with a consideration of the United States.
If Mr. Bush has lost his “appetite for foreign conflict,” how will Iran be managed? It asks, adding, “though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how?” It then answers in a way that echoes some of the intellectuals we’ve just read – envisioning Europe acting as a non-militaristic alternative to US power – using economic influence – while giving a nod to the EU’s reliance on the US, “it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.”
Iran
The divine right to a bomb
Feb 26th 2004
From The Economist print edition
No case for a war. But the world would be safer without a nuclear Iran
AFP
IRAN'S election last week made it possible to see clearly something that had been fogged by ambiguity. It made it clear that the Islamic Republic founded by Ayatollah Khomeini 25 years ago has not evolved as some had hoped into a serious democracy. This is not for want of its people's trying. In a string of elections in recent years, Iranians flocked to vote for those politicians who said they were reformers. But under the constitution bequeathed by Khomeini, the decisions of a mere parliament can be struck down by the “just and pious” clergymen of the Council of Guardians, which is in turn subordinate to the faqih, the top cleric and “supreme leader”. He and they have crushed the breath out of reform by closing newspapers and striking down progressive laws. The final straw, which made the vote of February 20th a parody of an election, was the council's disqualification of more than 2,000 candidates, including 87 existing members of parliament.
Thumbs on the people, fingers on the button
In a bogus democracy, fewer people bother to vote. So the predictable outcome was the lowest turnout for a parliamentary election since the revolution, and a thumping victory for the religious conservatives. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, said that the losers were “the United States, Zionism, and the enemies of the Iranian nation”. In truth, the chief losers are Iran's own citizens, whose yearning for personal and political freedom has been thwarted again. But Mr Khamenei is right in at least one respect, which is that the result of the election is depressing not only for Iranians but for the outside world—and, yes, especially America and Israel—as well. For Iran is not just a country whose people look fated to squirm for a good while longer under the thumb of obscurantist clerics who claim a divine right to rule. These clerics also seem to want to put their finger on a nuclear button.
It has to be “seem” because Iran's leaders insist that they do not want nuclear weapons, and never have. That, they say, is why the Islamic Republic—unlike Israel—has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Over the past year, however, they have been caught out time and again failing to give the full account required by the treaty of their nuclear activities (see article). With each new leak, Iran has changed its story. It now admits to having had a secret programme to enrich uranium. Along with Libya and North Korea, it seems to have been one of the main customers of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced Pakistani who ran a global nuclear-smuggling network. Though it clings amid the confessions to the fable that all of this was for peaceful purposes, few people believe it.
How dangerous would a nuclear Iran be? And what should be done about it? Understandably, the world is in no mood to think about such questions right now. Just to pose them is to invite a sinking feeling of déjà vu. It is, after all, only two years since George Bush put Iran with Iraq and North Korea in his “axis of evil”. He still says he will not allow “the world's most dangerous regimes” to threaten America with nuclear weapons. But having invested so much political capital in the invasion of Iraq, Mr Bush no doubt feels his appetite for foreign conflict waning. He will not win re-election in November by making himself look like a serial warmonger.
The many people who were appalled by the Iraqi war may be reassured by Mr Bush's distraction. They should not be. A distracted America may give the clerics the very breathing space they need to build a nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Iran may have concluded from what happened to Saddam Hussein (and did not happen to North Korea) that the sooner you acquire a bomb the safer you are from the superpower, especially one with armies on two of your borders. Iran's recent agreement to submit to more rigorous inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency is not inconsistent with its having reached such a conclusion. Under the NPT, Iran is entitled to master the nuclear cycle. It could then give three months' notice to quit the NPT lawfully and build its bomb.
Yet that might not be calamitous. A nuclear Iran is certainly less frightening than a nuclear Saddam would have been. Even under the clerics, Iran is run by a regime with checks and balances, not by one megalomaniac. It no longer tries to export its revolution. It opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has so far done less than it might to undermine America in Afghanistan or Iraq. On the other hand, it calls for eliminating Israel and helps violent organisations like Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad to work to that end. The mere prospect of Iran acquiring a bomb has prompted Israel to ponder aloud the case for a pre-emptive strike (though that would depend on knowing exactly where all Iran's nuclear gear was concealed). If Iran got the bomb, sometime enemies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might feel compelled to follow suit.
Europe's chance
In short, though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how? In October, Britain, France and Germany thought they had talked Iran into coming clean about its secret nuclear activities and “suspending” uranium enrichment. In return, Europe dangles the trade relations Iran's economy sorely needs. If such an approach really did persuade Iran to do without a bomb, the Europeans could boast that they had found a better way than pre-emption to stop proliferation. And this may even be what Iran wants. Just possibly, Iran has decided in the wake of the Iraq war to do its own version of a Libya, by giving up a secret bomb programme but without the shame of admitting, as Muammar Qaddafi did, that it ever existed.
The question is how to be sure. Since October, Iran has spun more tales than Scheherazade to explain away the discovery of bits and pieces of nuclear research it had neglected to mention. This does not inspire confidence. The mullahs' failure to continue along the path of democratic reform is another reason not to give Iran the benefit of the doubt. Having dangled a carrot, the Europeans ought not to hand it over until Iran has delivered its end of the bargain. In the meantime, it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.
Copyright © 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
The Divine Right to a Bomb, The Economist
Both the U.S. and British press have reported in the past week that relations are starting to improve between both the United States and Germany and the U.S. and France. After all, Schroeder, who visited the White House for the first time in two years, knows how to make Bush laugh.
The warming of relations centers around conflict, both in the Middle East and Haiti, but still comes at a time when Europe begins trade sanctions against the U.S. for the first time. The two leaders can mug for the cameras and smile to the press while sanctions appear and Bush tells Schroeder that it's out of his hands that the dollar's weak.
It seems there may be disagreement over foreign policy, but the real battlefield will continue to be economic. And the freeze-thaw cycle may continue.
International Herald Tribune - Schröder and Bush get in sync on Mideast
BBC News - Thaw in US-German relations
U.S. and France Set Aside Differences in Effort to Resolve Haiti Conflict
Schröder and Bush get in sync on Mideast
John Vinocur/IHT International Herald Tribune
Saturday, February 28, 2004
Easing prewar feud, they vow to press for regional reforms
WASHINGTON President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, saying their damaged personal relationship had improved, pledged Friday to bring the United States and Germany together to create a new approach for the Middle East that would replace "fear and resentment with freedom and hope."
The two leaders, in a statement on what they called the Greater Middle East, said, "We will coordinate our efforts closely to respond to calls for reform in the region, and to develop specific proposals" to put before the separate summit meetings in June of NATO, the Group of Eight, and American and European Union leaders.
The statement, referring to the White House's Greater Middle East initiative and the German plan for the region proposed by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, was meant to demonstrate a new level of German-American cooperation after the angry differences of the Iraq war.
In the runup to that conflict, Bush was widely reported to consider Schröder as a leader who had broken a promise to him in early 2002 that he would not oppose American action in Iraq.
Today, although the two men did not look exceptionally at ease, Bush said of Schröder: "The chancellor has a good sense of humor. Therefore he's able to make me laugh." And that, Bush continued, "means I've got a comfortable relationship with him." That improved comfort level was apparently reached partly by a joint agreement to look forward and not dwell on past bitterness over Iraq.
As Schröder said, "Indeed we talked about not about the past; we very much agreed on that we have to talk about the present and the future now." That did not mean, however, that Iraq was off the table. Though the two did not refer to it publicly, Schröder had been expected to make clearer a promise to forgive a substantial portion of the billions of dollars owed it by Iraq. He said before leaving Berlin that Germany was prepared to offer "substantial debt relief." Germany has also agreed to train Iraqi police, beginning in mid-March, in the United Arab Emirates.
And Bush said he was "particularly grateful" for Germany's help in Afghanistan, where he said it was playing a "constructive role in making sure that country is able to survive in a - as a free nation." There was a clear element of American election-year politics in the meeting Friday. Bush seemed determined to demonstrate that the United States' relationship with Europe had not, as some Democrats have charged, strikingly deteriorated.
"Germany is an important nation," he said. "It's essential that America have good relations with Europe." The chancellor, who sought to bolster Germany's role within the EU by showing that ties with America had been re-established at a confident level, talked to reporters after the meeting.
"A very friendly atmosphere," Schröder replied, when a reporter asked him about the quality of his personal relationship with the president. "I'm very satisfied."
A participant at the meeting said that the exchanges ranged from the Middle East to economic problems to both leaders' judgment of President Vladimir Putin of Russia and the present circumstances in the region of the former Soviet Union.
The participant said there had been no reference made to Germany's decision not to provide troops for an eventual NATO mission in Iraq, because the chancellor's viewpoint had been made sufficiently clear prior to the discussions.
The joint statement Friday, in effect, gave Germany a new kind of prominence among European nations on the Middle East.
Bush and Schröder said in a statement: "We commit our nations to an ambitious goal, rooted in our shared values and experience: to promote freedom, democracy, human dignity, the rule of law, economic opportunity, and security in the Greater Middle East. Fear and resentment must be replaced with freedom and hope."
The statement continued, "We must build a genuine partnership connecting Europe and America with the wider Middle East, aimed at cooperating with the countries and peoples of that region to achieve these just objectives and to live side by side in peace."
