Here is a French article about Tony Blair's position towards the EU Constitution and the British Referendum. The article explains pretty clearly the strategic reasons why the Premier supported the idea of a referendum, and the general Europhobic feelings throughout the country...
British citizens apparently need to be reassured about the "scary" idea of being part of a new United States of Europe...
Le Monde, "Tony Blair soumettra la Constitution de l'UE à un référendum", 4/21/04
Last week Robert E. Hunter, who was the U.S. ambassador to NATO under Clinton, answered questions regarding the expansion of NATO to 26 countries with the addition of seven new members. He responded to a question from Post editors whether an ESDP would leave NATO irrelevant. His response was basically "Yeah, right."
Europe doesn't have the capabilities - yet - he argued to go it alone in security matters. His argument is that Europe still needs the United States and NATO in Europe and will for many years to come. Eventually, however, the US might be able to "go home" and let Europe deal with itself. For now, an ESDP would be a complement to NATO.
This is a slightly different picture than officials we spoke with portrayed. While I think they'd all agree that NATO will continue to be the dominant player for some time, an ESDP wouldn't necessarily be a complementary entity. The view is that NATO is just another option in the great big European toolbox of defense. Hunter argues that Europe still doesn't have the tools.
Washington Post.com - NATO conversation with Amb. Robert E. Hunter
washingtonpost.com
World: NATO
Amb. Robert E. Hunter
NATO Ambassador Under President Clinton
Monday, March 29, 2004; 4:00 PM
The prime ministers of seven new NATO member nations are being welcomed to the White House by President Bush today. The leaders of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, expand the alliance to 26 countries.
Robert E. Hunter, NATO ambassador under President Clinton and Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, will be online to discuss the expansion of NATO and today's White House ceremony.
Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: This afternoon, President Bush welcomed 7 new countries to NATO -- bringing the total to 26. That is 10 new countries from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the last five years. Clearly, NATO will be different; but just how different is the critical question. Much is already known -- for instance, that all members have the same rights and responsibilities, that all will join the integrated command structure, Allied Command Operations, that all will be covered by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all allies to come to the defense of any any that is attacked, and that all must now also look beyond Europe -- "out of area" in NATO jargon -- to new challenges as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq. As before, US engagement and leadership are critical; as before, the US needs to sustain its involvement on a bipartisan basis.
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Lyme, Conn.: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes -- as of today, it has 26 members, only 5 years ago it had only 16 -- the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members -- in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about it should do -- and not do -- against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular counse of action is important; and for their to be effective leadership -- and particularly American leadership. This leadership -- and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security -- remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so -- in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.
At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end. But one thing is clear: one of the key elements of NATO is its consensus rule, which stimulates all the allies to take critical matters seriously, and to work together to preserve the alliance for all the tasks ahead.
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washingtonpost.com: Would a coordinated EU foreign and defense policy replace NATO for many European nations and thus render the alliance irrelevant?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Wouldn't it be wonderful if the EU had a foreign and security policy that would lead Europeans to take full responsibility for European security, and let the US just go home?! But that is not likely to happen, at least not for many years. The Europeans are not yet so organized that they can "do security" by themselves, and they do not have the tools needed, as are found in the NATO integrated command structure and more than half a century of working together, a precious asset that is not easily duplicated. But the EU is beginning to do more -- in Macedonia, for instance, and later this year to take over full responsibility for security from NATO in Bosnia.
America is still needed in Europe -- and that means NATO is still needed -- in terms of the great historic imponderables, including insurance that the 20th century, the worst century ever for war and human suffering, is well and truly in the past; and working to ensure that the future of Russia will not again lead to a fundamental rupture in arrangements for European security. In addition, the European Union does not have the capacity -- and is unlikely anytime soon to gain the capacity -- to act beyond Europe, as NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is likely to do in Iraq. Thus the European Security and Defense Policy (an adjunct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) can be a useful complement to NATO, but the EU will not replace NATO, and certainly not US power and engagement, at least for many years to come.
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washingtonpost.com: Will Russia ever join NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Russia in NATO? In theory, yes. Indeed, officially, NATO membership is open to any member of the OSCE that is "ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership." But for Russia to join would require major changes in that country, including assurance that democracy is well rooted; and it would require Russia to meet all the other aspects of NATO membership, measured also in terms of its relations with other countries.
More important, would the rest of the alliance be prepared to extend to Russia guarantees of all its borders against external armed attack -- for example, some day against China? If the Western nations were so disposed, it is very likely that they would work out this business with Russia by other means; and, indeed, they would want to do all that is possible so that this eventuality did not come to pass.
At heart, if the security situation in Eurasia reached the point where Russia could be considered for membership in NATO to be a serious proposition, things would probably be so positive that NATO would not any longer be needed!
Because of all of these argument, Russia has not suggested joining NATO, and no one in the West has proposed it. Instead, there is now a NATO-Russia Council, which seeks to treat Russia like an equal, to bring it into NATO deliberations when its interests are truly engaged, to build cooperation, including in areas like peacekeeping and -- in time -- security for the Middle East, and to extend security truly in a "Europe whole and free." But Russia does not have to be in NATO to be part of NATO -- and the test will be how all these countries work together to build security across Eurasia.
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Cumberland, Md.: While it is nice to have new members in NATO -- it is doubtful if they can carry their weight militarily or even spend the money on defense that is required to upgrade their out-of-date equipement. I question the value of accepting new members in NATO who are militarily underpowered. Your comments please?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: When we set out to take in new NATO members a decade ago, I invented a slogan to put this point: a country to join NATO would have to be a "produce and not just a consumer of security." Now, that does not mean being able to mount a defense like that of the Cold War. None of these new countries, or any of the "old" NATO allies (with the possible exception of Turkey, on the Iraqi border) faces an external military threat. What we need from the new countries is that they democratize their military forces, that they adopt NATO standards in equipment and practice, that they take part in Allied Command Operations (however little), that they be able to coordinate their activities, their equipment, and their training with NATO -- and that the continue efforts to deepen democracy and market economies, and continue their renunciation of claims against neighbors. At the same time, there is an interest in having these countries make some contribution to the newer tasks, including doing what they can to counter terrorism (and that can including police work, intelligence, and border control within their own countries) and to join, in however limited a way, in common decisions NATO takes to be engaged in places like Afghnistan and Iraq. This is part of a total security concept: and the amount of money spent on military forces is not the key point -- indeed, NATO does not want Central European countries to spend so much money that they may retard the development of their economies.
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Little Rock, Ark.: Will or should NATO ever get increasingly involved in the Iraqi conflict like it has in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: I predict that, within a year, NATO will have taken over responsibility for much if not all external military engagement in Iraq, under a UN mandate. This is a logical extension of what NATO has already done successfully in the Balkans (neither Bosnia or Kosovo is yet successful politically and economically but, except for the recent violence in Kosovo, neither has experienced the conflict of the pre-NATO period), and is beginning to do in Afghanistan. The US is reaching the point of acknowledging that we would like help in Iraq -- in military deployments, in reconstruction, in development of post-Saddam politics -- and that many of the allied countries have capabilities that can be of significan benefit. What is required is that we be willing to share influence and decision-making as well as responsibility and burdens: something that may seem obvious, but which official Washington has not yet been prepared to do.
At heart, whether or not we should have gone to war in Iraq, it is over. The old security system has been shattered. Both we and the Europeans have a vital interest -- vital self-interests -- in putting something viable in its place. And how better to do that, from the point of view of all concerned, than through NATO?
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washingtonpost.com: How has perceived unilateralism affected the United States' leadership role in NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: NATO is now slowly emerging from the worst crisis in its history, occasioned in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so, and certainly without being able to bring along the NATO allies as a whole. Even if the US could be argued to have had no choice, the way we went about it gratuitously weakened our reputation for probity, cooperation, consultation, and sound judgement. But the Alliance is, in the end, about what countries either do or do not do together in their common interests -- and common values -- for the future. And if wiser heads prevail, on both sides of the Atlantic -- and there is evidence this is beginning to happen -- then the Western alliance can regain must of its former strength. And the US can gain much of its former leadership: but that must be on the basis of looking to others for counsel rather than obedience; seeking to build cooperation and common understanding rather than an assertion of "our way or the highway." The latter method has been tried and found wanting. We know now that we have to have allies and partners to shape the world to our (and their) liking; and if we act on that insight, we can regain the highground that was so woefully lost last year. In sum, the US disposes of great incipient power, unrivalled, perhaps, in history; but to change that incipient power into lasting influence, we must create institutions, attitudes, practices, and policies that work for us....because they also work for others.
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Washington, D.C.: If there is no threat to these new members, why is NATO installing air defense over the Baltics, thus to treat Russia as the enemy? While Putin has much more important things to do, like growing the Russian economy, and the level-headed Russians I talk to don't get too excited over the Baltics (though they think this "Article 5 protection" emboldens the Baltics on the language question), it merely encourages the unreformed Russian military to keep trumpeting the threat from the West and the need to keep their old formations. So is this air defense gesture really necessary?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: You put your finger on a key problem. On the one hand, countries have to be able to do at least a minium to guarantee the sanctity of their borders and their air space. As NATO members, there at least needs to be some means for what is called "air policing" -- hence, the four F-16s (and some limited other equipments) that will be deployed in Lithuania: these are no threat to Russia, and cannot be so represented. Indeed, nothing that has been done in any of the new allied states, or that anyone contemplates doing, can pose such a treat or honestly be represented as doing so. But on the other hand, it is also important that, with the expansion of NATO, Russia not be pushed away or even have a sense is it being pushed away. That is one reason Lithuania has worked out arrangements with Russia (and Belarus) for the movement of people to/from Kaliningrad, a part of Russia now separated from it by NATO territory. That is why NATO is pressing Latvia to treat is major Russian minority with dignity. It is why NATO and Russia have created the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, in which Russia is equal with the now 26 NATO allies. And it is why NATO has sought to engage Russia in peacekeeping (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), and has a raft of common activities (see the NATO website for a list). But this must all be done deftly; there has since NATO began its venture of playing a lead role in crafting a "Europe whole and free," it has had to be sure that it advaces the legitimate security interests both of Central European states and of Russia; and it must continue to do this. (This is particular true with regard to any bases and permenent deployments in former Warsaw Pact territory: in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO included a unilateral statement that imposed a number of limitations on what it would do in this regard. It is not violating the letter of these pledges; but it must be careful, as well, to honor the spirit).
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Kansas City, Mo.: For some time, I have heard a Russian point-of-view that the US made commitments at the end of the Cold War to limit NATO enlargement. Michael Mandelbaum has referred to such commitments in his opposition to NATO expansion. I've heard other policymakers and scholars say that no such commitments were made, and that NATO is free to enlarge. Apparently the US would also be free to restructure its military deployments, away from Germany and to "New Europe."
