This is a little peach of a story. As I run around reporting on static between U.S. and European defense constractors, here's a nice piece in the New York Times and the BBC about NATO awarding a contract for 4 billion euros to a trans-Atlantic consortium, led by EADS and Northrup Grumman. Perhaps this will usher in a new dawn of joint procurement for the alliance, the Times reports.
Cooperation throughout Europe is something we've heard, European companies wanting in on juicy U.S. defense contracts, but is this really a new cooperation across the Atlantic?
There was another bidder, also a trans-Atlantic consortium.
New York Times - New Unity on Contracts Seen in NATO
BBC - EADS wins 'eye in sky' contract
April 16, 2004
New Unity on Contracts Seen in NATO
By KATRIN BENHOLD
ARIS, April 15 - With NATO member states just days away from awarding a military contract for 4 billion euros to a trans-Atlantic consortium of aerospace companies, a new era of joint procurement may be dawning for the alliance, defense experts said on Thursday.
A group of six companies, led by the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, known as EADS, and Northrop Grumman of the United States, looks set to win the contract, worth $4.8 billion, to build a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft for the alliance by 2010, said a NATO official close to the selection process.
Since procurement experts at NATO's Brussels headquarters put their support behind the EADS-Northrop consortium, officials in national capitals are expected to approve that decision "within days,'' the official said.
"It seems to be a genuine multinational procurement decision, and that is quite a significant step for cooperation in this area," said Steven Everts, a military expert at the Center for European Reform, a research group in London. "There is an acceleration of the desire to cooperate more closely within the E.U. and across the Atlantic.''
Against a backdrop of violence in Iraq and heightened concerns that terrorists may be aiming at Europe after the Madrid train bombings, pragmatism may be gaining the upper hand over the political procurement decisions of the past, analysts said. While some major European governments continue to disagree with the United States on a wide range of issues, including the war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the willingness to deepen their cooperation within NATO may herald a renewed commitment to the alliance.
James Appathurai, a spokesman for NATO, called the decision "historic,'' confirming a report on Thursday in The Financial Times.
"This is only the second time in NATO's history that members join forces in procurement on this scale,'' he said. The first time, he said, was the Awacs surveillance system developed in the 1960's.
"The decision was reached pragmatically on the basis of price, capability and scheduling considerations - not necessarily three factors that have determined procurement decisions in the past,'' Mr. Appathurai said.
Governments have preferred to keep national control of procurement, both to determine the exact nature of a project and to award contracts to the titans of a country's military industry.
As a result, military capacities within the European Union, where most countries also belong to NATO, have often been duplicated.
The idea for a joint fleet of air-to-ground surveillance aircraft has been considered for about a decade at NATO, Mr. Appathurai said. Recent progress on the matter "reflects a realization on the part of NATO nations that our troops are out there in the field, and they need this type of cooperation,'' he said.
This evolving pragmatism is rooted at least in part in financial reality. With technology becoming more sophisticated and expensive, collective procurement makes financial sense, analysts said. In addition, recent sluggishness in the global economy has depleted national coffers, leaving less room for governments to bolster military budgets.
"Pooling is the way to go,'' Mr. Everts of the Center for European Reform said. "It's good news for taxpayers and also good news for political cooperation that common sense has won.''
The EADS-Northrop consortium includes Galileo Avionica of Italy, General Dynamics Canada, Indra of Spain, and Thales of France. In addition, more than 80 other companies from NATO countries support the joint proposal, which would provide a mixed fleet of manned A320 Airbus planes and unmanned Global Hawk planes.
According to Alexander Reinhardt, an EADS spokesman, the price for an A320 is about 50 million euros, or $59.8 million, though a modified version for intelligence purposes might vary in price. The Global Hawk aircraft that Northrop has been building for the United States Air Force costs about $30 million, James Stratford, a spokesman for the company, said.
A competing consortium, led by Raytheon of the United States and including Siemens of Germany and Marconi of Britain, has complained that NATO's procurement officials took too little time to examine the two proposals, which were submitted four months ago. Mr. Appathurai of NATO rejected the complaint.
BBC
EADS wins 'eye in sky' contract
A consortium led by European aerospace company EADS has won a contract to supply a multi-billion-dollar surveillance system to Nato.
The alliance said it aimed to sign a contract for the "eye in the sky" programme - which is expected to enter service in 2010 - by spring next year.
Under the deal, the group will supply Nato with a system that uses aircraft, unmanned drones and ground systems.
The deal is though to be worth up to four billion euros ($4.9bn, £2.7bn).
Nato said the new equipment "will be essential enabling capability for the Nato Response Force and will provide... an invaluable Eye in the Sky".
It added that the system would gather information about what was happening on the ground during peacetime, crisis or war.
EADS Airbus A321 planes will be among those provided as part of the surveillance system.
Good news
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics Canada, French defence firm Thales, Spain's Indra and Italy's Galileo Avionica were among the companies in the winning EADS-led consortium.
A spokesman for EADS - the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company - in Munich said: "We are pleased with this decision."
He declined to give financial details but said further information would be released next week.
US rival Raytheon had led another consortium bidding for the contract. That included Siemens and Alenia Marconi Systems - a joint venture between the UK's BAE Systems and Italy's Finmeccanica.
The contract is further good news for EADS - home of the Airbus passenger jets - which has recently pulled ahead of US rival Boeing for the first time in its 30-year history.
Last month, the firm revealed it had returned to the black in 2003, unveiling net profits of 152m euros ($188m; £102m) for the year, driven by a late surge in deliveries.
EADS, along with other aerospace companies, had suffered in the wake of the 11 September 2001 US terrorist attacks and was driven into the red in 2002.
This is a couple of weeks old, but it came up as I searched on defense and security policy. It takes a longer view of transatlantic relations and postulates that the rift between the two continents, particularly focusing on Frano-American relations, is not long term. That is, of course, without taking into consideration who is in the White House.
But, Noelle Lenoir, the French minister for Europe Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues again what we have heard as the official line from the French government, and from what I've gathered talking to defense experts -- Europe and the United States must cooperate, that our aims overlap, and Europe must have autonomy with military planning and capacities.
Basically, it's the message that Europe is ready to step up militarily in the world, but it needs US cooperation while preparing to step out from America's shadow.
Taipei Times - West against the rest?
The West against the rest?
Europe and the US have reacted differently to the threat of terrorism in their midst, but that does not mean Europeans are anti-American
By Noelle Lenoir
Wednesday, Mar 24, 2004,Page 9
The Madrid bombings have made Europeans feel the scourge of terrorism in their bones. March 11 is now Europe's version of Sept. 11 in the US. Yet the US and Europe often do not seem to see the world through the same glasses: Spain's response to the terrorist attacks -- a threat common to all democracies -- was to vote in a government promising an end to pro-US policy on Iraq. Does this mean that Europe and the US have dramatically different visions?
Part of the seeming disconnect on foreign policy emerges from a misunderstanding about what "Europe" is about. The European project is a realist's response to globalization and its challenges. It was initiated to create "solidarites de fait," promote political stability, and consolidate democracy and Europe's social model. Having achieved these goals, Europe now wants to make a positive contribution to world developments.
This is not nostalgia for past glory. An unprecedented degree of solidarity now exists across Europe, as was apparent in the collective mourning and outpouring of sympathy toward Spain; we must build on that huge potential to create a logic of solidarity in the world.
The US, also victim of a horrendous attack, feels drawn to the world, but not to promote a similar model of cooperation. Rather, in defending their values and security, Americans strive to defend the world, especially the Western world, from dark new threats. The messianic idealism that liberated Europe from Nazism and protected Western Europe from communism is now directed at other enemies.
With all the attention devoted to strained transatlantic relations, it is easy to overlook how often our preoccupations overlap. On issues such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan (where we jointly train the country's future army), and Africa (where French initiatives with US support recently succeeded in stabilizing the Ivory Coast and Congo), Europe and the US speak with a common voice. But on some issues, such as the Iraq war, Europeans are not all ready to follow the US blindly.
The world -- Europe in particular -- has fascination and admiration for the US. But today we must move away from fascination and gratitude and realize that the pursuit of European integration remains in the best interest of the US, which has supported it for 50 years. In today's world, there is clearly work for two to bring about stability and security, and in promoting common values.
In particular, the Franco-German "engine" of Europe should not be seen as a potential rival to the US. France and Germany are not an axis aspiring to be some sort of an alternative leadership to the US. Rather, the two countries form a laboratory needed for the internal working of the EU. Anyone who thinks we are building a European rival to the US has not looked properly at the facts.
Indeed, France and Germany do not get along naturally. Much sets us apart: EU enlargement, agriculture and domestic market issues. So it is not the sum of the two that matters, but the deal between the two, which should be viewed as a prototype of the emerging Europe. It is in that process, mostly inward looking, that France and Germany claim to make Europe advance.
So I do not believe that a lasting rift looms. Most Americans still see in Europe a partner with largely the same aims in the world. Most Europeans see in the US a strong friend. We are all allies of the US; our draft constitution restates the importance of the NATO link; our strategy for growth and our contribution to global stability depend on the irreplaceable nature of our relationship with the US.
This is why the US should encourage the development of a common European security and defense policy, which is merely the burden-sharing that the US has been pressing on Europe for decades. We must forge greater European military capacities simply to put in place a mechanism that allows us to stand effectively shoulder to shoulder when terrorism or other catastrophes strike one of our democracies, as just happened.
But we must also establish an autonomous European military planning capacity, because the EU might need to lead its own operations, perhaps because NATO is unwilling to. We French are opposed to building a "two-speed" Europe. But we want structured co-operation -- meaning that some European states may press ahead in defense capacity -- because we are not prepared to let the more cautious and hesitant dictate a recurrence of the Balkan tragedy of the 1990s, when Europeans couldn't act and the US wouldn't (for a while). The creation of such a capacity will make the EU a more effective transatlantic partner.
So it is hard for Europeans to understand why plans for closer European integration should be seen as anti-American. The only way to arrest such fears is through closer and more frequent dialogue. On defense and security matters, the EU's security doctrine provides a great opportunity to build on our common worries: terrorism and non-proliferation, but also the need to ensure sustainable development in all quarters of the world.
Europe and the US must pursue their aims in cooperation, while ensuring that such cooperation never becomes an alliance of the "West against the Rest." Some in the West have tried to conjure a "Clash of Civilizations" out of our troubled times. Our task is to find a way to stand together without standing against anybody in particular.
Noelle Lenoir is France's minister for Europe and a former member of the Constitutional Court, France's highest court, and has taught law at Yale University and the University of London.
This is for all you defense-industry buffs. It's another example of friction between US and France and defense. Now the pressure comes from Wall Street. EADS is Europe's largest defense contractor, a multinational company that is split between French, German and a few other satellite companies. The French government also has a one-third stake in the company, which is a primary builder of the Airbus.
European defense contractors want a larger piece of US defense contracts; but the Buy America Act has put up barriers to this. EADS set up a North American branch to navigate around this.
As this report states, if EADS wants any US investment (and with that, contracts), Wall Street analysts say it better keep the French government from gaining any more than its current stake.
Then there's the issue of a European defense market. European nations have balked at US investment in companies like HDW, a German submarine manufacturer, while at the same time asking for more cooperation and technology sharing.
The Guardian - EADS pressed to sever French link
http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,11882,1180103,00.html
EADS pressed to sever French link
David Gow
Monday March 29, 2004
The Guardian
EADS, the European aerospace and defence group, is under growing pressure from Wall Street investors to dilute or even scrap stakes held by the French government and its other two main shareholders.
It is understood that both DaimlerChrysler, the German-US cars group, and Lagardère, the French media group, have been urged by US investors keen to buy into the majority-owner of Airbus to press Paris for a synchronised sell-down.
Manfred Bischoff, EADS co-chairman and senior DC executive, warned President Jacques Chirac against turning the group into a purely French player. "In the long run, national interests would best be served if we keep EADS multinational," he told Defense News.
Analysts said yesterday EADS "can kiss goodbye to ever having a substantial US business" if it handed over control to the French state which shares equally a 30.13% stake with Lagardère. DC holds a 33% share.
The issue has come to a head because Arnaud Lagardère, son and successor to Jean-Luc at the eponymous group, has indicated his desire eventually to sell the EADS stake and focus on the media business.
Analysts said both the French group and DC would eventually like to realise the value of their EADS holdings as cash for ei ther acquisition or, in Daimler's case, consolidation of a balance sheet put under pressure by Chrysler's losses.
Mr Lagardère has said he will stick to his father's commitment to the EADS stake until the Airbus superjumbo, the 555-seater A380, has entered service in 2006 - and proven its commercial viability.
The French state, which is considering a partial privatisation of the power groups Gaz de France and Electricité de France next year, has long held the view that aerospace and defence businesses are "strategic" interests.
But Mr Bischoff told Defense News: "Often, the word 'strategic' can be replaced with 'not making money'." Analysts said it would require a substantial cultural change for Paris to allow a more distributed share ownership base.
Mr Bischoff said: "They [French officials] are concerned about ownership and fear that the company will be managed only on quarterly results."
With the European defence market worth $180bn (£100bn) compared with the $400bn-plus American market, EADS is keen to reach its target of 10% profit margins by taking on more US military business.
Last year, with the A380's $1bn annual development costs eating into earnings, the group made €1.54bn (£1.03bn) pre-tax profits and says it will make €1.8bn this year.
This is for all you defense-industry buffs. It's another example of friction between US and France and defense. Now the pressure comes from Wall Street. EADS is Europe's largest defense contractor, a multinational company that is split between French, German and a few other satellite companies. The French government also has a one-third stake in the company, which is a primary builder of the Airbus.
European defense contractors want a larger piece of US defense contracts; but the Buy America Act has put up barriers to this. EADS set up a North American branch to navigate around this.
As this report states, if EADS wants any US investment (and with that, contracts), Wall Street analysts say it better keep the French government from gaining any more than its current stake.
Then there's the issue of a European defense market. European nations have balked at US investment in companies like HDW, a German submarine manufacturer, while at the same time asking for more cooperation and technology sharing.
The Guardian - EADS pressed to sever French link
http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,11882,1180103,00.html
EADS pressed to sever French link
David Gow
Monday March 29, 2004
The Guardian
EADS, the European aerospace and defence group, is under growing pressure from Wall Street investors to dilute or even scrap stakes held by the French government and its other two main shareholders.
It is understood that both DaimlerChrysler, the German-US cars group, and Lagardère, the French media group, have been urged by US investors keen to buy into the majority-owner of Airbus to press Paris for a synchronised sell-down.
Manfred Bischoff, EADS co-chairman and senior DC executive, warned President Jacques Chirac against turning the group into a purely French player. "In the long run, national interests would best be served if we keep EADS multinational," he told Defense News.
Analysts said yesterday EADS "can kiss goodbye to ever having a substantial US business" if it handed over control to the French state which shares equally a 30.13% stake with Lagardère. DC holds a 33% share.
The issue has come to a head because Arnaud Lagardère, son and successor to Jean-Luc at the eponymous group, has indicated his desire eventually to sell the EADS stake and focus on the media business.
Analysts said both the French group and DC would eventually like to realise the value of their EADS holdings as cash for ei ther acquisition or, in Daimler's case, consolidation of a balance sheet put under pressure by Chrysler's losses.
Mr Lagardère has said he will stick to his father's commitment to the EADS stake until the Airbus superjumbo, the 555-seater A380, has entered service in 2006 - and proven its commercial viability.
The French state, which is considering a partial privatisation of the power groups Gaz de France and Electricité de France next year, has long held the view that aerospace and defence businesses are "strategic" interests.
But Mr Bischoff told Defense News: "Often, the word 'strategic' can be replaced with 'not making money'." Analysts said it would require a substantial cultural change for Paris to allow a more distributed share ownership base.
Mr Bischoff said: "They [French officials] are concerned about ownership and fear that the company will be managed only on quarterly results."
With the European defence market worth $180bn (£100bn) compared with the $400bn-plus American market, EADS is keen to reach its target of 10% profit margins by taking on more US military business.