The participant at the meeting acknowledged that there may be some resentment from other European countries or from the EU itself about the role Germany has taken since Fischer's speech on the Middle East at a security conference in Munich this month.
EU foreign policy officials will be at the White House on Monday for talks about the EU's vision for the region.
France has expressed concerns that German and U.S. references to the role of NATO in the region as a guarantor of security would stir up old resentments and resistance within Arab nations toward Western involvement in the region.
But representatives of the United States and Europe were described by diplomats after the meeting as attempting to consult with Middle Eastern governments about the agendas of the three June meetings. Position papers were also circulating on the American, German and EU initiatives in preparation for two of those meetings, the Group of Eight summit talks at Sea Island, Georgia, and the NATO meeting in Istanbul.
Schröder further stressed in remarks to reporters that the two countries "are together" in "putting disagreements in the past." Along this line, the joint statement described the Americans and Germans as being "united in support of a free Iraq; a secure, unified, democratic and fully sovereign nation." Bush, perhaps in recognition of Germany's desire for multilateral action on the international scale, seemed to go in this direction through a sentence in the statement that said, "We welcome and support the vital and growing role of the United Nations in Iraq." The statement contained no specific reference to Schröder's complaints that the United States had to do more to stop the fall of the dollar against other currencies, and to right the trade imbalances growing out of this situation.
In Schröder's first White House visit in two years, the two leaders also discussed tensions in Korea and the global war on terrorism, they said, without providing details. The chancellor had also been expected to raise European concerns over the fall of the dollar against the euro, which has caused considerable difficulties for European exporters.
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune
Thaw in US-German relations
By Justin Webb
BBC correspondent in Washington
After two years of bitter animosity, Germany and the United States are once again friends.
That is the message Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President George Bush are seeking to convey.
The Bush administration has been at pains recently to point out how grateful it is for German military help in Afghanistan and to promise that although rebuilding contracts in Iraq are to go initially to nations which helped in the war that could change in the future.
Germany for its part has been stressing common goals particularly in the war on terror.
A nasty fallout
Relations really have been quite bad between the two countries.
American leaders were questioning the political good sense of Chancellor Schroeder and suggesting that he was acting in bad faith.
The Germans said the US was acting arrogantly.
It was quite a nasty fallout, but both nations realise that they have a lot to lose if relations are soured in the long term.
Germany is, as President Bush said, a very important country.
It is one of the leaders of the European Union. It is an economic powerhouse - albeit a rather damaged powerhouse in recent years.
There's nothing wrong with friends having differences and we're both committed to putting the differences behind us
President Bush
For Germany not to be on board in the wider war on terrorism and other American policy objectives around the world would be quite a serious thing.
And both leaders realise that, which explains why they were so keen to patch up the differences they have had.
However, there is very little of substance that has changed.
From the American side, they are not yet in a position to tell the Germans that they can have their companies bid for contracts to rebuild Iraq.
From the German side, they are not yet ready to say they will send German troops to Iraq as they have to Afghanistan.
Changing mood music
The two men were asked mainly about Iraq but that subject was challenged for its place at the top of the agenda today by the more pressing question of the weakness of the dollar.
It is a weakness which has boosted American companies - with American goods much cheaper in Europe - and harmed European firms, with European goods more expensive in America.
There is still a suspicion on the German side that not enough is being done to keep the dollar at what they consider an acceptable exchange rate.
But the chancellor says he accepts President Bush's promise that he has not deliberately allowed the dollar to weaken in order to boost US manufacturers at the expense of Europeans.
On none of these things do we see agreement, but the mood music has changed with respect to the Germans and the Americans.
And mood music is important in international relations.
President Bush spoke very warmly about Chancellor Schroeder, saying that he made him laugh and has a great sense of humour.
And President Bush sets great store by his personal relationship with foreign leaders and on that subject he made it clear that things were going well.
It may well mean that some of those substantive issues might see progress in the not so distant future.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3494744.stm
Published: 2004/02/27 21:53:44 GMT
© BBC MMIV
March 3, 2004
THE ALLIES
U.S. and France Set Aside Differences in Effort to Resolve Haiti Conflict
By ELAINE SCIOLINO
ARIS, March 2 — It took a crisis over the Caribbean country of Haiti to get French-American relations back on track.
There is nothing romantic about the reconciliation. The United States and France are motivated by their own histories, national interests and domestic politics in deciding to work together to send troops to restore order to Haiti after the departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
When it comes to Iraq, by contrast, President Bush's conviction that he was right in waging war remains as fixed as President Jacques Chirac's conviction that he was right in opposing it.
But the joint diplomacy over Haiti is a dramatic example of how the longtime allies can set aside differences, find common ground, play to their strengths and even operate in an atmosphere of trust.
On Monday, the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, described the departure of Mr. Aristide as a result of "perfect coordination" between France and the United States.
On Tuesday, Mr. Bush telephoned Mr. Chirac to express delight over "the excellent French-American cooperation in Haiti" and to "thank France for its action," Catherine Colonna, Mr. Chirac's spokeswoman, told reporters.
Mr. Chirac responded that he was also pleased that France and the United States had such "good diplomacy working" and that they now needed to bring peace and stability to Haiti, Ms. Colonna said in a subsequent telephone interview.
France was willing to take the lead, and the heat, in proposing the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to its French-speaking former colony, urging Mr. Aristide to step aside and helping facilitate his departure. It was only after Mr. de Villepin laid out the proposal that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell followed suit.
France, with the United States, also persuaded the Central African Republic to give Mr. Aristide temporary exile, and France is helping protect him with troops stationed in the impoverished country since a military coup there last year, two senior French officials said.
Despite initial French reluctance to send troops that might be portrayed at home to be part of an American military "invasion" of Haiti, French and American forces will work side by side, as they do in Afghanistan, but not Iraq.
By Wednesday, 350 French troops from both the Foreign Legion and the navy based in the Caribbean will be deployed in Haiti.
On Tuesday, Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie acknowledged that France was involved in protecting Mr. Aristide but said he was free to leave whenever he wished.
"Today, he is protected and not imprisoned," Ms. Alliot-Marie said in an interview with Europe 1 radio.
She added that, "France is not controlling his comings and goings," but that, "this is simply a question of ensuring that his temporary stay in the Central African Republic takes place under normal conditions."
But Mr. Aristide can go nowhere unless another country gives him asylum, and Ms. Alliot-Marie did not say where or when he might be going.
However, her remarks prompted a swift denial by Col. Christian Baptiste, the spokesman for the French Armed Forces.
"She's not in the know with what is happening in regards to the security of this man," he said in a telephone interview, adding, "There was no physical or verbal contact between the French and the Aristide group."
A senior official at Élysée Palace also said French troops helped Mr. Aristide's plane to land but were not stationed anywhere near the place where he had taken refuge.
A senior Defense Ministry official defended his boss, saying that local authorities would never have agreed to accept Mr. Aristide, however temporarily, without guarantees of French protection.
During the Iraq crisis, Mr. Powell and Mr. de Villepin each felt betrayed by the other. The low point came in January 2003 when Mr. Powell felt he had been blindsided when Mr. de Villepin turned a Security Council meeting into a forum to severely criticize Washington and declare that nothing justified envisaging military action in Iraq. American officials who were with Mr. Powell that day said at the time that they had never seen him so angry.
In turn, Mr. de Villepin said he felt betrayed by Mr. Powell's assurances that the goal of American policy was not to overthrow Saddam Hussein but to disarm Iraq.
But that was then. The Haiti crisis has required Mr. Powell and Mr. de Villepin to consult regularly by phone, sometimes more than once a day.
Both nations have an interest in forestalling an influx of refugees — the Bush administration to Florida during an election year, and France to its Caribbean provinces.
About a million French citizens live in the Caribbean area.
Starting Monday, the EU will impose trade sanctions on US imported goods. That means an extra 5% tarriff on goods ranging from honey to nuclear reactors. And that is to continue increasing 1% a month.
This landmark sanction is an attempt to retaliate against U.S. corporate tax breaks (Foreign Sale Corporation- FSC--ruled illegal by the WTO).
This is a huge move that some EU officials are celebrating and others are calling the beginning of a hostile relationship between the EU and US. I see the move as justified, as many U.S. corps are able to get the leg up with tax breaks and dominate the market, but I foresee the consequences snowballing negatively.
Here are a few different viewpoints.
'Sad day' as EU imposes sanctions on US goods
Financial Times
By Tobias Buck in Brussels
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1077690772765&p=1012571727108
Europe slaps sanctions on US over export tax breaks
EU Business
http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040227224025.yw5ij37j
Sanctions give Europe Prime Opportunity
Scotsman.com
http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=240252004
US firms to be hit by multimillion-euro sanctions
EU Observer
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&aid=14634
'Sad day' as EU imposes sanctions on US goods
By Tobias Buck in Brussels
For the first time in the history of transatlantic trade relations, the European Union will on Monday impose trade sanctions on US goods, in an attempt to force Washington lawmakers to repeal controversial corporate tax breaks.
EU customs officials will levy an additional 5 per cent tariff on a wide range of American products. The duty on imports of natural honey, for example, will rise from 17.3 per cent to 22.3 per cent. Roller skates will be subject to a 7.7 per cent duty up from 2.7 per cent.
The punitive tariffs will also apply to textiles, agricultural products, steel and glass, books and newspapers, sugar and toys - even nuclear reactors. And they will rise, by 1 percentage point each month, until they affect US exports worth $666m a year.
