Euromedia

Britain VS Geneva

What's the position of Europe toward the Iraqui prisoners' scndal? If Britain knew, and was partly responsible, how do the Europeans feel about the violation of the Geneva convention?

"Les photos sont choquantes, mais nos rapports sont pires", accuse la Croix-Rouge
LE MONDE | 05.05.04

Basics of the draft EU Constitution

Very brief and clear introduction by the BBC to the ideas in the draft of EU Constitution. I found it useful, as I didn't really know all these issues before. Take a look...

It's an interactive page on the BBC

Berlin-Madrid-Paris

Zapatero is moving fast in international affair. After going first to Rabat, he went to Paris where the creation of a new Berlin-Madrid-Paris troika was announced. The participation of a middle size country might have a significant impact on European dynamics.

It has been officially said that Madrid will play a role in the relationships with the Magreb, that is with part of the Arab and Muslim world. Spain is in an excellent position to be a bridge between many worlds.

El País - Chirac anuncia la creación de un nuevo eje Berlín-Paris-Madrid

Chirac anuncia formalmente la creación de un nuevo eje Berlín-París-Madrid
España y Francia cooperarán para resolver en seis meses el conflicto del Sáhara

PERU EGURBIDE / ENVIADO ESPECIAL - París

EL PAÍS | España - 30-04-2004

El acercamiento de España al eje Berlín-París no es ya una colaboración ocasional ni una promesa de futuro, como podía deducirse de las palabras pronunciadas el miércoles en Berlín por el canciller alemán, Gerhard Schröder. El presidente de la República Francesa, Jacques Chirac, confirmó anoche en París que se ha puesto en marcha un auténtico eje Berlín-París-Madrid suficientemente estructurado y con voluntad de acción cotidiana. Una de sus consecuencias inmediatas será la cooperación hispano-francesa para resolver "en seis meses" el conflicto del Sáhara. Fue el presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, quien habló del plazo de seis meses para resolver el conflicto del Sáhara, sorprendente si se tiene en cuenta que el contencioso entre Marruecos y el Frente Polisario, con Argelia en la retaguardia, data de los años setenta del siglo pasado. Francia y España han estado, además, tradicionalmente, en campos distintos de esta contienda. París ha apoyado siempre a Rabat, mientras que Madrid, desalojada de su ex colonia por la fuerza de la Marcha Verde, sustentaba más o menos abiertamente las tesis independentistas del Polisario.

Durante años, el Gobierno español ha defendido la necesidad de una solución aceptada por las dos partes, y eso es lo que sigue haciendo ahora, según expresó ayer Zapatero. Pero el nuevo presidente ve la posibilidad de cooperar con Francia en este campo, donde en el pasado reciente Madrid y París se habían mostrado en competencia, para alcanzar un acuerdo "que satisfará a todas las partes". "Es posible hacerlo en seis meses", añadió.

Chirac, por su parte, se mostró convencido de que España debe jugar un papel "eminente" en el Magreb y afirmó que, por lo que se refiere a esa región y, por tanto, al conflicto del Sáhara, París, Madrid y Berlín desarrollarán "una cooperación especialmente reforzada" en el seno del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas.

"Eminente" es también el papel que, según Chirac, le va a corresponder a España en la construcción europea tras su incorporación inmediata al eje París-Berlín que, precisó el presidente galo, promueve una Europa "de paz y democracia, de desarrollo económico, pero también social, de un gran pacto social".

Chirac utilizó reiteradamente la expresión "la main dans la main [de la mano]", para describir la voluntad "muy fuerte de París y Berlín de avanzar con España en la ruta europea". "Hemos decidido una cooperación consciente y diaria entre nuestros colaboradores y autoridades para afrontar todos los problemas que se plantean".

El presidente francés se extendió en una larga explicación sobre cómo esa cooperación es posible y aconsejable. "El enfoque que hemos venido observando de la construcción europea defendido por el Gobierno José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero es el mismo que el de la mayor parte de los países europeos y, en particular, de Francia y Alemania. Eso no quiere decir que estemos de acuerdo en todo, pero si hay diferencias de enfoque, estamos determinados a trabajar juntos para reducirlas", expuso Chirac.

"También tenemos muchas diferencias de punto de vista con nuestros amigos alemanes, pero las superamos siempre, porque eso nos interesa más hacerlo", añadió. "El problema de la financiación de la UE es uno de ellos", prosiguió. "España tiene una posición optimista, que es la de la Comisión, y entendemos muy bien que España defienda sus intereses. Es completamente legítimo. Alemania y Francia, que son contribuyentes netos [al presupuesto comunitario] y tienen problemas financieros, ven con más reticencia el aumento del gasto, y es lógico".

"En esas circunstancias, se puede hacer dos cosas: reñir, lo que nunca trae nada bueno, o dialogar para encontrar una solución. Eso es lo que vamos a hacer, naturalmente", concluyó.

Zapatero confirmó, por otro lado, que su Gobierno "ha cambiado de posición" sobre el reparto de votos en el Consejo Europeo, ya que "ha aceptado el sistema de la doble mayoría" propuesto por Francia y Alemania. Pero declinó entrar en más detalles sobre la negociación ya iniciada para definir los criterios del nuevos sistema.

Zapatero tuvo palabras de especial agradecimiento a Francia, "al pueblo francés" y a sus gobernantes por la cooperación en la lucha contra ETA, que "es un buen ejemplo de lucha contra el terrorismo, el camino que hay que seguir", dijo, en contraposición implícitam con la invasión de Irak. "Hubiera debido yo mencionar el tema", le replicó Chirac, "pero me parece tan obvio que olvidé hacerlo. La colaboración contra el terrorismo y especialmente contra ETA es una posición firme y permanente del Gobierno francés".

In Europe, the tone is changing

According to this article published in Le Monde, the impact of Aznar's defeat is much wider than the loss of an ally for Bush.

Spain turns to Europe

This is a fascinating reaction to the M11 bombings in that instead of bringing EU-US relations together, it could possibly create a wider chasm.

It could very well be a hair-trigger reaction to the bombings by a new Spanish government, and, in the long run, Britain and the US will make efforts to assuage Spain's anger and hurt.

But in essence it charges the U.S. with some culpability for these attacks, if not complicity -- the U.S. precipitated these bombings in its role as aggressive "liberator" and Spain, as a member of the "Coalition of the Willing," has paid the price.

Of course, the U.S., British and perhaps other members of the coalition of the willing will see the removal of Spanish troops as appeasement — a dirty word in Europe as it is a reminder of British PM Neville Chamberlain's policy toward Mussolini and Hitler's march through Ethiopia and Czechoslavakia, respectively, in the mid to late 1930s.

At a time when U.S.-EU relations appeared to be brightening ever so slightly, it will be interesting to see how the mood of Europe will be swayed, and if the Summit will be fractious.

BBC - Spain to re-join 'Old Europe'

Spain to re-join 'Old Europe'
By William Horsley
BBC European Affairs correspondent

The winner of the Spanish general election, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has promised to end Spain's close alliance with the US over Iraq and to revive its traditional ties with France and Germany.

The political landscape of Europe may again be split in two.

Within hours of the election result, Mr Zapatero condemned the Iraq war and its US-led occupation as "disasters".

He said President George Bush and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair should engage in "self-criticism" for their mistakes.

He promised to bring home Spain's 1300-strong contingent of peacekeeping troops in Iraq.

He is to announce the date after his inauguration, in a few weeks.

Valuable ally

These outbursts may reflect Mr Zapatero's political inexperience, or his strong convictions.

Either way, they point to a re-heating of a cauldron of old arguments within Europe and across the Atlantic.

Under Jose Maria Aznar, Spain became - along with Britain - a pillar of the pro-American group of nations in western Europe.

Its main contributions were:

internationally, giving diplomatic support to the US and UK over the use of military force in Iraq

in Iraq, deploying highly-skilled peacekeepers to help with the physical and political re-building of the country

in the European Union, standing up for Nato and the vital importance of Europe's relations with America.

Along with Spain, the closest European allies of the US over Iraq and its strategy against terrorism are Britain, Denmark, Italy, Poland and most of the other eastern European countries which will join the European Union in May.

On the other side, France leads another group of European states which opposed the US-led war in Iraq and which still refuse to contribute directly to the coalition's work in Iraq.

Germany and Belgium are in this group. Spain may now join them.

For 18 months, from August 2002 up to last month, efforts to forge a credible common foreign policy for the EU were stymied as these two rival camps clashed in a series of public wrangles.

The divide helped to poison the atmosphere as leaders from 25 governments in Western and Eastern Europe struggled last year to agree on the text of a new EU constitution, which was meant to demonstrate the unity and common purpose of Europe as a whole.

'Appeasement of terror'

Instead, the talks on a constitution collapsed at an EU summit meeting in Brussels last December.

Mr Zapatero has promised to revive Spain's traditional "pro-European" foreign policy.

Its main points are:

to compromise over Spain's defence of its national interests - especially over its relative voting strength - for the sake of early agreement on the EU constitution

to bring back Spanish troops from Iraq to show the new government's disapproval of a "unjustified" war

to call for a new "international alliance" against terrorism, based on the authority of the United Nations, not "unilateral actions" by the US and UK.

This set of proposals has been welcomed by France, but brought a cool response from the British government.

The European Commission President Romano Prodi, a champion of a stronger Europe, told the Italian newspaper La Stampa that the US strategy had failed, as it had led to international terrorism growing "infinitely more powerful".

But a long-standing friend of the US, the German Christian Democrat Freidbert Pflueger, told BBC Radio that the new Spanish government was engaged in "appeasement" of terrorism.

Al-Qaeda appeared to have succeeded in changing the government of one European country through terror.

"That must never happen again," he said.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3513898.stm

Published: 2004/03/15 17:15:49 GMT

© BBC MMIV

Emergency EU talks on terrorism

Is this the unfortunate spark that will push the EU toward its common defense policy and a Constitution? That with the urgency and support of various countries, this will push through the Constitution, much the same way the USA Patriot Act was pushed through after 9/11?

With Spain already talking about removing troops from Iraq instead of pushing forward with immediate retaliation, will Spain, and with it Europe in a collective approach, avoid anti-European reaction in the Muslim world and defuse potential anti-Islamic sentiment in its home country?

BBC - EU calls emergency terror talks

EU calls emergency terror talks

European Union ministers have been called to emergency talks on Friday in response to last week's Madrid attacks.

Germany and France had led calls for a meeting of the EU interior ministers.

One idea - proposed by the European Commission president - is for a special commissioner to be appointed to combat the terror threat.

A routine EU summit next week is set to be dominated by security issues, amid growing signs that the Madrid attacks were the work of Islamic extremists.

European Commission president Romano Prodi said: "We have to discuss thoroughly the entire (security) strategy and we will do it at the summit next week."

"The anti-terrorism commissioner could be a piece of that strategy."

'Schengen stays'

BBC correspondents say the decision to hold the crisis talks reflects the view that the Madrid attacks have security implications well beyond Spanish borders.

European intelligence agencies are said to increasingly believe the attackers were linked to the global Islamist cause rather than Basque separatism.

German Interior Minister Otto Schily said that if it were confirmed that the Madrid bombings had an "Islamic background" then it would mean a new level of threat in Europe.

The Madrid bombings have prompted fierce debate in Germany about security measures, with the opposition calling for airport-style security to be introduced at railway stations across the country.

The German government rejects this as impractical, and says it has beefed up security in other ways.

It has also insisted that the Schengen Agreement, which allows travel between many EU members without border checks, should remain in place.

London alert

Elsewhere in Europe, security is being tightened.

Undercover anti-terrorist police are patrolling the public transport system in London for the first time.

Passengers using underground trains in London now face random checks and searches.

Posters have been put up in the city's transport terminals, urging the public to report anything suspicious.

Police said the measures - announced on Monday - had been planned for some time and were not triggered by the Spain attacks.

Spanish reversal

Spain's new leader-in-waiting, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has also asserted his commitment to fighting terror - though observers say his approach will differ markedly from that of the outgoing government.

Spain's conservative rulers were voted out of office on Sunday amid public anger at their handling of the Madrid bombings.

Mr Zapatero has already said he may withdraw Spanish troops serving in Iraq unless the United Nations is put in charge there.

Mr Zapatero said President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair needed to "engage in some self-criticism" over their decision to invade Iraq.

Al-Qaeda angle

Spanish police are holding three Moroccans and two Indians in connection with the attacks.

The three Moroccans being held have been named as Jamal Zougam, 30, Mohamed Bekkali, 31, and Mohamed Chaoui, 34.

The two Indians arrested were named as Vinay Kohly and Suresh Kumar.

Spain's El Pais newspaper reported that investigators had found links between Jamal Zougam and the Salafia Jihadia group held responsible for attacks in Casablanca last May in which more than 40 people died.

Reports also linked Jamal Zougam to a Spanish cell of al-Qaeda which was headed by Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, also known as "Abu Dahdah".

Abu Dahdah has been indicted by the Spanish anti-terrorist prosecutor Baltasar Garzon on charges relating to the preparation of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States.

El Pais said Jamal Zougam was cited at two points in judge Garzon's indictment, but was not charged.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3510968.stm

Published: 2004/03/15 19:13:49 GMT

© BBC MMIV

Energy chief challenges EU stance on Kyoto

One of the issues that have caused a major rift between the US and the EU is now dividing EU commission members. The FT reported that Loyola de Palacio, EU commissioner for energy and transport, suggested that the EU should back away from the Kyoto protocol and look for alternative ways to reduce green house gas emissions while maintaining competitiveness in industry. After the US and Australia indicated that they will not join, the fate of the protocol rests on Russia which has been taking a long time to make a decision. Margo Wallstrom, EU environmental commissioner and architect of the protocol that allows individuals countries to trade on emissions targets, declared that she was undermining her efforts to get Russia to ratify the protocol.