What's the right story here?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: No such commitments were made. When I was US ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, we researched the case thoroughly, to be sure that we were honoring all pledges made. At the same time, NATO enlargement has not taken place in a vacuum, as though Russia has no importance. Quite the contrary: it is engaged in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO peacekeeping (at one point in both Bosnia and Kosovo), in exercises, and even now moving in the direction of "interoperability" with NATO equipment.
The US redeployments easterward are ostensibly to have different kinds of bases -- some just for runways and storage of supplies -- that would make deployments farther east, for instance to Middle East crisis regions, easier. This is still being debated. And it needs to be undertaken with several points in mind: military efficiency and cost are only one factor. We also have to reassure the Germans and others in West Europe that we are not shifting our focus decisively away from Europe; and we have to assure the Russians that we are not taking advantage of their weakness. In fact, nothing the US is thinking of doing could pose a threat to Russia, but it is critical that whatever is done be done in full "transparence" -- indeed in consultations -- with Russia, which does, indeed, share many of the US and allied objectives with regard to countering terrorism and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
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Alexandria, Va.: Are there other countries that wish to join NATO? Now that the Cold War is behind us what is the rational for joining the group?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Secretary countries in the Balkans want to join NATO -- Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania -- and all may do so. Their reasoning is the same as that of the countries that have already joined: to "bring history to an end," in the sense of being the playthings of the Great Powers; to have an association with the EU (with tends to follow) and with the US; to have an added incentive domestically to put down deep democrtic roots; and to gain -- they believe -- the benefits in terms of foreign investment and confidence that can come with NATO membership. In addition, Ukraine has expressed an interest in joining NATO -- in its case to become mroe certain of its relationship with Russia, as well as to gain economic benefits. Georgia has said it will apply for membership and Azerbaijan is moving in that direction. But beyond the Balkans and perhasp Ukraine (leading aside, for some time, Belarua and Moldova), one has to ask just how big NATO can become and still retain a sense of common purpose, and also a willingness of each of its members to give security guarantees -- and NATO's security guarantees must always be real -- to farflung states. The Caucasus is a long way away from NATO-Europe, strategically and politically; most allies would be reluctant to take on the burdens of potentially having to defense Georgia; and they would not want to do so regarding Azerbaijan while it is still at war with Armenia: and yet, these are precisely reasons these two countries are interested in NATO -- and Azerbaijan also speaks both of Russia and Iran in terms of its concerns, something that most if not all the European NATO allies shy away from getting involved in. So -- NATO is a successful venture; but it must not be seen as the be-all and end-all for everyone. The farther from Europe, the more there needs to be creativity about something else -- e.g., a new security system, crafted on 21st century lines, for at least major parts of what is being called the "Greater Middle East."
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Warsaw, Poland: What role will NATO play in the war against terrorism?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Counter-terrorism is most about non-military activities -- as Secretary of Defense and others have said. It is about intelligence, policy work, border control, etc., etc. -- most of which are activities carried out by other institutions and relationships, both singly and in groups. There is also the task of trying to "dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim," which, if anything, is the task of institutions like the European Union (in a new strategic partnership with the US). Militarily, there is work to do, of course, and most of that is in the realm of either special forces or of the kind of "reconstruction" and "stabilization" work that is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq (which becamse a terrorism problem only after the war). This is not about high intensity warfare, except in rare circumstances (such as the anti-Taliban period after 9/11).
Thus NATO has already assumed command of ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, and it is developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Indeed, if NATO gets more deeply engaged in Afghanisan to do what is needed so that it will cease being a base for the export of terrorism (if "cease" can be achieved, which is a daunting task), then this could become the most ambitous task the Alliance has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is likely to take over major responsibilities in Iraq, which have their own counter-terrorism aspects.
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Cumberland, Md.: NATO is more and more becoming relatively useless as a military alliance for the U.S.
Too many members, including France and Germany, are unwilling to spend the money for up-to-date military hardware. These countries cannot keep up with the US on the battlefield -- Should we not compel them to assume peacekeeping duties and take over from the U.S. in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: We have to be careful about reading too much into what we read in the newspapers, especially at a time when there has been so much bad blood across the Atlantic.
As we look down the road, it is not clear that there is a signficant range of possibilities where the "big batallions" will be needed, at least in terms of Allied engagement militarily. What is needed, clearly, is special forces, in particular for counter-terrorism; the kinds of stabilization forces that are now going into Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ability of allied forces to be able to fight together -- which means truly compatible C4ISR -- an abbreviation for command, control, communications, computors, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It will also mean a sharing of high technology so that allies can field these equipments that can work together (here, the US has been especially laggard in easing restrictions in the flow of high technology -- we can't have it both ways!).
This does mean more capabilities by many of the Europeans; but less in terms of major power projection at the high end of combat than in the ability to get appropriate forces to a theater, quickly (air and sea lift) and to keep them there for a period of time (logisitics and support). The EU has been creating a Rapid Reaction Force, one of whose virtues is that it simulates some of the governments to spend money on defense, in order to promote European unity, that they might not otherwise spend. And NATO is developing a NATO Response Force, which will be able to deploy forces in as little as 5 days and keep them deployed for a signficant period of time.
Note also that one country we have been criticizing -- France -- has been engaged in NATO's major activities: it has more resources committed to the NATO Response Force than any other European ally; it is sending more officers to Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation; and it has about 250 special forces fighting in Afganistan, under US command! And before NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan, the Germans (and the Dutch) had the command.
Yes, the allies can do more -- and will also be doing more in Macedonia (an EU operation) and later this year in Bosnia (taking over from NATO). And most if not all will be willing to engage with the US, Britain, etc., in Iraq, as a NATO operation, if we are prepared to have an appropriate UN resolution (which would also lead Spain to keep its troops there, as the new prime minister has made clear) -- which means our being prepared to share some of the decision-making and influence as well as the responsibility and the burdens (understanding, of course, that we would still be the "800-pound gorilla" in terms of influence.)
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Tallahassee, Fla.: ".....in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so..."
I must say I am a bit shocked by your comment here. Especially since the 911 commission has been grilling everyone on the cost of inaction against the Taliban. Why do you think these new member countries, that lived under supression for so long, joined the coalition and supported the war in Iraq? Or would you, like Senator Kerry, just say they were bribed or coerced?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: "Cost of inaction against the Taliban." Yes. But it is not clear that a war in Iraq helped against the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or terrorism, or what was done to us on 9/11.
Be that as it may, we are in Iraq, and the Middle East, for the next generation. No matter who is president will have to face that fact. And the Europeans, too. This is our engagement for as far ahead as we can see. But we must not in the process lose sight of what we as Americans are most concerned about: terrorism here, against our people, and potentially being visited here, again. That is the priority, and going into Iraq did little to advance that cause.
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Virginia: What must a country do to be offered NATO membership?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Be a democracy with firm roots. Be committed to a market economy (success upfront not required: that can be aided by belonging to NATO). Renunciation of any claims against neighbors (note the achievement of Hungary and Romania). Reform (including democratization) of the military. Adaptation to NATO methods and standards. And geographic relevance (i.e., not so far distant that existing allies will be reluctant to provide the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
It is a tribute to NATO's past, its future, and the role of American leadership and engagement that so many countries want to join this alliance -- of both interests and values.
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Falls Church, Va.: Is there a list of countries that have especially close ties with NATO, so that they can be more easily included in intra-NATO agreements and exercises? Are NATO standards pushed to non-NATO countries (for example, Australia or Sweden)?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Sweden (and Finland) yes -- indeed, they could join anytime they wanted to, as meeting every conceivable criterion (including being "producers and not just consumers of security.") Australia (etc.), no: can one see that it would give a commitment to fight for countries in Europe? (It did do so in WWI and WWII, along with New Zealand, but more was involved than geopolitics).
For NATO to have relevance, in terms of members being willing freely to make the commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to mutual self-defense, there has to be a solid basis for doing so and meaning it. Geography is at least one element of that. Some other form of engagement that includes Australia (etc)? Fine, and a number exist.....
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: In sum: what we are seeing, today, in taking in 7 more countries to NATO, is a further step in fulfilling the potential -- and the promise -- of a "Europe whole and free" -- the first time in all of European history when there has been a chance of creating a security system from which all countries in "Europe" (and that includes the US and Canada) can benefit and which will penalize none. NATO is many elements, and all are critical. As devised in the 1990s -- and I was honored to have the chance to play a role -- NATO crafted a coherent strategy, consisting of several parts:
o the US as a permanent "European power"
o preservation of the integrated military command structure;
o continued support for the "European Civil Space" and the end of the "German problem"
o enlargement to Central Europe
o Partnership for Peace, to get countries ready for membership and provide security and involvement for those who do not join
o Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
o NATO-Russia Council
o NATO-Ukraine Commission
o NATO-ESDP relationship (European Union)
o new command structures
o Bosnia-Kosovo-Afghanistan-Iraq.
"something for everyone." But requiring robust common action, no "something for nothing." And firmly dependent on US leadership, commitment, and wisdom.
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© 2004 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive
This is an interesting Op-ed on "secularism" (laicism) from Fernando Savater a Spanish philosopher and writer. He develops "five theses" that deserve a close reading from those working on this issue.
An imperfect summary of the most relevant points could be:
Savater thinks that the Constitution should avoid any reference to the Christian roots of Europe (a very complex matter) and explains that a "secular" society tends to be clearly unitary and anti segregationist.
El País - Laicismo: cinco tesis
Laicismo: cinco tesis
Fernando Savater es catedrático de Filosofía de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
EL PAÍS | Opinión - 03-04-2004
El debate sobre la relación entre el laicismo y la sociedad democrática actual (en España y en Europa) viene ya siendo vivo en los últimos tiempos y probablemente cobrará nuevo vigor en los que se avecinan: dentro de nuestro país, por las decisiones políticas en varios campos de litigio que previsiblemente adoptará el próximo Gobierno; y en toda Europa, a causa de los acuerdos que exige la futura Constitución europea y por la amenaza de un terrorismo vinculado ideológicamente a determinada confesión religiosa. En cuestiones como ésta, en que la ceguera pasional lleva a muchos a tomar por enemistad diabólica con Dios el veto a ciertos sacristanes y demasiados inquisidores, conviene intentar clarificar los argumentos para dar precisión a lo que se plantea. A ello y nada más quisieran contribuir las cinco tesis siguientes, que no pretenden inaugurar mediterráneos, sino sólo ayudar a no meternos en los peores charcos.