The aim is to force the US Congress to change the foreign sales corporation provision (FSC), which grants tax breaks to US exporters and was ruled illegal by the World Trade Organisation in 2002.
But to John Disharoon, vice president of the trade committee at the American chamber of commerce to the EU, Monday is simply "a sad day for trade relations between the US and Europe". He says: "Nobody wants to see sanctions. It adds to the negative climate."
European companies share some of Mr Disharoon's concerns. But according to one trade expert, there is "no sense of disaster" among European trade officials, business lobbies and observers. The European Commission is keen to play down the significance of the trade sanctions. It insists that Brussels has shown patience and diplomacy in the run-up to March 1, and that Washington as well as US companies have had ample warning and enough time to prepare for the sanctions.
"We've been extremely patient, but there is no way now we can avoid these sanctions, which hopefully will concentrate a few minds on the urgency of this legislation," Pascal Lamy, EU trade commissioner, told reporters in Washington on Friday following two days of meetings with US lawmakers. He added: "The day the necessary legislation is there, I will remove the sanctions." Officials close to Mr Lamy have argued for months that there would be no backlash from US lawmakers.
Monique Julien, a trade expert at Unice, a business federation that claims to represent some 16m European companies, says: "If you look at the record on the European side there has always been an attempt at conciliation. Sanctions were repeatedly postponed but at the end of the day, it is a question of [upholding] the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system."
But even Europeans admit that - at some point - the Commission and its counterpart in Washington might have to rethink the way they approach trade disputes. Like many trade experts, Ms Julien is worried about the "multiplication" of recent EU-US trade spats - of which the dispute over FSC is only the most visible example.
In the past two months the EU has moved closer to trade sanctions in a string of cases, many of which are linked to US anti-dumping legislation and practices. In a dispute over the so-called Byrd amendment, which allows US companies to keep the anti-dumping proceeds raised from foreign competitors, sanctions could come this summer.
Nick Clegg, a British Liberal Democrat member of the European Parliament and trade expert, warns that "everything is being shuffled off to the WTO, and if that trend continues it begins straining the credibility of the institution".
Although he applauds Mr Lamy's approach in the FSC case, Mr Clegg believes that at some point it could become necessary for the EU and the US to settle their disputes through direct negotiations. "If we continue along the same trajectory, there needs to be some kind of political decision to clear the decks in a comprehensive way.
"I think more and more businesses, especially big companies with transatlantic links, are asking: is this really the best way to handle the biggest trade relationship in the world?" Additional reporting from Edward Alden in Washington
Europe slaps sanctions on US over export tax breaks
http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040227224025.yw5ij37j
EU Business
European trade chief Pascal Lamy said time has finally run out and Europe will launch sanctions Monday to pressure the United States to scrap illegal export tax breaks.
But for the first time, Lamy said he would consider allowing a transition period for removing the subsidies, ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization.
"We have been very patient but there is no way now that we can avoid this action, which hopefully will concentrate a few minds on the urgency of this legislation," the European trade commissioner said.
The European sanctions, to be ratcheted up each month to increase pressure on the United States to overturn the law, would be lifted when Congress passes legislation to repeal the subsidies, he said.
Tariffs, already approved by the WTO, begin at five percent on a range of goods from American meat to nuclear reactor parts. The duties will rise by one percentage point a month.
In 2004, the extra duties would be worth a total 315 million dollars, according to the Europeans.
The WTO has ruled that the so-called foreign sales corporation (FSC) law flouts global trade rules by allowing US firms, operating through subsidiaries in offshore tax havens, to benefit from reduced export taxes.
WTO arbitrators have agreed with the EU that just over four billion dollars (3.4 billion euros) would constitute "appropriate countermeasures" based on the trade impact of the US policy.
Lamy said he had no desire to take sides on the various proposals for US legislation to replace the FSC law; he only wanted to check the final proposal before it becomes law.
The House of Representative and Senate are drawing up rival proposals for legislation, which would need to be hammered out in a compromise text before signature by President George W. Bush.
Two of the main proposals contain a three-year transition period to phase out the tax break, however.
"The WTO ruling says that the only WTO-compliant transition period is zero. That is what the WTO ruling says," Lamy said.
"This being said, we have a margin of appreciation and if my judgment at that time is that I can use a bit or part of this margin of appreciation, I will do it (while) keeping my goal ... which is getting this thing repealed."
The trade boss said he would have to consult with the European industries affected by the US tax break, however, "to see whether or not they can live with such and such option."
Lamy noted that he had received a letter from European business chiefs suggesting they could live with a transition period.
The European business group UNICE sent a letter to Lamy on February 13 noting that the Congress was considering a three-year transition period for removing the tax break.
"For our part, we are ready to consider, while reluctantly, a reasonable transition period, as short as possible, for repeal of the current legislation," it said.
"It would therefore be appreciated if such flexibility could be explored, provided that the final outcome would be WTO-compatible and not affecting negatively European interests."
Sanctions give Europe prime opportunity
Scotsman.com
http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=240252004
OFF a dirt road in a quiet section of Tripoli, a trailer camp flies two flags. One is the green flag of Libya. The other is a red banner bearing a single word: "Halliburton".
The British general manager, Richie Jones, squirms a bit when a journalist shows up. He explains that United States sanctions bar him from expanding his business. He can’t import anything with a US part, he can’t use US technology. He isn’t even supposed to communicate with Americans or anyone who pays US taxes.
"I don’t know if we’re breaking the sanctions by talking to you," Mr Jones says in a conspiratorial tone. "If you sent me an e-mail it would be illegal for me to open it."
He manages the Libyan branch of Halliburton Germany GmbH, a subsidiary of the oil services giant once run by the US vice president Dick Cheney, and his hands are tied. The US sanctions, imposed in 1986 to punish Libya for supporting terrorism, bar Americans from most Libyan business. While sanctions have cost Libya at least $30 billion (£16 billion) in lost revenues, they have also taken a toll on US business.
European and Asian companies are cashing in, building a $5 billion (£2.67) project to pump and pipe Libyan natural gas to European power plants. They will soon vie for work on a $2 billion (£1.07 billion) upgrade for a major oil refinery.
"We’re preparing for a very active and promising decade," says Tarek Hassan-Beck, planning director for the government-owned National Oil Corp. But unless the sanctions end, the Americans will be sitting it out.
US firms to be hit by multimillion-euro sanctions
EU Observer
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&aid=14634
The EU will impose sanctions worth hundreds of millions of euro on US businesses from next Monday.
The move is retaliatory, counteracting tax breaks for US companies which the WTO has ruled illegal.
"I think the picture is now clear: countermeasures will come into force by Monday", Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said after talks with his US counterparts Thursday.
A 5% levy will be placed on all US exports to the EU, with that figure rising each month that the US tax break stays in place.
"Our countermeasures will start in a relatively modest way but the system has been devised so that it increases every month, the notion being that this will focus minds on the necessity to comply, which is the real name of the game", Mr Lamy said.
The figure is expected to rise by over 30 million euro a month.
With the US in an election year, any pressure from the sanctions will be made all the greater, with voters calling for politicians to protect US jobs and interests.
The Foreign Sale Corporation (FSC) - as the tax break is known - creates a loophole allowing US companies to benefit from decreased export tax.
The EU, backed by the WTO, says the FSC gives US companies an unfair market advantage.
Coupled with the strong euro, the FSC has led to very cheap US imports.
Similarly, the strong euro may also mean that the US companies hit by the sanctions will not feel the pinch quite as much as they otherwise would, with their products still being competitively priced.
The WTO has ruled that the EU may impose sanctions of up to 3.4 billion euro.
It is up to the US Congress to repeal the law.
What we're looking at here is global energy policy and security. The US, as recognized, is reaping the benefits of "rebuilding" Afghanistan and Iraq, with the potential for a greater harvest of energy reserves in the region after its "preventive" action in the latter country and manhunt in the former.
The author outlines how Germany has remained more or less on the sidelines, which is potentially troubling. But now, the constant political instability in the region is perceived as an underestimated threat to energy supplies. Perhaps it's time to get more involved.
Quoting a couple of academics, the writer lists that German dependence on foreign oil is increasing, and there is a need to diversify imports. But what is most curious about one of the academics suggestions is how it follows U.S. policy on foreign oil.
The author tucks this at the bottom of the piece, but it stuck out the most to me: linking energy and security policy. Putatively these are disparate and seperate realms. It also reminds me of a recent New Yorker article that examines Dick Cheney's involvement with Halliburton and defense contracts.
According to this piece, written by Jane Meyer in the Feb. 16 & 23 issue, a high level National Security Council official wrote a memo in Feb. 2001 that "directed NSC staff to cooperate fully with [Cheney's] Energy Task Force as it considered the 'melding' of two seemingly unrelated areas of policy: 'the review of operational policies towards rogue states,' such as Iraq, and 'actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.'"
As dependence on foreign oil increases, and oil exports go more and more to China and expanding economies, will this 'melding' become a commom policy practice? Will the west dispose more and more "authoritarian" rulers who happen to sit on "exploitable" energy reserves?
Of course, many suspect that invasions and regime change have something to do with energy supplies and lining pockets, but will this become explicit policy?