I have attached three articles that have been published in the FT and the Irish Times that indicate that there may be underlying issues such as de Palacio’s interest in how the protocol could affect Spanish industry (her home country) as well as the concern that the EU is not provided a united front on this issue.

Energy chief challenges EU stance on Kyoto, Financial Times, Feb. 26, 2004

Prodi stands by EU Kyoto policy, Financial Times, Feb. 27, 2004

Prodi rejects talk of discarding Kyoto, Irish Times, Feb. 27, 2004

Financial Times (London, England)
February 26, 2004 Thursday
SECTION: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY;
Energy chief challenges EU stance on Kyoto
BYLINE: By TOBIAS BUCK

Loyola de Palacio, the European Union commissioner for transport and energy, has openly challenged the European Union's commitment to the Kyoto protocol, arguing that plans to implement cuts in greenhouse gas emissions pose a severe threat to European industry.

Though she said she supported the Kyoto target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by 8 per cent between 2008 and 2012, Ms de Palacio told the FT that the Union should explore alternative ways of meeting that goal.

In her most trenchant comments on the issue to date, Ms de Palacio asked: "Should we maintain our position or not? Maybe there are no alternatives. But I think there are alternatives.

"We should look at other ways of achieving our goal - to reduce emissions - while maintaining the competitiveness of our industry."

Ms de Palacio's latest intervention represents a provocative break with the Commission's agreed position and is certain to increase tensions between her and Margot Wallstrom, the environment commissioner.

Ms Wallstrom is the architect of the legislative package that seeks to implement the emission cuts through an emission trading scheme based on individual national reduction targets.

Ms Wallstrom has complained repeatedly that Ms de Palacio is underming her efforts to get countries such as Russia to ratify the protocol and has labelled her "disloyal". Such open criticism is extremely rare among Commissioners, who generally seek to present a united front on crucial policy issues.

But Ms de Palacio insisted that she had the right to speak her mind. "I cannot shut up when confronted with a big problem, especially one that falls into my direct responsibility. Energy is my responsibility."

Ms de Palacio's comments are also certain to infuriate environmental groups, which look to the EU as one of the last bastions of support for the Kyoto protocol. However, she is likely to be backed by many European businesses, some of which have already threatened to abandon the EU if forced to implement strict emission-reduction targets.

The US and Australia have already made clear that they will not apply the Kyoto protocol, which also does not bind emerging economies such as China and India.

The protocol can now come into effect only if Russia agrees to ratify it, and its reluctance to do so until now is one of the prime reasons for Ms de Palacio's decision.

"Unhappily, it looks as if the Russians are not going to ratify. This is something that needs to be addressed," she said. Ms de Palacio would not comment on what alternative approach she had in mind for implementing the Kyoto targets, insisting that she merely wanted to stimulate a debate.

But she pointed out that there were always two ways of achieving a goal: "You can punish and threaten or you can give incentives."

She said her calls for a rethink had won the support of a growing number of EU member states: "Several ministers from different countries, both from northern and southern Europe, have told me in private that they have great concerns.

"And this concern is growing and growing."

Financial Times (London, England)
February 27, 2004 Friday
London Edition 1
SECTION: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY; Pg. 11
HEADLINE: Prodi stands by EU Kyoto policy
BYLINE: By TOBIAS BUCK

The European Commission sought yesterday to paper over the cracks that have emerged in its position on implementing the Kyoto protocol, after one of its members said the European Union should think about different ways to achieve its target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In a statement by Romano Prodi, Commission president, the Brussels-based executive said it "strongly rejects all calls to change its position concerning the ratification of the Kyoto protocol and its full implementation by the European Union".

The move followed comments by Loyola de Palacio, the Commission vice-president in charge of energy and transport, in an interview with the FT in which she called for a rethink on the EU approach to implementing the protocol.

Though she insisted that the EU should keep to its target of lowering greenhouse gas emissions by 8 per cent between 2008 and 2012, she called for a debate over whether there were better ways of reaching that goal.

She pointed out that Russia was unlikely to ratify the protocol, which would mean the agreement would not come into force. "This is something that needs to be addressed," Ms de Palacio said, pointing out that the reductions were likely to dent the competitiveness of European industry.

Her comments represent a challenge to EU legislation that seeks to achieve the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through an emissions trading system based on national reductions targets.

People close to Margot Wallstrom, the environment commissioner and architect of that legislation, yesterday expressed their anger at Ms de Palacio, saying the energy commissioner was "damaging the EU's standing".

"De Palacio has undermined the Commission's position," one person close to Ms Wallstrom said. "She is a commissioner and she has to stand behind Commission decisions."

However, Ms de Palacio reiterated her concerns at a press conference in Madrid yesterday. According to Reuters, she said the EU should give Russia until 2005 at the latest to ratify the protocol.

If Moscow failed to do so, the EU should reconsider its proposed emissions trading scheme, Ms de Palacio added.

The Irish Times
February 27, 2004
SECTION: CITY EDITION; BUSINESS AND FINANCE; Pg. 51
Prodi rejects talk of discarding Kyoto
BYLINE: By TIM KING

The President of the European Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, yesterday rejected "all calls" to abandon the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions. His declaration was forced by an interview given by Commission vice-president Ms Loyola de Palacio in which she suggested that the EU should find alternatives to Kyoto for fear of damaging the competitiveness of European industry.

"We cannot and we will not back down in the fight against human-induced climate change," Mr Prodi said in an attempt to re-establish the Commission's position.

The comments from his energy commissioner directly contradicted the stance long held by the Commission and the majority of EU states, but they reflect growing concern in Ms de Palacio's home country about how Spanish industry may be affected.

EU states have until the end of March to submit their national plans for allocating licences for emissions of carbon dioxide.

The Republic published its plans this week. Although Kyoto will not enter into force unless and until Russia ratifies the protocol, the European Environment Commissioner, Mrs Margot Wallstrom, maintains that the EU should press ahead with emissions trading on the terms laid down at Kyoto.

Au revoir l'Europe à deux vitesses?

Roya was right to signal Fisher's evolution (see her post just before this one). Chirac has moved in the same direction. During an official visit to Hungary on February 23rd and 24th, he has declared : "I know the questions raised by an enlarged Europe as its capacity to move forward. I am aware too of the fear that a two-speed Europe may trigger. I want to solemny declare that France wants to build a Europe of 25 countries!"

Does that mean that the two-speed Europe is dead? Not necessarily. French and German agree to be careful, that's for sure. The problems of an enlarged Europe remain and time will tell if Chirac and Fisher really meant what they said. Nevertheless, it's importante t acknowledge the fact that they felt obliged to reassure their partners.

Le Monde - Devant le Parlement hongrois, Jacques Chirac clame sa foi dans l'Europe à vingt-cinq

Devant le Parlement hongrois, Jacques Chirac clame sa foi dans l'Europe à vingt-cinq

LE MONDE | 24.02.04
Paris veut dissiper les craintes des pays de l'Est.
Budapest de notre envoyée spéciale

Jacques Chirac a mis à profit sa visite à Budapest, lundi 23 et mardi 24 février, pour tenter de lever la suspicion dont la France fait l'objet dans plusieurs des pays de l'Est qui intégreront l'Union européenne le 1er mai. Et c'est une véritable profession de foi dans l'Europe à 25 qu'il a délivrée, mardi matin, dans son discours devant le Parlement hongrois.

Le terrain était favorable : les dirigeants hongrois, qui sont considérés comme les "bons élèves" parmi les nouveaux entrants dans l'Union, ne font pas partie des francophiles déçus des pays de l'Est. Le président Ferenc Madl, qui a reçu, lundi, M. Chirac au palais Sander, sur les hauts de Buda, a abondamment remercié la France pour le soutien qu'elle a apporté à la Hongrie pendant les années de transition et pour "le rôle qu'elle a joué en faveur de l'avènement de l'Europe à 25", en affirmant, à plusieurs reprises, que le mérite en revenait "tout particulièrement au président Chirac".

Au-delà des politesses - dont il n'a pas, lui non plus, été avare -, le président français s'est efforcé, mardi, devant le Parlement hongrois, de dissiper point par point les malentendus qu'a pu susciter dans la région sa politique européenne. L'Europe nouvelle, selon Jacques Chirac, "doit être une Europe en marche et qui poursuit son intégration". "Je sais les interrogations que suscite une Europe élargie quant à sa capacité à aller de l'avant. Je perçois également la crainte, chez certains, d'une Europe à deux vitesses. Je tiens à le dire solennellement : c'est une Europe à 25 que la France veut construire !", a affirmé M. Chirac. Ni les sommets à deux, franco- allemands, ou à trois, comme celui du 18 février à Berlin avec les Britanniques, ni non plus l'idée des "groupes pionniers" pour lesquels plaide la France ne visent à imposer quoi que ce soit aux autres, a dit M. Chirac, surtout pas à réintroduire des divisions en Europe, contrairement à ce qu'ont redouté certains publiquement, notamment l'ancien président tchèque Vaclav Havel.

Les "groupes pionniers" sont appelés à ouvrir la voie pour les autres, "à défricher en éclaireurs certains domaines où l'Europe peut s'intégrer davantage", a expliqué M. Chirac, avant d'ajouter : "Il ne s'agit pas de diviser, il ne s'agit pas d'exclure (...). De tout cœur, je souhaite que la Hongrie se joigne à ce mouvement." La Hongrie le souhaite elle-même pour l'euro, dès qu'il lui sera possible de rejoindre la zone de la monnaie unique. Elle s'intéresse aussi à la défense européenne, mais avec des interrogations nées en grande partie de la crise irakienne et auxquelles le président français s'est efforcé de répondre : "N'en doutez pas. Nul ne demande à la Hongrie de choisir entre l'OTAN et la défense européenne. Les Etats-Unis sont nos alliés. Une Europe plus forte, c'est une Alliance plus forte."

Enfin, M. Chirac a essayé de démentir l'idée selon laquelle l'entrée des nouveaux pays membres dans l'Union allait s'accompagner d'un repli budgétaire avaricieux de ceux qui font déjà partie du "club". Il n'a toutefois pas promis de miracle : "Dans un cadre financier qui n'est pas extensible à loisir, a-t-il dit, la France veillera à ce que les arbitrages de l'Union soient rendus dans l'esprit de solidarité qui la fonde et que, à juste titre, vous attendez d'elle."

Claire Tréan

• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 25.02.04

Different takes on the Berlin Summit:

The Washington Post's "Germany and France Driving EU, to Distraction of Other Members" is a good review of the ties and tensions that exist between France and Germany and gives them some historic perspective.

From the UK, The Daily Telegrap in an article titled "Blair must not blow his European triumph" presents the meeting as a great victory for Blair (France and Germany have failed in their politics towards Iraq, and in reforming their economy) but is worried by what they view as a temptation to "get into bed with two countries whose recent record has been so retrogarade," and that are trying "to build a defence capability to rival NATO's."

The Portuguese Diario de Noticias, in a story titled "Uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades" considers that the existence of a so-called Directory is now a fact. It concedes that the three men who recently met in Germany may very well has the good of Europe as a goal, but it underlines the loss of credibility suffered by France and Germany for their no compliance of the stability pact.

In what appears to be an editorial from The International Herald Tribune "Europe's Big Three," the European version of the New York Times favors the summit for several reasons among which, "the main reason why the trilateral meeting makes sense is that unless Britain, France and Germany see eye to eye, little gets done in the EU."

La Vanguardia from Barcelona in Spain tries to keep a balance between those who see the meeting as a "mistake" as in the story "El tripartito" and those who consider as in "Un directorio europeo?" that anything that can contribute to moving forward is good. Many stories one can find in the Spanish press point out the fact that Blair, Chirac and Schr? are politically weak at this point.

The Washington Post - Germany and France Driving EU, to Distraction of Other Members
Two Say Close Relationship Does Not Harm Europe's Interests

By John Burgess
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, February 22, 2004; Page A25

GENSHAGEN, Germany -- Every six weeks or so, the leaders of Germany and France drop everything and get together for a meal.

This month, the place was this tidy village 10 miles south of Berlin. French President Jacques Chirac arrived by helicopter, then rode through the streets in a black Mercedes, waving to the locals. Ahead, up the cobblestone drive of a mansion that houses a French-German cooperation institute, his counterpart Gerhard Schroeder was waiting. Beaming, the two men embraced, bantered for a moment by the car, then disappeared inside amid a clutch of aides for lunch and private talk.

From the start of European integration a half-century ago, French-German cooperation has been the driving engine. Today the tie is so close, at both the personal and national levels, that elsewhere in Europe some people see too much of a good thing. In their view, France and Germany are sometimes crafting the new Europe on the principle that what's good for them is good for everyone.

In the past year, the two countries have stood firm against the United States in the Iraq war, ignoring sentiment in other European capitals. In efforts to restart their stalled economies, they have violated the fundamental pact of the five-year-old euro common currency. Now they are helping hold up the drafting of the first European Union constitution by insisting on a voting system weighted in their favor.

"The two cooks come from the kitchen and say they have already prepared the dinner . . . You can either eat it or not eat it, but this is what the dinner is," said Jan Truszczynski, who represents Poland, an incoming European Union member, in negotiations. Too often, he said, that's the unpleasant taste the two leave behind.

Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, another critic, recently summed up the constitutional deadlock: "There's one issue being debated -- who's going to be the boss in the Europe of the future?" he told Washington Post reporters and editors last month.

In Berlin and Paris, officials concede that such tensions exist, but they say that whatever others may say, Europe's interests remain at the heart of the cooperation. Hans Martin Bury, Schroeder's coordinator for relations with Europe, depicts agreement between France and Germany, countries that have vastly different cultures and a history of animosity, as a natural starting point for any decision to be made in the 15-country EU as a whole.

"If we can't get together, there won't be a consensus in Europe," he said in an interview in his Berlin office. "We bring different interests and traditions together. Our interest is not to dominate Europe but to create new solutions."