Last year, with the A380's $1bn annual development costs eating into earnings, the group made €1.54bn (£1.03bn) pre-tax profits and says it will make €1.8bn this year.
Last week Robert E. Hunter, who was the U.S. ambassador to NATO under Clinton, answered questions regarding the expansion of NATO to 26 countries with the addition of seven new members. He responded to a question from Post editors whether an ESDP would leave NATO irrelevant. His response was basically "Yeah, right."
Europe doesn't have the capabilities - yet - he argued to go it alone in security matters. His argument is that Europe still needs the United States and NATO in Europe and will for many years to come. Eventually, however, the US might be able to "go home" and let Europe deal with itself. For now, an ESDP would be a complement to NATO.
This is a slightly different picture than officials we spoke with portrayed. While I think they'd all agree that NATO will continue to be the dominant player for some time, an ESDP wouldn't necessarily be a complementary entity. The view is that NATO is just another option in the great big European toolbox of defense. Hunter argues that Europe still doesn't have the tools.
Washington Post.com - NATO conversation with Amb. Robert E. Hunter
washingtonpost.com
World: NATO
Amb. Robert E. Hunter
NATO Ambassador Under President Clinton
Monday, March 29, 2004; 4:00 PM
The prime ministers of seven new NATO member nations are being welcomed to the White House by President Bush today. The leaders of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, expand the alliance to 26 countries.
Robert E. Hunter, NATO ambassador under President Clinton and Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, will be online to discuss the expansion of NATO and today's White House ceremony.
Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
________________________________________________
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: This afternoon, President Bush welcomed 7 new countries to NATO -- bringing the total to 26. That is 10 new countries from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the last five years. Clearly, NATO will be different; but just how different is the critical question. Much is already known -- for instance, that all members have the same rights and responsibilities, that all will join the integrated command structure, Allied Command Operations, that all will be covered by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all allies to come to the defense of any any that is attacked, and that all must now also look beyond Europe -- "out of area" in NATO jargon -- to new challenges as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq. As before, US engagement and leadership are critical; as before, the US needs to sustain its involvement on a bipartisan basis.
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Lyme, Conn.: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes -- as of today, it has 26 members, only 5 years ago it had only 16 -- the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members -- in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about it should do -- and not do -- against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular counse of action is important; and for their to be effective leadership -- and particularly American leadership. This leadership -- and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security -- remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so -- in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.
At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end. But one thing is clear: one of the key elements of NATO is its consensus rule, which stimulates all the allies to take critical matters seriously, and to work together to preserve the alliance for all the tasks ahead.
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washingtonpost.com: Would a coordinated EU foreign and defense policy replace NATO for many European nations and thus render the alliance irrelevant?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Wouldn't it be wonderful if the EU had a foreign and security policy that would lead Europeans to take full responsibility for European security, and let the US just go home?! But that is not likely to happen, at least not for many years. The Europeans are not yet so organized that they can "do security" by themselves, and they do not have the tools needed, as are found in the NATO integrated command structure and more than half a century of working together, a precious asset that is not easily duplicated. But the EU is beginning to do more -- in Macedonia, for instance, and later this year to take over full responsibility for security from NATO in Bosnia.
America is still needed in Europe -- and that means NATO is still needed -- in terms of the great historic imponderables, including insurance that the 20th century, the worst century ever for war and human suffering, is well and truly in the past; and working to ensure that the future of Russia will not again lead to a fundamental rupture in arrangements for European security. In addition, the European Union does not have the capacity -- and is unlikely anytime soon to gain the capacity -- to act beyond Europe, as NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is likely to do in Iraq. Thus the European Security and Defense Policy (an adjunct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) can be a useful complement to NATO, but the EU will not replace NATO, and certainly not US power and engagement, at least for many years to come.
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washingtonpost.com: Will Russia ever join NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Russia in NATO? In theory, yes. Indeed, officially, NATO membership is open to any member of the OSCE that is "ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership." But for Russia to join would require major changes in that country, including assurance that democracy is well rooted; and it would require Russia to meet all the other aspects of NATO membership, measured also in terms of its relations with other countries.
More important, would the rest of the alliance be prepared to extend to Russia guarantees of all its borders against external armed attack -- for example, some day against China? If the Western nations were so disposed, it is very likely that they would work out this business with Russia by other means; and, indeed, they would want to do all that is possible so that this eventuality did not come to pass.
At heart, if the security situation in Eurasia reached the point where Russia could be considered for membership in NATO to be a serious proposition, things would probably be so positive that NATO would not any longer be needed!
Because of all of these argument, Russia has not suggested joining NATO, and no one in the West has proposed it. Instead, there is now a NATO-Russia Council, which seeks to treat Russia like an equal, to bring it into NATO deliberations when its interests are truly engaged, to build cooperation, including in areas like peacekeeping and -- in time -- security for the Middle East, and to extend security truly in a "Europe whole and free." But Russia does not have to be in NATO to be part of NATO -- and the test will be how all these countries work together to build security across Eurasia.
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Cumberland, Md.: While it is nice to have new members in NATO -- it is doubtful if they can carry their weight militarily or even spend the money on defense that is required to upgrade their out-of-date equipement. I question the value of accepting new members in NATO who are militarily underpowered. Your comments please?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: When we set out to take in new NATO members a decade ago, I invented a slogan to put this point: a country to join NATO would have to be a "produce and not just a consumer of security." Now, that does not mean being able to mount a defense like that of the Cold War. None of these new countries, or any of the "old" NATO allies (with the possible exception of Turkey, on the Iraqi border) faces an external military threat. What we need from the new countries is that they democratize their military forces, that they adopt NATO standards in equipment and practice, that they take part in Allied Command Operations (however little), that they be able to coordinate their activities, their equipment, and their training with NATO -- and that the continue efforts to deepen democracy and market economies, and continue their renunciation of claims against neighbors. At the same time, there is an interest in having these countries make some contribution to the newer tasks, including doing what they can to counter terrorism (and that can including police work, intelligence, and border control within their own countries) and to join, in however limited a way, in common decisions NATO takes to be engaged in places like Afghnistan and Iraq. This is part of a total security concept: and the amount of money spent on military forces is not the key point -- indeed, NATO does not want Central European countries to spend so much money that they may retard the development of their economies.
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Little Rock, Ark.: Will or should NATO ever get increasingly involved in the Iraqi conflict like it has in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: I predict that, within a year, NATO will have taken over responsibility for much if not all external military engagement in Iraq, under a UN mandate. This is a logical extension of what NATO has already done successfully in the Balkans (neither Bosnia or Kosovo is yet successful politically and economically but, except for the recent violence in Kosovo, neither has experienced the conflict of the pre-NATO period), and is beginning to do in Afghanistan. The US is reaching the point of acknowledging that we would like help in Iraq -- in military deployments, in reconstruction, in development of post-Saddam politics -- and that many of the allied countries have capabilities that can be of significan benefit. What is required is that we be willing to share influence and decision-making as well as responsibility and burdens: something that may seem obvious, but which official Washington has not yet been prepared to do.
At heart, whether or not we should have gone to war in Iraq, it is over. The old security system has been shattered. Both we and the Europeans have a vital interest -- vital self-interests -- in putting something viable in its place. And how better to do that, from the point of view of all concerned, than through NATO?
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washingtonpost.com: How has perceived unilateralism affected the United States' leadership role in NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: NATO is now slowly emerging from the worst crisis in its history, occasioned in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so, and certainly without being able to bring along the NATO allies as a whole. Even if the US could be argued to have had no choice, the way we went about it gratuitously weakened our reputation for probity, cooperation, consultation, and sound judgement. But the Alliance is, in the end, about what countries either do or do not do together in their common interests -- and common values -- for the future. And if wiser heads prevail, on both sides of the Atlantic -- and there is evidence this is beginning to happen -- then the Western alliance can regain must of its former strength. And the US can gain much of its former leadership: but that must be on the basis of looking to others for counsel rather than obedience; seeking to build cooperation and common understanding rather than an assertion of "our way or the highway." The latter method has been tried and found wanting. We know now that we have to have allies and partners to shape the world to our (and their) liking; and if we act on that insight, we can regain the highground that was so woefully lost last year. In sum, the US disposes of great incipient power, unrivalled, perhaps, in history; but to change that incipient power into lasting influence, we must create institutions, attitudes, practices, and policies that work for us....because they also work for others.
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Washington, D.C.: If there is no threat to these new members, why is NATO installing air defense over the Baltics, thus to treat Russia as the enemy? While Putin has much more important things to do, like growing the Russian economy, and the level-headed Russians I talk to don't get too excited over the Baltics (though they think this "Article 5 protection" emboldens the Baltics on the language question), it merely encourages the unreformed Russian military to keep trumpeting the threat from the West and the need to keep their old formations. So is this air defense gesture really necessary?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: You put your finger on a key problem. On the one hand, countries have to be able to do at least a minium to guarantee the sanctity of their borders and their air space. As NATO members, there at least needs to be some means for what is called "air policing" -- hence, the four F-16s (and some limited other equipments) that will be deployed in Lithuania: these are no threat to Russia, and cannot be so represented. Indeed, nothing that has been done in any of the new allied states, or that anyone contemplates doing, can pose such a treat or honestly be represented as doing so. But on the other hand, it is also important that, with the expansion of NATO, Russia not be pushed away or even have a sense is it being pushed away. That is one reason Lithuania has worked out arrangements with Russia (and Belarus) for the movement of people to/from Kaliningrad, a part of Russia now separated from it by NATO territory. That is why NATO is pressing Latvia to treat is major Russian minority with dignity. It is why NATO and Russia have created the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, in which Russia is equal with the now 26 NATO allies. And it is why NATO has sought to engage Russia in peacekeeping (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), and has a raft of common activities (see the NATO website for a list). But this must all be done deftly; there has since NATO began its venture of playing a lead role in crafting a "Europe whole and free," it has had to be sure that it advaces the legitimate security interests both of Central European states and of Russia; and it must continue to do this. (This is particular true with regard to any bases and permenent deployments in former Warsaw Pact territory: in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO included a unilateral statement that imposed a number of limitations on what it would do in this regard. It is not violating the letter of these pledges; but it must be careful, as well, to honor the spirit).
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Kansas City, Mo.: For some time, I have heard a Russian point-of-view that the US made commitments at the end of the Cold War to limit NATO enlargement. Michael Mandelbaum has referred to such commitments in his opposition to NATO expansion. I've heard other policymakers and scholars say that no such commitments were made, and that NATO is free to enlarge. Apparently the US would also be free to restructure its military deployments, away from Germany and to "New Europe."
What's the right story here?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: No such commitments were made. When I was US ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, we researched the case thoroughly, to be sure that we were honoring all pledges made. At the same time, NATO enlargement has not taken place in a vacuum, as though Russia has no importance. Quite the contrary: it is engaged in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO peacekeeping (at one point in both Bosnia and Kosovo), in exercises, and even now moving in the direction of "interoperability" with NATO equipment.
The US redeployments easterward are ostensibly to have different kinds of bases -- some just for runways and storage of supplies -- that would make deployments farther east, for instance to Middle East crisis regions, easier. This is still being debated. And it needs to be undertaken with several points in mind: military efficiency and cost are only one factor. We also have to reassure the Germans and others in West Europe that we are not shifting our focus decisively away from Europe; and we have to assure the Russians that we are not taking advantage of their weakness. In fact, nothing the US is thinking of doing could pose a threat to Russia, but it is critical that whatever is done be done in full "transparence" -- indeed in consultations -- with Russia, which does, indeed, share many of the US and allied objectives with regard to countering terrorism and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
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Alexandria, Va.: Are there other countries that wish to join NATO? Now that the Cold War is behind us what is the rational for joining the group?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Secretary countries in the Balkans want to join NATO -- Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania -- and all may do so. Their reasoning is the same as that of the countries that have already joined: to "bring history to an end," in the sense of being the playthings of the Great Powers; to have an association with the EU (with tends to follow) and with the US; to have an added incentive domestically to put down deep democrtic roots; and to gain -- they believe -- the benefits in terms of foreign investment and confidence that can come with NATO membership. In addition, Ukraine has expressed an interest in joining NATO -- in its case to become mroe certain of its relationship with Russia, as well as to gain economic benefits. Georgia has said it will apply for membership and Azerbaijan is moving in that direction. But beyond the Balkans and perhasp Ukraine (leading aside, for some time, Belarua and Moldova), one has to ask just how big NATO can become and still retain a sense of common purpose, and also a willingness of each of its members to give security guarantees -- and NATO's security guarantees must always be real -- to farflung states. The Caucasus is a long way away from NATO-Europe, strategically and politically; most allies would be reluctant to take on the burdens of potentially having to defense Georgia; and they would not want to do so regarding Azerbaijan while it is still at war with Armenia: and yet, these are precisely reasons these two countries are interested in NATO -- and Azerbaijan also speaks both of Russia and Iran in terms of its concerns, something that most if not all the European NATO allies shy away from getting involved in. So -- NATO is a successful venture; but it must not be seen as the be-all and end-all for everyone. The farther from Europe, the more there needs to be creativity about something else -- e.g., a new security system, crafted on 21st century lines, for at least major parts of what is being called the "Greater Middle East."
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Warsaw, Poland: What role will NATO play in the war against terrorism?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Counter-terrorism is most about non-military activities -- as Secretary of Defense and others have said. It is about intelligence, policy work, border control, etc., etc. -- most of which are activities carried out by other institutions and relationships, both singly and in groups. There is also the task of trying to "dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim," which, if anything, is the task of institutions like the European Union (in a new strategic partnership with the US). Militarily, there is work to do, of course, and most of that is in the realm of either special forces or of the kind of "reconstruction" and "stabilization" work that is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq (which becamse a terrorism problem only after the war). This is not about high intensity warfare, except in rare circumstances (such as the anti-Taliban period after 9/11).
Thus NATO has already assumed command of ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, and it is developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Indeed, if NATO gets more deeply engaged in Afghanisan to do what is needed so that it will cease being a base for the export of terrorism (if "cease" can be achieved, which is a daunting task), then this could become the most ambitous task the Alliance has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is likely to take over major responsibilities in Iraq, which have their own counter-terrorism aspects.
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Cumberland, Md.: NATO is more and more becoming relatively useless as a military alliance for the U.S.
Too many members, including France and Germany, are unwilling to spend the money for up-to-date military hardware. These countries cannot keep up with the US on the battlefield -- Should we not compel them to assume peacekeeping duties and take over from the U.S. in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: We have to be careful about reading too much into what we read in the newspapers, especially at a time when there has been so much bad blood across the Atlantic.
As we look down the road, it is not clear that there is a signficant range of possibilities where the "big batallions" will be needed, at least in terms of Allied engagement militarily. What is needed, clearly, is special forces, in particular for counter-terrorism; the kinds of stabilization forces that are now going into Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ability of allied forces to be able to fight together -- which means truly compatible C4ISR -- an abbreviation for command, control, communications, computors, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It will also mean a sharing of high technology so that allies can field these equipments that can work together (here, the US has been especially laggard in easing restrictions in the flow of high technology -- we can't have it both ways!).
This does mean more capabilities by many of the Europeans; but less in terms of major power projection at the high end of combat than in the ability to get appropriate forces to a theater, quickly (air and sea lift) and to keep them there for a period of time (logisitics and support). The EU has been creating a Rapid Reaction Force, one of whose virtues is that it simulates some of the governments to spend money on defense, in order to promote European unity, that they might not otherwise spend. And NATO is developing a NATO Response Force, which will be able to deploy forces in as little as 5 days and keep them deployed for a signficant period of time.
Note also that one country we have been criticizing -- France -- has been engaged in NATO's major activities: it has more resources committed to the NATO Response Force than any other European ally; it is sending more officers to Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation; and it has about 250 special forces fighting in Afganistan, under US command! And before NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan, the Germans (and the Dutch) had the command.