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - An ever more dangerous dependency
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An ever more dangerous dependency
By Nikolas Busse
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led the United States into the region with the bulk of the world's energy reserves, and Washington has been quick to start exploiting the economic advantages of its position. American companies are active in the Gulf and central Asian regions; in such countries as Azerbaijan (oil reserves) and Georgia (oil pipeline to Turkey) the old regional superpower Russia is being forced to watch as the United States secures its strategic interest.
Germany has so far shown little interest in this game of influence and oil, believing that a well-functioning world market offers the best guarantee of reliable supplies. It considers additional political or military efforts unnecessary; after all, the German Economics Ministry says, the oil-producing countries are keen to sell.
Past experience seems to confirm that view. Even the oil crisis of the mid-1970s was basically a price crisis; the basic supply was not threatened. Throughout all political crises in recent decades, oil and gas imports have never subsided, whether they are from the Middle East or Russia. Even the Soviet Union was a reliable supplier.
Nonetheless, a debate over the future of German energy provision has been started in Berlin's foreign policy institutions. Such researchers as Friedemann Müller of the Science and Politics Foundation and Frank Umbach of the German Society for Foreign Policy see the persistent political instability in the Middle East as an underestimated threat.
The two academics are above all concerned by statistics showing that in 30 years Europe will be far more dependent on energy imports than it is today. In 2000, the European members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development still produced 48 percent of their own oil, thanks mostly to the North Sea reserves, but the International Energy Agency estimates that this share will drop to 15 percent by 2030. Most of the shortfall will have to come from the Middle East.
Given the latest political turbulence in this region, this is worrying. Since Sept. 11, 2001 caused new disruptions, perhaps even a war of cultures between the Western world and the Islamic world, oil has begun to look more like a potential political weapon. The authoritarian rulers in the Gulf region could be tempted to ward off Western attempts at political intervention - and democratization - by raising prices or reducing supplies, and if Islamists came to power in one of these countries, oil supplies would be seriously threatened. What's more, the Gulf states are no longer as dependent on the West as a buyer; already, 60 percent of Gulf oil is sold to Asia, a share that is likely to increase further, given the rapid economic growth of southeast and east Asia.
Dependence on imported gas, Germany's second most important source of energy, is also increasing. In 2000, the European OECD countries bought 36 percent of their gas abroad, a share that will rise to 63 percent by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency. Europe currently buys 66 percent of its gas imports in Russia and the rest from Africa. This gives Moscow, in particular, substantial political leverage. Müller argues that the Russian government is already trying to channel gas supplies from other countries, such as Turkmenistan or Kazakstan, to Europe across its own territory so as to gain influence on volumes and prices. “There's a clear conflict of interest here between Russia and Europe,“ Müller says.
Windmills won't be able to change all of this. Even the German Economics Ministry says that alternative sources of energy will account for no more than 7 percent of German energy provision in the medium term. The planned abandonment of nuclear energy will worsen the problem, which is why people like Umbach believe it is time for Germany to link energy and security policy. The United States did this quite a while ago, diversifying imports so that the United States today is less dependent on individual supplier countries. Müller's conclusion: The Europeans should buy more oil from the Caspian region and more gas from Iran.
Feb. 27
Late Tuesday night, the US government announced to suspend importation of all processed meat and poultry from France, saying that some plants that process delicacies like foie gras didn't meet the US standars for food safety, as reported in San Francisco Chronicle story.
The EU, on the other side, banned the import of poultry and eggs from the United States on the same day after the bird flu cases in Texas.
As pointed out in the story, there's some political reason behind the food import fight. It could help better understand the relations between France (or EU countries as a whole) and the United State.
The story is from AFP. Sorry there's no direct link to the article. You need to get on the website of AFP then click the title.
PARIS (AFP) France and the United States were locked in a food fight as Washington slapped a suspension on imports of French cold cuts and foie gras after finding fault with French health safety measures.
The ban was announced here late Tuesday, the same day as the European Union said it was halting imports of poultry and eggs from the United States after an outbreak of highly contagious bird-flu in Texas.
A US Department of Agriculture official denied suggestions that the US action was retaliatory and a spokeswoman for the EU commission in Brussels said the timing of the two announcements appeared to be coincidental.
But some EU observers privately suspect that diplomatic factors may indeed have been involved. "Yes, there is very likely a political aspect," said a European diplomat who asked not to be named.
France challenged the US decision, describing it as "unjustified" but vowing to stay in contact with US authorities in order to get the suspension lifted as quickly as possible.
French meat producers affected by the ban were stunned and outraged by the US move and vowed to seek the intervention of the World Trade Organization or to take reprisals against US exports to France.
French government officials rejected the findings of a visiting team of US veterinary inspectors, who found what the agriculture ministry here called "non-confomities" with US practice in French health protection measures.
But Agriculture Minister Herve Gaymard maintained that there are "100 times more deaths from food poisoning in the United States than in Europe."
He told journalists here that a high-level French delegation had gone to Washington on Monday to confer with US public health officials.
"But the Americans had already made their decision, mass had been said," he added.
The US move followed a visit to France by a team from the US Department of Agriculture from January 15 to February 5 that included inspections of 11 companies authorized to export food products to the United States and the veterinary services that supervise them.
"In this case we found repeated problems with those plants that are certified to export," Agriculture Department spokesman Steven Cohen said.
The plants manufacture beef, chicken, pork and duck-based products, he said, without naming the factories.
Cohen also insisted that no link existed with the EU suspension of live poultry and egg imports from the United States.
"This is a process that began, concerns that were documented, beginning in 1992," Cohen said.
French producers of cold cuts and foie gras reacted with fury to the US suspension.
"The Americans don't respect the rules of the game," said Vincent Truelle, co-director of a professional committee of foie gras producers.
"They had already done us great harm by applying, since 1999, 100 percent customs duties on certain French products -- such as foie gras -- because of the measures taken against (US) hormone-treated beef by the European Union.
"Today, they are wiping out years of work by French producers to conquer the US market.
"It's not for health reasons that the Americans are closing their borders to our products ... The real reasons lie elsewhere."
Added Robert Volut, head of the federation of cold cut producers: "We are considering filing a case at the World Trade Organization or taking reprisal measures against US products imported by France."
Sales to the United States account for a only a small percentage of annual earnings by French meat exporters. But the US market, free of constraints, presents an outlet of great potential, exporters say.
France produced 18,000 tonnes of foie gras last year, of which just 20 tonnes of the prepared product -- compared with 50 tonnes before 1999 -- was exported to the United States. Another 100 tonnes of raw meat parts and products made from foie gras was also shipped.
The leading importer of French foie gras is Spain, with 300 tonnes, followed by Switzerland, Belgium and Japan.
Nearly 90 percent of French foie gras production is consumed in France.
The Bush Administration is urging NATO to expand its prescence in Iraq and Afghanistan to ease some of the military burden off of the U.S. The International Herald Tribune article says the administration's goal is for NATO to make a "headline-grabbing commitment" by the end of June and a few months before the presidential election. The administration has struggled to reduce its military prescence and vulnerability in the two countries, the article said.
I think this story touches a broad range of topics from national identity to defense to perception. While Europe tries to unite and build up its military defense, the U.S. request to expand NATO into Iraq and Afghanistan would cause a significant drain on European forces but at the same time make Bush look good for the elections. Its also interesting that France's president Jacques Chirac is trying to mend his political differences with the Bush administration after clashing over the Iraq war.
Nato role expanding at urging of the U. S.
Elaine Sciolino, International Herald Tribune
NATO role expanding at urging of the U.S.
Elaine Sciolino/NYT NYT
Saturday, February 21, 2004
Bush wants alliance, now in Afghanistan, to add Iraqi mission
BRUSSELS NATO is back.
The much-maligned cold war military alliance lost its mission when its primordial enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed, and was ridiculed by the Bush administration and rendered impotent by its own division over the American-led war on Iraq.
Only 16 months ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lectured NATO defense ministers in Warsaw that if NATO did not transform itself, "it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century." Now, the Bush administration is struggling to reduce its military presence and vulnerability in Afghanistan in Iraq. And it is turning to NATO to expand its mandate in Afghanistan and play a substantive role in Iraq. "I believe in NATO," President George W. Bush told Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the new NATO secretary general, when the two met in the Oval Office last month, senior NATO officials said. "I believe NATO is transforming itself and adjusting to meet the true threats of the 21st century." When de Hoop Scheffer pledged to work hard to get NATO to do more in Afghanistan, Bush replied, "I'm with you." And when the conversation turned to Iraq, Bush said, "The more of a NATO role the better."