The partnership is overseeing a future that includes admission of 10 new member countries on May 1, strengthened rule of law, human rights and environmental protection and a progressive pooling of money and decision-making. The union sometimes functions as a counterbalance to U.S. influence in the world, though in foreign policy the two big partners don't always prevail. During the Iraq war, Britain, Spain and Italy led a faction siding with Washington.

The union is creating closer ties between all members, but nowhere are they closer than between Germany and France. Their cabinets hold joint meetings twice a year. Ministers meet to work on "road maps" on issues of mutual interest. French officials are stationed in ministries in Berlin, and Germans serve with their counterpart agencies in Paris. In a few countries, the governments have joint diplomatic offices and cultural institutes.

The heads of German states and French regional governments met in October to approve the exchange of more students and teachers and generally enhance people-to-people links; about 150,000 people already take part in youth exchange programs each year. Plans call for a 50 percent rise in the number of students studying the other country's language. Historians from both sides are meeting in an effort to draft a common textbook for use in French and German high schools.

As the war generation dies out, ordinary people on the both sides of the long-disputed border are acquiring warmer feelings toward each other. In a November 2002 survey of people aged 15-30, 88 percent of Germans described relations as rather good or very good; 94 percent of French respondents did.

French and German officials contend that each day that things go so smoothly is a miracle, in view of the rivalries and wars between the two peoples stretching back to the Middle Ages.

Preventing yet another armed conflict between France and Germany was the vision underlying the EU's founding in 1951 as a six-country common market for coal and steel. In subsequent years, President Charles de Gaulle acted as Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's patron in readmitting Germany to respectability in the postwar period.

National needs have often helped smooth over personal differences between German and French leaders in the past, as is happening today. Chirac is a highly cultured man who attended France's elite schools and leads a right-of-center government. Schroeder has blue-collar roots and governs from the left. But by all outward signs, there is a personal rapport, and officials on both sides say it is real.

Relations between the two leaders were not always smooth. At an EU summit in Nice in December 2000, France and Germany clashed over a new framework for governance of an expanded EU. But a month later the two met for dinner at a restaurant in the French village of Blaesheim, on territory that had changed hands four times in 130 years. They decided to meet every six weeks or so, just to keep up. The lunch in Genshagen on Feb. 9 was the 17th such get-together.

The first big sign of parallel thinking came in 2002, when France and Germany reached a deal on restructuring EU farm programs, the largest single drain on the EU's $120 billion annual budget.

As the Iraq war approached, the two leaders again stood together, in opposition. Their reasons were different. Chirac sought to assert France's independence in the world, political analysts say, while Schroeder found he could save a failing reelection campaign by playing to antiwar sentiments among German voters. But the positions were the same: no support at the United Nations, no troops.

In the meantime, both countries' economies were stagnating as part of the global slowdown that followed the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Both governments tried to stimulate their economies through deficit spending, at levels supposedly outlawed by a pact that laid down rules for countries using the euro.

In theory, they became liable for fines equivalent to billions of dollars. In November, finance ministers from the euro countries voted 8 to 4 to forgive the transgression. Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm, a dissenter, complained that other ministers "had been intimidated by these two big countries."

France and Germany have also stood firm in the unsuccessful negotiations on the EU's first constitution. They and other countries say that to pass, a measure must have the backing of a majority of countries that represent at least 60 percent of the expanded EU's population of nearly 500 million people. That would make it hard for smaller countries to gang up against the big ones.

People in other countries sometimes see hints of coercion in statements from Germany, the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, that without agreement on the constitution it will be hard to settle on budgets.

The new style of business has also drawn criticism at home. In Germany, a debate broke out last year on whether the country was squandering trust and friendships built at great effort since 1945. "There is less willingness by people to think that France and Germany act in the interests of Europe," said Christoph Bertram, chairman of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "The Germans have lost something very important."

In France, said Jean-Luc Parodi, an analyst at the IFOP polling institute, the political elite is committed to the German ties. But among ordinary citizens, feelings can differ. Some "see a little risk in giving too much importance to this alliance and not enough to the total European alliance."

Officials in the two countries promise to try harder to consult, but some say that at times there's just no pleasing the critics. At the constitutional convention, said a senior French official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, delegates from other countries frequently asked: " 'What will France and Germany do?' They were waiting for the initiative from France and Germany . . . In other cases, they said, 'be careful, we don't want you to impose your views.' "

Bury said that Germany and France work hard to include other nations in consultations. British Prime Minister Tony Blair periodically attends three-way summits with Chirac and Schroeder, most recently Wednesday in Berlin. In addition, Germany and France are developing European military policy with Belgium and Luxembourg, and strengthening ties with Poland.

But in their public words and body language, Chirac and Schroeder seem to try to show there is no relationship like theirs. At news conferences, they talk about holding identical views. At times, each publicly grants the other a sort of political power of attorney -- the right to speak for both.

In Genshagen, dressed in similar gray suits, they stepped into a ballroom to deliver that message again to reporters.

Schroeder said: "The close, friendly French-German cooperation that has brought very, very pleasant personal experiences is truly fit to make progress for both countries, to make progress for Europe and to let the weight that we have together be clearly known in international discussions."

Chirac chimed in: "On the European topics that we have discussed our positions are absolutely identical. We have the same views." He went on to say that later in the day Schroeder would present those views on behalf of both men to Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the EU.

But one French reporter managed to zero in on discord. France wants to lower the EU-regulated value-added tax that restaurants collect; Germany is opposed. Chirac replied that France understands Germany's position, and Germany understands France's. Smiling, he added that on this issue France will not budge.

The Daily Telegraph - Blair must not blow his European triumph
(Filed: 19/02/2004)
Never did Britain appear more at the heart of Europe than at yesterday's trilateral summit in Berlin. Tony Blair is being courted by France and Germany because they realise that on their own they cannot remain the driving force in a union shortly to expand to 25 members. In addition, they are having second thoughts about having alienated the United States, and a large part of Europe, by their opposition to last year's invasion of Iraq. They hope that Britain can provide the impetus for new moves towards integration, and at the same time act as a bridge to Washington.
For his part, the Prime Minister seeks to convince a sceptical domestic electorate that his "passionate" commitment to both the transatlantic relationship and the union is paying off. Events of the past year - the invasion of Iraq, the imminence of enlargement - have handed him a diplomatic coup.
The kudos of Berlin, however, raises more questions than it answers. Will not France and Germany seek to exploit Mr Blair's delight at being at the heart of Europe for their own ends, the first to build a defence capability to rival Nato's, the second to advance a federal agenda? Do we want to get into bed with two countries whose recent record has been so retrograde, initially over reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, then in breaching the guidelines of the stability and growth pact?
What of our relationships with other European allies, notably Italy, Poland and Spain, which fear that the Berlin triumvirate is an embryonic directory designed to present European summits with faits accomplis, thus excluding them from decision-making? And can a country which remains outside the euro zone really claim to belong to the core?
The seismic shifts which are taking place offer Britain an opportunity to reassert Europe's vocation as a union of nation states rather than a would-be federation. France and Germany, the old motors of integration, have alienated many of their partners by their behaviour over Iraq and the stability pact.
The Commission has rarely been weaker. Differences over voting rights have prevented adoption of a European constitution. The new entrants are looking for liberal economic policies which will allow them to make the most of membership. As a champion of transatlantic unity and free trade, Britain has the potential to be the continent's pace-maker.
The problem is Mr Blair's ambivalence. He is a close ally of Washington, yet has accepted the union's acquiring an autonomous defence capability outside Nato. Despite domestic opposition, he still dreams of taking Britain into the euro zone. His attitude towards the new European constitution remains confusing: he talks of red lines that cannot be crossed, yet appears ready to accept a document which would radically alter the union's status.
This may be the hour of Britain within European councils, but it is far from certain that he is the man to match it.

Diario de Noticias - Uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades

O chanceler alem㯠tentou ontem minimizar a import⮣ia da cimeira tripartida de Berlim, onde participaram, al魠do pr󰲩o Gerhard Schroeder, o Presidente franc곬 Jacques Chirac, e o primeiro-ministro ingl곬 Tony Blair. O que alguns pa���s europeus temiam - recorde-se a carta de seis l���res de outros tantos pa���s (Portugal, Espanha, Itᬩa, Holanda, Pol󮩡 e Est󮩡) ao primeiro-ministro irland곬 que este semestre preside ࠕni㯠Europeia, em defesa do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento e do princ���o da igualdade para todos - acabou por acontecer: a cria磯 de um direct󲩯 europeu.

Schroeder afirmou que a iniciativa n㯠visava o dom���o de ningu魠e muito menos da Europa. O chanceler alem㯠sublinhou que os tr고pretendiam apenas resolver os problemas comuns e aumentar a eficᣩa da UE. A afirma磯 頶erdadeira, jᠱue os tr고procuram fugir aos problemas internos dos seus pa���s e, por isso, querem assumir a imagem de estadistas que resolvem os problemas da UE. A quest㯠頱ue os outros pa���s olham com desconfian硠para Fran硠e Alemanha, que foram durante anos o motor da Europa, sobretudo na concretiza磯 de projectos como a Uni㯠Econ󭩣a e MonetᲩa e o pr󰲩o euro. O facto de n㯠cumprirem as regras do PEC sem serem alvo de qualquer san磯 retirou-lhes credibilidade. Agora precisam do Reino Unido para voltarem a poder reunir consensos e ditar regras na Constitui磯 europeia. Tony Blair, debilitado internamente pela morte de David Kelly e pela inexistꮣia de armas de destrui磯 maci硠no Iraque, tamb魠procura apoios que hᠵm ano eram impensᶥis.

Uma locomotiva anglo-franco-alem㠧era grandes apreens?aos restantes 12 pa���s da UE, a que se juntam os 10 do alargamento, marcado para Maio. Os condenados a viajar nas carruagens de tr᳠jᠮ㯠tꭠd?s de que vai passar a existir uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades. S󠦡lta saber quem vai ficar nas carruagens de tr᳠e se se vai perder o princ���o de um comissᲩo por pa���ou as presidꮣias rotativas da UE.

El tripartito

FRANCIA VUELVE a poner en peligro la construcci󮠤e Europa

MIQUEL ROCA I JUNYENT - 24/02/2004

El t���lo se presta a enga񯺠hoy, no s󬯠en Catalunya, sino en toda Espa񡠬a menci󮠤e ?tripartito? se atribuye en exclusiva al Gobierno de Catalunya. En esta ocasi󮬠no obstante, se estᠨaciendo referencia a la pretensi󮠤e Chirac, Schr? y Blair de constituir, de hecho, un poder tripartito para conducir la nueva etapa pol���ca de la Uni󮠅uropea. Cansados de intentar alcanzar un consenso que no llegan a conseguir con los dem᳠estados miembros, singularmente con Espa񡠹 los pa���s recientemente incorporados procedentes de la Europa del Este, pretenden gobernar Europa prescindiendo de ellos.

?Es un ejercicio de prepotencia? No, simplemente es ignorar que la UE o se construye desde el consenso o va a refugiarse en una triste y limitada realidad como mercado econ󭩣o, sin proyecci󮠰ol���ca ni capacidad de influencia en la escena internacional. Francia vuelve de nuevo a poner en peligro la construcci󮠰ol���ca de Europa. Lo hizo con Mendes France en 1953, cuando lo que se pretend���era la comunidad europea de defensa, y lo vuelve a hacer ahora, antes que aceptar que Europa pueda constituirse sin hegemon���francesa.

Y lo pretende hacer de la mano de Alemania, pieza clave de la Europa de futuro, pero que no puede olvidar que su nombre inspira a muchos pa���s del Este el mismo recelo que despierta el vecino ruso. Unos y otros, germanos y rusos, se han pasado los dos ?os siglos de nuestra historia ocupando sucesiva y alternativamente el escenario del centro de Europa, dejando tras de s���n reguero de v���imas y agresiones.

Y, por si fuera poco, la compa񭡠se culmina con la presencia de Gran Breta񡬠que ha ido siempre a remolque en la construcci󮠥uropea y que, hoy por hoy, todav���no ha aceptado el euro como moneda com?ste tripartito s󬯠tiene de com?n el de Catalunya, que tambi鮠atribuye la culpa de todos los males a Aznar. Pero, igual que aqu���en Europa deber���decirse qu頳e propone, c󭯠se quiere avanzar, en qu頤irecci󮮠No basta con definir el adversario, adem᳠debe saberse proponer cuᬠserᠥl futuro que espera a los europeos.

En todo caso, en este momento el tripartito europeo huele a retroceso, a volver muy atrᳮ La ampliaci󮠱ueda en entredicho y la construcci󮠰ol���ca de la Uni󮠅uropea en v���muerta. Lo que franceses, alemanes y britᮩcos se proponen no es s󬯠una respuesta a la oposici󮠤e otros pa���s, es sacar provecho de 鳴a para retroceder a muchos a񯳠atr᳠y volver a construir la Europa de los potentes, recelosos del protagonismo de los nuevos. A los euroesc鰴icos se suma ahora una nueva categor��� los de ?Europa s���pero nunca a costa de nosotros?. ?Ad󮤥 vas, Europa?

?Un directorio europeo?