1) Durante siglos, ha sido la tradición religiosa -institucionalizada en la iglesia oficial- la encargada de vertebrar moralmente las sociedades. Pero las democracias modernas basan sus acuerdos axiológicos en leyes y discursos legitimadores no directamente confesionales, es decir, discutibles y revocables, de aceptación en último caso voluntaria y humanamente acordada. Este marco institucional secular no excluye ni mucho menos persigue las creencias religiosas: al contrario, las protege a las unas frente a las otras. Porque la mayoría de las persecuciones religiosas han sucedido históricamente a causa de la enemistad intolerante de unas religiones contra las demás o contra los herejes. En la sociedad laica, cada iglesia debe tratar a las demás como ella misma quiere ser tratada... y no como piensa que las otras se merecen. Convertidos los dogmas en creencias particulares de los ciudadanos, pierden su obligatoriedad general pero ganan en cambio las garantías protectoras que brinda la Constitución democrática, igual para todos.
2) En la sociedad laica tienen acogida las creencias religiosas en cuanto derecho de quienes las asumen, pero no como deber que pueda imponerse a nadie. De modo que es necesaria una disposición secularizada y tolerante de la religión, incompatible con la visión integrista que tiende a convertir los dogmas propios en obligaciones sociales para otros o para todos. Lo mismo resulta válido para las demás formas de cultura comunitaria, aunque no sean estrictamente religiosas, tal como dice Tzvetan Todorov: "Pertenecer a una comunidad es, ciertamente, un derecho del individuo pero en modo alguno un deber; las comunidades son bienvenidas en el seno de la democracia, pero sólo a condición de que no engendren desigualdades e intolerancia" (Memoria del mal).
3) Las religiones pueden decretar para orientar a sus creyentes qué conductas son pecado, pero no están facultadas para establecer qué debe o no ser considerado legalmente delito. Y a la inversa: una conducta tipificada como delito por las leyes vigentes en la sociedad laica no puede ser justificada, ensalzada o promovida por argumentos religiosos de ningún tipo ni es atenuante para el delincuente la fe (buena o mala) que declara. De modo que si alguien apalea a su mujer para que le obedezca o apedrea al sodomita (lo mismo que si recomienda públicamente hacer tales cosas), da igual que los textos sagrados que invoca a fin de legitimar su conducta sean auténticos o apócrifos, estén bien o mal interpretados, etcétera...: en cualquier caso debe ser penalmente castigado. La legalidad establecida en la sociedad laica marca los límites socialmente aceptables dentro de los que debemos movernos todos los ciudadanos, sean cuales fueren nuestras creencias o nuestras incredulidades. Son las religiones quienes tienen que acomodarse a las leyes, nunca al revés.
4) En la escuela pública sólo puede resultar aceptable como enseñanza lo verificable (es decir, aquello que recibe el apoyo de la realidad científicamente contrastada en el momento actual) y lo civilmente establecido como válido para todos (los derechos fundamentales de la persona constitucionalmente protegidos), no lo inverificable que aceptan como auténtico ciertas almas piadosas o las obligaciones morales fundadas en algún credo particular. La formación catequística de los ciudadanos no tiene por qué ser obligación de ningún Estado laico, aunque naturalmente debe respetarse el derecho de cada confesión a predicar y enseñar su doctrina a quienes lo deseen. Eso sí, fuera del horario escolar. De lo contrario, debería atenderse también la petición que hace unos meses formularon medio en broma medio en serio un grupo de agnósticos: a saber, que en cada misa dominical se reservasen diez minutos para que un científico explicara a los fieles la teoría de la evolución, el Big Bang o la historia de la Inquisición, por poner algunos ejemplos.
5) Se ha discutido mucho la oportunidad de incluir alguna mención en el preámbulo de la venidera Constitución de Europa a las raíces cristianas de nuestra cultura. Dejando de lado la evidente cuestión de que ello podría entonces implicar la inclusión explícita de otras muchas raíces e influencias más o menos determinantes, dicha referencia plantearía interesantes paradojas. Porque la originalidad del cristianismo ha sido precisamente dar paso al vaciamiento secular de lo sagrado (el cristianismo como la religión para salir de las religiones, según ha explicado Marcel Gauchet), separando a Dios del César y a la fe de la legitimación estatal, es decir, ofreciendo cauce precisamente a la sociedad laica en la que hoy podemos ya vivir. De modo que si han de celebrarse las raíces cristianas de la Europa actual, deberíamos rendir homenaje a los antiguos cristianos que repudiaron los ídolos del Imperio y también a los agnósticos e incrédulos posteriores que combatieron al cristianismo convertido en nueva idolatría estatal. Quizá el asunto sea demasiado complicado para un simple preámbulo constitucional...
Coda y final: el combate por la sociedad laica no pretende sólo erradicar los pujos teocráticos de algunas confesiones religiosas, sino también los sectarismos identitarios de etnicismos, nacionalismos y cualquier otro que pretenda someter los derechos de la ciudadanía abstracta e igualitaria a un determinismo segregacionista. No es casualidad que en nuestras sociedades europeas deficientemente laicas (donde hay países que exigen determinada fe religiosa a sus reyes o privilegian los derechos de una iglesia frente a las demás) tenga Francia el Estado más consecuentemente laico y también el más unitario, tanto en su concepción de los servicios públicos como en la administración territorial. Por lo demás, la mejor conclusión teológica o ateológica que puede orientarnos sobre estos temas se la debo a Gonzalo Suárez: "Dios no existe, pero nos sueña. El Diablo tampoco existe, pero lo soñamos nosotros" (Acción-Ficción).
11-M could have an important impact on a European security policy. Some elements mentioned in this article are:
Many other stories underline the will to strengthen the will to improve cooperation in this field, but a lot of disagreements remain.
In political terms, Le Monde writes: "The fight against terrorism which is now felt all over the continent enhances a solidarity put in doubt by the Iraq crisis and the disagreements about the future Constitution."
El País - La UE propone activar una nueva cláusula de solidaridad que incluye la asistencia militar
La UE propone activar una nueva cláusula de solidaridad que incluye la asistencia militar
Bruselas convoca este viernes un Consejo extraordinario de ministros de Justicia e Interior
GABRIELA CAÑAS - Bruselas
EL PAÍS | España - 16-03-2004
La UE se está planteando activar la cláusula de solidaridad prevista en el borrador de Constitución europea, que prevé la asistencia de los socios, con medios incluso militares, en caso de que un miembro sufra un atentado terrorista. Pero ésta no es la única iniciativa que va a impulsar la política antiterrorista europea tras los atentados de Madrid. La UE desea tener un responsable antiterrorista y Bruselas propone reforzar una unidad en Europol que coordine e intercambie la información de los sistemas de espionaje. Como medida más inminente, habrá este viernes un Consejo extraordinario de Justicia e Interior. Como ocurrió tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre, las bombas de Madrid van a suponer un nuevo impulso a la política de seguridad europea. El presidente de turno de la UE, el primer ministro irlandés, Bertie Ahern, confirmó ayer que en el próximo Consejo Europeo, que reunirá a los líderes los días 25 y 26 próximos en Bruselas, quedarán desplazados los asuntos de competitividad previstos, para dar paso a los ahora más urgentes de lucha contra el terrorismo. Las manifestaciones de solidaridad europea, que ayer continuaron con tres minutos de silencio organizados por todos los Gobiernos de la UE, han abierto paso también a la preocupación por la amenaza terrorista global al confirmarse que tras los atentados del jueves pasado está la mano de Al Qaeda.
Este fin de semana, la Comisión Europea ha propuesto a la presidencia irlandesa de turno activar la cláusula de solidaridad que recoge el borrador de Constitución. "La Unión y sus Estados miembros", dice dicha cláusula, "actuarán conjuntamente en un espíritu de solidaridad en caso de que un Estado miembro sea objeto de un ataque terrorista o de una catástrofe natural o de origen humano. La Unión movilizará todos los instrumentos de que disponga, incluidos los medios militares puestos a su disposición por los Estados "para prevenir, proteger o aportar asistencia". Ahern señaló ayer su intención de proponer esta fórmula a sus homólogos europeos.
El primer ministro belga, Guy Verhofstadt, propuso el viernes crear una CIA europea, una idea que Austria ya había puesto sobre la mesa el pasado 19 de febrero. El resto de los socios acogieron entonces con frialdad tal propuesta alegando que hay muchos mecanismos a la disposición de la UE que sólo requieren ser utilizados por los países miembros para luchar contra el terrorismo y el crimen organizado en general. Ayer, sin embargo, una fuente de la UE aseguraba que "todo se queda cojo tras la matanza en Madrid de 200 personas a manos de Al Qaeda".
Para el comisario europeo de Justicia e Interior, António Vitorino, esa CIA europea podría lograrse simplemente reforzando la unidad antiterrorista de Europol.
Otra medida que se baraja es la de designar a un responsable que coordine la lucha antiterrorista europea. Los servicios del Alto Representante, Javier Solana, proponen en un documento previo al 11-M la designación de un responsable que coordine la lucha antiterrorista de todos los países miembros. El presidente de la Comisión Europea, Romano Prodi, propuso ayer la figura de un supercomisario encargado de estos asuntos y que podría ser la "pieza clave" de toda la estrategia de seguridad.
Seven out of 10 Turks support joining the Europpean Union and the country's politicians say there's never been a "broader political consensus toward EU membership." The thought in Turkey is that joining the EU would "cement Turkey's secularism and raise incomes, which now stand at about one-quarter the average level of the Union," according to the International Herald Tribune article. But doing so won't be easy as they need all 25 EU members' votes. And France may be shakey while the other "heavyweights" like Germany, Britan, Italy and Spain appear to be in favor of at least negotiations.
I think this is interesting because as Turkey and its 70 million and growing Muslim population look to boost its economy and status as a secular state, it may solicit the US's support in gaining entry to the EU. And if the EU decides against letting Turkey negotiate its entry at the December summit, the rejection could have some interesting political implications. As Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said in an interview, "all the Muslim world will once more think that, yes, there is a double standard, that there will always be a clash of civilizations."
"In Turkey, a pro-EU consensus" by Thomas Fuller
International Herald Tribune
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
In Turkey, a pro-EU consensus
Thomas Fuller/IHT IHT
Saturday, March 6, 2004
7 out of 10 favor joining the Union
ANKARA At a time of relative gloom and uncertainty for the European Union, some of its most enthusiastic supporters live here in Asia.
In Western Europe, a creeping note of worry has accompanied the imminent expansion of the Union to 25 members. But here in Turkey, politicians say there has never been broader political consensus on the drive toward EU membership.
Joining is seen as a way to cement Turkey's secularism and raise incomes, which now stand at about one-quarter the average level of the Union.
In opinion polls, nearly 70 percent of Turks say they want to join the EU, a number whose corollary is the government's methodical passage of reform packages required for EU membership.