De Hoop Scheffer, the Bush administration's choice to lead NATO, came home and pitched the new line. At a speech in Brussels on Tuesday, he said that the alliance was willing to deploy in Iraq. "Under the right conditions we could do it," de Hoop Scheffer told the German Marshall Fund's Trans-Atlantic Center. If a sovereign Iraqi government with United Nations backing were to ask for NATO's help, it would be difficult to "abrogate our responsibilities." Until NATO took command of the force that policies Kabul and the area around it, NATO was in the midst of an identity crisis, uncertain of its role, its future and what constituted a military threat in the post 9/11 era. Its role in stabilizing Afghanistan represents NATO's first "out of area" mission beyond Europe; Iraq would be the second. The United States wants NATO to deliver on an ambitious plan to extend its peacekeeping presence outside Kabul and create links with the American-led offensive military operation in the south, which is struggling to rout the remnants of Taliban rule. It also wants NATO to take command of the vulnerable 9,500-strong multinational brigade in central Iraq, which is now run by Poland, and possibly the larger British-led operation in the south. The goal is for NATO to make a headline-grabbing commitment to both missions at the NATO summit meeting in Istanbul, just days before the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis at the end of June and five months before the U.S. presidential election. The problem in expanding NATO into Iraq is that it already has failed to persuade countries to do enough in Afghanistan. In the four months since the UN authorized NATO to expand its peacekeeping mission of about 6,000 outside the Afghan capital, Kabul, the alliance has managed to send only a few hundred troops under German command to the relatively safe northern city of Kunduz. It took months of high-level arm-twisting of NATO members last year to get them to pledge to send desperately needed helicopters to Afghanistan.
George Robertson, the former secretary general, was forced to lobby hard for the helicopters at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels and at every farewell meeting in December, finally getting commitments of three Black Hawk helicopters from Turkey and three or four from the Netherlands. "Lord Robertson had to use everything he had to bludgeon the foreign and defense ministers into committing helicopters," said Robert Bell, a former White House and senior NATO official who is now a private defense consultant in Brussels. "NATO can't operate that way." General James Jones, NATO's top commander in Europe, told a Senate committee last month that Afghanistan was a "defining moment" for the alliance as it adopted a broader global agenda, but then complained that NATO members were not providing enough troops for the country's reconstruction. "The alliance has agreed, the donor countries have been identified, and yet we find ourselves mired in the administrative details of who's going to pay for it, who's going to transport it, how's it going to be maintained," he said. On Wednesday, Jones presented NATO members with a wish list of what it need to enable NATO to deploy in five provincial cities, senior NATO officials said.
De Hoop Scheffer also has acknowledged his failure so far to persuade NATO nations to send more troops to Afghanistan, saying on Tuesday that force protection was a continuing problem. No member of parliament in any NATO country would approve the new request for troops if there was not an answer to the question, "Who will come to the assistance" of the troops "in extreme circumstances," he said. Asked whether the alliance could contemplate moving into Iraq when there was so much to do in Afghanistan, de Hoop Scheffer launched into a long answer about how the mission was possible, and then said that he could not be expected as secretary general "to bang my head on the table and say, 'This has to work.'" On the positive side, France, whose opposition to the war in Iraq damaged its relationship with Washington, sees NATO as a vehicle for projecting its own military and political power and repairing its American ties. In recent weeks, the United States quietly has welcomed two French one-star generals onto the staff of the NATO Response Force, a creation of Rumsfeld's set up to move rapidly in case of crisis. Jones pushed hard for the administration to grant the French request that the two generals be placed, but the issue was so divisive that Bush himself had to made the final decision, according to NATO officials. France has not been part of NATO's military command structure since President Charles de Gaulle, on a campaign to assert France's military autonomy, withdrew from it in the 1960s. But now, with about 2,000 troops in the first rotation of the 6,000-troop Response Force, France is the force's largest troop contributor. France and three other NATO countries - Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg - have also dropped plans announced at a summit meeting in Brussels last April to build a separate European Union military headquarters in Belgium that the United States vehemently opposed as duplicative of NATO and counter to American interests. Instead, last Friday, Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy envoy, unveiled a much more modest - but face-saving - plan to ambassadors of member countries.
A golden opportunity for Bush to patch up differences with both President Jacques Chirac of France and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder will come with the 60th anniversary of D-Day on June 6. Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has recommended that Bush accept Chirac's offer to dine at the Élysée Palace the night before and visit the Normandy beaches together, but Bush had not yet accepted, senior administration and French officials said. Senior American and French officials have said privately in recent weeks that Bush has no choice but to accept, given the historic importance of the event. They also noted that a photo of Bush standing side by side in Normandy with Chirac and Schröder could help deflect charges by Democrats that he has squandered good relations with two of America's most important allies.
There's an excellent cover article in the Feb7-13 Economist. It goes into a nice explanation (with history) on how the weaker dollar actually benefits the U.S. We started to touch on this in the first few classes. It says that many economists expect the dollar to drop even more, and illuminates how a few--Japan & China--are trying to intervene.
If anyone wants to borrow this from me, please let me know. (I'll type out a few paragraphs)
"Competitive Sport in Boca Raton"
Europeans think the dollar is in danger of becoming too weak; Americans disagree, Who is right?"
The Economist
February 7-13
"Competitive Sport in Boca Raton"
Europeans think the dollar is in danger of becoming too weak; Americans disagree, Who is right?"
The Economist
February 7-13
Second paragraph
"The euro has risen by 50% against the dollar since its trough in July 2001. European officials are frustrated by America's lack of concern for the dollar's slide and the disproportionate burden this is imposing on the euro. In the run-up to the Boca Raton meeting, some European policy makers were alling for a joint statement to stabilise the dollar. But this seems likely to have fallen on deaf ears. As John Connally, a former treasury secretary, told the rest of the world in 1971: "The dollar is our currency, but it is your problem."
The Guardian, UK to join rapid reaction force
The wheels are in motion to create small "battle groups" of German, French and British soldiers for deployment to world "hotspots" by 2007. The troops would only be sent to areas where the U.S. has "no direct interest." The plan appears heavily symbolic in the wake of EU failure to create a larger and broader defense apparatus. The Guardian piece touches on the reasons why: EU members are not spending enough to modernize their armies and they won't combine resources in order to save money.
It's clear that the EU wants to be a political and military counterweight to the US, but it won't realistically be able to compete with US funding of its armed forces, even if member states share equipment. It seems the EU will have to make a tough choice: stick closely to Nato or build its own forces at the risk of jeopardizing the Alliance and being a weak military power in the region. Can the EU be a strong institution without a joint armed forces to back its political reach? More food for an identity crisis thought.
UK to join rapid reaction force
New EU battle groups for deployment to 'failing states'
Richard Norton-Taylor
Wednesday February 11, 2004
The Guardian
Britain, France and Germany, are to set up a joint military force in a ground-breaking initiative expected to be approved by senior EU officials today.
Under the ambitious plan, the three countries will create battle groups of well-trained troops ready to be deployed at a moment's notice to prevent fighting or restore peace around the world.
The battle groups, each of 1,500 troops, will be capable of being deployed within 15 days. They will be active initially for 30 days, but, with a turnaround of troops, could stay at a location for up to 220 days.
Their missions are to be "appropiate for, but not limited to, use in failed or failing states (of which most are in Africa)", according to the draft proposal.
The force will operate under the mandate of chapter seven of the UN charter, which covers peacemaking and peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the UN security council. The plan is the outcome of the British-French summit, held in November, when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, the French president, agreed it was time the EU "pulled its weight", and bolstered its influence, by intervening early on and with force in conflicts.
British defence sources say the plan will be subject to approval by the EU's military committee and also by the union's political and security committee. It is expected to be discussed by Mr Blair, Mr Chirac, and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, at their trilateral summit in Berlin next week.
The aim is for the the joint battle groups, capable of air, land and amphibious missions, to be ready by 2007. It is likely the troops would be used only in limited, regional, crises in which the United States had no direct interest.
The move reflects frustration at the inability of the EU to realise its original aim of setting up a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops, and the failure of European countries to modernise their armed forces and save money by sharing equipment - failures which have been having a serious impact on Nato, as most EU members are also members of the US-led military alliance.
Nato's new secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, told an international security conference in Munich last weekend that the alliance could soon find itself unable to deploy troops to hotspots around the world unless it tackled serious shortcomings in its armed forces.
"If this shortfall is left unaddressed we will soon reach a point where our political reach goes beyond our military grasp," Mr Scheffer said.
He was referring in particular to Afghanistan. Despite the severe budgetary problems facing his department, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has offered British troops as leaders in an expanded Nato peacekeeping mission in northern Afghanistan.
Mr Scheffer also said Nato should not rule out a role in Iraq. "If a legitimate Iraqi government asks for our assistance, and if we have the support of the UN, Nato should not abdicate from its responsibilities."
However, Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, expressed what he called "deep scepticism" about the US proposal for Nato to play a role in Iraq, warning that such missions could threaten the cohesion of Nato. "The risk of failure and the potentially very serious, possibly fatal consequences for the alliance, absolutely must be taken into consideration," he told the Munich conference.
According to this piece, it looks like even with the cooling of hostility over the war in Iraq, solidarity doesn't have a sunny forecast in 2004 for trans-Atlantic relations.
It is interesting to see the incipient divide between Germany and France regarding NATO involvement in Europe's defense. Of course the US would like to see expansion of NATO and NATO forces in Europe and Iraq, including Turkey. It still maintains US military power in the region while diffusing the interests of the EU (not to mention US military costs) and affords the US more leverage in Europe, particularly if the US endorses "fringe" candidates, like Turkey.
The German defense minister, Peter Struck, supports Brent Scowcroft's (who was actually the adviser to GHWB, not GWB himself as stated), assertion that, "unless NATO was Europe's explicit court of first resort in a crisis, 'we're on the road to destruction.'"
I find it curious that the article doesn't peek into this aspect and what may precipitate it.
In response to Roya's earlier posting about Germany and France's seemingly unavoidable involvement in Iraq, this piece speaks to that, with Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, offering the idea of a European-American plan for the Middle East. It sounds like he wants the European brain to kill Islamic fundamentalist terrorism with kindness while American brawn can strangle them with war.