QUE CHIRAC, SCHRքER y Blair concierten un proyecto para revitalizar la econom���no debe rechazarse sin m᳠por supuesto hegemonismo

CARLOS NADAL - 22/02/2004

La reuni󮠤e Chirac, Schr? y Blair celebrada en Berl���el pasado mi鲣oles la han tomado a mal los gobiernos de Espa񡬠Italia, Portugal, Holanda, Polonia y Estonia. Sobre todo el de Aznar, quien, al parecer, puso el asunto sobre la mesa en la reuni󮠲eciente de la internacional del Partido Popular Europeo con el resultado del redactado de una carta que estos seis pa���s enviaron al presidente semestral de la Uni󮠅uropea, el primer ministro irland鳬 Bertie Ahern. Una misiva en la cual se expresaba el temor a que Alemania, Gran Breta񡠹 Francia pretendan constituirse en algo as���omo un directorio dispuesto a marcar las pautas que seguir por la UE, en v���eras y despu鳠de que se ampl���con diez estados m᳠a partir del 1 de mayo de este a񯮠

El recelo de los gobiernos espa񯬠y polaco a todo tipo de iniciativa de los pa���s de mayor peso demogrᦩco, territorial y econ󭩣o de la UE en el sentido de querer imponer los criterios a ellos m᳠favorables y en detrimento de los miembros medianos o peque񯳠ha ocasionado ya m᳠de una diferencia comunitaria. Ocurri󠡳��� ra���de que los ministros de Econom���resolvieran no aplicar a Francia y Alemania las penalizaciones que merec��� por no cumplir el pacto de contenci󮠤el d馩cit y, anteriormente, cuando la guerra de Iraq cre󠵮a escisi󮠧rave entre los gobiernos de la UE que se alinearon con Estados Unidos y los que, encabezados por Alemania y Francia, mostraron su disconformidad con la iniciativa norteamericana. Tambi鮠entonces Espa񡠹 Polonia encabezaron agrupaciones de estados proamericanos. Concretamente, Espa񡠣on un documento firmado por ocho gobiernos. Estos desentendimientos crearon el ambiente enrarecido que condujo a la reuni󮠤e Bruselas en que el proyecto de Constituci󮠥uropea elaborada por una Convenci󮠢ajo la presidencia de Val鲹 Giscard d'Estaing qued󠡲rinconado en espera de una mejor oportunidad.

La susceptibilidad espa񯬡 se apoya en el rechazo de que haya en la UE distintos grados de autoridad y capacidad de decidir. Pero al mismo tiempo responde a la hipersensibilidad de la soberan���nacional, el temor a que Espa񡠳e vea arrastrada a cumplir decisiones pol���cas que perjudiquen sus intereses, no s󬯠en el seno de la Comunidad Europea, sino tambi鮠en pol���ca exterior. Esto ?o se puso claramente de manifiesto respecto a Iraq. Es decir, al distanciamiento de la pol���ca francesa y alemana en beneficio de un acercamiento preferencial a Estados Unidos como principal gestor de la pol���ca en el escenario mundial.

Pero entre tanto se han producido cambios en el contexto europeo. El m᳠notable ha sido el acercamiento progresivo de Gran Breta񡠡 Francia y Alemania. El deseo del ?premier? britᮩco Blair de reequilibrar su postura acentuadamente proamericana mediante la aproximaci󮠣ontinental a Francia y Alemania. Como si entendiera la necesidad de borrar el efecto de la reuni󮠴ripartita con Bush y Aznar en las Azores.

Este paso progresivo del eje Par���Berl���al triᮧulo Par���Berl���Londres establece relaciones especiales entre los tres pa���s miembros de la UE que suman el mayor peso demogrᦩco y econ󭩣o. Y, sin duda, militar, sobre todo por la aportaci󮠢ritᮩca, que en este terreno tiene una superioridad indiscutible. Precisamente la que le convirti󠥮 el ? aliado de peso en la guerra y ocupaci󮠤e Iraq. No en vano es en las cuestiones militares donde se comenz󠡠forjar este entendimiento tripartito europeo, mediante instrumentos de una defensa com?rimer paso en la direcci󮠤e establecer ?convergencias aceleradas?.

Y ahora esta nueva realidad se ha consolidado en la reuni󮠥n Berl���del pasado mi鲣oles, de la cual ha surgido un acuerdo muy amplio para que la UE d頵n paso adelante en su potencialidad industrial, tecnol󧩣a, de investigaci󮬠de creaci󮠤e infraestructuras, de actualizaci󮠹 ampliaci󮠤e la educaci󮬠de ajuste de la pol���ca social y sanitaria. Un conjunto de iniciativas que tienen su vertiente pol���ca, por ejemplo, con el proyecto de crear una especie de superministro europeo encargado de poner en prᣴica estos objetivos. Los reunidos en Berl���lo han considerado como la figura de un vicepresidente de la Comisi󮠅uropea con amplios poderes.

Las denuncias de que los acuerdos tomados en Berl���son la manifestaci󮠤e una voluntad hegem󮩣a inaceptable no parecen en principio la respuesta m᳠adecuada. Es comprensible que levanten recelos. Pero Chirac, Schr? y Blair han procurado desvanecerlos, advirtiendo de que no se trata de imposiciones, sino de propuestas que plantear, sobre todo, cara a la cumbre comunitaria que ha de celebrarse el 25 y el 26 de marzo.

Si es verdad que puede sospecharse la creaci󮠤e una especie de triunvirato, de la aplicaci󮠤el principio de la ?convergencia acelerada?, tambi鮠lo es que se trata de un proyecto que m᳠bien estᠥncaminado a evitar las ?geometr��� variables? en la participaci󮠥n la UE. Porque, habida cuenta de las circunstancias actuales, lo ocurrido en Berl���m᳠parece responder al temor de un desfase econ󭩣o general de la UE respecto a las grandes y poderosas unidades macroecon󭩣as como Estados Unidos y Jap󮠹 al avance hacia el primer plano de potencias en crecimiento acelerado como China e India que a la voluntad de predominio triangular en el seno de la UE. Es la conciencia de que Alemania y Francia estᮠa punto de quedarse peligrosamente atr᳠y de que Gran Breta񡬠pese a encontrarse en condiciones algo mejores, tampoco da la medida del gran desaf���econ󭩣o y por tanto pol���co que estᠰlanteado o planteᮤose a escala global.

Los gobiernos de Par��� Berl���y Londres han comprendido la urgencia de conjuntar esfuerzos si no quieren quedarse atrᳮ Y esto, l󧩣amente, han de resolverlo teniendo muy en cuenta el marco comunitario en el que estᮠinscritos de manera irreversible. Que algunas potencias medias o peque񡳠hagan interpretaciones peyorativas de las propuestas elaboradas en la reuni󮠤e Berl���en vez de disponerse a estudiarlas y comprenderlas como una iniciativa con la que es conveniente colaborar no les ayudarᮠEs natural que los estados miembros procuren no salir perjudicados por las decisiones comunitarias, pero un puntilloso nacionalismo por sistema cada vez serᠭenos rentable en una UE que s󬯠va a ser verdaderamente viable si acrecienta la interdependencia.

Ni Chirac ni Schr? ni Blair estᮠen sus mejores d��� pol���camente. Lo cual les empuja a apoyarse mutuamente en lo que puede ser una empresa com?paz de devolverles el cr餩to popular del que no van sobrados. Si esta merma les lleva de verdad a ser creativos con una perspectiva europe���a, no parece razonable acusarles de hegemonismo sin esperar a estudiar sus propuestas y hacer las aportaciones cr���cas o participativas que se estimen oportunas y leg���mas.

No es Berlusconi la persona m᳠indicada para despacharse sobre el asunto afirmando que Europa no necesita ning?rectorio que cree confusi󮮠Y parece exagerado que la ministra espa񯬡 Ana Palacio diga que ?nadie deber���estar autorizado a secuestrar el inter鳠general de Europa?. De momento mejor ser���darle un margen de confianza a Blair cuando dice: ?No tenemos por qu頰resentar excusas a nadie. Estamos buscando c󭯠deber���os hacer para hacer funcionar a Europa de una manera m᳠eficiente en inter鳠de nuestros pueblos?.

Europe's Big Three
The International Herald Tribune
The meeting of the leaders of Britain, France and Germany on Wednesday was guaranteed to get other Europeans grumbling anxiously about a "big three" directorate. The fears are understandable, especially with the approach of the expansion of the EU, and it was right for six nervous European prime ministers to issue a joint statement effectively reminding Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schr? that they have no monopoly on EU policy-making.
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That said, there is nothing wrong in a separate get-together of the three, especially after the bitter disputes over Iraq. In fact, it is critical for the heads of Europe's three biggest economies to be talking. What is important is that Blair, Chirac and Schr? come up with concrete ideas in advance of the next EU summit meeting on March 25 about getting Europe over some of the toughest times in its history and delivering real benefits to the people of Europe. And it is equally important that they present their decisions in a way that does not rouse new anxieties, in Europe or the United States, and avoids any talk of a "two-speed Europe" or patronizing lectures to new members.
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The conventional wisdom about the big three is that the French-German "motor" is no longer powerful enough to drive European integration and needs the added horsepower of Britain. So Blair's trip to Berlin should be good news for all Europeans, all the more so since Britain, a trusted friend of many new entrants and Europe's leading Atlanticist, will temper French-German tendencies to go it alone. It should also be welcomed by Washington, which will be less suspicious of French and German intentions for Europe if America's British ally is in on their talks.
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In the end, though, the main reason why the trilateral meeting makes sense is that unless Britain, France and Germany see eye to eye, little gets done in the EU. When they do pull together, they can often achieve more, and more quickly, than the cumbersome bureaucratic beast of Brussels in full battle armor. Recent examples of trilateral success include the mission to Tehran last year that persuaded Iran to allow inspection of its nuclear program, and burgeoning defense cooperation, notably the agreement last week by Germany to join the Franco-British plan for rapid reaction forces.
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Such cooperation, of course, can easily strain the nerves of those left out; hence the warning letter from Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Estonia. But fears of a trilateral directorate are exaggerated; Britain, France and Germany have very differing national agendas, and the three men are hardly bosom buddies, however chummy they may try to appear over their beer and w?
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The greater fear is that their separate ambitions will deflect them from the responsibility they bear for all Europe. The EU on the eve of enlargement is a fragile thing, as demonstrated by the debacle in December over the Union's draft constitution. A compromise proposed by Blair, Chirac and Schr? - or even just an agreement to compromise - could go along way toward solving the constitution wrangle; bulldozing by the big three, on the other hand, could do enormous damage to Europe's big house.
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The most promising thing about the Berlin meeting is that social and economic reform is high on the agenda. The EU has worked so far, most of the time, because it is an economic union; and globalization's success stories worldwide show that economic progress is the best recipe for stability. Settling on the best ways to tackle unemployment, social security and health care, and to improve the business environment, would not only help Europe through its current rough patch, but also give Europeans some evidence that the EU is not such a bad thing.

Italy and the Big Three

As we all saw in the last few days (see articles on the Berlin summit and the Big Three), the struggle for power and the fear for a country’s dominance are not confined to the US VS Europe strategic competition/conspiracy. Europe has its own internal tensions, too.
In this phase of expansion and re-definition, every little step seems crucial (therefore controversial) for the attribution of a future European leadership.
As Francis mentioned, the Berlin meeting raised a lot of polemics in Italy, especially from Berlusconi, who called the meeting a “pastiche” and opposed the idea of a European “directory” altering the EU foundation (a union based on equality and unanimity of all members.)
The article says that the main result of the Berlin meeting was an agreement about a new “Super Commissary for the European Economy” that – according to Schroeder - would have the goal “to make the EU the most competitive area in the world.”
While underlining the economic competition between EU and the US (helped by the Euro), Schroeder recalled that the “Three Big” have no will of dominance in Europe. And that that the idea of an exclusive summit between the three countries that have the 50% of the European GDP is “natural.”
Now, I definitely think that the three-vertix summit was natural. And we all know that Berlusconi, with his proverbial egotism, always tends to take it personally. But it’s also natural that Italy, as a borderline power and a founding father of the EU, doesn’t like to be excluded from the process. And the idea of a two-speed Europe and a European directory based on economic strength is problematic and questionable.
While the EU is trying to build its institutional, constitutional, political and cultural common identity, should the economy (the GDP) be the only distinctive factor in the decision-making process?
The fact is that – before the War in Iraq – Berlusconi, Aznar and Blair formed a new pro-war, pro-American axis, which excluded France and Germany. Now – as the situation in Iraq changed – the central axis is shifting again reuniting the three European bigger powers. Not Italy, Spain and Britain, but France, Germany and Britain. So, it seems that Italy instrumentally used the war to “gain weight,” but now – going back to the economic criteria – is loosing relevance in the international arena.

(Also, note that the Berlin summit discussed the lack of resources for universities and the scientific research – and that the problem was, once again, a French concern, brought at the discussion table by Chirac.)

La Repubblica, "Un supercommissario per l'Economia Europea"

Immigration Policies

This is another article on resistance to immigration. It covers the likely migration of poor minorities in Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech republic to richer EU countries. And it specifically examines worries in the UK.
The article highlights the lack of overarching policy to handle inter-EU migration - for instance, do immigrants from memebr states get the same access to the welfare system?
But most interesting for me is the connection between immigration and the proposed 25% increase in EU spending. Could it be that countries opposed to the increase are increasing their immigration woes? Maybe they could bridge their domestic political quagmires by promising that a steep tax hike will stave off floods of immigration by giving newer, poorer EU members more incentive to stay home - thereby keeping local office and satisfying EU expectations?

Immigration
Those roamin' Roma
Feb 5th 2004 | BRATISLAVA AND BRUSSELS
From The Economist print edition
The government may change the benefit system to deal with the threat that lots of poor central Europeans will turn up when the European Union expands in May

AN UNSTOPPABLE tide of British journalists is flooding into eastern Slovakia, swamping law-abiding local residents with demands for free interviews. The reason for the hacks' sudden interest in the obscurer bits of central Europe is that Britain has just woken up to one of the consequences of the enlargement of the European Union on May 1st—the free movement of people and labour, including the wretchedly poor Roma minorities of new member-states like Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
AP
Have freedom of movement, will travel

The reaction to the idea that Roma might choose to exercise their right to move to Britain has been—to put it mildly—uncharitable. The Daily Express proclaimed on January 20th—“The Roma gypsies of Eastern Europe are heading to Britain to leech on us. We do not want them here.” Reports like this prompted Denis MacShane, Britain's Europe minister, to speak out in Parliament against “rancid hate campaigns” in the British press, which he likened to the demonisation of Jewish immigrants in the 1930s. But Tony Blair is clearly feeling the pressure. On February 4th, he suggested that Britain might re-examine its “concessions” to would-be workers from the new EU members and will tighten up the welfare system to prevent possible abuse.