The government begins every weekly cabinet meeting with an hourlong discussion on the implementation of EU-related laws, according to Murat Sungar, secretary general of a special government department that coordinates Turkey's drive for membership.
Since 2001, Turkey has rewritten more than one-fifth of its constitution. It abolished the death penalty except for times of war, repealed laws that barred the Kurdish minority from assembling or publishing in their language, and passed a law that prevents the press from being forced to reveal sources, among many other changes.
Reforms scheduled for April will remove the military, seen in Turkey as secularism's guardian, from civilian posts such as the national educational council. Such a change would until recently have been considered taboo.
Remarkably, even among supporters of the sole opposition party in Parliament, the left-leaning Republican People's Party, 85 percent want Turkey to join the EU, according to Kemal Dervis, the deputy head of the party.
The momentum is leading up to the climactic day of Turkey's aspirations: a December summit meeting in Brussels where European leaders will decide whether to allow the country to begin formal negotiations for entry.
A "yes" decision will require unanimous approval by the EU's 25 countries and would be followed by about a decade of detailed negotiations.
EU leaders must contemplate a future where its second-biggest member is a predominantly Muslim nation of 70 million people - and growing fast.
If Europe dashes Turkey's hopes, then the reform process here and the relative harmony between a governing Muslim party and the traditionally secular and powerful military establishment could end.
When asked about the prospect of failure, Turkey's leaders say there will be great disappointment and a belief that Europe treats Turkey differently because of its Muslim nature.
"All the Muslim world will once more think that, yes, there is a double standard, that there will always be a clash of civilizations," Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said in an interview.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, said in an interview with Europe-based journalists that Turks "would really have a heartache" if given a negative response.
Turkish politicians believe that the current political constellation in Europe favors a "yes" decision.
But they are not leaving it to chance. The government recently convened its ambassadors posted in EU countries to discuss lobbying efforts. Turkey may also call on the United States, a longtime and overt supporter of membership, to trumpet the cause.
EU leaders have been making positive noises recently. "Turkey is on the right path," Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said during a visit in February. "Turkey can always count on Germany for support."
Visiting Ankara on Wednesday, Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, praised Turkey for its "positive approach" on the reunification of Cyprus. "We look forward to a positive decision," he said, referring to the EU summit talks in December.
In the past, Turks and others suspected that what European leaders said publicly to encourage Turkey was different what they actually felt.
Today, the enthusiasm seems more anchored in actual support, EU politicians say.
Turkey's longstanding enemy, Greece, has become a cheerleader for Turkish membership.
Ties started to thaw between the two through a pair of remarkable and cooperative foreign ministers and the "seismic diplomacy" behind each country's assistance to the other after deadly earthquakes in 1999.
The reasons for Greece's support are complex. Yannos Papantoniou, the Greek defense minister, says it is better to have Turkey in the club than outside. Still, he notes that Greece still has concerns about human rights and the depth of democratic reform in Turkey.
"We simply believe that if and when it joins the European Union it will be obliged to observe these rules and values," he said. "This will by itself resolve most of our problems."
Still, Papantoniou said he believed the recent expressions of support around Europe for Turkish membership were genuine.
"I'm not quite sure about the end of this game, whether the Europeans really believe that at some point Turkey will in fact become a member," Papantoniou said in an interview. "But I think they are sincere that they want to help Turkey enter into the road leading up to eventual membership." Greece is using the prospect of membership as a lever to solve a territorial dispute with Turkey in the Aegean Sea and as a way to bring about the reunification of Cyprus.
Both those issues are prerequisites to Greek support in December, Papantoniou said.
Ultimately the decision on Turkish admittance would be taken by a future generation of politicians, he added.
The negotiation process involves absorption by Turkey of the EU's 80,000 pages of laws.
Commentators who oppose Turkey's admission have argued that it would draw massive subsidies from the EU, that it is simply too big to swallow and that as an Asian country it has no place in a European Union. But Halefoglu is confident: "If we get the big fish the others will follow." There is an emerging consensus, here and in Brussels, among diplomats and politicians, that Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain are among the EU heavyweights likely to favor offering negotiations. The position of France, where support for EU enlargement has been cooler, is less certain.
With a need for unanimity, a "yes" is far from certain. The collapse of the EU's constitutional talks in December was mainly caused by the steadfast opposition of Poland and Spain to the draft document, a demonstration of how a small minority can block a big decision.
The admission of Turkey - a huge, existential question for the EU - is also likely to be more widely debated in public as December approaches.
Ultimately Turkey will be judged by what is known in EU jargon as the Copenhagen criteria, a short and relatively basic set of principles established by the EU in 1993.
There are political criteria: "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." And economic criteria: "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union." A country must also be able to "take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union." Sungar, the secretary general of Turkey's EU coordination office, says one problem for the government is that the political criteria "cannot be calculated" and are therefore open to interpretation.
The European Commission, the EU's executive, is responsible for judging whether the criteria have been fulfilled. The commission will issue a report in October that will form the basis for talks at the December summit meeting. International Herald Tribune
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune
Galileo is key to the constitution of an independent European Defense. The EU commission presents the agreement with the US as favorable (see Federico's entry). The situation might be more complex though.
This is the conclusion drawn by Strafor.com a site specialized in intelligence analisis with close ties to official military and intelligence institutions:
"The crux of the agreement is that both GPS and Galileo will share the Binary Offset Carrier (BOC) 1.1 signal -- wholly separate from the U.S. M-Code -- and have agreements in place to optimize the performance of the shared signal in the future. This is almost exactly what NATO had proposed nearly two years ago and means that Galileo will be a European commercial competitor, but GPS will remain the primary satellite navigation system used by NATO -- with Galileo likely acting as a backup system.
"This is another nail in the coffin of an independent European defense. Previous efforts to create a European Common Defense Force separate from NATO have stalled. This is due as much to an inability to formulate a common foreign policy as to the lack of capable and willing military forces. Despite these setbacks, many Europeans have held out hope that limited military independence from the U.S.-led NATO umbrella was possible.
"The preservation of the U.S. M-Code as the military navigation frequency ensures that all European militaries -- whether they like it or not -- are inextricably linked to the U.S. Global Positioning System for the foreseeable future."
Roya was right to signal Fisher's evolution (see her post just before this one). Chirac has moved in the same direction. During an official visit to Hungary on February 23rd and 24th, he has declared : "I know the questions raised by an enlarged Europe as its capacity to move forward. I am aware too of the fear that a two-speed Europe may trigger. I want to solemny declare that France wants to build a Europe of 25 countries!"
Does that mean that the two-speed Europe is dead? Not necessarily. French and German agree to be careful, that's for sure. The problems of an enlarged Europe remain and time will tell if Chirac and Fisher really meant what they said. Nevertheless, it's importante t acknowledge the fact that they felt obliged to reassure their partners.
Le Monde - Devant le Parlement hongrois, Jacques Chirac clame sa foi dans l'Europe à vingt-cinq
Devant le Parlement hongrois, Jacques Chirac clame sa foi dans l'Europe à vingt-cinq
LE MONDE | 24.02.04
Paris veut dissiper les craintes des pays de l'Est.
Budapest de notre envoyée spéciale
Jacques Chirac a mis à profit sa visite à Budapest, lundi 23 et mardi 24 février, pour tenter de lever la suspicion dont la France fait l'objet dans plusieurs des pays de l'Est qui intégreront l'Union européenne le 1er mai. Et c'est une véritable profession de foi dans l'Europe à 25 qu'il a délivrée, mardi matin, dans son discours devant le Parlement hongrois.
Le terrain était favorable : les dirigeants hongrois, qui sont considérés comme les "bons élèves" parmi les nouveaux entrants dans l'Union, ne font pas partie des francophiles déçus des pays de l'Est. Le président Ferenc Madl, qui a reçu, lundi, M. Chirac au palais Sander, sur les hauts de Buda, a abondamment remercié la France pour le soutien qu'elle a apporté à la Hongrie pendant les années de transition et pour "le rôle qu'elle a joué en faveur de l'avènement de l'Europe à 25", en affirmant, à plusieurs reprises, que le mérite en revenait "tout particulièrement au président Chirac".
Au-delà des politesses - dont il n'a pas, lui non plus, été avare -, le président français s'est efforcé, mardi, devant le Parlement hongrois, de dissiper point par point les malentendus qu'a pu susciter dans la région sa politique européenne. L'Europe nouvelle, selon Jacques Chirac, "doit être une Europe en marche et qui poursuit son intégration". "Je sais les interrogations que suscite une Europe élargie quant à sa capacité à aller de l'avant. Je perçois également la crainte, chez certains, d'une Europe à deux vitesses. Je tiens à le dire solennellement : c'est une Europe à 25 que la France veut construire !", a affirmé M. Chirac. Ni les sommets à deux, franco- allemands, ou à trois, comme celui du 18 février à Berlin avec les Britanniques, ni non plus l'idée des "groupes pionniers" pour lesquels plaide la France ne visent à imposer quoi que ce soit aux autres, a dit M. Chirac, surtout pas à réintroduire des divisions en Europe, contrairement à ce qu'ont redouté certains publiquement, notamment l'ancien président tchèque Vaclav Havel.
Les "groupes pionniers" sont appelés à ouvrir la voie pour les autres, "à défricher en éclaireurs certains domaines où l'Europe peut s'intégrer davantage", a expliqué M. Chirac, avant d'ajouter : "Il ne s'agit pas de diviser, il ne s'agit pas d'exclure (...). De tout cœur, je souhaite que la Hongrie se joigne à ce mouvement." La Hongrie le souhaite elle-même pour l'euro, dès qu'il lui sera possible de rejoindre la zone de la monnaie unique. Elle s'intéresse aussi à la défense européenne, mais avec des interrogations nées en grande partie de la crise irakienne et auxquelles le président français s'est efforcé de répondre : "N'en doutez pas. Nul ne demande à la Hongrie de choisir entre l'OTAN et la défense européenne. Les Etats-Unis sont nos alliés. Une Europe plus forte, c'est une Alliance plus forte."
Enfin, M. Chirac a essayé de démentir l'idée selon laquelle l'entrée des nouveaux pays membres dans l'Union allait s'accompagner d'un repli budgétaire avaricieux de ceux qui font déjà partie du "club". Il n'a toutefois pas promis de miracle : "Dans un cadre financier qui n'est pas extensible à loisir, a-t-il dit, la France veillera à ce que les arbitrages de l'Union soient rendus dans l'esprit de solidarité qui la fonde et que, à juste titre, vous attendez d'elle."
Claire Tréan
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 25.02.04
You are not alone: most Europeans don't know their institutions very well. They don't see enough of their Euro-deputies and tend to be confused by the role of the Commission, and the Parliament. Only a third intends to vote in the coming election. The good side of this is that there seems to be a "European public opinion." The general feelings seem to be shared by most countries. This includes the 10 incoming members.