But the U.S. still doesn't want its troops to die alone.
International Herald Tribune - News Analysis: For allies, well-tempered sparring
News Analysis: For allies, well-tempered sparring
John Vinocur/IHT
Monday, February 9, 2004
MUNICH A master of excess, Donald Rumsfeld sought this time to be resoundingly lukewarm. Asked just before the opening of the Munich Conference on Security Policy to describe the current state of trans-Atlantic relations, he said, smiley-faced, "fairly normal."
It was the moderate/cautious/mildly consensual public approach to Europe of the U.S. secretary of defense over the weekend. In an election year, a new round of insults and shrillness with old allies like France and Germany over Iraq and how to deal with the dangers of the world would not do the Bush administration much good with American voters, however little they may really care.
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany, who emotionally battled Rumsfeld in the same hotel conference room a year ago, reciprocated with non-hysterics, saying, "We have to look forward."
Finished was the environmentalist peace-guardian binding himself to a tree of virtue. Twelve months later, for Fischer, the apparent futility of the French and German effort to turn Europe against the Americans on the Iraq war seemed to be a lesson well taken on board, if never to be acknowledged in confessional terms.
But all the willful moderation at the conference Saturday could not hide the mutual skepticism, or the degrees of mistrust and contempt, and plain disagreement running inches below the surface.
The doggedly civil exchange between security officials and experts about how the allies and NATO could combat Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and help install security and modernity in the Middle East came down to a tacit reconsecration of the Alliance's split between those who want to do and those who want to talk.
On the German side, there was an unusually open acknowledgment about "destructive jihadist terrorism with its totalitarian ideology" as the greatest global threat - but by American definition at least, no "do" on Iraq. Zero troops from us, said Fischer. After all, Germany's antiwar position, he insisted three paragraphs into a keynote speech, had been proven right by events.
Rather than offering antiterrorist fighters for the front lines, Fischer called for a joint European-American plan for the Middle East. Elevating talk to complete equality with doing, Fischer claimed that alongside security matters it was "of almost even greater importance" that "social and cultural modernization issues, as well as democracy, the rule of law, women's rights and good governance" get full attention.
Applause (moderate, in keeping with the conference tonality) and mumbling in the audience. Ulrich Weisser, a retired German vice admiral, leaned toward a neighbor and said, "That speech was from Venus," reworking the caricature of Robert Kagan's remark comparing American Martians with European Venusians.
Was Fischer prescribing a division of labor among the allies where the Americans went after the killers and the Europeans spread the peace and re-painted schoolrooms?
Former Senator William Cohen of Maine, a secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, formulated this thought more indirectly and elegantly by wondering, in a question asked of Fischer, how come Germany was not furnishing military assistance in Iraq if stabilization there was the obvious prerequisite to modernization, democracy and Mediterranean free trade zones. Another American asked rhetorically how the allies were to install dialogue and détente with a security threat that is clearly not open to them.
But the Germans were intent on appearing active and full of gabby initiative. While Rumsfeld stuck to saying that NATO showed "a good deal of life," promising that a Mediterranean dialogue would find a place high on the NATO summit meeting in Istanbul in June (and with a little more heat, remembering out loud that his audience in Munich last year included people from countries who said they did not care who won in Iraq), Defense Minister Peter Struck proposed that the Alliance commission a statement on its future at Istanbul.
He called it a "new Harmel report," a reference to a 1967 document that the then West Germany considered a legitimization of its policy of détente toward the Soviet Union. In a sense, Struck seemed to be interested in a reworked mission statement that would bring soft diplomacy an official and respectable place alongside search-and-destroy missions as NATO's zone of geographic preoccupation spread into the Middle East.
Without any elaboration, Struck also advocated "sensible complementarity" between NATO and the European Union's projected military units and coordination between the two concerning their "level of ambition."
What? For Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to President George W. Bush, that seemed to sound like very willful ambiguity. He said that it was nice to talk about complementarity and Harmel reports, but that unless NATO was Europe's explicit court of first resort in a crisis, "we're on the road to destruction."
Struck gave Scowcroft one of the clearest responses of the weekend. It rivaled Rumsfeld's remark in response to a Palestinian's question about Israel's atomic weapons: that if the Israelis had them it was because they alone had to deal with forces in the Middle East that sought their country's extinction.
"NATO is first choice for me," Struck said. "There's no doubt that NATO is in the forefront."
But that was the German defense minister. A high NATO official said that nothing of like clarity could be expected from France. Indeed, the French defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, in talking about the EU's defense efforts, succeeded rhetorically and without harshness in placing a larval European notion and NATO on exactly the same plane, mighty coequals in a world known only to the imagineers, in Walt Disney's phrase, of France's security-policy think tanks.
All these exchanges - their moderation and their more jagged subtext - wound up without discussion of at least three potentially raw and critical areas of trans-Atlantic disagreement.
In recent weeks, both Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac have said they would like to consider arms sales to China. The U.S. State Department responded disapprovingly, calling this a very poor idea. The EU will probably be asked to consider lifting a ban on weapons deals soon.
At the same time, many in Europe, including a big segment of the Bush administration's conservative friends, do not like the United States' open pressure on the EU to accept Turkey as a candidate member.
They say American involvement feeds the arguments of those who describe U.S. policy as seeking to foil European integration. And they fear that with American strategic goals in the Middle East being of greater interest than pleasing Europe, the Americans will not find a way to back off from aggressive support of the Turks.
Most important, the willful courtesies of the well-mannered sparring in Munich left out the enormous implications of the administration's $401.7 billion defense budget for next year. Senator John McCain did mention in passing that of more than two million Europeans under arms, some 5 percent of them were deployable on really tough assignments.
But this was a weekend when contentiousness was not the intent. Considering the virtually unbridgeable gap in capabilities, nobody had the heart to smudge the occasion by saying that trans-Atlantic solidarity in 2004, to use the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's words, is just no longer a given.
International Herald Tribune
From this conservative "intelligence gathering" news service, this view of France's diminishing influence in the world and how the government is trying to address it is a useful example of this country international standing today. It deals with the visit of Dominique de Villepin to 4 of the main Latin American countries in a effort to gather support for its world view (about the UN, and Iraq among other issues).
Comment from Strafor.com: "Confronted with the reality of its diminishing power, France had two options: accept its new second-tier status in a world dominated by U.S. economic and military might, or chart a new course to ensure Paris continues to be a force in global affairs -- at least in the eyes of the French, if not in fact."
Stratfor.com - France: Seeking Influence in Latin America
France: Seeking Influence in Latin America
Summary
French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin visited Latin America as Paris is intensifying efforts to craft a new foreign policy to reverse its waning influence in global and European affairs. In practice, the new bilateral relations Paris is seeking with key countries in Latin America likely won't have any major impact on geopolitical developments there.
Analysis
Over the past year, France has seen its influence significantly diminish in the arena of global affairs and within the European Union. This has greatly upset France, which likes to think of itself as a leading voice in the world; after all, it has a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and, with Germany, is a co-founder of the European Union.
Lately, France's perception of its place in the world has taken a beating. First the Iraq war, which Paris opposed bitterly in a joint alliance with Berlin, demonstrated that French foreign policy did not match the European Union's foreign policy. France and Germany tried to make their anti-war position the common EU foreign policy, but seven countries voted instead to back the United States. In the end, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder wound up looking to all the world like a pair of curmudgeons who the Bush administration and many of their EU peers simply ignored.
More recently, Paris has realized that the inclusion in May 2004 of 10 new EU members -- several of which also supported the Bush administration on the Iraq war and the fight against global terrorism -- will weaken French influence within the union even more. The incoming members have made it clear to Paris and Berlin that they will not let the Franco-German alliance dominate them on foreign policy or anything else.
Confronted with the reality of its diminishing power, France had two options: accept its new second-tier status in a world dominated by U.S. economic and military might, or chart a new course to ensure Paris continues to be a force in global affairs -- at least in the eyes of the French, if not in fact.
In recent months, Paris has intensified a far-reaching diplomatic offensive designed to make France a key force in a multipolar alliance of developing powers like China, Russia, India and South Africa. This week it was Latin America's turn. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin made a five-day trip to Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico from Feb. 2 through 6 to lay the foundations of a new alliance between Paris and the four countries in Latin America that France perceives as having any real importance to its interests.
From the Bush administration's perspective, the only ramification of French efforts to strengthen relations with these countries is that the new allies likely will try to speak with a more coordinated voice on Latin American foreign policy issues. This means that Paris might take positions on specific issues like Colombia, trade or Cuba that would run counter to U.S. interests.
However, Washington won't pay much attention -- just as it doesn't pay much attention to Brazil, Argentina and Mexico on these matters.
The official theme of de Villepin's visit was "Latin America and the new international order." He did not meet with Mexican President Vicente Fox, but he met with the presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Chile -- underscoring the importance these three South American countries assign to closer relations with Paris.
France clearly views Brazil as the Latin American pillar of the new alliance that would support multilateralism against U.S.
unilateralism. European diplomatic sources in Buenos Aires told Stratfor on Feb. 5 that the Chirac government views Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva as the most credible and geopolitically relevant head of state in Latin America today.