But while the language used by some newspapers is repellent, they may have identified a real issue. Incomes are low and unemployment rates high across much of central Europe. But conditions are much worse still for the Roma minorities, who number about 1.5m in the countries joining the EU this year, and another 3m or so in Romania and Bulgaria, which are on schedule to join in 2007. In Hungary the poverty rate is about five times greater among Roma than among non-Roma, the World Bank reported last year.

The poorest of Slovakia's 500,000 or so Roma live in clusters of wooden shacks without mains water or sewerage, on refuse-strewn wasteland, often segregated from “white Slovak” housing. Families pack into freezing huts. Roma were usually the first to lose their jobs when communism collapsed. Whole villages have been living for years on meagre child-benefit payments, charity and foraging. With no jobs to be had, parents have lost sight of the link between education and employment, so many Roma children are growing up unschooled.

Slovakia's “Roma parliament”, a community body, said last month that the favoured destinations for Roma emigrants this year would be Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Czech Republic. Many may be too poor to make the trip to Britain. But for those who can scrape £60 ($110) together, there is a flight from Bratislava to London.

The British government is under particular pressure because it is throwing the labour market open immediately to workers from the new member-states. The south-east of England is already awash with Polish builders and nannies. More may come in May when the remaining restrictions lapse—and a good thing too. But would those who fail to find work be eligible for welfare benefits?

That is not clear. A senior diplomat in one of the accession countries says that he has appealed to London several times for guidance, but that the answers he has received have been incomprehensible and contradictory. One thing is clear, however: EU countries cannot introduce laws that discriminate against other EU citizens on grounds of nationality, so the benefit rules that apply to Britons must apply to immigrants from the rest of the EU.

Other EU countries clearly fear that their welfare systems might be open to abuse. Last week, Goran Persson, the Swedish prime minister, said that workers from the new member-states would, “once inside our country, have access to the entire social security safety net. I expect enormous problems unless we protect ourselves.” The Swedes—and almost all other EU countries except Britain and Ireland—will require workers from eastern Europe to get work permits for the first few years.

Britain is—so far—resisting taking similar measures. British officials point out that insisting on permits for those who want to work will do nothing to roll back one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU—the freedom to move from one country to another. Even without the right to work, central European immigrants could apply for the bottom level of the British social safety net—means-tested payments such as income support and housing benefit.

To qualify for those, applicants must meet a test of “habitual residence” in Britain. This used to be defined as six months' unbroken residence, but the conditions were softened after complaints from Britons who had spent time abroad. Government officials are talking of reintroducing a well-defined “habitual residence” test.

Would such a measure—combined with the fact that the most generous benefits are restricted to people with a record of employment—solve the problem? Not necessarily. Central Europe's poor may still come, on the grounds that poverty in Britain is unlikely to be worse than destitution is Slovakia; and, as one British minister puts it, “If people are lying around on the streets, we won't leave them to die.” The burden of providing emergency housing and food would fall on local social-services departments. This kind of help is normally regarded as strictly temporary, until a more permanent solution can be found. What that solution might be in the case of Roma immigrants is unclear.

Europe Aims at Endless Energy

It basically talks about the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project which is planning to build a nuclear fusion actor. The six members of the ITER are Japan, US, China, Russia, the European Union and South Korea. The two candidate sites for the fusion reactor are Cadarache, France and Rokkasho, Japan.

Even though the members have reached some compromise, as reported by The Japan Times, due to the adamant attitude of France and Japan who both want the reactor to be built in their countries, the talk on the site-choosing this Saturday in Vienna will not be breezy easy.

The topic is kind of related to my area of interest. Clear/renewable energy has been a huge topic in Europe, compared to the lukewarm reaction it receives in the US (think about Kyoto Protocol and so on). I'll keep an eye on the progress of the talk among the members of ITER, and see if there's possible new stories to explore.

This story is by Tim Radford, published on The Guardian.

Europe's scientists hope to mimic the power of the sun and create limitless energy on Earth with the help of a £6bn experiment in the south of France.
Ministers in Brussels gave the go-ahead yesterday for Iter, the world's biggest and most ambitious fusion reactor, at Cadarache near Aix-en-Provence. It will be 10 years in the making and, in its 20-year operating life, researchers will experiment with a kind of slow hydrogen bomb in the hope of extracting vast amounts of clean energy from tiny amounts of heavy water.

Iter will replace Jet, the current joint European fusion research project, based at Culham, Oxfordshire.

Sir Chris Llewellyn-Smith, head of the UK fusion programme, said yesterday: "The Iter project will allow a major step towards an inexhaustible source of environmentally friendly power."

Petroleum and coal deliver chemical energy liberated by the breaking of chemical bonds in the form of fire. Nuclear fission of enriched uranium exploits the energy released by the breakdown of a unstable heavy atom to a lighter one. But the "ash" from a fission reaction is radioactive and it stays too hot to handle for thousands of years.

The great prize has always been fusion power: the fusion of two hydrogen atoms to make one of helium, releasing huge quantities of heat. Every second, the sun converts 600m tonnes of hydrogen into helium and illuminates and warms this planet from 90m miles away.

To do the same on Earth, engineers and physicists have to collect deuterium and tritium - isotopes of hydrogen - and heat them to more than 100m C, many times hotter than the heart of the sun. At these temperatures the heavy hydrogen would become a plasma, a ball of subatomic particles which would fuse to become helium and a shower of neutrons and a supply of heat. One kilogram of heavy hydrogen would supply the heat now generated by 10m kg of fossil fuel. There would be no greenhouse gases, no soot, and no long-lived radioactive waste. The oceans contain all the heavy hydrogen such reactors would need.

Fusion power would, in theory, be safe, because the challenge is not to stop a fusion reaction, but to keep it going. But that is the catch. If plasma at 100m C so much as touched anything, it would go out like a light. The trick is to keep tiny pellets of fuel suspended in a kind of magnetic "bottle" in a sealed chamber. Then engineers would have to pump blasts of laser fire at the pellets, compressing them to 20 times the density of lead, at which point they would start to behave like tiny stars, releasing a thermonuclear blast of neutrons to heat up a containment wall many metres away.

Fusion's most ardent enthusiasts believe that a viable power plant is 30 years away. Iter is just another stage in the research.

Although the Cadarache site has Brussels' backing, the decision has yet to be confirmed by the other partners in the project. These include Canada, the US, Russia, Japan, South Korea and China. There is one other candidate site - at Rokkashomura in Japan - and the final decision could be made in Washington next month.

Not invited to the "Big Three" party

This is somewhat a continuation of the "Big Three: What Europe needs?" entry.

Those not invited to the "Big Three" party should be upset. El Paîs’ editorial patiently explains how important it is to keep the ENTIRE EU involved. But, again, Balibar would say, well, do something about it Spain, Holland and Italy. Action leads to power.

Principally Spain, Holland and Italy are potentially falling behind as the Big Three set the agenda. It also appears that talk of equal states in Europe is just that – talk.

Divergence and convergence among member nations on various issues can create an equilibrium, albeit fragile, in European affairs. France and Germany split on something like the role of NATO and European security, but agree that Britain is good as an additional leader. But, what El Pais argues is that the interests of the entire EU is best served by cooperation from all member states.

I think it’s interesting that the tone of the El Pais editorial is, for the most part, relatively calm. The Italians sure weren't.

I’m also reminded of the United States and relations between states. Arizona, California, Colorado may battle over water rights, for instance, but when it comes to the Western United states and, say transportation dollars, states will line up. This is the state of affairs with politics in the EU. There is a model that already exists, despite its flaws.

An aside:
In regard to security policy and the EU, I wonder again about examining a US model. Countries can maintain its own military, something akin to individual states and their respective "National Guard" outfits, while still developing and maintaining a larger "united" military. Of course, there is the concern of resources.

I need to read more on Britain’s take on a European Union army. I can still see Blair wanted to keep a more autonomous approach to Her Majesty’s security. Has anyone seen anything on this?

Basically, what this editorial is saying that the Big Three discussion of employment, competitiveness and innovation was used as a red herring perhaps to distract from a potential power grab before the EU expands to 25.

However, the best cooperation is among all member-states, and not just the three giants.

El Pais - Cita en Berlin

Cita en Berlín

EL PAIS | Opinión - 19-02-2004

Sobre la reunión en Berlín de los tres grandes han sobrevolado las quejas de unos socios no invitados -Holanda, Italia y España básicamente- que creen que Alemania, Francia y Gran Bretaña pretenden dominar la futura Unión Europea de 25 miembros que nacerá en semanas. Quizá para disipar en parte este clima envenenado, la agenda formal del encuentro, el tercero de este tipo desde septiembre pasado, ha estado centrada en temas como el empleo, la competitividad industrial o la innovación en la UE. Pese a este temario deliberadamente degradado por los interlocutores para evitar la impresión de que se erigen en puente de mando continental, la comitiva ministerial que les ha acompañado revela la importancia que Berlín, París y Londres han dado al encuentro.
La grisura de la actual realidad europea, con la futura Constitución en el limbo y el desafío de organizar un club que en pocos meses tendrá casi el doble de afiliados, hace más tentadora para sus miembros más poderosos la idea de dar un paso al frente. En este sentido hay que saludar la propuesta alumbrada en Berlín para revitalizar la agenda de Lisboa enunciada en el año 2000 -un intento de crear empleo, estimular el crecimiento y reducir el foso entre Europa y EE UU- y poner a su cargo a un nuevo vicepresidente de la Comisión Europea.

Pero Francia, Alemania y Gran Bretaña deberían resistir cualquier eventual tentación de convertirse en directorio de sus socios. Mejor que peor, la UE se las ha arreglado hasta ahora para mantener un cierto equilibrio entre los intereses de sus miembros mediante el mecanismo mixto del Consejo intergubernamental y la Comisión Europea. Los países más grandes tienen más votos en el Consejo, y la Comisión vela por los intereses del conjunto. Trasladar este engranaje a una asociación de 25 va a poner a prueba el sistema. Pero una Unión donde los más poderosos controlaran la adopción de decisiones mientras una superpoblada Comisión permaneciera entre bambalinas destruiría contrapesos que han mostrado su eficacia durante años.

La nueva UE ampliada necesitará sin duda de un liderazgo estratégico, sobre todo en materia de reforma económica y defensa, que evite su transformación en un magma sin claros objetivos comunes. Pero es más que discutible que esa dirección deba llegar de la alianza bilateral entre Berlín y París, con la ineludible participación británica -todavía fuera de la eurozona- en razón, entre otras, de sus capacidades militares. El mejor servicio a los intereses de tantos y tan dispares Estados y la flexibilidad del conjunto estarán probablemente mejor garantizados por la cooperación entre los grandes y los pequeños que por el designio de los gigantes.

El emergente tripartito, en definitiva, debería concentrarse en los ámbitos donde su esfuerzo puntero sea más útil para un conjunto cuyo dibujo está a punto de ser alterado sustancialmente. Pero las decisiones sobre la Unión Europea, con todo el esfuerzo y la cintura política que requieran, deben dejarse al total de sus miembros. La UE como realidad global será de todos o no será.

Big Three: what Europe needs?

My initial thought on both the meeting of the Big Three and the reaction of the excluded nations is how critical it is that the EU get its constitution created and ratified as soon as it can.

With the persistent tectonics of European politics, it’s crucial that there is other ligature to bind the EU together and to keep other countries from forming isolated alliances. Despite efforts by smaller countries to keep the EU equitable, especially the effort to keep voting weights equal for EU members, a hierarchy already exists among the 15 nation-states. Adding 10 more is going to amplify this and instead of consensus building I see more countries polarizing on various issues without a constitution.

I am reminded of pre-World War I Europe and the dealing for alliances. Of course, with the EU, and its common currency, this extreme example of alliance grabbing seems unlikely.

Now, I may not have a solid grasp of the recent historical context here, but to add Britain to the mix certainly causes future disruption, which isn't necessarily a bad thing, particularly if you consider Balibar and his "anti-strategic" policy of action over power.

It seems that the rest of Europe at least acquiesced to the idea of France and Germany assuming a joint leadership role in the EU. But, as Vinocur (and others) points out, they aren’t able to pull the EU on its own. While it is a symbolic move to bring Britain into this dialogue, I think it is also symbolic in efforts to mend relations with the U.S., a point that an El Paîs editorial makes.

Along with taking on this shared leadership role, Britain will certainly take on a mediator role between the core European Union countries (and those who opposed the invasion of Iraq) and the United States.

I also see Britain getting squeezed between France and Germany. France, as Vinocur mentions, wants to be a military power on par with Britain. However, Germany has said it's ready to have NATO assume a security role for Europe.

But, perhaps, the Big Three also recognizes something critical Balibar points out in his work -- The sum of European Union nations is less powerful than some of the constitutive states. Also, (paraphrasing Timothy Garton Ash) how important it is for both sides of the Atlantic to have the U.S. involved, and, perhaps with the help of Britain, make the U.S. a partner, and not a rival.

International Herald Tribune - News Analysis: A new power equation - It takes three nations to lead Europe

News Analysis: A new power equation

John Vinocur/IHT

It takes three nations to lead Europe
 
PARIS Regardless of how much or how little new European solidarity eventually comes out of Wednesday's Big Three summit meeting in Berlin, it produced one element of exceptional clarity: With Britain now consecrated as at least a theoretical partner, the French-German axis has lost its status as the reference point for leadership in the European Union.

On one hand, the meeting demonstrated there are now wider, richer, more consensual possibilities for pushing the EU forward than the joint impetus emanating from Paris and Berlin for the past 40 years. Three strong players, the participants seemed to say, were better than two.