Yes, the allies can do more -- and will also be doing more in Macedonia (an EU operation) and later this year in Bosnia (taking over from NATO). And most if not all will be willing to engage with the US, Britain, etc., in Iraq, as a NATO operation, if we are prepared to have an appropriate UN resolution (which would also lead Spain to keep its troops there, as the new prime minister has made clear) -- which means our being prepared to share some of the decision-making and influence as well as the responsibility and the burdens (understanding, of course, that we would still be the "800-pound gorilla" in terms of influence.)
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Tallahassee, Fla.: ".....in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so..."
I must say I am a bit shocked by your comment here. Especially since the 911 commission has been grilling everyone on the cost of inaction against the Taliban. Why do you think these new member countries, that lived under supression for so long, joined the coalition and supported the war in Iraq? Or would you, like Senator Kerry, just say they were bribed or coerced?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: "Cost of inaction against the Taliban." Yes. But it is not clear that a war in Iraq helped against the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or terrorism, or what was done to us on 9/11.
Be that as it may, we are in Iraq, and the Middle East, for the next generation. No matter who is president will have to face that fact. And the Europeans, too. This is our engagement for as far ahead as we can see. But we must not in the process lose sight of what we as Americans are most concerned about: terrorism here, against our people, and potentially being visited here, again. That is the priority, and going into Iraq did little to advance that cause.
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Virginia: What must a country do to be offered NATO membership?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Be a democracy with firm roots. Be committed to a market economy (success upfront not required: that can be aided by belonging to NATO). Renunciation of any claims against neighbors (note the achievement of Hungary and Romania). Reform (including democratization) of the military. Adaptation to NATO methods and standards. And geographic relevance (i.e., not so far distant that existing allies will be reluctant to provide the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
It is a tribute to NATO's past, its future, and the role of American leadership and engagement that so many countries want to join this alliance -- of both interests and values.
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Falls Church, Va.: Is there a list of countries that have especially close ties with NATO, so that they can be more easily included in intra-NATO agreements and exercises? Are NATO standards pushed to non-NATO countries (for example, Australia or Sweden)?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Sweden (and Finland) yes -- indeed, they could join anytime they wanted to, as meeting every conceivable criterion (including being "producers and not just consumers of security.") Australia (etc.), no: can one see that it would give a commitment to fight for countries in Europe? (It did do so in WWI and WWII, along with New Zealand, but more was involved than geopolitics).
For NATO to have relevance, in terms of members being willing freely to make the commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to mutual self-defense, there has to be a solid basis for doing so and meaning it. Geography is at least one element of that. Some other form of engagement that includes Australia (etc)? Fine, and a number exist.....
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: In sum: what we are seeing, today, in taking in 7 more countries to NATO, is a further step in fulfilling the potential -- and the promise -- of a "Europe whole and free" -- the first time in all of European history when there has been a chance of creating a security system from which all countries in "Europe" (and that includes the US and Canada) can benefit and which will penalize none. NATO is many elements, and all are critical. As devised in the 1990s -- and I was honored to have the chance to play a role -- NATO crafted a coherent strategy, consisting of several parts:
o the US as a permanent "European power"
o preservation of the integrated military command structure;
o continued support for the "European Civil Space" and the end of the "German problem"
o enlargement to Central Europe
o Partnership for Peace, to get countries ready for membership and provide security and involvement for those who do not join
o Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
o NATO-Russia Council
o NATO-Ukraine Commission
o NATO-ESDP relationship (European Union)
o new command structures
o Bosnia-Kosovo-Afghanistan-Iraq.
"something for everyone." But requiring robust common action, no "something for nothing." And firmly dependent on US leadership, commitment, and wisdom.
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© 2004 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive
Last week Robert E. Hunter, who was the U.S. ambassador to NATO under Clinton, answered questions regarding the expansion of NATO to 26 countries with the addition of seven new members. He responded to a question from Post editors whether an ESDP would leave NATO irrelevant. His response was basically "Yeah, right."
Europe doesn't have the capabilities - yet - he argued to go it alone in security matters. His argument is that Europe still needs the United States and NATO in Europe and will for many years to come. Eventually, however, the US might be able to "go home" and let Europe deal with itself. For now, an ESDP would be a complement to NATO.
This is a slightly different picture than officials we spoke with portrayed. While I think they'd all agree that NATO will continue to be the dominant player for some time, an ESDP wouldn't necessarily be a complementary entity. The view is that NATO is just another option in the great big European toolbox of defense. Hunter argues that Europe still doesn't have the tools.
Washington Post.com - NATO conversation with Amb. Robert E. Hunter
washingtonpost.com
World: NATO
Amb. Robert E. Hunter
NATO Ambassador Under President Clinton
Monday, March 29, 2004; 4:00 PM
The prime ministers of seven new NATO member nations are being welcomed to the White House by President Bush today. The leaders of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, expand the alliance to 26 countries.
Robert E. Hunter, NATO ambassador under President Clinton and Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, will be online to discuss the expansion of NATO and today's White House ceremony.
Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: This afternoon, President Bush welcomed 7 new countries to NATO -- bringing the total to 26. That is 10 new countries from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the last five years. Clearly, NATO will be different; but just how different is the critical question. Much is already known -- for instance, that all members have the same rights and responsibilities, that all will join the integrated command structure, Allied Command Operations, that all will be covered by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all allies to come to the defense of any any that is attacked, and that all must now also look beyond Europe -- "out of area" in NATO jargon -- to new challenges as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq. As before, US engagement and leadership are critical; as before, the US needs to sustain its involvement on a bipartisan basis.
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Lyme, Conn.: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes -- as of today, it has 26 members, only 5 years ago it had only 16 -- the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members -- in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about it should do -- and not do -- against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular counse of action is important; and for their to be effective leadership -- and particularly American leadership. This leadership -- and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security -- remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so -- in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.
At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end. But one thing is clear: one of the key elements of NATO is its consensus rule, which stimulates all the allies to take critical matters seriously, and to work together to preserve the alliance for all the tasks ahead.
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washingtonpost.com: Would a coordinated EU foreign and defense policy replace NATO for many European nations and thus render the alliance irrelevant?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Wouldn't it be wonderful if the EU had a foreign and security policy that would lead Europeans to take full responsibility for European security, and let the US just go home?! But that is not likely to happen, at least not for many years. The Europeans are not yet so organized that they can "do security" by themselves, and they do not have the tools needed, as are found in the NATO integrated command structure and more than half a century of working together, a precious asset that is not easily duplicated. But the EU is beginning to do more -- in Macedonia, for instance, and later this year to take over full responsibility for security from NATO in Bosnia.
America is still needed in Europe -- and that means NATO is still needed -- in terms of the great historic imponderables, including insurance that the 20th century, the worst century ever for war and human suffering, is well and truly in the past; and working to ensure that the future of Russia will not again lead to a fundamental rupture in arrangements for European security. In addition, the European Union does not have the capacity -- and is unlikely anytime soon to gain the capacity -- to act beyond Europe, as NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is likely to do in Iraq. Thus the European Security and Defense Policy (an adjunct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) can be a useful complement to NATO, but the EU will not replace NATO, and certainly not US power and engagement, at least for many years to come.
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washingtonpost.com: Will Russia ever join NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Russia in NATO? In theory, yes. Indeed, officially, NATO membership is open to any member of the OSCE that is "ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership." But for Russia to join would require major changes in that country, including assurance that democracy is well rooted; and it would require Russia to meet all the other aspects of NATO membership, measured also in terms of its relations with other countries.
More important, would the rest of the alliance be prepared to extend to Russia guarantees of all its borders against external armed attack -- for example, some day against China? If the Western nations were so disposed, it is very likely that they would work out this business with Russia by other means; and, indeed, they would want to do all that is possible so that this eventuality did not come to pass.
At heart, if the security situation in Eurasia reached the point where Russia could be considered for membership in NATO to be a serious proposition, things would probably be so positive that NATO would not any longer be needed!
Because of all of these argument, Russia has not suggested joining NATO, and no one in the West has proposed it. Instead, there is now a NATO-Russia Council, which seeks to treat Russia like an equal, to bring it into NATO deliberations when its interests are truly engaged, to build cooperation, including in areas like peacekeeping and -- in time -- security for the Middle East, and to extend security truly in a "Europe whole and free." But Russia does not have to be in NATO to be part of NATO -- and the test will be how all these countries work together to build security across Eurasia.
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Cumberland, Md.: While it is nice to have new members in NATO -- it is doubtful if they can carry their weight militarily or even spend the money on defense that is required to upgrade their out-of-date equipement. I question the value of accepting new members in NATO who are militarily underpowered. Your comments please?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: When we set out to take in new NATO members a decade ago, I invented a slogan to put this point: a country to join NATO would have to be a "produce and not just a consumer of security." Now, that does not mean being able to mount a defense like that of the Cold War. None of these new countries, or any of the "old" NATO allies (with the possible exception of Turkey, on the Iraqi border) faces an external military threat. What we need from the new countries is that they democratize their military forces, that they adopt NATO standards in equipment and practice, that they take part in Allied Command Operations (however little), that they be able to coordinate their activities, their equipment, and their training with NATO -- and that the continue efforts to deepen democracy and market economies, and continue their renunciation of claims against neighbors. At the same time, there is an interest in having these countries make some contribution to the newer tasks, including doing what they can to counter terrorism (and that can including police work, intelligence, and border control within their own countries) and to join, in however limited a way, in common decisions NATO takes to be engaged in places like Afghnistan and Iraq. This is part of a total security concept: and the amount of money spent on military forces is not the key point -- indeed, NATO does not want Central European countries to spend so much money that they may retard the development of their economies.
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Little Rock, Ark.: Will or should NATO ever get increasingly involved in the Iraqi conflict like it has in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: I predict that, within a year, NATO will have taken over responsibility for much if not all external military engagement in Iraq, under a UN mandate. This is a logical extension of what NATO has already done successfully in the Balkans (neither Bosnia or Kosovo is yet successful politically and economically but, except for the recent violence in Kosovo, neither has experienced the conflict of the pre-NATO period), and is beginning to do in Afghanistan. The US is reaching the point of acknowledging that we would like help in Iraq -- in military deployments, in reconstruction, in development of post-Saddam politics -- and that many of the allied countries have capabilities that can be of significan benefit. What is required is that we be willing to share influence and decision-making as well as responsibility and burdens: something that may seem obvious, but which official Washington has not yet been prepared to do.
At heart, whether or not we should have gone to war in Iraq, it is over. The old security system has been shattered. Both we and the Europeans have a vital interest -- vital self-interests -- in putting something viable in its place. And how better to do that, from the point of view of all concerned, than through NATO?
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washingtonpost.com: How has perceived unilateralism affected the United States' leadership role in NATO?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: NATO is now slowly emerging from the worst crisis in its history, occasioned in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so, and certainly without being able to bring along the NATO allies as a whole. Even if the US could be argued to have had no choice, the way we went about it gratuitously weakened our reputation for probity, cooperation, consultation, and sound judgement. But the Alliance is, in the end, about what countries either do or do not do together in their common interests -- and common values -- for the future. And if wiser heads prevail, on both sides of the Atlantic -- and there is evidence this is beginning to happen -- then the Western alliance can regain must of its former strength. And the US can gain much of its former leadership: but that must be on the basis of looking to others for counsel rather than obedience; seeking to build cooperation and common understanding rather than an assertion of "our way or the highway." The latter method has been tried and found wanting. We know now that we have to have allies and partners to shape the world to our (and their) liking; and if we act on that insight, we can regain the highground that was so woefully lost last year. In sum, the US disposes of great incipient power, unrivalled, perhaps, in history; but to change that incipient power into lasting influence, we must create institutions, attitudes, practices, and policies that work for us....because they also work for others.
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Washington, D.C.: If there is no threat to these new members, why is NATO installing air defense over the Baltics, thus to treat Russia as the enemy? While Putin has much more important things to do, like growing the Russian economy, and the level-headed Russians I talk to don't get too excited over the Baltics (though they think this "Article 5 protection" emboldens the Baltics on the language question), it merely encourages the unreformed Russian military to keep trumpeting the threat from the West and the need to keep their old formations. So is this air defense gesture really necessary?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: You put your finger on a key problem. On the one hand, countries have to be able to do at least a minium to guarantee the sanctity of their borders and their air space. As NATO members, there at least needs to be some means for what is called "air policing" -- hence, the four F-16s (and some limited other equipments) that will be deployed in Lithuania: these are no threat to Russia, and cannot be so represented. Indeed, nothing that has been done in any of the new allied states, or that anyone contemplates doing, can pose such a treat or honestly be represented as doing so. But on the other hand, it is also important that, with the expansion of NATO, Russia not be pushed away or even have a sense is it being pushed away. That is one reason Lithuania has worked out arrangements with Russia (and Belarus) for the movement of people to/from Kaliningrad, a part of Russia now separated from it by NATO territory. That is why NATO is pressing Latvia to treat is major Russian minority with dignity. It is why NATO and Russia have created the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, in which Russia is equal with the now 26 NATO allies. And it is why NATO has sought to engage Russia in peacekeeping (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), and has a raft of common activities (see the NATO website for a list). But this must all be done deftly; there has since NATO began its venture of playing a lead role in crafting a "Europe whole and free," it has had to be sure that it advaces the legitimate security interests both of Central European states and of Russia; and it must continue to do this. (This is particular true with regard to any bases and permenent deployments in former Warsaw Pact territory: in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO included a unilateral statement that imposed a number of limitations on what it would do in this regard. It is not violating the letter of these pledges; but it must be careful, as well, to honor the spirit).
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Kansas City, Mo.: For some time, I have heard a Russian point-of-view that the US made commitments at the end of the Cold War to limit NATO enlargement. Michael Mandelbaum has referred to such commitments in his opposition to NATO expansion. I've heard other policymakers and scholars say that no such commitments were made, and that NATO is free to enlarge. Apparently the US would also be free to restructure its military deployments, away from Germany and to "New Europe."
What's the right story here?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: No such commitments were made. When I was US ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, we researched the case thoroughly, to be sure that we were honoring all pledges made. At the same time, NATO enlargement has not taken place in a vacuum, as though Russia has no importance. Quite the contrary: it is engaged in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO peacekeeping (at one point in both Bosnia and Kosovo), in exercises, and even now moving in the direction of "interoperability" with NATO equipment.
The US redeployments easterward are ostensibly to have different kinds of bases -- some just for runways and storage of supplies -- that would make deployments farther east, for instance to Middle East crisis regions, easier. This is still being debated. And it needs to be undertaken with several points in mind: military efficiency and cost are only one factor. We also have to reassure the Germans and others in West Europe that we are not shifting our focus decisively away from Europe; and we have to assure the Russians that we are not taking advantage of their weakness. In fact, nothing the US is thinking of doing could pose a threat to Russia, but it is critical that whatever is done be done in full "transparence" -- indeed in consultations -- with Russia, which does, indeed, share many of the US and allied objectives with regard to countering terrorism and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
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Alexandria, Va.: Are there other countries that wish to join NATO? Now that the Cold War is behind us what is the rational for joining the group?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Secretary countries in the Balkans want to join NATO -- Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania -- and all may do so. Their reasoning is the same as that of the countries that have already joined: to "bring history to an end," in the sense of being the playthings of the Great Powers; to have an association with the EU (with tends to follow) and with the US; to have an added incentive domestically to put down deep democrtic roots; and to gain -- they believe -- the benefits in terms of foreign investment and confidence that can come with NATO membership. In addition, Ukraine has expressed an interest in joining NATO -- in its case to become mroe certain of its relationship with Russia, as well as to gain economic benefits. Georgia has said it will apply for membership and Azerbaijan is moving in that direction. But beyond the Balkans and perhasp Ukraine (leading aside, for some time, Belarua and Moldova), one has to ask just how big NATO can become and still retain a sense of common purpose, and also a willingness of each of its members to give security guarantees -- and NATO's security guarantees must always be real -- to farflung states. The Caucasus is a long way away from NATO-Europe, strategically and politically; most allies would be reluctant to take on the burdens of potentially having to defense Georgia; and they would not want to do so regarding Azerbaijan while it is still at war with Armenia: and yet, these are precisely reasons these two countries are interested in NATO -- and Azerbaijan also speaks both of Russia and Iran in terms of its concerns, something that most if not all the European NATO allies shy away from getting involved in. So -- NATO is a successful venture; but it must not be seen as the be-all and end-all for everyone. The farther from Europe, the more there needs to be creativity about something else -- e.g., a new security system, crafted on 21st century lines, for at least major parts of what is being called the "Greater Middle East."