You should get a sense of what this all means in terms of the strength of European institutions, and in terms of identities.
You can read the story in French, and/or check for similar stories published by other media. The first link will lead you to the institutions that did the survey.
Eurobarometer - Website for the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission
Le Monde - A la veille des lections europennes, institutions et eurodputs restent trs mal connus
A la veille des lections europennes, institutions et eurodputs restent trs mal connus
LE MONDE | 25.02.04 | 14h09 MIS A JOUR LE 25.02.04 | 18h25
Une enqute rvle notamment que les Europens ont une ide fausse des rles du Parlement et du conseil des ministres. Moins d'un tiers des citoyens ont l'intention d'aller voter en juin.
Bruxelles de notre bureau europen
A quatre mois des lections europennes, moins d'un tiers des citoyens de l'Union (31 %) dclarent avoir la ferme intention de voter. Ce rsultat inquitant a t rendu public, lundi 23 fvrier, par la Commission de Bruxelles, d'aprs l'Eurobaromtre semestriel sur l'tat de l'opinion publique, ralis du 1er octobre au 7 novembre 2003 auprs d'un chantillon reprsentatif de 16 082 personnes.
Le manque d'enthousiasme des personnes sondes se traduit par un nouveau recul de leur confiance dans les institutions europennes (41 %, contre 44 % au printemps 2003, et 46 % au printemps 2002). Un manque de confiance qui s'applique aussi aux institutions nationales (seules 31 % des personnes interroges disent avoir confiance en leur gouvernement national, au lieu de 39 % au printemps 2002).
Cet tat d'esprit se nourrit manifestement d'un grand pessimisme sur la situation conomique : 46 % des Europens prdisent que la conjoncture va se dgrader en 2004, tandis que 16 % restent optimistes. Seuls les pronostics de 1992 taient plus noirs, avec 48 % de pessimistes.
Dans les dix pays qui rejoindront l'Union europenne au 1er mai, 35 % seulement des citoyens se dclarent srs d'aller voter. Il faut dire qu' l'Est aussi le pessimisme domine : 33 % de personnes pensent que leurs conditions de vie vont empirer cette anne et autant misent sur la stagnation, selon un sondage effectu du 11 octobre au 9 novembre auprs de 12 165 personnes des dix pays candidats, plus la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et la Turquie.
LUS NON IDENTIFIS
Curieusement, le Parlement europen est l'institution europenne la plus reconnue : 91 % des personnes interroges l'Ouest en ont entendu parler et 78 % pensent qu'il joue un rle important dans la vie de l'Union europenne. 70 % donnent le premier rle la Commission et 58 % au conseil des ministres.
Cette hirarchie, identique l'Est, montre que les Europens ont une vision errone du fonctionnement de leurs institutions. "La surreprsentation du Parlement europen est sans doute lie son nom", suggre Bruno Jeanbart, directeur adjoint du dpartement opinion de CSA, qui a particip l'enqute pour la France : "Les gens calquent ce qu'ils savent de leur Parlement national sur le Parlement europen, alors qu' Bruxelles le lgislatif a deux ttes", explique-t-il. Il prcise que, en France, "la trs faible connaissance des institutions est lie au fait que les hommes politiques ne font pas l'effort de parler de l'Europe".
Bien que le Parlement soit l'institution la plus plbiscite, l'opinion publique ne connat pas ses eurodputs : 44 % des personnes interroges dclarent n'avoir "ni vu, ni entendu, ni eu de contacts avec un membre du Parlement depuis les dernires lections europennes". Seuls le Danemark (17 %) et la Finlande (26 %) font exception ce constat d'ignorance. En France, "cette mconnaissance s'explique par le mode de scrutin", indique M. Jeanbart : "Les lecteurs connaissent, la rigueur, les ttes de listes nationales, mais elles sont presque toutes parties." Seuls sont rests Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Charles Pasqua, Jean Saint-Josse, Arlette Laguiller et Alain Krivine. M. Jeanbart ajoute que le nouveau dcoupage, en trs grandes circonscriptions, "ne permettra pas plus l'identification des eurodputs".
Les mdias ne facilitent pas cette connaissance : seules 38 % des personnes interroges disent qu'elles ont vu des membres du Parlement europen la tlvision. Ce pourcentage augmente toutefois au Danemark (77 %) et en Finlande (61 %). Or 42 % des personnes interroges disent qu'elles aimeraient voir leurs eurodputs sur le petit cran.
Rafale Rivais
ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 26.02.04
An important summit Blair, Chirac, Schröder, will take place tomorrow in Berlin. Several European countries, Italy, Spain and Poland among them, are upset by the emergence of this new "directory."
After explaining the progresses made in the building of a common defense, this article taken from Le Monde sees the addition of the UK to the Franco-Germen duo as a way to appease some tensions. Their influence could be huge in many fields: commision, constitution, enlargement, etc.
It would be useful to look at how the summit is covered in different capitals and report it on the blog. Many of the issues at stake in Europe today should come up during the discussion, and in the coverage they get.
Le Monde - Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin
Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin
LE MONDE | 17.02.04 | 13h22 • MIS A JOUR LE 17.02.04 | 16h20
A quelques semaines de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, trois de ses principaux dirigeants se réunissent à Berlin, mercredi 18 février, suscitant la rancœur de certains de leurs partenaires, inquiets de voir se mettre en place une gestion par Paris, Berlin et Londres. Officiellement rejetée par les intéressés, l'expression "directoire" ne les fait cependant pas hurler d'indignation. Refusant de limiter l'Europe à un espace de paix intérieure, les dirigeants français, allemand et britannique devraient envisager les moyens de relancer les réformes, la croissance et la politique industrielle. Ils pourraient aussi décider de réformer la Commission de Bruxelles.
A peine un an après la fameuse lettre des Huit sur l'Irak, initiée par la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne, qui scellait la césure entre une Europe pro-atlantiste et une Europe franco-allemande récusant la politique américaine, Tony Blair se retrouve avec le président Jacques Chirac et le chancelier Schröder, mercredi 18 février à Berlin, pour une rencontre tripartite. A deux mois de l'élargissement de l'Union, alors que la question du fonctionnement de l'Europe à 25 est loin d'être résolue, les autres Européens s'interrogent sur l'objet de cette réunion à trois, présentée comme une concertation en vue du sommet européen qui sera consacré fin mars à l'évolution économique de l'Union.
Malgré les apaisements prodigués par Tony Blair, jeudi, lors de la rencontre préparatoire qu'il a eue avec le chancelier allemand à Berlin, plusieurs capitales, notamment au sud de l'Europe, expriment quelque agacement à voir refleurir une sorte de "directoire", non plus franco-allemand, mais à trois. "Nous ne pouvons accepter les initiatives qui mettent les uns ou les autres le dos au mur", a averti le ministre italien des affaires étrangères, Franco Frattini. "Il n'est pas bon que quelques voix fassent taire toutes les autres, dont celle de l'Espagne", a estimé de son côté la ministre espagnole Ana Palacio, qui avait dénoncé avec virulence en 2003, lors de la célébration du 40e anniversaire du traité franco-allemand, la volonté d'hégémonie de Paris et de Berlin.
L'idée d'un leadership franco-germano-britannique en Europe n'est pas nouvelle. Elle avait pris corps après l'arrivée de Tony Blair aux commandes en Grande-Bretagne, le leader travailliste revendiquant ouvertement, après les années Thatcher, un retour de son pays sur la scène européenne pour y exercer son influence. M. Blair n'a pas été en mesure de tirer suffisamment son pays derrière lui pour le convaincre de rejoindre la zone euro. Il a cependant avancé sur d'autres sujets européens, notamment en relançant avec Paris, dès décembre 1998, l'idée d'une véritable défense européenne.
C'est à nouveau à propos de la défense que les "trois grands" Européens ont manifesté ces derniers mois leur volonté de tourner la page de la crise irakienne. Le 20 septembre 2003, le sommet surprise qui les a réunis, à Berlin déjà, avait esquissé un compromis sur la création d'un état-major européen autonome au sein de l'OTAN.
Ce compromis, finalement acepté par Washington, a été la base de l'accord intervenu au sommet de Bruxelles en décembre sur la future politique de défense de l'Union à 25. Il permet d'envisager de nouveaux développements à la fois en matière de projection de forces, mais aussi de coopération dans le domaine de l'armement. L'Allemagne vient de se joindre à Paris et Londres pour mettre sur pied des corps d'intervention de 1 500 hommes prêts à être déployés pour tenter d'empêcher des crises de dégénérer, comme cela a été fait en 2003 dans la province de l'Ituri en République démocratique du Congo.
UN SOUFFLE D'AIR
Cette entente à trois a aussi débouché sur la création d'une agence d'armement, qui doit permettre à l'Europe de mettre en commun son potentiel industriel. Symbole de cette avancée : la décision de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne de coopérer pour la construction de leurs nouveaux porte-avions. Des discussions sont également en cours dans le domaine des sous-marins, où le potentiel allemand est important.
Paris et Berlin avaient dû constater pendant la crise irakienne que, dans la nouvelle Europe élargie, ils ne pourraient plus à eux seuls être le moteur de l'Union. La main tendue de Tony Blair est donc pour eux bienvenue. M. Blair a donné des gages de sa fidélité aux Etats-Unis, et sa présence devrait rassurer les pays membres les plus atlantistes sur les objectifs de la rencontre de Berlin, notamment les Polonais et les Espagnols. On en espère du coup, dans les milieux européens, une décrispation qui facilite le déblocage des négociations sur la Constitution.
De même que le couple franco-allemand a été utile dans la "vieille Europe" pour cristalliser les problèmes et dégager les compromis, un trio pourrait avoir une précieuse fonction de défrichage. En Allemagne, la droite, qui a soutenu le camp atlantiste pendant la crise irakienne contre le gouvernement Schröder, milite aujourd'hui pour qu'une place soit offerte aussi à la Pologne dans ce cercle restreint.
M. Schröder, qui s'est largement inspiré du programme travailliste pour ses propres propositions de réforme en Allemagne, peut espérer, pour sa part, trouver dans ce nouveau forum un souffle d'air dans la phase difficile qu'il traverse. Une part importante des discussions de Berlin doit être consacrée à la relance de la croissance en Europe, aux réformes, à une politique industrielle commune et peut-être à une redéfinition des postes au sein de la Commission.
Il est peu probable que soient formulées de nouvelles propositions sur la Constitution européenne, pour désarmer l'opposition de l'Espagne et de la Pologne au projet qui est sur la table. Ce projet, élaboré par la Convention, est largement le résultat des compromis auxquels les trois étaient parvenus. La France, l'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne sont loin d'avoir sur tout des points de vue identiques, mais sur cette question ils semblent décidés à attendre que le mouvement vienne d'abord de Madrid et de Varsovie.