On the other hand, the willingness of Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schröder to promise new cooperation for the good of all Europe commanded examination of the serious differences among the three - on trans-Atlantic relations, the euro, the level of EU integration, tax and veto powers - as well as possible new elements of divergence in policy between France and Germany.

At a news conference, the three leaders seemed intent on giving an unexceptional and nonepochal feel to their get-together. Blair, low-keying the event, talked about "finding ways of making Europe work more efficiently." When the first question at the news conference went to the idea of whether they were trying to run Europe, Schröder responded, "We don't want to dominate anyone."

All the same, the three men, side by side with Blair's eager-looking addition, signaled an attempt at a new way of doing Europe's business. And the meeting hardened into obviousness the notion that whatever the real limits of agreement among the three, the French-German relationship no longer represented the optimal leadership approach to lead an EU running to the borders of Russia, or, in 10 years, very possibly to the Turkish frontier with Iraq.

Who says so? British officials and German think-tankers. And, startlingly to some, the French.

Without devaluing the real and special ties between France and Germany or granting a psychic seal of full Europeanness to Britain, stuck outside the euro's common currency zone and self-defined as a Euro-Atlantic nation, a French diplomat recently acknowledged that France and Germany alone did not have the means in 2004 to pull along an EU of 25 members.

That is the professionally scrubbed version of where Europe has come, scraped clean of scales and asperities. In fact, by just taking place, the summit meeting gave legitimacy to a novel, coarser notion of reality.

Hours before the meeting began in Berlin, drive-time listeners to Europe 1 radio, a national mass-market broadcaster, were told matter-of-factly that the summit meeting's backdrop was a French-German partnership that had "neither the energy nor the credibility" to lift Europe from its miseries and was now turning toward Blair, "the indispensable hyphen between 'old' and 'new' Europe."

Hardly suspect of Euroskeptic gloating, the leftist newspaper Liberation was drawing roughly the same conclusions. "The French-German axis no longer has the weight to hope to conserve its European role," it said in an editorial.

Across the Rhine in Frankfurt, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was on much the same page. The newspaper wrote, "It will no longer be accepted that Paris and Berlin alone share the imprimatur on plans for shaping Europe."

These new realities, taken for the first time as givens in mainstream political discourse in France and Germany, accept that the two countries' attempt at joint European political and economic leadership became a train wreck in 2003.

They failed to rally their neighbors behind them in opposition to the United States' and Britain's war on Saddam Hussein. As a result of half-hearted reforms and unwillingness to make cuts in state spending, they deliberately broke the economic performance rules of the Stability and Growth Pact they themselves had created. And they were unable to muster the leverage within the widening EU to avert the collapse in December of its talks on a constitution.

Mockingly, some German commentators, breaking into Italian, began last year to refer to Paris/Berlin-Chirac/$ Schröder as the "Duo Infernale."

In this light, the summit meeting had the appearance of an attempt to redistribute leadership from a vacuum of vanished direction. Yet, even with the addition of Blair, the three participants (already distressed in their home constituencies) had no instant, amplified credibility in relation to their neighbors in Europe.

Against the determination expressed in Berlin by the three leaders to raise a beacon of European economic reform, a group of six EU members pointedly insisted on Monday, in an open letter to the EU's current president, that the Stability and Growth Pact must be applied, and that specific European economic directives carried out. This was an unmistakable jab at France and Germany as the pact's miscreants, and as the countries judged by the EU to have the lowest level of follow-through in the hard business of enacting on the national level the community's Lisbon pledge to make itself an economically competitive world-beater.

Of the six countries - Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Poland and Estonia - none have any tolerance for the idea that a triumvirate would run Europe, whatever the Big Three's repeated reassurances about contrary intentions.

In this view, the addition of Britain as an adjunct to the old French-German duo represented no quick reassurance. Countries like Spain feared Blair could be more an alibi for Schröder's and Chirac's difficulties in reforming their economies than a guarantor of change and new openness in Germany and France. Pushing further, Italy charged that the three were grouping together for individual national advantage and that their undertaking had visibly little to do with the EU's welfare as a whole.

A subtext of potential new rivalries, perhaps magnified in a three-cornered relationship, came in here.

Germany is giving the appearance of trying hard to make clear to all its partners what former Defense Minister Volker Rühe this week called "its driving role for Europe" in the Middle East. This involves Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's open attempt to coordinate Europe's diplomacy in the region with the United States and NATO and his definition of the world's central problem, dear to the heart of the Bush administration, as "the new totalitarianism" of "destructive jihadist terrorism."

If Germany maintains it will not send troops to Iraq, it appears, with its good relations in Israel and among the Palestinians, to be cutting ahead of France in trying to create a European approach on the region that is complementary rather a rival to the approach of the United States. German press reports say the French, unlikely to take as their own Fischer's dire assessment of Islamic fundamentalism as the global menace, consider the initiative an elbow in the ear and powerfully resent that Fischer did not consult with them beforehand.

Besides the Germans' obvious direct interest in improved relations with the Americans - Schröder travels to the United States next week to meet President George W. Bush - they also hope for a Washington-London-Warsaw carom effect on the EU's new members from Eastern Europe. Schröder's difficulties with the Bush administration have been described as a serious impediment to reinforcing German influence in a "new" Europe.

This is not the stuff of Chirac's continuously repeated characterization of a "perfect identity of views" between the Germans and the French, and it comes against a backdrop of France's recent eagerness to emphasize its role as the continent's most competent military player and its proximity and parity with Britain as a nuclear power and member of the UN Security Council. In the sense that both France and Germany, without jumping back chest-deep into the Atlanticist camp, are likely to look separately to Britain for reinforcement and legitimization on security and foreign policy matters, a new situation is being created with its own uncertain pressure points and arbitrages.

But on a day of professions of unity and common expectation, these and all the tens of mortally divisive issues within the EU may be considered as details. However far from taking operational form, by its great possibilities alone, a Big Three equation at the very least has given the French-German European leadership axis the look of yesterday's math.

International Herald Tribune

Copyright © 2003 The International Herald Tribune

European media reaction to trilateral summit

There are numerous editorials and columns in the European press about the unofficial meeting between Shroder, Chirac and Blair. This Guardian link provides a sidebar full of stories and commentary, so do check it out.

It seems that Europeans are saying on the one hand, this is an ill-fated menage a trois or not so alarming, while others are bristling nonetheless and calling the meeting a threat to EU unity. As one Financial Times columnist noted though, the so called directoires will not agree enough ... so those who support them should worry that they won't be able to lay down the law too much.

I think I agree. There are fundamental differences between these partners. Where two agree on Iraq, one will disagree, and where another pair agree on EU immigration policies, a third dissents. Interestingly, an Independent editorial notes that, at the end of the day, their national interests will supercede a common EU position.

The Guardian, Press Roundup of "Big Three" Summit

'Those not invited will begin to howl'
The 'big three' are determined to lead the union

Thursday February 19, 2004
The Guardian

Julian Lindley-French
Wall Street Journal Europe, February 18

"Britain, France and Germany [met yesterday] in the latest attempt to kick-start a new power hub for Europe, a 'trirectoire'. The fact that the meeting is taking place at all represents a failure of Franco-German attempts to lead Europe and a tacit recognition that such 'leadership' is unrealistic these days without the British ... Even the suggestion of a British-French-German power hub hints to the US of an alternative to the special relationship ... [But] it will be a long time before the British forsake the reflected glory of the special relationship. First, because other Europeans are at best ambivalent about Britain in Europe. Second, because the loss of the special relationship would end once and for all Britain's view of itself in the world."

Grard Dupuy
Libration, France, February 18

"The meeting in Berlin reflects the stand the three leaders have taken on Europe - starting with their common refusal to see their influence diluted by the arrival of new members. The summit also corresponds to [the French president] Jacques Chirac's idea of having pioneering coalitions within Europe, linked by a common affinity (for example, the military).

"The three men who had a rendezvous in Berlin may not see themselves as the natural leaders of Europe, as some accuse them of doing. But the circumstances of their meeting back up that interpretation."

Angelo M Petroni
Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy, February 17

"The true, dual novelty here is, on the one hand, the inclusion of Britain in the renewed alliance, and on the other, the fact that the Franco-German claim to superiority is being staked at a time when the EU is getting set to face a constitutional moment unprecedented in its entire history ...

"The fact that France and Germany have decided to proceed down this path ... shows just how fragile their Europeanism really is, and how their national interests prevail over the ideology of a united Europe ... The price for satisfying these national interests is going to be very high for Europe."

Der Tagesspiegel
Editorial, Germany, February 18

"Berlin cannot escape the eternal problem of European politics. If you wait for consensus among the 15 member states, you will be waiting forever ... But if Germany begins an initiative with fewer EU partners, those who are not invited will begin to howl ... The widening of the Franco-German partnership to include Britain should be valuable not just to the struggle over European economic reforms, but it should also dispel mistrust over the 'Schrder-Chirac duo'."

Independent
Editorial, February 18

"For all the honeyed words in Berlin, this is a marriage of convenience. France and Germany need Britain if they want to achieve anything on foreign policy, and Britain needs both, especially after Iraq. For now, they are at one in demanding such things as a cap on EU spending. But it will surely not be long before national interest rears its head once again."

El Pas
Editorial, Spain, February 18

"The Spanish prime minister, Jos Mara Aznar, has gone back to behaving like a battering ram striking at the heart of Europe ... The motive [this time] is the stability and growth pact ... and its purpose is to underline his disagreement with the meeting in Berlin signalling to France and Germany, that their failure to stick to the deficit agreement did not incur sanctions, unlike Portugal ...

"It is not clear whether Mr Aznar is pursuing these kind of initiatives to spread division within the EU and to pay them back for not taking him into account. But it does not help with the construction of Europe nor does it increase Spain's influence in it."

A new European "directory"?

An important summit Blair, Chirac, Schröder, will take place tomorrow in Berlin. Several European countries, Italy, Spain and Poland among them, are upset by the emergence of this new "directory."

After explaining the progresses made in the building of a common defense, this article taken from Le Monde sees the addition of the UK to the Franco-Germen duo as a way to appease some tensions. Their influence could be huge in many fields: commision, constitution, enlargement, etc.

It would be useful to look at how the summit is covered in different capitals and report it on the blog. Many of the issues at stake in Europe today should come up during the discussion, and in the coverage they get.

Le Monde - Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin

Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin

LE MONDE | 17.02.04 | 13h22 • MIS A JOUR LE 17.02.04 | 16h20
A quelques semaines de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, trois de ses principaux dirigeants se réunissent à Berlin, mercredi 18 février, suscitant la rancœur de certains de leurs partenaires, inquiets de voir se mettre en place une gestion par Paris, Berlin et Londres. Officiellement rejetée par les intéressés, l'expression "directoire" ne les fait cependant pas hurler d'indignation. Refusant de limiter l'Europe à un espace de paix intérieure, les dirigeants français, allemand et britannique devraient envisager les moyens de relancer les réformes, la croissance et la politique industrielle. Ils pourraient aussi décider de réformer la Commission de Bruxelles.
A peine un an après la fameuse lettre des Huit sur l'Irak, initiée par la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne, qui scellait la césure entre une Europe pro-atlantiste et une Europe franco-allemande récusant la politique américaine, Tony Blair se retrouve avec le président Jacques Chirac et le chancelier Schröder, mercredi 18 février à Berlin, pour une rencontre tripartite. A deux mois de l'élargissement de l'Union, alors que la question du fonctionnement de l'Europe à 25 est loin d'être résolue, les autres Européens s'interrogent sur l'objet de cette réunion à trois, présentée comme une concertation en vue du sommet européen qui sera consacré fin mars à l'évolution économique de l'Union.

Malgré les apaisements prodigués par Tony Blair, jeudi, lors de la rencontre préparatoire qu'il a eue avec le chancelier allemand à Berlin, plusieurs capitales, notamment au sud de l'Europe, expriment quelque agacement à voir refleurir une sorte de "directoire", non plus franco-allemand, mais à trois. "Nous ne pouvons accepter les initiatives qui mettent les uns ou les autres le dos au mur", a averti le ministre italien des affaires étrangères, Franco Frattini. "Il n'est pas bon que quelques voix fassent taire toutes les autres, dont celle de l'Espagne", a estimé de son côté la ministre espagnole Ana Palacio, qui avait dénoncé avec virulence en 2003, lors de la célébration du 40e anniversaire du traité franco-allemand, la volonté d'hégémonie de Paris et de Berlin.

L'idée d'un leadership franco-germano-britannique en Europe n'est pas nouvelle. Elle avait pris corps après l'arrivée de Tony Blair aux commandes en Grande-Bretagne, le leader travailliste revendiquant ouvertement, après les années Thatcher, un retour de son pays sur la scène européenne pour y exercer son influence. M. Blair n'a pas été en mesure de tirer suffisamment son pays derrière lui pour le convaincre de rejoindre la zone euro. Il a cependant avancé sur d'autres sujets européens, notamment en relançant avec Paris, dès décembre 1998, l'idée d'une véritable défense européenne.

C'est à nouveau à propos de la défense que les "trois grands" Européens ont manifesté ces derniers mois leur volonté de tourner la page de la crise irakienne. Le 20 septembre 2003, le sommet surprise qui les a réunis, à Berlin déjà, avait esquissé un compromis sur la création d'un état-major européen autonome au sein de l'OTAN.

Ce compromis, finalement acepté par Washington, a été la base de l'accord intervenu au sommet de Bruxelles en décembre sur la future politique de défense de l'Union à 25. Il permet d'envisager de nouveaux développements à la fois en matière de projection de forces, mais aussi de coopération dans le domaine de l'armement. L'Allemagne vient de se joindre à Paris et Londres pour mettre sur pied des corps d'intervention de 1 500 hommes prêts à être déployés pour tenter d'empêcher des crises de dégénérer, comme cela a été fait en 2003 dans la province de l'Ituri en République démocratique du Congo.