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Warsaw, Poland: What role will NATO play in the war against terrorism?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Counter-terrorism is most about non-military activities -- as Secretary of Defense and others have said. It is about intelligence, policy work, border control, etc., etc. -- most of which are activities carried out by other institutions and relationships, both singly and in groups. There is also the task of trying to "dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim," which, if anything, is the task of institutions like the European Union (in a new strategic partnership with the US). Militarily, there is work to do, of course, and most of that is in the realm of either special forces or of the kind of "reconstruction" and "stabilization" work that is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq (which becamse a terrorism problem only after the war). This is not about high intensity warfare, except in rare circumstances (such as the anti-Taliban period after 9/11).
Thus NATO has already assumed command of ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, and it is developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Indeed, if NATO gets more deeply engaged in Afghanisan to do what is needed so that it will cease being a base for the export of terrorism (if "cease" can be achieved, which is a daunting task), then this could become the most ambitous task the Alliance has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is likely to take over major responsibilities in Iraq, which have their own counter-terrorism aspects.
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Cumberland, Md.: NATO is more and more becoming relatively useless as a military alliance for the U.S.
Too many members, including France and Germany, are unwilling to spend the money for up-to-date military hardware. These countries cannot keep up with the US on the battlefield -- Should we not compel them to assume peacekeeping duties and take over from the U.S. in the Balkans?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: We have to be careful about reading too much into what we read in the newspapers, especially at a time when there has been so much bad blood across the Atlantic.
As we look down the road, it is not clear that there is a signficant range of possibilities where the "big batallions" will be needed, at least in terms of Allied engagement militarily. What is needed, clearly, is special forces, in particular for counter-terrorism; the kinds of stabilization forces that are now going into Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ability of allied forces to be able to fight together -- which means truly compatible C4ISR -- an abbreviation for command, control, communications, computors, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It will also mean a sharing of high technology so that allies can field these equipments that can work together (here, the US has been especially laggard in easing restrictions in the flow of high technology -- we can't have it both ways!).
This does mean more capabilities by many of the Europeans; but less in terms of major power projection at the high end of combat than in the ability to get appropriate forces to a theater, quickly (air and sea lift) and to keep them there for a period of time (logisitics and support). The EU has been creating a Rapid Reaction Force, one of whose virtues is that it simulates some of the governments to spend money on defense, in order to promote European unity, that they might not otherwise spend. And NATO is developing a NATO Response Force, which will be able to deploy forces in as little as 5 days and keep them deployed for a signficant period of time.
Note also that one country we have been criticizing -- France -- has been engaged in NATO's major activities: it has more resources committed to the NATO Response Force than any other European ally; it is sending more officers to Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation; and it has about 250 special forces fighting in Afganistan, under US command! And before NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan, the Germans (and the Dutch) had the command.
Yes, the allies can do more -- and will also be doing more in Macedonia (an EU operation) and later this year in Bosnia (taking over from NATO). And most if not all will be willing to engage with the US, Britain, etc., in Iraq, as a NATO operation, if we are prepared to have an appropriate UN resolution (which would also lead Spain to keep its troops there, as the new prime minister has made clear) -- which means our being prepared to share some of the decision-making and influence as well as the responsibility and the burdens (understanding, of course, that we would still be the "800-pound gorilla" in terms of influence.)
_______________________
Tallahassee, Fla.: ".....in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so..."
I must say I am a bit shocked by your comment here. Especially since the 911 commission has been grilling everyone on the cost of inaction against the Taliban. Why do you think these new member countries, that lived under supression for so long, joined the coalition and supported the war in Iraq? Or would you, like Senator Kerry, just say they were bribed or coerced?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: "Cost of inaction against the Taliban." Yes. But it is not clear that a war in Iraq helped against the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or terrorism, or what was done to us on 9/11.
Be that as it may, we are in Iraq, and the Middle East, for the next generation. No matter who is president will have to face that fact. And the Europeans, too. This is our engagement for as far ahead as we can see. But we must not in the process lose sight of what we as Americans are most concerned about: terrorism here, against our people, and potentially being visited here, again. That is the priority, and going into Iraq did little to advance that cause.
_______________________
Virginia: What must a country do to be offered NATO membership?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Be a democracy with firm roots. Be committed to a market economy (success upfront not required: that can be aided by belonging to NATO). Renunciation of any claims against neighbors (note the achievement of Hungary and Romania). Reform (including democratization) of the military. Adaptation to NATO methods and standards. And geographic relevance (i.e., not so far distant that existing allies will be reluctant to provide the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
It is a tribute to NATO's past, its future, and the role of American leadership and engagement that so many countries want to join this alliance -- of both interests and values.
_______________________
Falls Church, Va.: Is there a list of countries that have especially close ties with NATO, so that they can be more easily included in intra-NATO agreements and exercises? Are NATO standards pushed to non-NATO countries (for example, Australia or Sweden)?
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Sweden (and Finland) yes -- indeed, they could join anytime they wanted to, as meeting every conceivable criterion (including being "producers and not just consumers of security.") Australia (etc.), no: can one see that it would give a commitment to fight for countries in Europe? (It did do so in WWI and WWII, along with New Zealand, but more was involved than geopolitics).
For NATO to have relevance, in terms of members being willing freely to make the commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to mutual self-defense, there has to be a solid basis for doing so and meaning it. Geography is at least one element of that. Some other form of engagement that includes Australia (etc)? Fine, and a number exist.....
_______________________
Amb. Robert E. Hunter: In sum: what we are seeing, today, in taking in 7 more countries to NATO, is a further step in fulfilling the potential -- and the promise -- of a "Europe whole and free" -- the first time in all of European history when there has been a chance of creating a security system from which all countries in "Europe" (and that includes the US and Canada) can benefit and which will penalize none. NATO is many elements, and all are critical. As devised in the 1990s -- and I was honored to have the chance to play a role -- NATO crafted a coherent strategy, consisting of several parts:
o the US as a permanent "European power"
o preservation of the integrated military command structure;
o continued support for the "European Civil Space" and the end of the "German problem"
o enlargement to Central Europe
o Partnership for Peace, to get countries ready for membership and provide security and involvement for those who do not join
o Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
o NATO-Russia Council
o NATO-Ukraine Commission
o NATO-ESDP relationship (European Union)
o new command structures
o Bosnia-Kosovo-Afghanistan-Iraq.
"something for everyone." But requiring robust common action, no "something for nothing." And firmly dependent on US leadership, commitment, and wisdom.
_______________________
© 2004 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive
Of course, many of the people we spoke to in Europe want Bush out of the White House. I heard no support for the Bush White House in Europe except for the wife of a U.S. State Department bureaucrat living in Brussels.
But, that doesn't mean that trans-Atlantic relations will be any better, according to this article. Kerry might not be so blunt, he may be able to discuss nuances of European politics in French, but, as this article points out, the US and Europe will likely continue to approach the world's problems differently.
The comments from Sen. Joe Biden amplify this. He doesn't believe the Europeans are willing to do what it takes (i.e. spend the money) to create a ESDP and the prospect of an EU army is risible, to him. (He needs to listen to Sarah's report.)
International Herald Tribune - Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
Politicus: Europe in for a letdown if it's counting on Kerry
John Vinocur IHT
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
WASHINGTON At one end of a marble hall in the U.S. House of Representatives' Sam Rayburn office building, George W. Bush's re-election aspirations were taking a jostling. Testimony before the Sept. 11 commission contended that the self-described war president had not paid attention early or fully enough to warnings about Al Qaeda's murderous capabilities.
About 100 strides down the hall, at the same time last week, some of Europe's grandest illusions about what a new Democratic administration might mean to the European Union were also being jarred, minus the din and camera lights next door. Congress's leading Democratic voices on foreign policy, with a trace of the disdain that so rankles Europeans, suggested that their critical view of the European Union's weaknesses was intact, and that in puckering up for a November embrace Europe might have to settle for a formalistic kiss.
This may come as a surprise in Europe, where wide segments of opinion, official and public, confidential or boisterous, want Bush beaten. Many influential Europeans seem to believe that Senator John Kerry in a Democratic White House would restore both respectful equanimity to the American side of the trans-Atlantic relationship and, perhaps more naïvely, aim to redefine U.S. interests in a way that did not seem so self-interestedly American.
Pushed to the extreme, this might be called the European School for Reforming America. In this notion, a needy United States seeks out European counsel, converts to multilateralism and submits get-tough inclinations to the United Nations for the veto-ready muster of China, Russia and France. In the Rayburn Building's Gold Room, such tones were unmistakably absent from the remarks of Senator Joseph Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and of Representative Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee. At a seminar sponsored by the University of Michigan, Biden and Lantos were joined by Henry Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House committee, and Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under Bill Clinton, to talk about the European Union and the United States before a group that included the German and French ambassadors in Washington.
In looking eternally inward, Biden said, the European Union's leading members had for the most part had taken their eye off the ball about the rest of the world. Europeans misguidedly tended to regard the United States as an imperial power, he added. And their leaders offered no really constructive alternatives to the Iraq war.
Recalling that he had talked to six European government chiefs about the war, Biden caricatured how they would have done things better. "Blah blah blah, international cooperation," the senator mimicked. He added, in his own voice, "Give me a break, huh."
When Biden offered the possibility, beyond more civility, of a future in contrast to the Bush administration, it was in a plague-on-your-houses context. He said of the two, Europe and Bush, "You have fallen in love with international institutions to the extent that this administration has fallen in love with unilateral action."
For good measure, Biden threw in the view that the European Union will not have a unified foreign policy, and with it, the phrase, "I hope you do, I wish you well, but I see no evidence you're going to spend the money needed" to create a serious European military force either.
Biden left the prospect of a trans-Atlantic emotional healing to Lantos, who was born in Europe. He saw none at hand. There was no hatred in America for Europe, he said, just "disenchantment and disillusion." The new American college generation "couldn't care less" about Europe.
Indeed, for Lantos, the European-American bond was now "a cold-blooded, cynical relationship." Perhaps a bit ironically, he then explained the situation as a basis for optimism in that it perhaps made for more rationality on both sides.
All this, word for word, might not be Kerry's party's message in the strictest sense. Yet it came from the mouths of two influential Democrats who did not get to their leading roles in forming congressional opinion on foreign affairs by nonconsensual posturing or freaky one-man crusades. Indeed, Kerry would very much need their support if he wanted to reverse the Bush administration and participate in the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol on the environment - symbolic issues for Europe that European ambassadors here do not expect to rank high among the candidate's priorities if elected. In fact, since getting cornered with a remark that many foreign leaders wanted him to win (and for reasons of discretion, not being able to identify them when pressed by the Bush campaign), Kerry has had effectively to disavow two such endorsements with an advisory that he would neither seek nor accept support from overseas.
Part of this was a no-brainer in the American political context: A statement of backing for Kerry from former Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia prompted Rand Beers, Kerry's foreign policy adviser, to describe the ex-leader as "an avowed anti-Semite whose views are totally deplorable."
The other pledge of support required much more subtlety, bearing as it did the mark of those in Europe who would cast Kerry as an American flagellant, ready for a virtual apology to all for America's size, strength, and national instincts. Before he was elected prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero said he was "aligning" himself with the Democrat. After Zapatero's victory and his statement that Spain would pull its troops out of Iraq if UN authorization was not forthcoming, Kerry was caught in the position of having to deal with a self-appointed European ally apparently clueless about American politics. Kerry urged Zapatero to reconsider on Iraq and said he should "send a message that terrorists cannot win by their acts of terror."
Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, who served as foreign policy adviser to the Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic nomination, verbally shrugged. If Kerry wins, he said, there may be a new effort at better understanding, but "there's going to be real disappointment in Europe, in terms of their expectations, about everything being hunky-dory again. I don't think many Europeans understand U.S. politics."
Biden suggested at least one did. He told his audience of visiting an unnamed European leader whose government opposed the war in Iraq. Do you think it's more important to have the situation in Iraq righted than to see Bush defeated, the senator asked the European.
The leader cleared his throat, hemmed and hawed, began three different sentences, and, according to Biden, finally gave an answer. "Yes," he said.
Copyright © 2002 The International Herald Tribune
This report basically says that the Spaniards eased up on anti-terrorism efforts in the weeks leading up to the bombings.
This is inevitable - while Zapatero and others suggests that Bush and Blair reflect on the mistakes of the Iraq war and the war on terrorism and what precipitated this recent attack - the Spanish and all of Europe must look at how this happened and examine its own practices - as individual countries and a union.
Meanwhile, Schroder said the creation of a European Union CIA should take a backseat to better communication and cooperation between intelligence agencies now. But there are still complaints that intelligence sharing is still inefficient, which is becoming a familiar echo.
The Guardian - Spain accused of easing up on terror watch
Spain accused of easing up on terror watch
Signs emerge of serious intelligence and security failures before bombings
Giles Tremlett in Madrid, Owen Bowcott in Casablanca, Ian Black in Brussels and Sophie Arie in Milan
Wednesday March 17, 2004
The Guardian
Spain cut the number of police units responsible for watching radical Islamists in the months before last week's Madrid bombings, reducing numbers by up to a half in some cities and sending them back to ordinary police work, it was claimed yesterday.
A report in the newspaper El Mundo emerged amid numerous signs of serious police and intelligence failures in the run-up to the attacks that killed 201 commuters.
They include allegations that:
· Spanish police possessed phone taps linking a prime suspect in the bombings, the Moroccan Jamal Zougam, with Mohamed Fizazi, a jailed leader of the May bombings in Casablanca, Morocco;
· Arguments between Morocco and Spain over the island of Perejil, fishing rights and immigration had seriously hampered coordination on shared terrorism threats;
· Paperwork that should have allowed police to trace the sale in Spain of the explosives used in the attacks has reportedly gone missing; and
· Spanish police knew that Mr Zougam was closely connected to Salaheddine Benyaiche, another north African Islamist also imprisoned in Morocco for the Casablanca attacks.
It has also been revealed that of six other people now being hunted by Spanish police in connection with the blasts, the majority were already well-known for radical Islamist connections.
Last night, a Spanish interior ministry spokesman would neither confirm nor deny the reported reduction in the number of police devoted to watching Islamists.
But observers believe that a picture of missed intelligence opportunities and a failure to keep tabs on key figures is now emerging in the aftermath of the bombings.
The connection with Fizazi was revealed yesterday by a French lawyer, Jean-Charles Brisard, representing September 11 victims, who has access to Spanish police records.
In a phone call with a suspected leader of a Madrid-based al-Qaida cell that Spanish police monitored in August 2001, Mr Zougam said he had met Fizazi.
"On Friday, I went to see Fizazi and I told him that if he needed money we could help him with our brothers," Mr Zougam says, according to Mr Brisard.
Fizazi was one of 87 people sentenced in Morocco last August for their part in the Casablanca bombings last May which killed 45 people, including 12 suicide bombers.
He was ordered to serve 30 years in prison. He previously preached at a mosque in Hamburg frequented by some of the September 11 hijackers.
Mr Zougam's connections to militant Islamists were well known to both Spanish and French police and to intelligence services in Morocco. His Madrid apartment had been searched in 2001, turning up a videotape that included an interview with Osama bin Laden.
His half-brother Mohamed Chaoui, who has also been arrested, also features on Spanish police wiretaps of the suspected Madrid cell, according to Mr Brisard.
So far police have arrested three Moroccans, including Mr Zougam and Mr Chaoui, and two Indians in their search for the bombers.