Henri de Bresson
A number of people have expressed interest in Immigrants in Europe. This opinion Eurozine piece (great site recommendation from Francis) says that there is in increase in the illegal trafficking of people because of the very laws set to stop it. Sasseen argues that regulations (at the borders) and Europe's political and economic participation contribute to dehumanizing individuals (and sometimes their deaths) that try to come into the countries for work. He also offers good history. The story is a bit old, but maybe could use an update from one of us?
Saskia Sassen
Is this the Way to Go?
Handling Immigration in a Global Era
http://www.eurozine.com/article/2002-09-17-sassen-en.html
Saskia Sassen
Is this the Way to Go?
Handling Immigration in a Global Era
As Europe's borders become more and more fortified against immigrants, illegal human trafficking becomes ever more common. By criminalizing immigration, Europe does not only ignore a moral problem: It hits hardest on those desperate enough to escape their homecountries and contributes to the enormous profits that smugglers make in the process. Saskia Sassen asks what price Europe is paying for these shortsighted and unsustainable policies.
Over the last decade it is estimated that more than 2,500 would-be immigrants died trying to get into Europe. That is many dead, but not many immigrants for a continent of over 350 million people. Whom is it we are determined to keep out to the point that they risk their lives to get in: an equally determined but tiny minority of men, women and children from mostly poor countries who will come no matter what in search of work or refuge. They are not criminals. Yet the result of our determination is that we are feeding a criminal trade. There has been a sharp growth in illegal trafficking of people as receiving countries have clamped down on entries and semi-militarized more and more borders.
These developments raise two issues. One concerns the old trade-off between policies that criminalize what may not intrinsically be a criminal act in the name of controlling a somewhat untenable situation; this in turn raises the incentives for genuinely criminal actors to promote the forbidden activity. A familiar instance of this trade-off concerns marihuana control policy. Does the criminalizing of marihuana in the US -and the UK- really work better as a policy to control its use than the controlled legality of marihuana in the Netherlands which leaves very little room for profit making by drugdealers and hence no incentive to expand its use?
The second policy issue raised by these developments is that the deaths of these hundreds of people attempting to enter Europe affect us all, not only those directly concerned. The fact that these people lack the proper documents for entry is easily represented in policy and media circles as exempting us from any responsibility as societies for these deaths. The lack of proper documents somehow seems to make these deaths less human and reduce whatever might be our responsibility contributing to these deaths.
I want to argue that the direction we are taking in our immigration policies towards greater police and military control and growing disregard for international human rights codes as well as our own civil liberties laws is promoting illegal trafficking and weakening our rule of law and thereby our democracies. These policies are adding to an already growing mix of what I would describe as negative incentives, or incentives with negative outcomes for significant sectors of our societies. Illegal trafficking and the deaths of men, women and children who are not criminals, and who die on our "soil" eventually touches the fabric of our societies and distorts or weakens the rule of law. In the long run it will affect us all. Yes, the central victims are the men and women who are trafficked and especially those who die. But we would be foolish to think that we can allow these abuses and deaths to happen in the name of maintaining control, and remain untouched. The growth in illegal trafficking and the sharpening of extreme anti-immigrant politics willing to sacrifice some civil liberties in the name of control are indications of this broader negative effect.
Interconnected Forms of Violence
Part of the challenge is to recognize the interconnectedness of forms of violence that we do not always recognize as being connected or for that matter, as being forms of violence. The sharp growth of government debt, poverty, unemployment, closing of traditional economic sectors in the global south, partly due to neoliberal economic globalization has created whole new migrations as well as fed an exploding illegal trade in people. We now have growing evidence that IMF policy has sharpened these conditions even as it has brought great prosperity to about 20 per cent of residents in many countries in the global south(1).
Our governments, by supporting IMF policies, are partly contributing to those conditions that are going to stimulate emigration and illegal trafficking in people. Further, as the rich economies become richer partly because of these same IMF policies, they also become more desirable destinations. This in turn creates a source for hard currency for the governments of the sending countries in a context where they face mounting debt and declines in national revenues as neoliberal globalization weakens and often destroys many of the national economic sectors in these countries. Thus these governments are not interested particularly in regulating emigration either. Finally, as these same policies have also raised inequality and unemployment inside the rich economies, the disadvantaged have become radicalized, often taking on extreme right wing politics.
The tragedy is that those most affected negatively, those to whom violence has been done both in the global south and in the rich economies, the victims of it all, now confront each other as enemies inside our countries. Anti-immigrant sentiment probably runs highest among those who have been hurt from the same policies that have hurt the poor and the middle classes (though not the upper 20 per cent) from where the immigrants and would-be immigrants come. And as the rich countries raise their walls to keep immigrants and refugees out, they feed the illegal trade in people and raise the profits to be made as despair rises in the global south and fear in the global north. This is not sound policy. This is a vicious policy cycle.
The same infrastructure, both technical and institutional that has enabled global flows of capital and goods, services and the new transnational managerial and professional class, also enables migrations and illegal trafficking. And they facilitate the flow of remittances back to sending countries, a major incentive for not doing anything on the part of these governments. These various entanglements raise the complexity of the challenge of how to regulate immigration. But these entanglements and this type of complexity are going in the wrong direction. We need to reverse this dynamic.
When globalization policies go wrong they really go very wrong for countries in the global south. Thereby these policies sharpen the incentives for both emigration and trafficking for emigrants, traffickers and governments in the global south, given growing government indebtedness and lack of opportunity for workers and would be entrepreneurs in much of the global south.
Emigrants enter the macro-level of development strategies for sending countries through their remittances. In many countries these represent a major source of foreign exchange reserves for the government. While the flows of remittances may be minor compared to the massive daily capital flows in various financial markets, they are often very significant for developing or struggling economies.
In 1998 - the last year for which comprehensive data is available - global remittances sent by immigrants to their home countries reached over US$ 70 billion. To understand the significance of this figure, it should be related to the GDP and foreign currency reserves in the specific countries involved, rather than compared to the global flow of capital. For instance, in the Philippines, a key sender of migrants generally and of women for the entertainment industry in several countries, remittances were the third largest source of foreign exchange over the last several years. In Bangladesh, another country with significant numbers of its workers in the Middle East, Japan, and several European countries, remittances represent about a third of foreign exchange. Exporting workers and remittances are means for governments of coping with unemployment and foreign debt(2).
This would also seem to be the case given the growing interdependencies brought on by globalization which also enable illegal trafficking. Cross-border business travel, global tourism, the Internet, and other conditions integral to globalization enable multiple global flows not foreseen by the framers and developers of economic globalization. This creates a difficult trade-off in a context where September 11 has further sharpened the will to control immigration and resident immigrants. Increased illegal trafficking and the reduction in civil liberties will not facilitate the need to learn how to accommodate more immigration to respond to the future demographic turn. Let me focus next with some detail on one specific flow which brings many of these issues together.
Illegal Trafficking
Trafficking in workers for both licit and illegal work (e.g. unauthorized sex work) illuminates a number of intersections between the negative conditions in the global south and some of the tensions in the immigration regime(3). Trafficking is a violation of several distinct types of rights: human, civil, political. Trafficking in people appears to be mainly related to the sex market, to labor markets, to illegal migration. Much legislative work has been done to address trafficking: international treaties and charters, UN resolutions, and various bodies and commissions. Trafficking has become sufficiently recognized as an issue that it was also addressed in the G8 meeting in Birmingham in May 1998 (IOM 1998). The heads of the eight major industrialized countries stressed the importance of cooperation against international organized crime and trafficking in persons. The US President issued a set of directives to his administration in order to strengthen and increase efforts against trafficking in women and girls. This in turn generated the legislation initiative by Senator Paul Wellstone; bill S.600 was introduced in the senate in 1999. NGO's are also playing an increasingly important role. For instance, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women has centers and representatives in Australia, Bangladesh, Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa and Asia Pacific. The Women's Rights Advocacy Program has established the Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons to combat the global trade in persons. This type of trafficking shows us one of the meanings of interdependence in the current global system. There are two distinct issues here: one is that globalization has produced new conditions and dynamics, especially the growing demand for these types of workers by the expanding high income professional workforce associated largely, though not exclusively, with globalization(4). The second issue is that globalization has enabled older trafficking networks and practices which used to be national or regional to become global.
Here I want to focus on some of the data on the trafficking of women, especially for the sex industries and the growing weight of this trafficking as a profit making option for the traffickers, especially it would seem from the global south. This, then adds to the role of emigrants' remittances generally, whether from lawful, unauthorized or trafficked immigrants in the account balance of many of the impoverished governments of sending countries. Profits and revenues are, clearly, a disincentive to attack this trade. Insofar as the countries of the global north are one of the key destinations, they do not escape the consequences of this illegal trade either.
Trafficking in migrants is a profitable business. According to a UN report, criminal organizations in the 1990s generated an estimated US$ 3.5 billion per year in profits from trafficking migrants (excluding most of the women trafficked for the sex industry). The entry of organized crime is a recent development in the case of migrant trafficking; in the past it was mostly petty criminals who engaged in this type of trafficking. The Central Intelligence Agency of the US(1999) reports that organized crime groups are creating intercontinental strategic alliances through networks of co-ethnics throughout several countries; this facilitates transport, local contact and distribution, provision of false documents, etc. The Global Survival Network (1997) reported on these practices after a two year investigation using the establishment of a dummy company to enter the illegal trade. Such networks also facilitate the organized circulation of trafficked women among third countries -not only from sending to receiving countries. Traffickers may move women from Burma, Laos, Vietnam and China to Thailand, while Thai women may have been moved to Japan and the US.
Although there is no exhaustive data, the available information suggests that trafficking in women, including minors, for the sex industry is highly profitable for those running the trade. The United Nations estimates that 4 million women were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of US$7 billion for criminal groups. These funds include remittances from prostitutes' earnings and payments to organizers and facilitators in these countries. In Japan, where the so-called entertainment industry is legal, profits are about 4.2 trillion yen per year over the last few years; there is growing evidence that illegally trafficked women are a growing share of sex-workers. In Poland, police estimate that for each Polish woman delivered, the trafficker receives about US$700. In Australia, the Federal Police estimate that the cash flow from 200 prostitutes is up to $900,000 a week. Ukrainian and Russian women, in high demand in the sex market, earn the criminal gangs involved about US$500 to US$1000 per woman delivered. These women can be expected to service on average 15 clients a day, and each can be expected to make about $US 215,000 per month for the gang.