Argentina and Chile are perceived as being pulled along in Brazil's wake. Mexico is viewed as important because of its membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the free trade agreement it already has with the European Union.
Although de Villepin's trip didn't produce any major political announcements or economic agreements, France's new foreign policy foundations in Latin America were laid. They include securing Latin American support for a major overhaul of the United Nations, most particularly the U.N. Security Council. Paris might not be happy about the prospect that new EU members will create a more vigorously, pugnaciously democratic union, but it does want an expanded and more democratic U.N. Security Council to prevent the United States from unilaterally imposing its will.
De Villepin also obtained an endorsement from all four governments of the French position that power in Iraq should be transferred to U.N. authority as quickly as possible. He argued that this is a necessary step toward bringing democracy to Iraq more quickly and restoring the U.N.'s credibility and authority in a multilateral world. Of course, that power transfer also would help French companies gain faster, broader access to international reconstruction contracts, and would help Paris press its claims over its existing prewar contracts with the Hussein regime in oil and other sectors of Iraq's economy.
At each stop, De Villepin pledged his support on matters specifically important to these countries. For example, in Chile he said the territorial conflict with Bolivia is strictly a bilateral matter, but added that borders between nations are "intangible." Many Chileans interpreted this statement as supporting their position against Bolivia, though in fact the Bolivians also could see it as endorsing their position against Chile.
In Argentina, he pledged French approval of the March 2004 review of Argentina's agreement with the International Monetary Fund.
Senior fund officials warned recently that Buenos Aires could face trouble with the IMF if it doesn't tangibly progress on restructuring between $88 billion and $100 billion in defaulted debt. However, the pledge suggests that Paris is willing to continue approving IMF loans to Buenos Aires even if the debt talks remain stalled, as Stratfor thinks they likely will.
In Brazil, de Villepin stroked da Silva's ego when exalting Brazil's role in the new multipolar international order -- and in Mexico, he pledged that France will help make the May 28-29 Latin American-EU summit in Guadalajara a success. In short, de Villepin didn't bind France to any entangling commitments. For example, he didn't offer to relax French opposition to liberalizing agriculture in any future trade deal between the EU and the Mercosur customs union.
Ultimately, the new relations Paris is pursuing in South America likely won't translate into a surge in French investments and aid there. Nor will France change its position on some policy positions, such as in agriculture, that are dear to South American hearts. However, the presidents de Villepin met with were happy to host him. At a time when the Bush administration isn't paying much attention to the region, de Villepin's tour probably felt like balm on a sunburn.
This is a Financial Times piece on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's eagerness for NATO to lead Polish troops in Iraq. The article briefly considers France's hesistation, as well as Germany's. They are waiting for Iraq to have some sovereign stauts.
It seems to me that NATO will readily accept a (near) future role in Iraq. I don't think France & Germany (or Belgium) are as reluctant now that the US has gone to war compared to their veto of defense for Turkey in the run up to war. Also, I think Poland's presence places pressure on France and Germany.
Rumsfeld gave the speech in Munich. He outlines a broad, and optimistic vision for NATO's future (including more expansions).
Rumsfeld attempts to draw Nato into Iraq
By Judy Dempsey and Peter Spiegel in Munich
Published: February 6 2004 22:53 | Last Updated: February 6 2004 22:53
Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, called on Nato to take over command of the Polish-led multinational force in south-central Iraq, the first public attempt by Washington to draw France and Germany into the country since the invasion.
Mr Rumsfeld was speaking on Friday after a special meeting of Nato defence ministers attended by all 19 members and the seven countries that will join the alliance in April.
Although he said there was no timetable for the Iraqi operation, Nato officials said they hoped to get agreement by the time the alliance holds its June summit in Istanbul. US officials hope that the handover can take place before sovereignty is returned to the Iraqis on July 1.
Although Nato's participation would not change the military balance in Iraq, it would have political significance, bringing recalcitrant European allies, particularly France, back into the fold.
Nato's presence would also help secure legitimacy and support in the region for the US presence in Iraq.
A move to take the Polish sector could be followed by a proposal to subsume the British-controlled southern provinces, based in Basra, creating an all-Nato flank south of Baghdad.
Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Polish defence minister, said he hoped the handover could happen this year, a view shared by other Nato members. Nato provides command-and-control assets to the Polish headquarters, but is not present on the ground.
Mr Rumsfeld was supported in the meeting by other Nato members, but declined to say who they were. Nato diplomats said backing came from several of the countries already in Iraq, including Poland, Italy and Spain.
Ministers from Germany and France did not join in the discussion, diplomats said. One said there was optimism that France may come on board "once you have a sovereign Iraqi government, things change. Things that are not possible now may be possible then".
A senior French official confirmed Paris would be ready to send troops "if the conditions were right". "It depends on how power is transferred back to the Iraqi people, what role the United Nations will have, and under what conditions the Iraqi government would invite Nato to take over the command," he said.
Germany, however, would find it hard to send troops, since Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, has promised his soldiers would not bear arms in Iraq.
Despite Mr Rumsfeld's optimism, Nato's new secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was unwilling to re-open wounds caused by deep and bitter divisions inside Nato over Iraq.
"Let's take things step by step. Let's see the political developments inside Iraq. It will depend on what the Iraqi government would or would not like Nato to do," he said.
A newly amended European Parliment bill that will make all software patentable is set to come back in the next few months. Big companies want it to protect their ideas. Smaller companies don't so that research can be shared and continued. This is one way that U.S. business (the article uses amazon's patents for example) have huge influence on European law. This would make an interesting follow-up story as the bill comes back to Parliment.
Europe's tug of war over software patents
By Jennifer L. Schenker/IHT
Monday, February 2, 2004
http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=127600&owner=&date=20040202142528
PARIS: You cannot patent software in the European Union today - except if the software is part of a separate invention or process, and even then, it depends on your country.
That can be a murky way to define a patent, both critics and supporters of the status quo would agree, and they are locked in a tempestuous tug of war to pass a new law in their favor.
On one side is big business - largely corporations with large research investments and scores of patents - which wants to make all software patentable in the EU to mirror U.S. and Japanese law and preserve their right to collect royalties and protect their work.
The opponents - made up of small and medium-size software companies, academic institutions and supporters of "open source" software, among others - want to make sure software cannot be patented at all, allowing them to create software without fear of lawsuits.
A European Parliament bill that would have made all software subject to patenting is the focal point of the outrage among technology activists. Opponents of the bill succeeded in adding amendments in September that would essentially prevent patents from being issued for most types of software. The proposal is due back in Parliament in the next few months, and the outcome is far from certain.
According to this story European media have reacted with cynicism and "a collective snort" to David Kay's testimony on WMD in Iraq.
You might want to check if it is true and/or find some examples from different countries.
We'll have our third class on Tuesday and I have not seen much blogging yet...
The New York Times - Much of Europe Is Derisive About Report on Iraqi Arms
January 31, 2004
Much of Europe Is Derisive About Report on Iraqi Arms
By CRAIG S. SMITH
PARIS, Jan. 30 — Much of Europe has given a collective snort to the testimony by David Kay, the former chief United States weapons inspector, that there probably were no illicit weapons in Iraq before the United States-led war there.
"There is a kind of cynicism here," said Dominique Moïsi, a political analyst in Paris. "So the Americans lied to their people and to us and maybe to themselves. That's exactly what we already thought."
Similar sentiments rippled across the Continent, where debate on the war was split between those who believed and those who doubted American and British contentions that Iraq posed an imminent threat.
Mr. Kay's testimony on Wednesday created less derision in countries like Poland, which supported the United States in going to war. "It doesn't change our position," said Boguslaw Majewski, a spokesman for Poland's Foreign Ministry. "When the decision was reached, all the warning signals were there."
There was greater bemusement in Europe over Britain's seemingly contradictory report that chastised the British Broadcasting Corporation for suggesting that Prime Minister Tony Blair's administration had hyped intelligence reports of weapons in Iraq.
"Especially in France, there is a feeling that if the David Kay report is right," Mr. Moïsi said. "How can the BBC be so severely punished for revealing what was ultimately true?"
Some German media scoffed at the purported independence of the Hutton report, which led to the resignations of the BBC's board chairman, Gavyn Davies its director general, Greg Dyke, and Andrew Gilligan, the reporter of the original account.
"Hutton has been a servant to the crown all his life; he always knows what his duty is," read an editorial in Friday's Die Tageszeitung, a national newspaper published in Berlin. It likened Lord Hutton's role to "a football team putting up their own manager as referee and then celebrating a win on dubious penalties."
The debate over whether Iraq posed enough of a threat to justify military action revealed deep divisions within Europe, which has worked hard for decades to forge a unified polity that would eventually be able to speak with a single voice on foreign affairs. France and Germany led the opposition to the American initiative. But Spain and most of Eastern Europe's former Soviet bloc countries took the United States and Britain's side.
Most galling to France and Germany was the allegiance to the United States expressed by Eastern European countries that will join the European Union this year.
Some people in the United States and Britain have called for independent inquiries into the quality of intelligence used to justify the war and whether that intelligence was unduly manipulated. But such calls are rarely heard on the Continent.
An exception is Spain, where the government supported the American-led invasion despite popular discontent. The opposition Socialist Party has taken Mr. Kay's testimony as an opportunity to demand such an inquiry at home. So far, the government has ignored the requests.