Last night, police in the Basque city of San Sebastian said they had detained an Algerian man who allegedly talked about a terrorist attack in Madrid two months before it happened.
Another Algerian named Said Arel is also reportedly wanted by police, along with five other Moroccans, all of whom are well known to Spanish police but have disappeared from Madrid in recent days.
Police sources said no international arrest warrants had been issued, despite reports that many of the bombers may have fled the country. Another avenue for investigating the bombings - tracing the route followed by the Spanish-made Goma 2 explosives used between the factory door and the Madrid train bombs - has reportedly been hampered because the paper trail it should have left behind is incomplete.
The 100 to 150 kilos of explosives used in the bombs may have been exported to Saudi Arabia, Syria or Mauritania before being smuggled back into the country via Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar, police sources said.
Another area of failure appears, according to Aboubakr Jamai, editor of the Casablanca-based Le Journal, to be political rows that have prevented Morocco and Spain coordinating anti-terrorism efforts properly.
"There was little cooperation between the Moroccan and Spanish authorities because of political disputes between the two countries over Perejil island and fishing rights," he said.
In an effort to regain the initiative in the fight against Islamist terror groups, anti-terrorism chiefs from around Europe will travel to Madrid this week to study implications of the bombings.
The German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, played down talk of creating a "European CIA" yesterday, saying the priority was to boost cooperation between existing intelligence services. Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands have all called for the creation of some kind of EU intelligence body.
The French president, Jacques Chirac, claimed the major intelligence agencies in Europe had over the past 18 months set aside previous reluctance to work together in the face of the new threat.
But one Italian terrorism expert yesterday warned that coordination between European countries was far from efficient, with important information sometimes failing to make it from one European police force to another.
guardian.co.uk/spain
According to this article published in Le Monde, the impact of Aznar's defeat is much wider than the loss of an ally for Bush.
Many stories show that those who favor "Old Europe," and the space for an independent voice might come out stronger. We should not forget though that this happens at a moment of high emotion, and should wait until it translates in a different policy.
Le Monde - Sous le choc des attentats, l'Europe reconsidère sa relation avec Washington
Sous le choc des attentats, l'Europe reconsidère sa relation avec Washington
LE MONDE | 16.03.04 | 14h24
En écho aux propos de José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero sur le "désastre" de la guerre en Irak, des diplomates européens s'en prennent à la politique étrangère menée par les Etats-Unis depuis plus d'un an. La mécanique atlantiste de Blair-Aznar-Berlusconi s'est cassée
L'europe en quelques jours a changé. Les attentats du 11 mars ont ébranlé tout le continent. Les événements qui ont suivi à Madrid modifient d'ores et déjà de façon irréversible l'équilibre des relations euro-américaines. George Bush a perdu beaucoup plus que le soutien indéfectible dont le gratifiait José Maria Aznar. Dès lundi, les langues se sont déliées.
En écho à José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero déclarant que "la guerre en Irak a été un désastre et -que- l'occupation continue d'être un désastre", le ministre français des affaires étrangères s'est totalement départi de sa retenue de langage habituelle. "La guerre en Irak était une erreur, je dirais même une faute, a déclaré lundi matin Dominique de Villepin. Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas voir qu'il y a aujourd'hui deux foyers qui nourrissent le terrorisme dans le monde : le premier, c'est la crise au Proche-Orient, et le deuxième, c'est l'Irak."
Le président de la Commission européenne, Romano Prodi, n'a pas été moins direct dans l'interview qu'il a donnée lundi à La Stampa. "Cela se passe en Irak comme au dehors. Istanbul, Moscou, Madrid. Le terrorisme que la guerre en Irak était censée faire cesser est infiniment plus puissant aujourd'hui qu'il y a un an", dit-il. On ne saurait être plus clair, à moins d'enfoncer le clou, comme l'a fait M. Zapatero, qui a invité lundi George Bush et Tony Blair à "faire leur autocritique".
Des dirigeants européens osent donc qualifier d'échec la politique étrangère menée par Washington depuis plus d'un an. MM. de Villepin et Prodi n'ont certes jamais été partisans de cette politique. Ils l'ont ouvertement combattue à ses débuts puis discutée pied à pied au fil des mois. Mais le ton a changé et l'heure du bilan a sonné.
La garde atlantiste en Europe s'est moyennement mobilisée. Une partie de la presse britannique s'est érigée contre l'idée que des terroristes puissent dicter le verdict des urnes dans un pays européen. Le ministre britannique des affaires étrangères, Jack Straw, a cru devoir rappeler à ses partenaires de l'Union que nul ne se protège du terrorisme islamiste en s'opposant à la guerre en Irak. Mais les électeurs espagnols sont moins soupçonnables que quiconque d'avoir cédé au terrorisme.
Quelques gouvernements européens, membres de la coalition en Irak - la Pologne, le Danemark, la Grande-Bretagne -, ont fait savoir dès lundi que la défection annoncée de l'Espagne ne remettrait pas en cause leur propre engagement militaire sur le terrain. Mais, outre que leur opinion publique n'est pas forcément du même avis, la question pour Washington n'est pas seulement celle du maintien des effectifs actuels en Irak. C'est celle de la relève des troupes américaines, que George Bush souhaite rapatrier en temps voulu pour en tirer un bénéfice électoral.
La relève au moins partielle par l'OTAN était au menu du sommet que l'Alliance atlantique doit tenir fin juin à Istanbul. Qui pourrait répondre à l'appel ? Le ministre allemand des affaires étrangères, Jochka Fischer, a longuement expliqué, dans un discours à Munich le mois dernier, que c'était une mauvaise idée. L'Allemagne ne s'y opposera pas mais, même dans ce cadre, elle n'enverra aucun soldat en Irak. Les Britanniques ne peuvent guère faire plus que ce qu'ils font déjà. José Maria Aznar ne sera plus là pour suggérer une "assistance technique" de l'OTAN qui aurait pu introduire cette dernière en Irak.
Par la voix de Dominique de Villepin, la France fait savoir depuis des semaines qu'elle mettra "des conditions" à une telle extension du rôle de l'OTAN en Irak et laisse entendre qu'elle n'en serait pas. Les "conditions"que le ministre des affaires étrangères français avait répétées après son dernier entretien avec Colin Powell, début février, ce serait qu'"un gouvernement irakien pleinement souverain en fasse la demande" et que le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU en décide. "La question n'est pas d'actualité pour le moment", avait dit alors Dominique de Villepin. Elle l'est de moins en moins.
"PÉCHÉ ORIGINEL"
Depuis, le ministre a expliqué les doutes de la France sur l'opportunité politique d'un tel transfert à l'OTAN. Cela aiderait-il ou cela aggraverait-il la situation sur place, demande-t-il ? Contrairement à l'Afghanistan - où on manque déjà de volontaires pour la prochaine relève -, la présence de troupes étrangères en Irak est pour l'instant frappée d'une sorte de "péché originel", explique un proche du ministre.
L'ONU est-elle prête à s'engager en Irak ? Serait-elle prête à mandater l'OTAN ? Un gouvernement irakien véritablement souverain verra-t-il vraiment le jour en Irak au 30 juin ? De tout cela, on doute fort à Paris.
Les attentats de Madrid ont fait que désormais on en doute fortement ailleurs aussi. La mécanique atlantiste de Blair-Aznar-Berlusconi s'est cassée. D'une certaine manière, la "nouvelle Europe" de Donald Rumsfeld a rendu l'âme en gare d'Atocha, le 11 mars. Restent, pour les Européens, l'urgence sécuritaire et la nécessité d'imaginer une suite en Irak, après le 30 juin comme le dit le calendrier officiel américain, ou plus probablement après les élections présidentielles américaines de novembre.
La Maison Blanche a laissé paraître, vendredi, un manifeste énervement en demandant à John Kerry de citer nommément ses alliés dans le monde s'il en a. George Bush n'en a plus guère de fiables pour l'instant en Europe.
Claire Tréan
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 17.03.04
11-M could have an important impact on a European security policy. Some elements mentioned in this article are:
Many other stories underline the will to strengthen the will to improve cooperation in this field, but a lot of disagreements remain.
In political terms, Le Monde writes: "The fight against terrorism which is now felt all over the continent enhances a solidarity put in doubt by the Iraq crisis and the disagreements about the future Constitution."
El País - La UE propone activar una nueva cláusula de solidaridad que incluye la asistencia militar
La UE propone activar una nueva cláusula de solidaridad que incluye la asistencia militar
Bruselas convoca este viernes un Consejo extraordinario de ministros de Justicia e Interior
GABRIELA CAÑAS - Bruselas
EL PAÍS | España - 16-03-2004
La UE se está planteando activar la cláusula de solidaridad prevista en el borrador de Constitución europea, que prevé la asistencia de los socios, con medios incluso militares, en caso de que un miembro sufra un atentado terrorista. Pero ésta no es la única iniciativa que va a impulsar la política antiterrorista europea tras los atentados de Madrid. La UE desea tener un responsable antiterrorista y Bruselas propone reforzar una unidad en Europol que coordine e intercambie la información de los sistemas de espionaje. Como medida más inminente, habrá este viernes un Consejo extraordinario de Justicia e Interior. Como ocurrió tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre, las bombas de Madrid van a suponer un nuevo impulso a la política de seguridad europea. El presidente de turno de la UE, el primer ministro irlandés, Bertie Ahern, confirmó ayer que en el próximo Consejo Europeo, que reunirá a los líderes los días 25 y 26 próximos en Bruselas, quedarán desplazados los asuntos de competitividad previstos, para dar paso a los ahora más urgentes de lucha contra el terrorismo. Las manifestaciones de solidaridad europea, que ayer continuaron con tres minutos de silencio organizados por todos los Gobiernos de la UE, han abierto paso también a la preocupación por la amenaza terrorista global al confirmarse que tras los atentados del jueves pasado está la mano de Al Qaeda.
Este fin de semana, la Comisión Europea ha propuesto a la presidencia irlandesa de turno activar la cláusula de solidaridad que recoge el borrador de Constitución. "La Unión y sus Estados miembros", dice dicha cláusula, "actuarán conjuntamente en un espíritu de solidaridad en caso de que un Estado miembro sea objeto de un ataque terrorista o de una catástrofe natural o de origen humano. La Unión movilizará todos los instrumentos de que disponga, incluidos los medios militares puestos a su disposición por los Estados "para prevenir, proteger o aportar asistencia". Ahern señaló ayer su intención de proponer esta fórmula a sus homólogos europeos.
El primer ministro belga, Guy Verhofstadt, propuso el viernes crear una CIA europea, una idea que Austria ya había puesto sobre la mesa el pasado 19 de febrero. El resto de los socios acogieron entonces con frialdad tal propuesta alegando que hay muchos mecanismos a la disposición de la UE que sólo requieren ser utilizados por los países miembros para luchar contra el terrorismo y el crimen organizado en general. Ayer, sin embargo, una fuente de la UE aseguraba que "todo se queda cojo tras la matanza en Madrid de 200 personas a manos de Al Qaeda".
Para el comisario europeo de Justicia e Interior, António Vitorino, esa CIA europea podría lograrse simplemente reforzando la unidad antiterrorista de Europol.
Otra medida que se baraja es la de designar a un responsable que coordine la lucha antiterrorista europea. Los servicios del Alto Representante, Javier Solana, proponen en un documento previo al 11-M la designación de un responsable que coordine la lucha antiterrorista de todos los países miembros. El presidente de la Comisión Europea, Romano Prodi, propuso ayer la figura de un supercomisario encargado de estos asuntos y que podría ser la "pieza clave" de toda la estrategia de seguridad.
Is this the unfortunate spark that will push the EU toward its common defense policy and a Constitution? That with the urgency and support of various countries, this will push through the Constitution, much the same way the USA Patriot Act was pushed through after 9/11?
With Spain already talking about removing troops from Iraq instead of pushing forward with immediate retaliation, will Spain, and with it Europe in a collective approach, avoid anti-European reaction in the Muslim world and defuse potential anti-Islamic sentiment in its home country?
BBC - EU calls emergency terror talks
EU calls emergency terror talks
European Union ministers have been called to emergency talks on Friday in response to last week's Madrid attacks.
Germany and France had led calls for a meeting of the EU interior ministers.
One idea - proposed by the European Commission president - is for a special commissioner to be appointed to combat the terror threat.
A routine EU summit next week is set to be dominated by security issues, amid growing signs that the Madrid attacks were the work of Islamic extremists.
European Commission president Romano Prodi said: "We have to discuss thoroughly the entire (security) strategy and we will do it at the summit next week."
"The anti-terrorism commissioner could be a piece of that strategy."
'Schengen stays'
BBC correspondents say the decision to hold the crisis talks reflects the view that the Madrid attacks have security implications well beyond Spanish borders.
European intelligence agencies are said to increasingly believe the attackers were linked to the global Islamist cause rather than Basque separatism.
German Interior Minister Otto Schily said that if it were confirmed that the Madrid bombings had an "Islamic background" then it would mean a new level of threat in Europe.
The Madrid bombings have prompted fierce debate in Germany about security measures, with the opposition calling for airport-style security to be introduced at railway stations across the country.
The German government rejects this as impractical, and says it has beefed up security in other ways.
It has also insisted that the Schengen Agreement, which allows travel between many EU members without border checks, should remain in place.
London alert
Elsewhere in Europe, security is being tightened.
Undercover anti-terrorist police are patrolling the public transport system in London for the first time.
Passengers using underground trains in London now face random checks and searches.
Posters have been put up in the city's transport terminals, urging the public to report anything suspicious.
Police said the measures - announced on Monday - had been planned for some time and were not triggered by the Spain attacks.
Spanish reversal
Spain's new leader-in-waiting, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has also asserted his commitment to fighting terror - though observers say his approach will differ markedly from that of the outgoing government.
Spain's conservative rulers were voted out of office on Sunday amid public anger at their handling of the Madrid bombings.
Mr Zapatero has already said he may withdraw Spanish troops serving in Iraq unless the United Nations is put in charge there.
Mr Zapatero said President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair needed to "engage in some self-criticism" over their decision to invade Iraq.
Al-Qaeda angle
Spanish police are holding three Moroccans and two Indians in connection with the attacks.
The three Moroccans being held have been named as Jamal Zougam, 30, Mohamed Bekkali, 31, and Mohamed Chaoui, 34.
The two Indians arrested were named as Vinay Kohly and Suresh Kumar.
Spain's El Pais newspaper reported that investigators had found links between Jamal Zougam and the Salafia Jihadia group held responsible for attacks in Casablanca last May in which more than 40 people died.
Reports also linked Jamal Zougam to a Spanish cell of al-Qaeda which was headed by Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, also known as "Abu Dahdah".
Abu Dahdah has been indicted by the Spanish anti-terrorist prosecutor Baltasar Garzon on charges relating to the preparation of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States.
El Pais said Jamal Zougam was cited at two points in judge Garzon's indictment, but was not charged.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3510968.stm
Published: 2004/03/15 19:13:49 GMT
© BBC MMIV
In the same way as 9/11 has changed the US, 11-M (March 11th) will change Europe (and its relation with the US.) Our class must pay very close attention to this event and its consequences.
First, there are signs that it may contribute to bring people closer on an emotional basis. "Nobody thinks that it's Spain that has been attacked," a Parisian friend told me over the phone.
Several European head of government took part in the gigantic march held in Madrid's street to denounce terrorism. Romano Prodi, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Silvio Berlusconi, José Manuel Durão Barroso were there, as were prominent members from several governments, Joschka Fischer among others. Denis MacShane, British Secretary of State for European Affairs declared to El País: "It's the first time I have seen all Europe united, left and right, in an expression of total solidarity in front of the third historic totalitarism after Communism and Fascism."
In front of the attack, many Europeans turn to Europe and 11-M might contribute to the emergence of a more tightly woven European identity. If ETA was to be recognized as the perpetrator, it might be seen as a horrendous local Spanish affair. But an attack by Al Qaeda is seen as an attack against Europe. Germany has already called for an urgent reassessment of European security in front of what is seen as a "terrorist threat against Europe."