It is estimated that in recent years several million women and girls are trafficked within and out of Asia and the former Soviet Union, two major trafficking areas. Increases in trafficking in both these areas can be linked to women being pushed into poverty or sold to brokers due to the poverty of their households or parents. High unemployment in the former Soviet republics has been one factor promoting growth of criminal gangs as well as growth of trafficking in women. Unemployment rates among women in Armenia, Russia, Bulgaria and Croatia reached 70 per cent and in Ukraine 80 per cent with the implementation of market policies. There is some research indicating that economic need is the bottom line for entry into prostitution(5).
Some of the features of immigration policy and enforcement may well contribute to make women who are victims of trafficking even more vulnerable and to give them little recourse to the law. If they are undocumented, which they are likely to be, they will not be treated as victims of abuse but as violators of the law insofar as they have violated entry, residence and work laws. The attempt to address undocumented immigration and trafficking through greater border controls over entry, raises the likelihood that women will use traffickers to cross the border, and some of these may turn out to belong to criminal organizations linked to the sex industry.
Further, in many countries prostitution is forbidden for foreign women, which enhances the role of criminal gangs in prostitution. It also diminishes one of the survival options of foreign women who may have limited access to jobs generally. Prostitution is tolerated for foreign women in many countries while regular labor market jobs are less so-this is the case for instance in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. According to IOM data, the number of migrant women prostitutes in many EU countries is far higher than that for nationals: 75 per cent in Germany, 80 per cent in the case of Milan in Italy, etc.
While some women know that they are being trafficked for prostitution, for many the conditions of their recruitment and the extent of abuse and bondage only become evident after they arrive in the receiving country. The conditions of confinement are often extreme, akin to slavery, and so are the conditions of abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, and physical punishments. They are severely underpaid, and wages are often withheld. They are prevented from using protection methods against AIDS, and typically have no right to medical treatment. If they seek police help they may be taken into detention because they are in violation of immigration laws; if they have been provided with false documents there are criminal charges(6).
As tourism has grown sharply over the last decade and become a major development strategy for cities, regions and whole countries, the entertainment sector has seen a parallel growth and recognition as a key development strategy. In many places, the sex trade is part of the entertainment industry and has similarly grown. At some point it becomes clear that the sex trade itself can become a development strategy in areas with high unemployment and poverty and governments desperate for revenue and foreign exchange reserves. When local manufacturing and agriculture can no longer function as sources of employment, of profits and of government revenue, what was once a marginal source of earnings, profits and revenues, now becomes a far more important one. The increased importance of these sectors in development generates growing tie-ins. For instance, when the IMF and the World Bank see tourism as a solution to some of the growth challenges in many poor countries and provide loans for its development or expansion, they may well be contributing to develop a broader institutional setting for the expansion of the entertainment industry and indirectly of the sex trade.
This tie-in with development strategies signals that trafficking in women may well see further expansion. It is a worrisome possibility especially in the context of growing numbers of women with few if any employment options. And such growing numbers are to be expected given high unemployment and poverty, the shrinking of a world of work opportunities that were embedded in the more traditional sectors of these economies, and the growing debt burden of governments rendering them incapable of providing social services and support to the poor. Under these conditions, women in the sex industry also can become a source of government revenue. These tie-ins are structural, not a function of conspiracies. Their weight in an economy will be raised by the absence or limitations of other sources for securing a livelihood, profits and revenues for respectively workers, enterprises and governments.
The Coming Demographic Crisis in the North
Even as the rich countries try harder and harder to keep would-be immigrants and refugees out, they face a growing demographic deficit and rapidly aging populations. According to a major study (Austrian Institute of Demography 2001), at the end of the current century and under current fertility and immigration patterns, population size in Western Europe will have shrunk by 75 milllion and almost 50 percent of the population will be over 60 years old -a first in its history(7). Europe, perhaps more so than the US given its relatively larger intake of immigrants, faces some difficult decisions. Where will they get the new young workers needed to support the growing elderly population and to do jobs considered unattractive by the native born, particularly in a context of rising educational attainment. The numbers of these jobs are not declining, even if the incidence of some of them is; one sector that is likely to add jobs is home and institutional care for the growing numbers of old people. Export of older people and of economic activities is one option being considered now. But there is a limit to how many old people and low wage jobs an economy can export and a society can tolerate. Immigration is expected to be part of the solution.
In the US, the evidence suggests a slightly different pattern. By century's end the forecasted fall for the US is 34 million people, though this represents a point in the upward slope which will not be completed until after the end of this century. The evidence is fairly clear that a significant component of population growth in the US over the last two decades as well as labor force growth is accounted for by immigrants, both second generation and foreign born. In both cases, immigrants account for a larger component of growth than their share in respectively the general population and the total labor force.
Yet the way the countries in the global north are proceeding is not preparing them to handle this future scenario. They are building walls to keep would-be immigrants out. At a time of growing refugee flows, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees faces an even greater shortage of funds than usual. Given an effective demand for immigrant workers, and indeed families for demographic purposes, both of these policy preferences are likely to have negative repercussions for Europe. They construct the immigrant and the refugee as a negative and undesirable subject, thereby encumbering integration. Further, given firms and households interested in hiring immigrants or determined to do so, for whatever reasons, restrictive policies and racialized representations of the immigrant and the refugee, can be expected to feed the already growing illegal trafficking of people.
Conclusion: The Need for a More Enlightened Immigration Policy
The large and looming issue confronting societies under the rule of law is whether policies that brutalize people - no matter what their nationality - and promote criminalized profit-making through the trade in people, are desirable and indeed sustainable if we are to keep up our systems based on the rule of law for which our forebears fought so hard and spilled so much blood.
Allowing this sort of brutalization and criminality is a very high price to pay for maintaining border control, and sooner or later it begins to tear at the fabric of the lawful state and of civil society.
The risks to our societies and to us - citizens - fully documented, are well illustrated by what is happening today in the US. The events of September 11 and the subsequent restrictions on the civil liberties of particular immigration groups in the US is tearing at, and some would say weakening the rule of law as it affects all US residents. The government in the US is granting itself more and more authority to deal directly, in an extrajudicial way, with matters that used to run through judiciaries or that would not be considered a matter for the government to get involved with. In so doing, the US government is violating basic rights not only of those it has profiled as possibly dangerous but also of its citizens, all citizens, not just those who might be suspect.
Are there ways of regulating the flow of people into our societies that could strengthen, rather than weaken, its civic fabric? The repeated incidents of would-be immigrants dying at the hands of illegal traffickers surely do not. They risk producing indifference when it happens over and over again. And they risk promoting acceptance of these deaths among ourselves and our children, all in the name of maintaining control over entry.
We are not only paying a price for those who die on our soil; we are also paying a price for those who are smuggled into our countries alive. The price we pay for allowing the abuse that is human smuggling is much higher than the "price" we pay for accommodating these people who just want a chance to work-and work they do. Indeed, much research suggests that we actually gain from the presence of these immigrants. For instance, 17 per cent of entrepreneurs in London belong to ethnic communities, a far higher share than their population share.
Continuing to use policies that make possible the brutalization of would-be migrants and the profit-making of criminal smugglers is a cancer deep inside our states and societies. It is the price we pay for criminalizing undocumented immigrants and, more generally, for resorting to policing and militarization as the way of regulating immigration. The US illustrates this to some extent. In the name of effective control, the new US 1996 Immigration Act strengthened policing by reducing judiciary review of immigration police actions. A crucial issue here is the object of the expanded policing: It is not known criminals or firms suspected of violating environmental regulations or drug dealers. It is a population sector, not even select individuals, but a fairly broad spectrum of men, women and children.
There are consequences to this tension between, on the one hand, the strenghtening of police approaches to immigrant regulation and, on the other, the strengthening of civil and human rights and the civic empowerment associated with a stronger sense of civil society. Sooner or later this policing will get caught in the expanding web of civil and human rights. And these rights will include those of citizens. Policing, when unchecked by civil review, can easily violate such rights and interfere with the functioning of civil society.
If my son decided to go write the great American novel by spending time with farm workers or in garment sweatshops, and there were an INS (Immigration and Naturalization Services) raid he could well be part of the suspects-because I know he would not be carrying his US passport with him. Or worse, if he were among the farmworkers in California running away from the INS police and pushed towards jumping in one of the water levies, as has happened a number of times over the last few years, he might have been one of those who drowned. The most dramatic account of these incidents has it that the turbulent waters seemed less threatening than the INS police with their guns and shouting, and that, indeed, these farmworkers may have been pressured in terror into the waters and drowned. After the new 1996 law, many of these INS actions can escape review and accountability in front of a judge if the persecuted were merely suspected of being undocumented. Sooner or later abusive or excess policing and the weakening of judicial review of such police actions will interfere with the aspiration towards the rule of law that is such a deep part of our inheritance and our lived reality. Sooner or later, this type of police action will touch us, the documented. We need to find another way of regulating entry: now we are strengthening modes of regulation that carry a high cost not only in immigrant deaths but also to the rule of law.
This "Agenda for a Growing Europe", often referred to as the "Sapir report" is a recent assessment of the EU situation today and its need for growth. Establkished on the initiative of the president of the European Commission, it assesses strengths and weaknesses and suggests an agenda to "make the EU economic system deliver." Very useful.
A newly amended European Parliment bill that will make all software patentable is set to come back in the next few months. Big companies want it to protect their ideas. Smaller companies don't so that research can be shared and continued. This is one way that U.S. business (the article uses amazon's patents for example) have huge influence on European law. This would make an interesting follow-up story as the bill comes back to Parliment.
Europe's tug of war over software patents
By Jennifer L. Schenker/IHT
Monday, February 2, 2004
http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=127600&owner=&date=20040202142528
PARIS: You cannot patent software in the European Union today - except if the software is part of a separate invention or process, and even then, it depends on your country.
That can be a murky way to define a patent, both critics and supporters of the status quo would agree, and they are locked in a tempestuous tug of war to pass a new law in their favor.
On one side is big business - largely corporations with large research investments and scores of patents - which wants to make all software patentable in the EU to mirror U.S. and Japanese law and preserve their right to collect royalties and protect their work.
The opponents - made up of small and medium-size software companies, academic institutions and supporters of "open source" software, among others - want to make sure software cannot be patented at all, allowing them to create software without fear of lawsuits.
A European Parliament bill that would have made all software subject to patenting is the focal point of the outrage among technology activists. Opponents of the bill succeeded in adding amendments in September that would essentially prevent patents from being issued for most types of software. The proposal is due back in Parliament in the next few months, and the outcome is far from certain.