In general, though, far less energy has been spent in continental Europe on re-examining prewar intelligence or decisions than has been expended in Britain or the United States.
Europe, it appears, would happily forget the matter and move on.
The New York Times
January 24, 2004
A Tougher War for the U.S. Is One of Legitimacy
By ROBERT KAGAN
This is the author of "Paradise and Power" (suggested reading) and the author of the quote "Americans are from Mars. Europeans from Venus" Here is his most recent analysys on US-EU relationships.
What kind of world order do we want?" That question, posed by Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has been on the minds of many Europeans these days.
Indeed, the great trans-Atlantic debate over the Iraq war was rooted in profound disagreement over "world order." Yes, Americans and Europeans differed on the specific question of what to do about Iraq. They debated whether Saddam Hussein posed a serious threat, and whether war was the right answer. A solid majority of Americans answered yes to both questions; even larger majorities of Europeans answered no.
But these disagreements reflected more than simple tactical and analytical assessments of the situation in Iraq. As the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, put it, the struggle was not so much about Iraq as it was about "two visions of the world." The differences were not only about policy. They were also about first principles.
Opinion polls taken before, during and after the war have shown two peoples living on separate strategic and ideological planets. More than 80 percent of Americans believe that war may achieve justice; less than half of Europeans believe that a war — any war — can ever be just. Americans and Europeans disagree about the role of international law and international institutions, and about the nebulous and abstract yet powerful question of international legitimacy.
These different worldviews predate the Iraq war and the presidency of George W. Bush, although both the war and the Bush administration's conduct of international affairs have deepened and perhaps hardened this trans-Atlantic rift into an enduring feature of the international landscape. "America is different from Europe," Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany declared matter-of-factly months before the war. Who any longer can deny it?
Today a darker possibility looms. A great philosophical schism has opened within the West, and instead of mutual indifference, mutual antagonism threatens to debilitate both sides of the trans-Atlantic community. Coming at a time in history when new dangers and crises are proliferating, this schism could have serious consequences. For Europe and the United States to decouple strategically has been bad enough. But what if the schism over "world order" infects the rest of what we have known as the liberal West? Will the West still be the West?
It is the legitimacy of American power and American global leadership that has come to be doubted by a majority of Europeans. America, for the first time since World War II, is suffering a crisis of international legitimacy.
Americans will find that they cannot ignore this problem. The struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be among the critical contests of our time, in some ways as significant in determining the future of the international system and America's place in it as any purely material measure of power and influence.
Americans for much of the past three centuries have considered themselves the vanguard of a worldwide liberal revolution. Their foreign policy from the beginning has not been only about defending and promoting their material national interests. "We fight not just for ourselves but for all mankind," Benjamin Franklin declared of the American Revolution, and whether or not that has always been true, most Americans have always wanted to believe that it is true. There can be no clear dividing line between the domestic and the foreign, therefore, and no clear distinction between what the democratic world thinks about America and what Americans think about themselves.
Every profound foreign policy debate in America's history, from the time when Jefferson squared off against Hamilton, has ultimately been a debate about the nation's identity and has posed for Americans the primal question "Who are we?" Because Americans do care, the steady denial of international legitimacy by fellow democracies will over time become debilitating and perhaps even paralyzing.
Americans therefore cannot ignore the unipolar predicament. Perhaps the singular failure of the Bush administration is that it has been too slow to recognize this. Mr. Bush and his advisers came to office guided by the narrow realism that dominated in Republican foreign policy circles during the Clinton years. The Clinton administration, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, wrote in a famous essay in January 2000, had failed to focus on the "national interest" and instead had addressed itself to "humanitarian interests" or the interests of "the international community." The Bush administration, by contrast, would take a fresh look at all treaties, obligations and alliances and re-evaluate them in terms of America's "national interest."
The notion that the United States could take such a narrow view of its "national interest" has always been mistaken. But besides being an analytical error, the enunciation of this "realist" approach by the sole superpower in a unipolar era was a serious foreign policy error. The global hegemon cannot proclaim to the world that it will be guided only by its own definition of its "national interest."
This is precisely what even America's closest friends fear: that the United States will wield its unprecedented vast power only for itself. In her essay, Ms. Rice derided "the belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of someone or something else." But for the rest of the world, what other source of legitimacy can there be? When the United States acts in its own interests, Ms. Rice claimed, as would many Americans, it necessarily serves the interests of everyone.
"To be sure," she argued, "there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect."
But could even America's closest friends ever be persuaded that an America always pursuing its self-interest could be relied upon to serve their interests, too, as some kind of "second-order effect"?
Both the unipolar predicament and the American character require a much more expansive definition of American interests. The United States can neither appear to be acting only in its self-interest, nor can it in fact act as if its own national interest were all that mattered. Even at times of dire emergency, and perhaps especially at those times, the world's sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it wields its great power on behalf of its principles and all who share them.
The manner in which the United States conducts itself in Iraq today is especially important in this regard. At stake is not only the future of Iraq and the Middle East more generally, but also the future of America's reputation, its reliability and its legitimacy as a world leader. The United States will be judged, and should be judged, by the care and commitment it takes to secure a democratic peace in Iraq. It will be judged by whether it really advances the cause of liberalism, in Iraq and elsewhere, or whether it merely defends its own interests.
No one has made this argument more powerfully, and more presciently, than that quintessential realist, Henry A. Kissinger.
The task in Iraq, Mr. Kissinger argued in an essay, was not just to win the war but to convey "to the rest of the world that our first pre-emptive war has been imposed by necessity and that we seek the world's interests, not exclusively our own." America's "special responsibility, as the most powerful nation in the world," he said, "is to work toward an international system that rests on more than military power — indeed, that strives to translate power into cooperation. Any other attitude will gradually isolate and exhaust us."
The United States, in short, must pursue legitimacy in the manner truest to its nature, by promoting the principles of liberal democracy, not only as a means to greater security, but as an end in itself. Success in such endeavors will provide the United States a measure of legitimacy in the liberal, democratic world, and even in Europe.
The United States should try to fulfill its part of a new trans-Atlantic bargain by granting Europeans some influence over the exercise of American power — if, that is, the Europeans in turn will wield that influence wisely. The NATO alliance — an alliance of and for liberal democracies — could be the locus of such a bargain. NATO is where the United States has already ceded influence to Europeans, who vote on an equal footing with the American superpower in all the alliance's deliberations. Indeed, NATO has for decades been the one organization capable of reconciling American hegemony with European autonomy and influence. And even today NATO retains a sentimental attraction for Americans, more potent than the attraction they feel for the United Nations.
But can the United States cede some power to Europe without putting American security, and indeed Europe's and the entire liberal democratic world's security, at risk in the process? Here lies the rub. For even with the best of intentions, the United States cannot enlist the cooperation of Europeans if there is no common assessment of the nature of global threats today, and of the means that must be employed to meet them. But it is precisely this gap in perception that has driven the United States and Europe apart in the post-cold-war world.
If it is true, as the British diplomat Robert Cooper suggests, that international legitimacy stems from shared values and a shared history, does such commonality still exist within the West now that the cold war has ended? For while the liberal trans-Atlantic community still shares much in common, the philosophical schism on the fundamental questions of world order may now be overwhelming those commonalities. It is hard to imagine the crisis of legitimacy being resolved as long as this schism persists. For even if the United States were to fulfill its part of the bargain, and grant the Europeans the influence they crave, would the Europeans, with their very different perception of the world, fulfill theirs?
As long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, they will not join in a common strategy. Nor will Europeans accord the United States legitimacy when it seeks to address those threats by itself, and by what it regards as sometimes the only means possible, force.
And what, then, is the United States to do? Should Americans, in the interest of trans-Atlantic harmony, try to alter their perceptions of global threats to match that of their European friends? To do so would be irresponsible. Not only American security but the security of the liberal democratic world depends today, as it has depended for the past half-century, on American power. Even Europeans, in moments of clarity, know that is true.
"The U.S. is the only truly global player," Joschka Fischer has declared, "and I must warn against underestimating its importance for peace and stability in the world. And beware, too, of underestimating what the U.S. means for our own security."
But the United States has played that role not by adopting Europe's postmodern worldview, but by seeing the world through its own eyes. Today most Europeans believe that the United States exaggerates the dangers in the world. After Sept. 11, most Americans fear that they haven't taken those dangers seriously enough.
Herein lies the tragedy. To address today's global threats, Americans will need the legitimacy that Europe can provide. But Europeans may well fail to provide it. In their effort to constrain the superpower, they will lose sight of the mounting dangers in the world. In their nervousness about unipolarity, they may forget the dangers of a multipolarity in which nonliberal and nondemocratic powers come to outweigh Europe in the global competition.
Europeans thus may succeed in debilitating the United States, but since they have no intention of supplementing American power with their own, the net result will be a diminution of the total amount of power that the liberal democratic world can bring to bear in its defense — and in defense of liberalism itself.
Right now many Europeans are betting that the risks from the "axis of evil," from terrorism and tyrants, will never be as great as the risk of an American Leviathan unbound. Perhaps it is in the nature of a postmodern Europe to make such a judgment. But now may be the time for the wisest heads in Europe, including those living in the birthplace of Pascal, to begin asking what will result if that wager proves wrong.
Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is adapted from the afterword to his book "Of Paradise and Power," republished this month in paperback by Vintage Books. A longer excerpt will appear in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs.
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