Second, this attack will affect the US-EU relationships. On one hand, Europeans should become more sensitive to Washington's call to fight terrorism world wide. On the other, it is significant that Spanish voters dismissed the government that brought Spanish soldiers into Iraq. After Schroeder's victory in Germany last year on the basis of his opposition to the war, it is the second government elected by Europeans opposed to Bush's policy.
Finally Bin Laden has just proven that he holds the capacity to affect the course of elections in major democratic countries. It has happened in Spain. It could happen in the United States.
"Given what is known from the strikes that continue to be mounted in other parts of the world, it seems likely that al Qaeda and its affiliates still command the resources and manpower necessary for conducting a major attack in the United States," wrote John Arquilla (who will come and visit us on April 20th) in an article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on February 1st.
Will Al Qaeda do it? Asked Arquilla and his answer was: "The outcome of the November election hinges on the answer."
San Francisco Chronicle – Will Osama rock the vote?
The piece is very short and includes some important information of Galileo, and I think it will be helpful to people who are pursuing defense stories as well as others, as Galileo is not only an EU issue but is also connected to the EU-US relations.
It is from European Voice. By David Cronin and Dana Spinant
JAVIER Solana, the EU’s foreign policy supremo, would be given the power to switch off the Galileo satellite system if it is misused in a way that endangers the security of the European Union, under a plan due to be discussed by member states’ diplomats in the coming weeks.
According to the blueprint, seen by European Voice, the high representative for foreign affairs would issue instructions “to take any measure necessary to safeguard the security” of the EU. The concession holder of the system “shall immediately execute any instructions addressed to him”.
Solana “would be responsible for matters where the operation of the system affects the security of the Union or the member states”, “in particular as a result of an international crisis, a threat to the proper operation or actual misuse of the system”.
The plan states that all aspects of Galileo “relating to the security of the Union or of the member states are handled by the Council”. Management “of all aspects relating to the system’s safety” would be given to a supervisory authority, which has representatives from member states and the European Commission.
However, the high representative would have the power to intervene in “exceptional cases, where the urgency of the situation is such that it requires immediate action”.
A diplomat involved in the drafting of the paper said that was a proof member states “genuinely trust” Solana.
“But at the same time,” he added, “somebody must be in charge of it [Galileo], somebody that can take decisions quickly.
“It is not a responsibility you can give to the presidency – in the future maybe a collective presidency – or to the Commission.
“Like it or not, it must be Solana.”
A network of 30 satellites, Galileo is principally a civilian navigation system, designed for such tasks as locating distressed mountaineers or ships in danger of capsizing. However, defence experts have pointed out the €3.2 billion system could be used by military planners to manage troops and munitions more effectively.
In a recent study, the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies said that “even if Galileo remains a civilian project, security issues will persist”. Because the system will have global coverage and will offer much of its services to private firms, it could have unintended users and uses, “with implications for the EU and its allies”.
The US had harboured reservations about Galileo for some time, viewing the project as a rival to its Global Positioning System (GPS).
But a deal was struck between the Commission and Washington on the project last week (25 February), under which Galileo would use the same ‘free signal’ as the GPS.
The Americans have insisted this signal would be better to avoid potential interference with the GPS military signal.
Romano Prodi, the Commission president, has been one of the strongest advocates of Galileo, which he regards as essential to strengthen the Union’s status as an economic superpower.
The system, designed by the Commission and the European Space Agency, received a major boost in September last when China agreed to contribute €203 million towards its cost.
This article considers the political personality of Iran and concludes that it’s further away from a democratic government than the western public has hoped – hinting darkly that the Bush administration knew more than they said when they included Iran in “the axis of evil.” What they knew, the article infers, is two-fold – first, that Iran has a secret program to enrich uranium – second, that conservative groups have the power to undermine the democratic process – as they just did on February 20th.
After doing this, the article tries to predict the EU’s reaction. This is interesting for two reasons, first – it assumes it will be uniform – second – it starts with a consideration of the United States.
If Mr. Bush has lost his “appetite for foreign conflict,” how will Iran be managed? It asks, adding, “though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how?” It then answers in a way that echoes some of the intellectuals we’ve just read – envisioning Europe acting as a non-militaristic alternative to US power – using economic influence – while giving a nod to the EU’s reliance on the US, “it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.”
Iran
The divine right to a bomb
Feb 26th 2004
From The Economist print edition
No case for a war. But the world would be safer without a nuclear Iran
AFP
IRAN'S election last week made it possible to see clearly something that had been fogged by ambiguity. It made it clear that the Islamic Republic founded by Ayatollah Khomeini 25 years ago has not evolved as some had hoped into a serious democracy. This is not for want of its people's trying. In a string of elections in recent years, Iranians flocked to vote for those politicians who said they were reformers. But under the constitution bequeathed by Khomeini, the decisions of a mere parliament can be struck down by the “just and pious” clergymen of the Council of Guardians, which is in turn subordinate to the faqih, the top cleric and “supreme leader”. He and they have crushed the breath out of reform by closing newspapers and striking down progressive laws. The final straw, which made the vote of February 20th a parody of an election, was the council's disqualification of more than 2,000 candidates, including 87 existing members of parliament.
Thumbs on the people, fingers on the button
In a bogus democracy, fewer people bother to vote. So the predictable outcome was the lowest turnout for a parliamentary election since the revolution, and a thumping victory for the religious conservatives. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, said that the losers were “the United States, Zionism, and the enemies of the Iranian nation”. In truth, the chief losers are Iran's own citizens, whose yearning for personal and political freedom has been thwarted again. But Mr Khamenei is right in at least one respect, which is that the result of the election is depressing not only for Iranians but for the outside world—and, yes, especially America and Israel—as well. For Iran is not just a country whose people look fated to squirm for a good while longer under the thumb of obscurantist clerics who claim a divine right to rule. These clerics also seem to want to put their finger on a nuclear button.
It has to be “seem” because Iran's leaders insist that they do not want nuclear weapons, and never have. That, they say, is why the Islamic Republic—unlike Israel—has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Over the past year, however, they have been caught out time and again failing to give the full account required by the treaty of their nuclear activities (see article). With each new leak, Iran has changed its story. It now admits to having had a secret programme to enrich uranium. Along with Libya and North Korea, it seems to have been one of the main customers of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced Pakistani who ran a global nuclear-smuggling network. Though it clings amid the confessions to the fable that all of this was for peaceful purposes, few people believe it.
How dangerous would a nuclear Iran be? And what should be done about it? Understandably, the world is in no mood to think about such questions right now. Just to pose them is to invite a sinking feeling of déjà vu. It is, after all, only two years since George Bush put Iran with Iraq and North Korea in his “axis of evil”. He still says he will not allow “the world's most dangerous regimes” to threaten America with nuclear weapons. But having invested so much political capital in the invasion of Iraq, Mr Bush no doubt feels his appetite for foreign conflict waning. He will not win re-election in November by making himself look like a serial warmonger.
The many people who were appalled by the Iraqi war may be reassured by Mr Bush's distraction. They should not be. A distracted America may give the clerics the very breathing space they need to build a nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Iran may have concluded from what happened to Saddam Hussein (and did not happen to North Korea) that the sooner you acquire a bomb the safer you are from the superpower, especially one with armies on two of your borders. Iran's recent agreement to submit to more rigorous inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency is not inconsistent with its having reached such a conclusion. Under the NPT, Iran is entitled to master the nuclear cycle. It could then give three months' notice to quit the NPT lawfully and build its bomb.
Yet that might not be calamitous. A nuclear Iran is certainly less frightening than a nuclear Saddam would have been. Even under the clerics, Iran is run by a regime with checks and balances, not by one megalomaniac. It no longer tries to export its revolution. It opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has so far done less than it might to undermine America in Afghanistan or Iraq. On the other hand, it calls for eliminating Israel and helps violent organisations like Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad to work to that end. The mere prospect of Iran acquiring a bomb has prompted Israel to ponder aloud the case for a pre-emptive strike (though that would depend on knowing exactly where all Iran's nuclear gear was concealed). If Iran got the bomb, sometime enemies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might feel compelled to follow suit.
Europe's chance
In short, though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how? In October, Britain, France and Germany thought they had talked Iran into coming clean about its secret nuclear activities and “suspending” uranium enrichment. In return, Europe dangles the trade relations Iran's economy sorely needs. If such an approach really did persuade Iran to do without a bomb, the Europeans could boast that they had found a better way than pre-emption to stop proliferation. And this may even be what Iran wants. Just possibly, Iran has decided in the wake of the Iraq war to do its own version of a Libya, by giving up a secret bomb programme but without the shame of admitting, as Muammar Qaddafi did, that it ever existed.
The question is how to be sure. Since October, Iran has spun more tales than Scheherazade to explain away the discovery of bits and pieces of nuclear research it had neglected to mention. This does not inspire confidence. The mullahs' failure to continue along the path of democratic reform is another reason not to give Iran the benefit of the doubt. Having dangled a carrot, the Europeans ought not to hand it over until Iran has delivered its end of the bargain. In the meantime, it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.
Copyright © 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
The Divine Right to a Bomb, The Economist
This article considers the political personality of Iran and concludes that it’s further away from a democratic government than the western public has hoped – hinting darkly that the Bush administration knew more than they said when they included Iran in “the axis of evil.” What they knew, the article infers, is two-fold – first, that Iran has a secret program to enrich uranium – second, that conservative groups have the power to undermine the democratic process – as they just did on February 20th.
After doing this, the article tries to predict the EU’s reaction. This is interesting for two reasons, first – it assumes it will be uniform – second – it starts with a consideration of the United States.
If Mr. Bush has lost his “appetite for foreign conflict,” how will Iran be managed? It asks, adding, “though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how?” It then answers in a way that echoes some of the intellectuals we’ve just read – envisioning Europe acting as a non-militaristic alternative to US power – using economic influence – while giving a nod to the EU’s reliance on the US, “it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.”
Iran
The divine right to a bomb
Feb 26th 2004
From The Economist print edition
No case for a war. But the world would be safer without a nuclear Iran
AFP
IRAN'S election last week made it possible to see clearly something that had been fogged by ambiguity. It made it clear that the Islamic Republic founded by Ayatollah Khomeini 25 years ago has not evolved as some had hoped into a serious democracy. This is not for want of its people's trying. In a string of elections in recent years, Iranians flocked to vote for those politicians who said they were reformers. But under the constitution bequeathed by Khomeini, the decisions of a mere parliament can be struck down by the “just and pious” clergymen of the Council of Guardians, which is in turn subordinate to the faqih, the top cleric and “supreme leader”. He and they have crushed the breath out of reform by closing newspapers and striking down progressive laws. The final straw, which made the vote of February 20th a parody of an election, was the council's disqualification of more than 2,000 candidates, including 87 existing members of parliament.
Thumbs on the people, fingers on the button
In a bogus democracy, fewer people bother to vote. So the predictable outcome was the lowest turnout for a parliamentary election since the revolution, and a thumping victory for the religious conservatives. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, said that the losers were “the United States, Zionism, and the enemies of the Iranian nation”. In truth, the chief losers are Iran's own citizens, whose yearning for personal and political freedom has been thwarted again. But Mr Khamenei is right in at least one respect, which is that the result of the election is depressing not only for Iranians but for the outside world—and, yes, especially America and Israel—as well. For Iran is not just a country whose people look fated to squirm for a good while longer under the thumb of obscurantist clerics who claim a divine right to rule. These clerics also seem to want to put their finger on a nuclear button.
It has to be “seem” because Iran's leaders insist that they do not want nuclear weapons, and never have. That, they say, is why the Islamic Republic—unlike Israel—has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Over the past year, however, they have been caught out time and again failing to give the full account required by the treaty of their nuclear activities (see article). With each new leak, Iran has changed its story. It now admits to having had a secret programme to enrich uranium. Along with Libya and North Korea, it seems to have been one of the main customers of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced Pakistani who ran a global nuclear-smuggling network. Though it clings amid the confessions to the fable that all of this was for peaceful purposes, few people believe it.
How dangerous would a nuclear Iran be? And what should be done about it? Understandably, the world is in no mood to think about such questions right now. Just to pose them is to invite a sinking feeling of déjà vu. It is, after all, only two years since George Bush put Iran with Iraq and North Korea in his “axis of evil”. He still says he will not allow “the world's most dangerous regimes” to threaten America with nuclear weapons. But having invested so much political capital in the invasion of Iraq, Mr Bush no doubt feels his appetite for foreign conflict waning. He will not win re-election in November by making himself look like a serial warmonger.
The many people who were appalled by the Iraqi war may be reassured by Mr Bush's distraction. They should not be. A distracted America may give the clerics the very breathing space they need to build a nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Iran may have concluded from what happened to Saddam Hussein (and did not happen to North Korea) that the sooner you acquire a bomb the safer you are from the superpower, especially one with armies on two of your borders. Iran's recent agreement to submit to more rigorous inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency is not inconsistent with its having reached such a conclusion. Under the NPT, Iran is entitled to master the nuclear cycle. It could then give three months' notice to quit the NPT lawfully and build its bomb.
Yet that might not be calamitous. A nuclear Iran is certainly less frightening than a nuclear Saddam would have been. Even under the clerics, Iran is run by a regime with checks and balances, not by one megalomaniac. It no longer tries to export its revolution. It opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has so far done less than it might to undermine America in Afghanistan or Iraq. On the other hand, it calls for eliminating Israel and helps violent organisations like Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad to work to that end. The mere prospect of Iran acquiring a bomb has prompted Israel to ponder aloud the case for a pre-emptive strike (though that would depend on knowing exactly where all Iran's nuclear gear was concealed). If Iran got the bomb, sometime enemies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might feel compelled to follow suit.
Europe's chance
In short, though a nuclear Iran may not be worth fighting a war to avert, it is a danger worth averting. But how? In October, Britain, France and Germany thought they had talked Iran into coming clean about its secret nuclear activities and “suspending” uranium enrichment. In return, Europe dangles the trade relations Iran's economy sorely needs. If such an approach really did persuade Iran to do without a bomb, the Europeans could boast that they had found a better way than pre-emption to stop proliferation. And this may even be what Iran wants. Just possibly, Iran has decided in the wake of the Iraq war to do its own version of a Libya, by giving up a secret bomb programme but without the shame of admitting, as Muammar Qaddafi did, that it ever existed.
The question is how to be sure. Since October, Iran has spun more tales than Scheherazade to explain away the discovery of bits and pieces of nuclear research it had neglected to mention. This does not inspire confidence. The mullahs' failure to continue along the path of democratic reform is another reason not to give Iran the benefit of the doubt. Having dangled a carrot, the Europeans ought not to hand it over until Iran has delivered its end of the bargain. In the meantime, it does no harm for America to keep hold of a stick.
Copyright © 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
The Divine Right to a Bomb, The Economist
Galileo is key to the constitution of an independent European Defense. The EU commission presents the agreement with the US as favorable (see Federico's entry). The situation might be more complex though.
This is the conclusion drawn by Strafor.com a site specialized in intelligence analisis with close ties to official military and intelligence institutions:
"The crux of the agreement is that both GPS and Galileo will share the Binary Offset Carrier (BOC) 1.1 signal -- wholly separate from the U.S. M-Code -- and have agreements in place to optimize the performance of the shared signal in the future. This is almost exactly what NATO had proposed nearly two years ago and means that Galileo will be a European commercial competitor, but GPS will remain the primary satellite navigation system used by NATO -- with Galileo likely acting as a backup system.
"This is another nail in the coffin of an independent European defense. Previous efforts to create a European Common Defense Force separate from NATO have stalled. This is due as much to an inability to formulate a common foreign policy as to the lack of capable and willing military forces. Despite these setbacks, many Europeans have held out hope that limited military independence from the U.S.-led NATO umbrella was possible.
"The preservation of the U.S. M-Code as the military navigation frequency ensures that all European militaries -- whether they like it or not -- are inextricably linked to the U.S. Global Positioning System for the foreseeable future."