European unity
The history of an idea
Jan 3rd 2004
From The Economist print edition
The idea of a united Europe stretches back thousands of years. The early enthusiasts were seldom as high-minded as their modern successors
(This is a good background reading on the history of the European Union and its more ancient origins)
A FEW months ago, George Bush gave a lunch at the White House for Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission. Mr Prodi, keen to impress upon his host the grandeur of the European project, launched into a description of the enlargement of the European Union. By 2004, he pointed out, the EU would have 450m citizens and its territory would stretch from the Atlantic to the borders of Russia. “Sounds like the Roman empire, Romano,” remarked Mr Bush. Other lunchers guessed that the American president was being gently satirical. But Mr Bush, wittingly or not, had touched upon a serious point. The drive for “European unity”, which will proceed further next year when the EU's membership expands to 25 countries, has deep historical origins. Indeed, they do stretch back to the dissolution of the Roman empire.
Ever since the fall of Rome, a strain in European thought has longed for the re-creation of an over-arching political structure for Europe, and used the Roman empire as a model. In 800AD—more than three centuries after the fall of Rome—Charlemagne, the king of the Franks, had himself crowned in Rome by the pope. His new empire stretched from the Pyrenees to the Danube and from Hamburg to Sicily; and his imperial seal bore the words Renovatio Imperii Romani, “the Renewal of the Roman Empire”.
Charlemagne's empire fell apart fairly swiftly after his death. But the memory of Charlemagne—and of the empire that he wished to renew—continued to inspire those who sought to unify Europe by fair means or foul. Napoleon created the Legion of Honour, an order of distinction, in 1802 on the model of the Roman Legio Honoratorum and invoked Charlemagne at his imperial coronation in 1804. Hitler's loyalists gave the Roman salute and their cry “Heil Hitler!” was modelled on “Hail Caesar!” When the Nazis formed a new SS division for French volunteers they called it the Charlemagne division.
Of course, the Romans have inspired not only despots but also democrats, among them the architects of the Capitol in Washington, DC. And the Romans and Charlemagne also inspired the fathers of the EU, whose objectives were the exact opposite of war. The founding treaty of their creation was signed in Rome in 1957 and their successors were hoping—until this month'st failed summit—to return to the eternal city in 2004 to put their names to a new constitution. Meanwhile the expansion of the club is being managed from the Charlemagne building in Brussels.
It is easy to see common elements in the Roman and the Carolingian empires that might appeal to modern-day builders of Europe. Most obvious is sheer territorial expanse. To that may be added the creation of a common legal code, the issuance of a common currency as a symbol of imperial rule, the building of roads linking the empire (or trans-European networks, as they are unsmilingly called in Brussels). And all this is based upon a new, and supposedly lasting, peace within the empire—for the Romans, the Pax Romana.
Unity, fraternity, creativity
The notion that unity and peace in Europe are two sides of the same coin is an article of faith for modern pro-Europeans. A large exhibition about the history of the idea of European unity was staged in 2003 at the German History Museum in Berlin. Marie-Louise von Plessen, the exhibition's curator, argues that the “idea of unification and peace are completely linked.” The political sympathies of the exhibition's organisers were barely disguised.
The Berlin exhibition emphasised the intellectual origins of the idea of European unity. Miss von Plessen's plan was to show that “Behind the shifting alliances between nations, there were always people who thought and wrote about the utopia of a united Europe, even though they were never really taken seriously until after the second world war.” The thousands of people trooping through the galleries were treated to tableaux bearing quotes from philosophers and thinkers promoting the idea of European unity.
There was Pierre Dubois, a counsellor for the Duke of Burgundy, who called for a European federation in 1306; Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who made a celebrated call for “perpetual peace”; William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, and an early advocate of a European parliament; and Victor Hugo, the French 19th-century novelist who proclaimed in 1849 that “A day will come when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, Germany, you, all nations of the continent, without losing your distinctive qualities and glorious individuality, will be merged within a superior unit.” Lest any utterly dim-witted visitor miss the political moral, the exhibition closed with a quotation from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the chairman of the convention that drafted the disputed constitution for the EU, urging his listeners to “Dream of Europe. Let us imagine a continent at peace, freed of its barriers and obstacles, where history and geography are finally reconciled.”
A tableau of crimes and misfortunes
It is not just museum curators and elderly politicians who hold fast to the idea that European unity is both the best way of guaranteeing peace in Europe and a natural historical progression. The idea is also cherished among serious historians in France and Germany. Hagen Schulze, a professor of history at the Free University of Berlin, ends his scholarly study of the evolution of the European nation-state, “States, Nations and Nationalism”, with the thought that the “ancient states and nations” of Europe “may gradually fade away and recede into the background to make way for one united Europe.” This, he avers, is likely to be a considerable improvement on previous efforts to “restore the former unity of this continent by elevating one of its major powers” to a position of hegemony—first Spain, then France, then Germany. The horrors of the fighting in Yugoslavia—he was writing in the mid-1990s—bring forth more lamentations about the warlike tendencies of nation-states. “The baleful principle of a nation united by bonds of blood is still capable of threatening democracy and plunging Europe into fresh...trials of strength.”
French historians tend to be a little less eager to wish away la patrie. But many of them also almost instinctively link the idea of European unity with notions of peace and progress. Jacques Boussard in “The Civilisation of Charlemagne” (1968) asserts that “Charlemagne's achievement was the realisation of a united Europe. There were no wars except at the frontiers.” (This is an important qualification, given that the great man fought some 53 military campaigns expanding the boundaries of his empire.) In Boussard's view it was only the “stable society created by Charlemagne” that allowed for an “extraordinary outpouring of cultural, artistic and intellectual activity.”
It is sometimes observed that places that once formed part of Charlemagne's empire—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands—have been much more at ease with the modern-day drive for European unity than areas that fell outside it, notably Britain and Scandinavia. Perhaps as a consequence, British historians are less likely than their French or German counterparts to assume that European unity is necessarily synonymous with peace and cultural progress. In the “Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe”, for example, George Holmes argues that one of the lessons of the period is the “extraordinary vigour and creativity which derive from the fragmentation of power and wealth”, and that “the places where political fragmentation was most complete, such as Tuscany, the Low Countries and the Rhineland, were perhaps the most creative.”
Arguments about the connections between creativity and culture on the one hand and political unity and fragmentation on the other are reassuringly abstract—particularly when safely placed in the Middle Ages. Historical debate becomes a lot rougher when it moves into the modern era. In 1997 John Laughland published “The Tainted Source”, whose subtitle—“The undemocratic origins of the European idea”—summarises its general thesis. Mr Laughland, who helps to run a Eurosceptical lobby group called the European Foundation, argues that it is not just the familiar figures in the pro-European pantheon—Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and the like—who preached the virtues of European unity. Similar sentiments had been expressed by Hitler and the architects of fascist Italy and Vichy France.
Hitler, for example, told the Reichstag in 1936, “It is not very intelligent to imagine that in such a cramped house like that of Europe, a community of peoples can maintain different legal systems and different concepts of law for long.” Mussolini urged in 1933 that, “Europe may once again grasp the helm of world civilisation if it can develop a modicum of political unity.” Oswald Mosley, the leading British fascist of the 1930s, was also a champion of the idea of European union.
Partly as a result of Mr Laughland's work, many British Eurosceptics are inclined to see the modern promoters of European unity not as idealistic peaceniks, but as the heirs of Hitler who have simply devised a new and subtler plan for taking over Britain. Bonkers? Perhaps. They certainly forget the speech of Winston Churchill in Zurich in 1946, in which he called for a United States of Europe. But the conquest-by-stealth view is popular in Britain. When Mr Giscard d'Estaing published his draft constitution this year, the Sun, Britain's bestselling newspaper, greeted it with a cartoon showing Hitler and Napoleon squabbling over a copy of the document, each claiming, “I thought of it first.”
A DNA test for Europe's real father?
Hitler does not feature very prominently either in Mr Giscard d'Estaing's works or in the recent Berlin exhibition on ideas of European unity. In the German exhibition, the Nazi contribution to the debate on European unity is dismissed thus: “Hitler seeks to subjugate the European continent to the Third Reich in the name of ‘New Europe'.” Miss von Plessen, the exhibition's organiser, says that she used Mr Laughland's book as a source for the Berlin show. But she argues that it is unfair to link Hitler to the modern movement for European unity because “Hitler based his ideas on notions of the superiority of the Germanic race and conquest, whereas modern Europe is being built on the idea of equality between peoples.”
She is not much keener on the idea that Napoleon was a “builder of Europe”. The exhibition catalogue refers to the French emperor as “seeking to use national sentiments for his own ends” and implies that it was the monarchical alliance that defeated him, and this was the true promoter of European co-operation and peace.
Some French historians, however, are much less bashful about claiming Napoleon to the cause of European Unity. Since the French still generally regard Napoleon as a “good thing”—he was a hero to Churchill, too—they are less likely to fear that the cause of European unity will suffer by association with the emperor.
On the contrary. In 2002 Historia, a monthly French magazine, published an article under the title “Napoleon—the real father of Europe”, with a cover illustration of the great man crossing the Alps wearing a hat decorated with the insignia of today's EU. According to the article, many of the EU's features—federal law, the common market, the dismantling of frontiers, the promotion of the idea of the rights of man—can be traced to the Napoleonic heritage. Why, even the Grand Army brought together 20 nations. And such musings are not confined to popular history magazines. Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, recently published a book on Napoleon in which he argued, “History has vindicated Napoleon's vision of a ‘great European family' of the future.”
Napoleon himself had little doubt that he deserved to be counted as a great European. In his memoirs, he lamented that had he only won his war in Russia, “Europe would soon have been...but one people, and anyone who travelled anywhere would have found himself always in the common fatherland.” Moreover, “Paris would have been the capital of the world, and the French the envy of the nations.”
O, for an empire like America's
Should anyone really be disturbed by the less savoury antecedents of Europhilia? Even Mr Laughland, the Eurosceptic polemicist, notes in a fit of fairness that “drawing attention to the detail of Nazi propaganda about Europe is not to imply that modern pro-Europeans are fascists. That would be absurd.” If the modern makers of European union are constructing an empire, it is of a new and strange variety—reliant on persuasion, example and regulation, rather than force of arms.
Naturally, it has ambitions. If pressed, few of the architects of the modern Europe venture would deny that they hope that one day the EU will be a great power—a peaceable, liberal, law-based and generous great power, no doubt, but one capable of looking the United States or China in the eye. Mr Bush caught an authentic whiff of this ambition when he teased Mr Prodi about the new Roman empire. Perhaps, nursing some imperial ambitions of his own, he recognised it. Not long before their lunch, Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor, was writing of the United States, “Not since Rome has any one nation loomed so large above the others.” The Roman empire has indeed been re-created, it seems, but its capital is Washington, DC—for the time being, anyway. Maybe, after a while, the new division of the West will mirror the old division of the Roman empire, with Rome and Constantinople replaced by Washington and Brussels.
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