UN SOUFFLE D'AIR

Cette entente à trois a aussi débouché sur la création d'une agence d'armement, qui doit permettre à l'Europe de mettre en commun son potentiel industriel. Symbole de cette avancée : la décision de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne de coopérer pour la construction de leurs nouveaux porte-avions. Des discussions sont également en cours dans le domaine des sous-marins, où le potentiel allemand est important.

Paris et Berlin avaient dû constater pendant la crise irakienne que, dans la nouvelle Europe élargie, ils ne pourraient plus à eux seuls être le moteur de l'Union. La main tendue de Tony Blair est donc pour eux bienvenue. M. Blair a donné des gages de sa fidélité aux Etats-Unis, et sa présence devrait rassurer les pays membres les plus atlantistes sur les objectifs de la rencontre de Berlin, notamment les Polonais et les Espagnols. On en espère du coup, dans les milieux européens, une décrispation qui facilite le déblocage des négociations sur la Constitution.

De même que le couple franco-allemand a été utile dans la "vieille Europe" pour cristalliser les problèmes et dégager les compromis, un trio pourrait avoir une précieuse fonction de défrichage. En Allemagne, la droite, qui a soutenu le camp atlantiste pendant la crise irakienne contre le gouvernement Schröder, milite aujourd'hui pour qu'une place soit offerte aussi à la Pologne dans ce cercle restreint.

M. Schröder, qui s'est largement inspiré du programme travailliste pour ses propres propositions de réforme en Allemagne, peut espérer, pour sa part, trouver dans ce nouveau forum un souffle d'air dans la phase difficile qu'il traverse. Une part importante des discussions de Berlin doit être consacrée à la relance de la croissance en Europe, aux réformes, à une politique industrielle commune et peut-être à une redéfinition des postes au sein de la Commission.

Il est peu probable que soient formulées de nouvelles propositions sur la Constitution européenne, pour désarmer l'opposition de l'Espagne et de la Pologne au projet qui est sur la table. Ce projet, élaboré par la Convention, est largement le résultat des compromis auxquels les trois étaient parvenus. La France, l'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne sont loin d'avoir sur tout des points de vue identiques, mais sur cette question ils semblent décidés à attendre que le mouvement vienne d'abord de Madrid et de Varsovie.

Henri de Bresson

A German take on the EU Budget

This is an opinion piece from Der Tagespiegel, a daily newspaper in the Berlin area. It addresses the issue of EU countries (specifically Germany and also France and England) resisting higher contributions to EU coffers without concrete results for themselves, while still claiming to want a bigger and more powerful Europe.

The author contends that this lack of commitment towards a goal of either a more powerful Europe or a Europe with less money in the EU coffers and therefore less power, is slowing things down considerably. She says that that EU agriculture and development support for the new member states is a very realizable goal, but that first Germany has to clarify that that is indeed what it wants, and then be more involved in Brussels to identify areas where cuts can be made and then come up with a workable budget. The problem is that this may be an unpopular course to take at home, even though the long-term results are still desirable.

Here are some translated sections of the article:

“When it comes down to it, the heads of different countries always agree – we want more Europe. More Eurpope in research, more Europe in development, more Europe in foreign policy… and officially they still want more Europe, but they no one wants to pay for it.”

“In Germany at the moment it’s hard for people to accept that people should dig deeper in the pockets for more money while at the same time the EU commission is making increased demands for savings and economic reforms from the German government.”

“As a Nettozahler (disproportionally taxed country?), Germany is one of the few countries that gets less money for farmers and regions than they put in.”

“If they want to pay less, however, they have to say how the Eastern zone should instead be financed.”

“But Germany and its fellow disproportionally taxed countries lack the political courage to call for cutbacks on their own spending.”

Der Tagesspiegel - Mehr Geld fuer mehr Europa? Deutschland und die Erhoehung des EU-Haushalts

Vornehme Zurückhaltung

Mehr Geld für mehr Europa? Deutschland und die Erhöhung des EU-Haushalts

Von Flora Wisdorff

Immer, wenn es zum Schwur kommt, entscheiden die Staats- und Regierungschefs einstimmig: Wir wollen mehr Europa. Mehr Europa bei der Bildung, mehr Europa bei der Forschung, mehr Europa in der Außenpolitik, und mehr Europa für die Polizei. Weniger Europa bei der Agrar- oder Regionalpolitik kam nicht in Frage. Bisher war das kein Problem. Selbst wenn mehr Europa auch hieß: mehr Geld für Europa, und mehr Macht für Europa.

Mehr Europa wollen sie – offiziell – immer noch. Aber mehr bezahlen wollen sie dafür nicht. Das ist ein Widerspruch, denn mehr Europa für das gleiche Geld, das funktioniert nicht. In Deutschland ist es zwar im Augenblick schwer vermittelbar, dass die Menschen für Europa noch tiefer in die Tasche greifen sollen – und gleichzeitig die Europäische Kommission von der Regierung einen noch schärferen Spar- und Reformkurs fordert. Immerhin würde eine Erhöhung des EU-Haushalts auf 1,15 Prozent des Bruttonationaleinkommens, wie sie die Kommission fordert, die deutschen Steuerzahler erheblich mehr belasten. Das Budget würde zwischen 2007 und 2013 von 100 auf 143 Milliarden Euro steigen – jetzt zahlt Deutschland bereits 22 Milliarden. Als „Nettozahler“ gehört Deutschland zudem zu jenen, die weniger aus den EU-Töpfen für Bauern und Regionen zurückbekommen, als sie einzahlen.

Dennoch: Wenn die Nettozahler weniger zahlen wollen, dann müssen sie sagen, wie die Osterweiterung stattdessen finanziert werden soll. Sie alle haben zugestimmt – wohlwissend, dass die zehn Neuen mit ihren landwirtschaftlichen und wirtschaftsschwachen Strukturen die Agrar- und Regionalpolitik viel Geld kosten werden.

Sparpotenzial gibt es hier genug: Immerhin verschlingen beide Bereiche zusammen 80 Prozent des EU-Haushalts. Aber Deutschland und seinen Mitstreitern fehlt der politische Mut, im Agrarbereich oder bei der Regionalförderung zu sparen. Denn dann müssten auch die deutschen, französischen oder englischen Bauern mit Abstrichen rechnen – und die ostdeutschen Länder auch. Hier wollen Schröder oder Chirac also offensichtlich nicht weniger Europa.

Zudem haben die Staatschefs ihr Ziel, die EU bis 2010 zur wettbewerbsfähigsten Region der Erde zu werden, nicht zurückgenommen. Auch dafür plant die Kommission Milliarden für Forschung und Innovationspolitik ein, genauso wie für die Sicherung der Außengrenzen und die europäische Außenpolitik. Auch diese Pläne wurden von den Nettozahlern noch nicht zunichte gemacht.

Insgesamt gibt es also den Wunsch nach mehr Europa. Aber beim EU-Haushalt ist es wie beim nationalen Budget: Dort, wo es politisch schwierig ist, sinnlose Subventionen zu streichen, hält man sich damit zurück. Lieber unterstellt man den Bürokraten aus Brüssel überzogene Wünsche. Wenn man in beiden Bereichen an der richtigen Stelle sparen würde, wäre die EU-Finanzierung kein Problem. Die Mitgliedsländer müssen sich darüber klar werden, ob sie grundsätzlich ein anderes Europa haben wollen, eines mit weniger Geld, das dann auch weniger Macht hat. Das müssen sie dann aber auch offen sagen – und die Konsequenzen tragen.

"Agenda for a Growing Europe"

This "Agenda for a Growing Europe", often referred to as the "Sapir report" is a recent assessment of the EU situation today and its need for growth. Establkished on the initiative of the president of the European Commission, it assesses strengths and weaknesses and suggests an agenda to "make the EU economic system deliver." Very useful.

Agenda for a Growing Europe

EU is getting tougher on immigration

The International Federation of Human Rights analyzes the migration policies of the EU, and concludes that to make its borders more secure, it runs the risk of curbing civil liberties. One of the points of contention is the ongoing debate about the notion of "secure countries" whose nationals would not be able to apply for political asylum. Some countries have started doing that even when the criteria of what constitues a "secure country" are not clear and seem to depend more on some official policies than on individual cases. Other issues are related to the expulsion of immigrants, and the control of travelers and communications.

El País - La UE refuerza el blindaje de sus fronteras para frenar la entrada de inmigrantes

La UE refuerza el blindaje de sus fronteras para frenar la entrada de inmigrantes
Las organizaciones de derechos humanos denuncian un retroceso de las libertades en 2003

GABRIELA CAÑAS - Bruselas

EL PAÍS | Internacional - 03-02-2004

Contener el flujo migratorio y establecer un área más segura aun a cambio de la pérdida de las libertades individuales. Éste puede ser el resumen de lo acontecido el año pasado en la Unión Europea (UE), que recoge el informe anual de la Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (FIDH). Mientras el presidente de la Comisión, Romano Prodi, proclamaba en Viena que en Europa no hay lugar para el racismo, la FIDH demostraba en un profundo análisis que la Unión y varios de sus países han endurecido sus políticas de inmigración y asilo y están mermando las libertades de sus ciudadanos, en contra de convenios internacionales y de sus propios principios. Las directivas sobre asilo en Europa y la reagrupación familiar de los inmigrantes, la agencia de control de fronteras y los acuerdos de readmisión con terceros países son las cuatro iniciativas europeas que la FIDH desgrana, para acabar concluyendo que toda la política sobre este asunto gira en torno a un objetivo fundamental: el cierre de fronteras.

Sobre la directiva de asilo que establece las condiciones para conseguir el estatuto de refugiado, la FIDH coincide con el Alto Representante de los Refugiados de la ONU, Ruud Lubbers, en señalar que el proyecto de establecer una lista de "países seguros" es contrario a la Convención de Ginebra. La Unión quiere rechazar sistemáticamente la petición de los demandantes de asilo procedentes de esos países considerados seguros, que formarán parte de una lista concreta todavía por confeccionar. La UE debate la posibilidad de que ésta la formen los países signatarios de la Convención de Ginebra, lo que no es garantía de respeto de los derechos humanos, como admiten fuentes de la propia Comisión.

Algunos países, como Francia, ya se han adelantado, curiosamente, a legislar en el mismo sentido apoyándose en que la Unión lo está debatiendo. La ley francesa aprobada el año pasado incorpora ya ese concepto de "país seguro", señala el informe.

La directiva europea incorpora el procedimiento acelerado para los casos "no admisibles", entre los que se sitúan, por ejemplo, los peticionarios de asilo no sólo procedentes de un "país seguro", sino que hayan pasado previamente por uno de ellos. Varios países se han aprestado a poner en marcha este procedimiento acelerado que recorta o niega el derecho a apelar la decisión tomada y acelera la expulsión. Se trata de Finlandia, Francia, Austria y Alemania. En este último país, uno de los más restrictivos de Europa, de las 7.463 peticiones de asilo presentadas en diciembre, el 67,3% ya han sido rechazadas. El Reino Unido planea una legislación que también limitará la apelación.

Los acuerdos de readmisión que la UE inició a finales de 2002, y a los que la FIDH califica de "acuerdos de expulsión", merecen un capítulo aparte. Mediante estos acuerdos, la UE aporta asistencia y ayuda a cambio de que el otro país readmita a sus ciudadanos expulsados. Ya se han firmado con Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Macao y Albania. Se negocia con Rusia, China, Ucrania, Turquía, Pakistán, Marruecos y Argelia. Pero, además, en abril pasado entró en vigor el acuerdo de Cotonú, firmado con 77 países de África, el Caribe y el Pacífico (ACP) con cláusulas similares, y que no cumplen las exigencias de la Agencia de Refugiados de la ONU de garantizar los derechos humanos.Las ligas de derechos humanos representadas en la FIDH y su sección europea denuncian también cómo se ha complicado la reagrupación familiar a los inmigrantes.

Para los ciudadanos de la UE, varios países han tomado iniciativas que merman sus libertades. La FIDH está en contra del pasaporte con datos biométricos que la UE planea. Pero, además, indica que Alemania proyecta una ley de control preventivo de las comunicaciones y que la ley Sarkozy francesa abre las puertas a los registros de automóviles y controles de identidad por presunta amenaza terrorista.

Defense and identity

EU foreign policy Chief Javier Solana compares the success of diplomatic mediation in the case of Iran and Libya with the failure of military action in Iraq. It constitutes, in his view, a good reason to promote "efficient multilateralism." He thinks that Europe should not be defended by others, and that without militarily competing with the US it should invest more in defense. During a conference held on January 31st in Barcelona he criticized the way EU heads of state adopted different positions in front of the Iraq crisis and heavily blamed the dependence on the intelligence community.

The German philosopher Jurgën Habermas and others defended the idea that Europe should not try to pretend creating an identity similar to the one that the Nation-State ideally provides. A minimum of solidarity allowing European countries to act on the world stage would be sufficient.

This story highlights the relationship between identity and defense and the ongoing search for a new answer to this very old problem.

El País - Solana compara el éxito de la mediación en Irán y Libia al fracaso de Irak

Solana compara el éxito de la mediación en Irán y Libia al fracaso de Irak Habermas, Rocard, Held y D'Amato analizan en Barcelona el modelo de seguridad europea

J. M. MARTÍ FONT - Barcelona

EL PAÍS | Internacional - 01-02-2004

"Cuando se ha intervenido con medios diplomáticos para la detección de armas de destrucción masiva, como en el caso de Irán y el de Libia, ha sido un éxito; cuando se ha hecho por medio de la fuerza militar, como en Irak, un fracaso". Esta comparación sirvió ayer al Alto Representante de la Política Exterior y la Seguridad Común europea (PESC), Javier Solana, para reivindicar el concepto de "multilateralismo eficiente" como uno de los principales pilares en que debe descansar la estrategia de seguridad de la Unión Europea. "Nuestro vecindario no debe ser defendido por otros", indicó Solana, "tampoco necesitamos competir militarmente con EE UU, pero sí que tenemos que invertir más en defensa para disponer de capacidad militar".