This is a very important step forward for the European defense policy. Keep in mind that without an independent satellite system (like Galileo) the European armies are electronically "blind" and therefore guided by the US.
Date: March 1st, 2004
Source: Cordis Rtd-News.
After three years of talks, the EU and the US have finally reached agreement on the frequency to be used by Galileo, Europe's satellite navigation system, clearing the way for the operational phase of the project.
A deal on the signal structure to be used by Galileo proved problematic because of US fears that the European system could interfere with its planned M-code military signal. The agreement, reached on 25 February, will see the adoption of a common baseline signal structure for both the EU and the US open services. The future US GPS will use a BOC 1,1 signal, whereas the Galileo open service will use a fully compatible optimised version of the same signal that guarantees a high level of performance.
'This is another very important step for the Galileo project, which recognises both sides as equal partners and creates the optimal conditions for the development of the European system, fully independent and compatible [...] with the American GPS,' said Loyola de Palacio, European Commission Vice President responsible for transport and energy.
Elaborating on the EU-US agreement, she explained: 'This agreement will allow all users to use, in a complementary way, both systems with the same receiver: it creates indeed the world standard of radio navigation by satellite. I'm happy to see that we agreed not to freeze the performance of signal modulations: on the contrary, it establishes clear rules for both parties to jointly or individually continuously improve the performance of their respective systems, for the benefit of all users worldwide.'
So that both systems can be improved in the future, the agreement also allows for a degree of optimisation of the baseline signal structures, either jointly or individually, in order to further improve performance.
A few outstanding issues remain, predominantly related to legal issues and procedural aspects, which still need to be resolved, but these are not expected to delay the signing of a formal agreement, anticipated to take place in the coming weeks.
For further information on Galileo, please consult the following web addresses:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index.htm
http://www.esa.int/export/esaNA/GGGMX650NDC_index_0.html
Category: General policy
Data Source Provider: European Commission
Document Reference: Based on IP/04/264
Programme or Service Acronym: FRAMEWORK 6C; FP6-INTEGRATING; FP6-AEROSPACE
Subject Index : Aerospace Technology; Coordination, Cooperation
RCN: 21669
CORDIS RTD-NEWS/© European Communities
The Bush Administration is urging NATO to expand its prescence in Iraq and Afghanistan to ease some of the military burden off of the U.S. The International Herald Tribune article says the administration's goal is for NATO to make a "headline-grabbing commitment" by the end of June and a few months before the presidential election. The administration has struggled to reduce its military prescence and vulnerability in the two countries, the article said.
I think this story touches a broad range of topics from national identity to defense to perception. While Europe tries to unite and build up its military defense, the U.S. request to expand NATO into Iraq and Afghanistan would cause a significant drain on European forces but at the same time make Bush look good for the elections. Its also interesting that France's president Jacques Chirac is trying to mend his political differences with the Bush administration after clashing over the Iraq war.
Nato role expanding at urging of the U. S.
Elaine Sciolino, International Herald Tribune
NATO role expanding at urging of the U.S.
Elaine Sciolino/NYT NYT
Saturday, February 21, 2004
Bush wants alliance, now in Afghanistan, to add Iraqi mission
BRUSSELS NATO is back.
The much-maligned cold war military alliance lost its mission when its primordial enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed, and was ridiculed by the Bush administration and rendered impotent by its own division over the American-led war on Iraq.
Only 16 months ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lectured NATO defense ministers in Warsaw that if NATO did not transform itself, "it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century." Now, the Bush administration is struggling to reduce its military presence and vulnerability in Afghanistan in Iraq. And it is turning to NATO to expand its mandate in Afghanistan and play a substantive role in Iraq. "I believe in NATO," President George W. Bush told Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the new NATO secretary general, when the two met in the Oval Office last month, senior NATO officials said. "I believe NATO is transforming itself and adjusting to meet the true threats of the 21st century." When de Hoop Scheffer pledged to work hard to get NATO to do more in Afghanistan, Bush replied, "I'm with you." And when the conversation turned to Iraq, Bush said, "The more of a NATO role the better."
De Hoop Scheffer, the Bush administration's choice to lead NATO, came home and pitched the new line. At a speech in Brussels on Tuesday, he said that the alliance was willing to deploy in Iraq. "Under the right conditions we could do it," de Hoop Scheffer told the German Marshall Fund's Trans-Atlantic Center. If a sovereign Iraqi government with United Nations backing were to ask for NATO's help, it would be difficult to "abrogate our responsibilities." Until NATO took command of the force that policies Kabul and the area around it, NATO was in the midst of an identity crisis, uncertain of its role, its future and what constituted a military threat in the post 9/11 era. Its role in stabilizing Afghanistan represents NATO's first "out of area" mission beyond Europe; Iraq would be the second. The United States wants NATO to deliver on an ambitious plan to extend its peacekeeping presence outside Kabul and create links with the American-led offensive military operation in the south, which is struggling to rout the remnants of Taliban rule. It also wants NATO to take command of the vulnerable 9,500-strong multinational brigade in central Iraq, which is now run by Poland, and possibly the larger British-led operation in the south. The goal is for NATO to make a headline-grabbing commitment to both missions at the NATO summit meeting in Istanbul, just days before the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis at the end of June and five months before the U.S. presidential election. The problem in expanding NATO into Iraq is that it already has failed to persuade countries to do enough in Afghanistan. In the four months since the UN authorized NATO to expand its peacekeeping mission of about 6,000 outside the Afghan capital, Kabul, the alliance has managed to send only a few hundred troops under German command to the relatively safe northern city of Kunduz. It took months of high-level arm-twisting of NATO members last year to get them to pledge to send desperately needed helicopters to Afghanistan.
George Robertson, the former secretary general, was forced to lobby hard for the helicopters at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels and at every farewell meeting in December, finally getting commitments of three Black Hawk helicopters from Turkey and three or four from the Netherlands. "Lord Robertson had to use everything he had to bludgeon the foreign and defense ministers into committing helicopters," said Robert Bell, a former White House and senior NATO official who is now a private defense consultant in Brussels. "NATO can't operate that way." General James Jones, NATO's top commander in Europe, told a Senate committee last month that Afghanistan was a "defining moment" for the alliance as it adopted a broader global agenda, but then complained that NATO members were not providing enough troops for the country's reconstruction. "The alliance has agreed, the donor countries have been identified, and yet we find ourselves mired in the administrative details of who's going to pay for it, who's going to transport it, how's it going to be maintained," he said. On Wednesday, Jones presented NATO members with a wish list of what it need to enable NATO to deploy in five provincial cities, senior NATO officials said.
De Hoop Scheffer also has acknowledged his failure so far to persuade NATO nations to send more troops to Afghanistan, saying on Tuesday that force protection was a continuing problem. No member of parliament in any NATO country would approve the new request for troops if there was not an answer to the question, "Who will come to the assistance" of the troops "in extreme circumstances," he said. Asked whether the alliance could contemplate moving into Iraq when there was so much to do in Afghanistan, de Hoop Scheffer launched into a long answer about how the mission was possible, and then said that he could not be expected as secretary general "to bang my head on the table and say, 'This has to work.'" On the positive side, France, whose opposition to the war in Iraq damaged its relationship with Washington, sees NATO as a vehicle for projecting its own military and political power and repairing its American ties. In recent weeks, the United States quietly has welcomed two French one-star generals onto the staff of the NATO Response Force, a creation of Rumsfeld's set up to move rapidly in case of crisis. Jones pushed hard for the administration to grant the French request that the two generals be placed, but the issue was so divisive that Bush himself had to made the final decision, according to NATO officials. France has not been part of NATO's military command structure since President Charles de Gaulle, on a campaign to assert France's military autonomy, withdrew from it in the 1960s. But now, with about 2,000 troops in the first rotation of the 6,000-troop Response Force, France is the force's largest troop contributor. France and three other NATO countries - Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg - have also dropped plans announced at a summit meeting in Brussels last April to build a separate European Union military headquarters in Belgium that the United States vehemently opposed as duplicative of NATO and counter to American interests. Instead, last Friday, Javier Solana, the European Union foreign policy envoy, unveiled a much more modest - but face-saving - plan to ambassadors of member countries.
A golden opportunity for Bush to patch up differences with both President Jacques Chirac of France and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder will come with the 60th anniversary of D-Day on June 6. Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has recommended that Bush accept Chirac's offer to dine at the Élysée Palace the night before and visit the Normandy beaches together, but Bush had not yet accepted, senior administration and French officials said. Senior American and French officials have said privately in recent weeks that Bush has no choice but to accept, given the historic importance of the event. They also noted that a photo of Bush standing side by side in Normandy with Chirac and Schröder could help deflect charges by Democrats that he has squandered good relations with two of America's most important allies.
An important summit Blair, Chirac, Schröder, will take place tomorrow in Berlin. Several European countries, Italy, Spain and Poland among them, are upset by the emergence of this new "directory."
After explaining the progresses made in the building of a common defense, this article taken from Le Monde sees the addition of the UK to the Franco-Germen duo as a way to appease some tensions. Their influence could be huge in many fields: commision, constitution, enlargement, etc.
It would be useful to look at how the summit is covered in different capitals and report it on the blog. Many of the issues at stake in Europe today should come up during the discussion, and in the coverage they get.
Le Monde - Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin
Un "directoire" européen à trois va s'ébaucher à Berlin
LE MONDE | 17.02.04 | 13h22 • MIS A JOUR LE 17.02.04 | 16h20
A quelques semaines de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, trois de ses principaux dirigeants se réunissent à Berlin, mercredi 18 février, suscitant la rancœur de certains de leurs partenaires, inquiets de voir se mettre en place une gestion par Paris, Berlin et Londres. Officiellement rejetée par les intéressés, l'expression "directoire" ne les fait cependant pas hurler d'indignation. Refusant de limiter l'Europe à un espace de paix intérieure, les dirigeants français, allemand et britannique devraient envisager les moyens de relancer les réformes, la croissance et la politique industrielle. Ils pourraient aussi décider de réformer la Commission de Bruxelles.
A peine un an après la fameuse lettre des Huit sur l'Irak, initiée par la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne, qui scellait la césure entre une Europe pro-atlantiste et une Europe franco-allemande récusant la politique américaine, Tony Blair se retrouve avec le président Jacques Chirac et le chancelier Schröder, mercredi 18 février à Berlin, pour une rencontre tripartite. A deux mois de l'élargissement de l'Union, alors que la question du fonctionnement de l'Europe à 25 est loin d'être résolue, les autres Européens s'interrogent sur l'objet de cette réunion à trois, présentée comme une concertation en vue du sommet européen qui sera consacré fin mars à l'évolution économique de l'Union.
Malgré les apaisements prodigués par Tony Blair, jeudi, lors de la rencontre préparatoire qu'il a eue avec le chancelier allemand à Berlin, plusieurs capitales, notamment au sud de l'Europe, expriment quelque agacement à voir refleurir une sorte de "directoire", non plus franco-allemand, mais à trois. "Nous ne pouvons accepter les initiatives qui mettent les uns ou les autres le dos au mur", a averti le ministre italien des affaires étrangères, Franco Frattini. "Il n'est pas bon que quelques voix fassent taire toutes les autres, dont celle de l'Espagne", a estimé de son côté la ministre espagnole Ana Palacio, qui avait dénoncé avec virulence en 2003, lors de la célébration du 40e anniversaire du traité franco-allemand, la volonté d'hégémonie de Paris et de Berlin.
L'idée d'un leadership franco-germano-britannique en Europe n'est pas nouvelle. Elle avait pris corps après l'arrivée de Tony Blair aux commandes en Grande-Bretagne, le leader travailliste revendiquant ouvertement, après les années Thatcher, un retour de son pays sur la scène européenne pour y exercer son influence. M. Blair n'a pas été en mesure de tirer suffisamment son pays derrière lui pour le convaincre de rejoindre la zone euro. Il a cependant avancé sur d'autres sujets européens, notamment en relançant avec Paris, dès décembre 1998, l'idée d'une véritable défense européenne.
C'est à nouveau à propos de la défense que les "trois grands" Européens ont manifesté ces derniers mois leur volonté de tourner la page de la crise irakienne. Le 20 septembre 2003, le sommet surprise qui les a réunis, à Berlin déjà, avait esquissé un compromis sur la création d'un état-major européen autonome au sein de l'OTAN.
Ce compromis, finalement acepté par Washington, a été la base de l'accord intervenu au sommet de Bruxelles en décembre sur la future politique de défense de l'Union à 25. Il permet d'envisager de nouveaux développements à la fois en matière de projection de forces, mais aussi de coopération dans le domaine de l'armement. L'Allemagne vient de se joindre à Paris et Londres pour mettre sur pied des corps d'intervention de 1 500 hommes prêts à être déployés pour tenter d'empêcher des crises de dégénérer, comme cela a été fait en 2003 dans la province de l'Ituri en République démocratique du Congo.
UN SOUFFLE D'AIR
Cette entente à trois a aussi débouché sur la création d'une agence d'armement, qui doit permettre à l'Europe de mettre en commun son potentiel industriel. Symbole de cette avancée : la décision de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne de coopérer pour la construction de leurs nouveaux porte-avions. Des discussions sont également en cours dans le domaine des sous-marins, où le potentiel allemand est important.
Paris et Berlin avaient dû constater pendant la crise irakienne que, dans la nouvelle Europe élargie, ils ne pourraient plus à eux seuls être le moteur de l'Union. La main tendue de Tony Blair est donc pour eux bienvenue. M. Blair a donné des gages de sa fidélité aux Etats-Unis, et sa présence devrait rassurer les pays membres les plus atlantistes sur les objectifs de la rencontre de Berlin, notamment les Polonais et les Espagnols. On en espère du coup, dans les milieux européens, une décrispation qui facilite le déblocage des négociations sur la Constitution.
De même que le couple franco-allemand a été utile dans la "vieille Europe" pour cristalliser les problèmes et dégager les compromis, un trio pourrait avoir une précieuse fonction de défrichage. En Allemagne, la droite, qui a soutenu le camp atlantiste pendant la crise irakienne contre le gouvernement Schröder, milite aujourd'hui pour qu'une place soit offerte aussi à la Pologne dans ce cercle restreint.
M. Schröder, qui s'est largement inspiré du programme travailliste pour ses propres propositions de réforme en Allemagne, peut espérer, pour sa part, trouver dans ce nouveau forum un souffle d'air dans la phase difficile qu'il traverse. Une part importante des discussions de Berlin doit être consacrée à la relance de la croissance en Europe, aux réformes, à une politique industrielle commune et peut-être à une redéfinition des postes au sein de la Commission.
Il est peu probable que soient formulées de nouvelles propositions sur la Constitution européenne, pour désarmer l'opposition de l'Espagne et de la Pologne au projet qui est sur la table. Ce projet, élaboré par la Convention, est largement le résultat des compromis auxquels les trois étaient parvenus. La France, l'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne sont loin d'avoir sur tout des points de vue identiques, mais sur cette question ils semblent décidés à attendre que le mouvement vienne d'abord de Madrid et de Varsovie.
Henri de Bresson
A number of people have expressed interest in Immigrants in Europe. This opinion Eurozine piece (great site recommendation from Francis) says that there is in increase in the illegal trafficking of people because of the very laws set to stop it. Sasseen argues that regulations (at the borders) and Europe's political and economic participation contribute to dehumanizing individuals (and sometimes their deaths) that try to come into the countries for work. He also offers good history. The story is a bit old, but maybe could use an update from one of us?
Saskia Sassen
Is this the Way to Go?
Handling Immigration in a Global Era
http://www.eurozine.com/article/2002-09-17-sassen-en.html
Saskia Sassen
Is this the Way to Go?
Handling Immigration in a Global Era
As Europe's borders become more and more fortified against immigrants, illegal human trafficking becomes ever more common. By criminalizing immigration, Europe does not only ignore a moral problem: It hits hardest on those desperate enough to escape their homecountries and contributes to the enormous profits that smugglers make in the process. Saskia Sassen asks what price Europe is paying for these shortsighted and unsustainable policies.