Solana participó ayer en Barcelona en el seminario Guerra y paz en el siglo XXI. Construyendo una Europa diversa para la seguridad global, organizado por la Fundación CIDOB, el Ayuntamiento de la capital catalana y el Fórum de las Culturas, junto al filósofo Jürgen Habermas; el ex primer ministro francés Michel Rocard; el ex primer ministro italiano Giuliano D'Amato; el profesor David Held, de la London School of Economics, y el profesor Tariq Modood, de la Universidad de Bristol (Reino Unido), entre otros.

Los servicios de inteligencia
El responsable de la política exterior de la UE criticó la actuación de los países europeos a lo largo del proceso de la guerra de Irak, cuya desunión propició el desenlace, y fue especialmente crítico con el papel determinante que los servicios de inteligencia occidentales jugaron en desencadenar conflicto. "Hemos estado en manos de la comunidad de inteligencia, una situación muy poco confortable", dijo. "Los jefes de Estado que apoyaron la guerra, incluido el propio [presidente norteamericano] George Bush, se justifican ahora diciendo que se creyeron los informes que les daban sus espías", añadió.

David Held, al igual que Solana, no descarta el uso de la fuerza, pero "sólo como la afirmación del derecho internacional". El autor de La democracia cosmopolita apuntó que "la crisis del multilateralismo es más profunda y sostenida de lo que muchos queremos creer". La globalización, aseguró, tiene también aspectos tan positivos como la extensión del concepto de derechos humanos y del Estado de derecho. Pero los acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre de 2002, en su opinión, han configurado una respuesta equivocada a los retos que plantea.

El concepto de identidad europea fue abordado tanto por Habermas como por Rocard y Modood. La complejidad de las actuales sociedades hace inútil, según todos ellos, la pretensión de crear una identidad similar europea al estilo de la que, idealmente, proporciona el Estado-nación tradicional. Se trataría, según el filósofo alemán, de establecer un mínimo de elementos solidarios "que otorguen a Europa la capacidad de actuar en la escena mundial". Según Rocard, la paradoja europea consiste en que, pese a que tiene una fuerte identidad, siempre se ha negado a dotarse de una identidad política.

Euro Backlash: Would You Like Cream With Your Lawsuit?

This comes from Stratfor.com a private company that "provides strategic intelligence" (for a price), and is described by some as a "quasi private-CIA." Most of the time they express tough unilateralist views of American Power. They tend to be well informed and smart.

Summary
An Italian court has ruled in favor of a coffee-drinker who sued because he said an Italian bistro "price-gouged" in the switchover from the lira to the euro in January 2002. The precedent will snarl European courts with thousands of similar cases until there is some sort of broad price amnesty or some government-enforced price adjustment. That is, of course, unless the Italian government spills the issue into someone else's lap.

Stratfor.com - Euro Backlash: Would You Like Cream With Your Lawsuit?

Analysis

A regional Italian court on Jan. 16 ruled that a bistro in the Italian town of Ladispoli overcharged a customer 0.23 euro (28
cents) for a cappuccino on Jan. 1, 2002.

The ruling, relating to widely reviled price rises that followed the introduction of the euro in 2002, is the first of its kind.
Barring an overturning of the Jan. 16 ruling, Europe is about to be hit with a wave of legal cases that will end with either a broad unpopular price amnesty or a broad (and equally unpopular) mandatory price adjustment.

The case in question was facilitated by Codacons, a leading Italian consumer advocacy group. Codacons President Carlo Rienzi, knowing a public relations coup when he saw one, ordered a cappuccino from the offending bistro -- at pre-euro prices, of course -- the day after the ruling. He proudly waved the receipt in front of reporters, celebrating "the cappuccino's vendetta."

What should be little more than an amusing historical footnote, however, could explode into a much larger issue.

On Dec. 31, 2001, the day before the euro became Europe's common currency, the offending cup of coffee cost 1,500 lire, or 0.77 euros. One day later the price was rounded up to 1 euro, approximately a 30 percent increase.

Similar price "round-ups" occurred throughout the 12 states that adopted the euro as a common currency, leading to a broad price increase throughout inflation-sensitive Europe. Particularly galling to most Europeans was the fact that most of the adjustments hit small-price items that impacted aspects of everyday life: parking meters, small food items and coffee.

More than a few cents are at stake. In addition to the 23 euro cents refund, the court ordered the convicted gouger to cover the plaintiff's legal costs of 1,200 euros ($1,480).

Now that the legal precedent has been set, Italian courts are bracing for a deluge of petty lawsuits that could drown the system if left unchecked. Other European justice systems, concerned about spillover, are casting a wary eye toward Rome.

The Italian government has three choices. First, it could enact a broad price amnesty, forgiving businesses for their "round-up"
strategies. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is particularly fond of such heavy-handed, retroactive solutions. After all, he rammed a similar amnesty through Parliament in 2003 in order to cover his own political hindquarters. The problem is that this "solution" would throw stale grounds into the brew of Italian politics just as new elections appear to be on the horizon.

The second option would be to couple the amnesty with an equally broad price rollback, forcing businesses to reduce their prices to pre-euro levels, albeit still denominated in euros, while forgiving them for past indiscretions. Such a price cut would please an electorate that is increasingly disenchanted with Italy's pro-U.S. government, but at the cost of brewing rage in Italy's small business community.

The final possibility is quintessentially Italian. A staple joke in European circles is that Italy always has supported European integration because Brussels eurocrats have longer attention spans than Italian bureaucrats and therefore do a better job of ruling Italy than the natives. Berlusconi's best bet probably is to drop this problem into someone else's lap. Appealing the case to a European court -- in effect, booting the issue upstairs -- would deflect criticism away from the government and onto "Europe" while creating a Europe-wide precedent that would bury the issue.

Such a development would appeal to European sensibilities, which often involve taking exception to the foibles of Italian governance, making the likelihood of a European solution quite likely.

Codacons is probably dreading just such a solution. After all, a cup of joe still costs 1 euro in Ladispoli. The price of Rienzi's cappuccino was only adjusted downward to pre-euro prices for the photo-op.

The "directory": Berlin-London-Paris

London seems to get closer to Berlin and Paris on some issues related to the construction of Europe. Foreign Ministers and Presidents meet more often and try to promote common solutions. Blair's participation gives strengh to the now traditional "duo" Chirac-Schröder, and could contribute to smooth some rough angles within Europe (with Spain and Poland for instance), and with the U.S.. Not everybody is pleased, though: Italy, a founder of the EU, and one of the four most important countries, because it has not been invited, Spain, and others because they fear that positions assumed by the "directory" might look very much like diktats.

El País - Londres se suma al eje franco-alemán en el diseño de la nueva UE

Londres se suma al eje franco-alemán en el diseño de la nueva UE La idea de un directorio europeo despierta recelos en Italia y otros socios comunitarios

CARLOS YÁRNOZ - Bruselas

EL PAÍS | Internacional - 26-01-2004

El eje franco-alemán ya no es suficiente para liderar el proceso de construcción europea. A las puertas de la histórica ampliación de la UE al Este el próximo 1 de mayo, París y Berlín han incorporado al grupo de cabeza, también llamado directorio con tono despectivo, a Londres, la tercera gran potencia europea, que hoy puede reflejar una sensibilidad trasatlántica y proestadounidense mucho más próxima a los nuevos socios que la mantenida por Alemania y Francia. Italia, por ser excluida; España, por temer el diktat de los tres, y otros países del club ya han expresado sus recelos y temores ante la nueva situación.

"Más que de trío, resulta más apropiado hablar de dos más uno", señalan fuentes diplomáticas del Consejo de la Unión, que restan dramatismo al hecho porque "siempre ha habido grupos de países en la UE". Recuerdan, por ejemplo, alianzas más o menos permanentes entre los países del Benelux, el Grupo de Visegrado (Polonia, Chequia, Hungría y Eslovaquia), los nórdicos... y los que se agrupan por intereses comunes (contribuyentes netos al presupuesto de la UE frente a receptores de fondos) o por proyectos globales (el euro, el espacio Shengen).

La consistencia del eje franco-alemán, plasmada en reuniones periódicas conjuntas de ambos Gobiernos, tuvo su imagen más elocuente el pasado otoño, cuando el presidente francés, Jacques Chirac, llegó a hablar en una cumbre europea en nombre del canciller alemán, Gerhard Schröder, ausente de la reunión. Pero el tramo final de las frustradas negociaciones para pactar una primera Constitución Europea, en el que Berlín y París actuaron codo con codo, contó con la incorporación al grupo dirigente del primer ministro británico, Tony Blair.

La primera concreción del trabajo en equipo del trío fue su pacto para definir el espinoso capítulo de la Europa de la Defensa. Frente a los aireados deseos franco-alemanes de crear una defensa europea de espaldas a Washington, la imprescindible participación directa de Londres en el proyecto amainó las iras de EE UU e hizo posible el acuerdo. En la cumbre de diciembre, en los últimos intentos por desbloquear la Constitución, fue Blair quien hizo de intermediario y puente entre Chirac y Schröder, de un lado, y el español José María Aznar y el polaco Leszek Miller, de otro.

El apoyo británico a Berlín y París para que éstos evitaran en noviembre los castigos por incumplir el Pacto de Estabilidad o el anuncio de que Reino Unido y Francia se repartirán la dirección de la Agencia Europea de Armamento que hoy se pone en marcha son otros evidentes ejemplos del nuevo entendimiento tripartito.

La crisis europea a raíz de la guerra de Irak, donde Londres se asoció con polacos y españoles, junto a la mayoría de candidatos, fue el precedente que ha desembocado en este nuevo papel que juega Blair. El trío "corresponde a la lógica" de una Europa que pasa de 15 socios a 25, ha declarado el ministro británico de Exteriores, Jack Straw, al diario francés Le Figaro. "Hay una verdadera voluntad de acuerdo entre Alemania, Reino Unido y Francia para crear un verdadero motor para la Europa de mañana", ha afirmado Chirac.

Próxima reunión en Berlín
Los ministros de Exteriores de los tres países ya se han reunido discretamente esta pasada semana y probablemente vuelvan a hacerlo hoy otra vez en Bruselas. Chirac, Schröder y Blair ya han anunciado que también se verán por separado el próximo día 18 en Berlín para preparar la cumbre europea de marzo y decidir si ya se da o no el ambiente adecuado para reactivar las negociaciones sobre la primera Constitución Europea.

Sin embargo, el equipo directivo formado por las tres grandes potencias de la Unión es mal visto en otras importantes capitales. Aznar dijo días atrás en Lisboa que hay que respetar "las pautas de funcionamiento interno" de la UE, receloso sin duda de que su aliado Blair se aproxime a sus clásicos adversarios Schröder y Chirac. La idea del directorio "es un pésimo camino", le coreó el portugués José Manuel Durão, temeroso de que cualquier pacto del trío se convierta en decisión indiscutida de la UE.

Con todo, el país más desairado es Italia, el único de los cuatro grandes, y encima socio fundador, excluido del equipo director. " pueden poner en peligro la unidad de Europa", ha clamado en el Senado italiano el ministro de Exteriores, Franco Frattini, quien, junto con el primer ministro, Silvio Berlusconi, fue incapaz el semestre anterior, durante la presidencia italiana de la UE, de consensuar el proyecto constitucional.

Desde España, el Gobierno, consciente de las animadversiones que ha levantado y de su debilidad negociadora ante el trío Berlín-París-Londres, advierte de que el vigente Tratado de Niza ya facilita las cooperaciones reforzadas (grupos de países que quieran avanzar más rápido en algunas áreas), pero que deben ser abiertas a todos los países. También desde Italia, el ministro Franco Frattini dice ser "totalmente contrario" a la creación de grupos de vanguardia. Dos muestras de cómo está variando el equilibrio de poder en Europa y, sobre todo, de cómo va a cambiar tras la ampliación.

Evitar un nuevo fracaso


El canciller alemán, Gerhard Schröder, y el presidente francés, Jacques Chirac, ya lanzaron en diciembre el mensaje de que, a la vista del fracaso de los Veinticinco (los Quince más los diez candidatos) para pactar la primera Constitución para Europa, la UE no podría permitirse un segundo fracaso porque, de lo contrario, habría una Unión a dos velocidades. Los dos han lanzado estos días similares advertencias.

Schröder insiste en que quiere una Constitución antes de concluir el año y su ministro de Exteriores, Joschka Fischer, añade que, "cuanto más rápido se avance en Europa, mejor para todos". Pero las heridas están aún abiertas y Bertie Ahern, el primer ministro de Irlanda, el país que preside la UE este semestre, es consciente de que "hace falta tiempo". Consciente de que el principal problema está en España y Polonia, los dos países que no aceptaron el nuevo reparto de poder previsto en el proyecto constitucional y provocaron su bloqueo, Ahern irá esta semana a Madrid para entrevistarse con José María Aznar y ya ha mantenido encuentros con dirigentes polacos.

La disposición en los dos países díscolos parece estar cambiando. "Nuestra disposición es abierta y práctica", ha dicho el ministro polaco de Exteriores, Wlodmierz Cimosevic, tras hablar con Fischer. "Estamos de acuerdo en encontrar una solución, pero que sea aceptada por los Veinticinco", ha declarado la española Ana Palacio, tras hablar esta semana con su homólogo irlandés, Brian Cowen.

Hoy, los ministros de Exteriores de los Veinticinco tendrán en Bruselas la primera oportunidad para reanudar las negociaciones, aunque sean conscientes de que se necesitan meses para presentar avances concretos pese a las prisas franco-alemanas, apoyadas por el Parlamento Europeo. Los socialistas españoles ya han dicho que debe haber acuerdos "antes del 1 de mayo". Bélgica, Luxemburgo y hasta la Comisión no ven mal que se abra el camino a una Europa de dos velocidades. "No podemos avanzar al paso del más lento", dice el presidente de la Comisión, Romano Prodi.