Over the last decade it is estimated that more than 2,500 would-be immigrants died trying to get into Europe. That is many dead, but not many immigrants for a continent of over 350 million people. Whom is it we are determined to keep out to the point that they risk their lives to get in: an equally determined but tiny minority of men, women and children from mostly poor countries who will come no matter what in search of work or refuge. They are not criminals. Yet the result of our determination is that we are feeding a criminal trade. There has been a sharp growth in illegal trafficking of people as receiving countries have clamped down on entries and semi-militarized more and more borders.
These developments raise two issues. One concerns the old trade-off between policies that criminalize what may not intrinsically be a criminal act in the name of controlling a somewhat untenable situation; this in turn raises the incentives for genuinely criminal actors to promote the forbidden activity. A familiar instance of this trade-off concerns marihuana control policy. Does the criminalizing of marihuana in the US -and the UK- really work better as a policy to control its use than the controlled legality of marihuana in the Netherlands which leaves very little room for profit making by drugdealers and hence no incentive to expand its use?
The second policy issue raised by these developments is that the deaths of these hundreds of people attempting to enter Europe affect us all, not only those directly concerned. The fact that these people lack the proper documents for entry is easily represented in policy and media circles as exempting us from any responsibility as societies for these deaths. The lack of proper documents somehow seems to make these deaths less human and reduce whatever might be our responsibility contributing to these deaths.
I want to argue that the direction we are taking in our immigration policies towards greater police and military control and growing disregard for international human rights codes as well as our own civil liberties laws is promoting illegal trafficking and weakening our rule of law and thereby our democracies. These policies are adding to an already growing mix of what I would describe as negative incentives, or incentives with negative outcomes for significant sectors of our societies. Illegal trafficking and the deaths of men, women and children who are not criminals, and who die on our "soil" eventually touches the fabric of our societies and distorts or weakens the rule of law. In the long run it will affect us all. Yes, the central victims are the men and women who are trafficked and especially those who die. But we would be foolish to think that we can allow these abuses and deaths to happen in the name of maintaining control, and remain untouched. The growth in illegal trafficking and the sharpening of extreme anti-immigrant politics willing to sacrifice some civil liberties in the name of control are indications of this broader negative effect.
Interconnected Forms of Violence
Part of the challenge is to recognize the interconnectedness of forms of violence that we do not always recognize as being connected or for that matter, as being forms of violence. The sharp growth of government debt, poverty, unemployment, closing of traditional economic sectors in the global south, partly due to neoliberal economic globalization has created whole new migrations as well as fed an exploding illegal trade in people. We now have growing evidence that IMF policy has sharpened these conditions even as it has brought great prosperity to about 20 per cent of residents in many countries in the global south(1).
Our governments, by supporting IMF policies, are partly contributing to those conditions that are going to stimulate emigration and illegal trafficking in people. Further, as the rich economies become richer partly because of these same IMF policies, they also become more desirable destinations. This in turn creates a source for hard currency for the governments of the sending countries in a context where they face mounting debt and declines in national revenues as neoliberal globalization weakens and often destroys many of the national economic sectors in these countries. Thus these governments are not interested particularly in regulating emigration either. Finally, as these same policies have also raised inequality and unemployment inside the rich economies, the disadvantaged have become radicalized, often taking on extreme right wing politics.
The tragedy is that those most affected negatively, those to whom violence has been done both in the global south and in the rich economies, the victims of it all, now confront each other as enemies inside our countries. Anti-immigrant sentiment probably runs highest among those who have been hurt from the same policies that have hurt the poor and the middle classes (though not the upper 20 per cent) from where the immigrants and would-be immigrants come. And as the rich countries raise their walls to keep immigrants and refugees out, they feed the illegal trade in people and raise the profits to be made as despair rises in the global south and fear in the global north. This is not sound policy. This is a vicious policy cycle.
The same infrastructure, both technical and institutional that has enabled global flows of capital and goods, services and the new transnational managerial and professional class, also enables migrations and illegal trafficking. And they facilitate the flow of remittances back to sending countries, a major incentive for not doing anything on the part of these governments. These various entanglements raise the complexity of the challenge of how to regulate immigration. But these entanglements and this type of complexity are going in the wrong direction. We need to reverse this dynamic.
When globalization policies go wrong they really go very wrong for countries in the global south. Thereby these policies sharpen the incentives for both emigration and trafficking for emigrants, traffickers and governments in the global south, given growing government indebtedness and lack of opportunity for workers and would be entrepreneurs in much of the global south.
Emigrants enter the macro-level of development strategies for sending countries through their remittances. In many countries these represent a major source of foreign exchange reserves for the government. While the flows of remittances may be minor compared to the massive daily capital flows in various financial markets, they are often very significant for developing or struggling economies.
In 1998 - the last year for which comprehensive data is available - global remittances sent by immigrants to their home countries reached over US$ 70 billion. To understand the significance of this figure, it should be related to the GDP and foreign currency reserves in the specific countries involved, rather than compared to the global flow of capital. For instance, in the Philippines, a key sender of migrants generally and of women for the entertainment industry in several countries, remittances were the third largest source of foreign exchange over the last several years. In Bangladesh, another country with significant numbers of its workers in the Middle East, Japan, and several European countries, remittances represent about a third of foreign exchange. Exporting workers and remittances are means for governments of coping with unemployment and foreign debt(2).
This would also seem to be the case given the growing interdependencies brought on by globalization which also enable illegal trafficking. Cross-border business travel, global tourism, the Internet, and other conditions integral to globalization enable multiple global flows not foreseen by the framers and developers of economic globalization. This creates a difficult trade-off in a context where September 11 has further sharpened the will to control immigration and resident immigrants. Increased illegal trafficking and the reduction in civil liberties will not facilitate the need to learn how to accommodate more immigration to respond to the future demographic turn. Let me focus next with some detail on one specific flow which brings many of these issues together.
Illegal Trafficking
Trafficking in workers for both licit and illegal work (e.g. unauthorized sex work) illuminates a number of intersections between the negative conditions in the global south and some of the tensions in the immigration regime(3). Trafficking is a violation of several distinct types of rights: human, civil, political. Trafficking in people appears to be mainly related to the sex market, to labor markets, to illegal migration. Much legislative work has been done to address trafficking: international treaties and charters, UN resolutions, and various bodies and commissions. Trafficking has become sufficiently recognized as an issue that it was also addressed in the G8 meeting in Birmingham in May 1998 (IOM 1998). The heads of the eight major industrialized countries stressed the importance of cooperation against international organized crime and trafficking in persons. The US President issued a set of directives to his administration in order to strengthen and increase efforts against trafficking in women and girls. This in turn generated the legislation initiative by Senator Paul Wellstone; bill S.600 was introduced in the senate in 1999. NGO's are also playing an increasingly important role. For instance, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women has centers and representatives in Australia, Bangladesh, Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa and Asia Pacific. The Women's Rights Advocacy Program has established the Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons to combat the global trade in persons. This type of trafficking shows us one of the meanings of interdependence in the current global system. There are two distinct issues here: one is that globalization has produced new conditions and dynamics, especially the growing demand for these types of workers by the expanding high income professional workforce associated largely, though not exclusively, with globalization(4). The second issue is that globalization has enabled older trafficking networks and practices which used to be national or regional to become global.
Here I want to focus on some of the data on the trafficking of women, especially for the sex industries and the growing weight of this trafficking as a profit making option for the traffickers, especially it would seem from the global south. This, then adds to the role of emigrants' remittances generally, whether from lawful, unauthorized or trafficked immigrants in the account balance of many of the impoverished governments of sending countries. Profits and revenues are, clearly, a disincentive to attack this trade. Insofar as the countries of the global north are one of the key destinations, they do not escape the consequences of this illegal trade either.
Trafficking in migrants is a profitable business. According to a UN report, criminal organizations in the 1990s generated an estimated US$ 3.5 billion per year in profits from trafficking migrants (excluding most of the women trafficked for the sex industry). The entry of organized crime is a recent development in the case of migrant trafficking; in the past it was mostly petty criminals who engaged in this type of trafficking. The Central Intelligence Agency of the US(1999) reports that organized crime groups are creating intercontinental strategic alliances through networks of co-ethnics throughout several countries; this facilitates transport, local contact and distribution, provision of false documents, etc. The Global Survival Network (1997) reported on these practices after a two year investigation using the establishment of a dummy company to enter the illegal trade. Such networks also facilitate the organized circulation of trafficked women among third countries -not only from sending to receiving countries. Traffickers may move women from Burma, Laos, Vietnam and China to Thailand, while Thai women may have been moved to Japan and the US.
Although there is no exhaustive data, the available information suggests that trafficking in women, including minors, for the sex industry is highly profitable for those running the trade. The United Nations estimates that 4 million women were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of US$7 billion for criminal groups. These funds include remittances from prostitutes' earnings and payments to organizers and facilitators in these countries. In Japan, where the so-called entertainment industry is legal, profits are about 4.2 trillion yen per year over the last few years; there is growing evidence that illegally trafficked women are a growing share of sex-workers. In Poland, police estimate that for each Polish woman delivered, the trafficker receives about US$700. In Australia, the Federal Police estimate that the cash flow from 200 prostitutes is up to $900,000 a week. Ukrainian and Russian women, in high demand in the sex market, earn the criminal gangs involved about US$500 to US$1000 per woman delivered. These women can be expected to service on average 15 clients a day, and each can be expected to make about $US 215,000 per month for the gang.
It is estimated that in recent years several million women and girls are trafficked within and out of Asia and the former Soviet Union, two major trafficking areas. Increases in trafficking in both these areas can be linked to women being pushed into poverty or sold to brokers due to the poverty of their households or parents. High unemployment in the former Soviet republics has been one factor promoting growth of criminal gangs as well as growth of trafficking in women. Unemployment rates among women in Armenia, Russia, Bulgaria and Croatia reached 70 per cent and in Ukraine 80 per cent with the implementation of market policies. There is some research indicating that economic need is the bottom line for entry into prostitution(5).
Some of the features of immigration policy and enforcement may well contribute to make women who are victims of trafficking even more vulnerable and to give them little recourse to the law. If they are undocumented, which they are likely to be, they will not be treated as victims of abuse but as violators of the law insofar as they have violated entry, residence and work laws. The attempt to address undocumented immigration and trafficking through greater border controls over entry, raises the likelihood that women will use traffickers to cross the border, and some of these may turn out to belong to criminal organizations linked to the sex industry.
Further, in many countries prostitution is forbidden for foreign women, which enhances the role of criminal gangs in prostitution. It also diminishes one of the survival options of foreign women who may have limited access to jobs generally. Prostitution is tolerated for foreign women in many countries while regular labor market jobs are less so-this is the case for instance in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. According to IOM data, the number of migrant women prostitutes in many EU countries is far higher than that for nationals: 75 per cent in Germany, 80 per cent in the case of Milan in Italy, etc.
While some women know that they are being trafficked for prostitution, for many the conditions of their recruitment and the extent of abuse and bondage only become evident after they arrive in the receiving country. The conditions of confinement are often extreme, akin to slavery, and so are the conditions of abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, and physical punishments. They are severely underpaid, and wages are often withheld. They are prevented from using protection methods against AIDS, and typically have no right to medical treatment. If they seek police help they may be taken into detention because they are in violation of immigration laws; if they have been provided with false documents there are criminal charges(6).
As tourism has grown sharply over the last decade and become a major development strategy for cities, regions and whole countries, the entertainment sector has seen a parallel growth and recognition as a key development strategy. In many places, the sex trade is part of the entertainment industry and has similarly grown. At some point it becomes clear that the sex trade itself can become a development strategy in areas with high unemployment and poverty and governments desperate for revenue and foreign exchange reserves. When local manufacturing and agriculture can no longer function as sources of employment, of profits and of government revenue, what was once a marginal source of earnings, profits and revenues, now becomes a far more important one. The increased importance of these sectors in development generates growing tie-ins. For instance, when the IMF and the World Bank see tourism as a solution to some of the growth challenges in many poor countries and provide loans for its development or expansion, they may well be contributing to develop a broader institutional setting for the expansion of the entertainment industry and indirectly of the sex trade.
This tie-in with development strategies signals that trafficking in women may well see further expansion. It is a worrisome possibility especially in the context of growing numbers of women with few if any employment options. And such growing numbers are to be expected given high unemployment and poverty, the shrinking of a world of work opportunities that were embedded in the more traditional sectors of these economies, and the growing debt burden of governments rendering them incapable of providing social services and support to the poor. Under these conditions, women in the sex industry also can become a source of government revenue. These tie-ins are structural, not a function of conspiracies. Their weight in an economy will be raised by the absence or limitations of other sources for securing a livelihood, profits and revenues for respectively workers, enterprises and governments.
The Coming Demographic Crisis in the North
Even as the rich countries try harder and harder to keep would-be immigrants and refugees out, they face a growing demographic deficit and rapidly aging populations. According to a major study (Austrian Institute of Demography 2001), at the end of the current century and under current fertility and immigration patterns, population size in Western Europe will have shrunk by 75 milllion and almost 50 percent of the population will be over 60 years old -a first in its history(7). Europe, perhaps more so than the US given its relatively larger intake of immigrants, faces some difficult decisions. Where will they get the new young workers needed to support the growing elderly population and to do jobs considered unattractive by the native born, particularly in a context of rising educational attainment. The numbers of these jobs are not declining, even if the incidence of some of them is; one sector that is likely to add jobs is home and institutional care for the growing numbers of old people. Export of older people and of economic activities is one option being considered now. But there is a limit to how many old people and low wage jobs an economy can export and a society can tolerate. Immigration is expected to be part of the solution.
In the US, the evidence suggests a slightly different pattern. By century's end the forecasted fall for the US is 34 million people, though this represents a point in the upward slope which will not be completed until after the end of this century. The evidence is fairly clear that a significant component of population growth in the US over the last two decades as well as labor force growth is accounted for by immigrants, both second generation and foreign born. In both cases, immigrants account for a larger component of growth than their share in respectively the general population and the total labor force.
Yet the way the countries in the global north are proceeding is not preparing them to handle this future scenario. They are building walls to keep would-be immigrants out. At a time of growing refugee flows, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees faces an even greater shortage of funds than usual. Given an effective demand for immigrant workers, and indeed families for demographic purposes, both of these policy preferences are likely to have negative repercussions for Europe. They construct the immigrant and the refugee as a negative and undesirable subject, thereby encumbering integration. Further, given firms and households interested in hiring immigrants or determined to do so, for whatever reasons, restrictive policies and racialized representations of the immigrant and the refugee, can be expected to feed the already growing illegal trafficking of people.
Conclusion: The Need for a More Enlightened Immigration Policy
The large and looming issue confronting societies under the rule of law is whether policies that brutalize people - no matter what their nationality - and promote criminalized profit-making through the trade in people, are desirable and indeed sustainable if we are to keep up our systems based on the rule of law for which our forebears fought so hard and spilled so much blood.
Allowing this sort of brutalization and criminality is a very high price to pay for maintaining border control, and sooner or later it begins to tear at the fabric of the lawful state and of civil society.
The risks to our societies and to us - citizens - fully documented, are well illustrated by what is happening today in the US. The events of September 11 and the subsequent restrictions on the civil liberties of particular immigration groups in the US is tearing at, and some would say weakening the rule of law as it affects all US residents. The government in the US is granting itself more and more authority to deal directly, in an extrajudicial way, with matters that used to run through judiciaries or that would not be considered a matter for the government to get involved with. In so doing, the US government is violating basic rights not only of those it has profiled as possibly dangerous but also of its citizens, all citizens, not just those who might be suspect.
Are there ways of regulating the flow of people into our societies that could strengthen, rather than weaken, its civic fabric? The repeated incidents of would-be immigrants dying at the hands of illegal traffickers surely do not. They risk producing indifference when it happens over and over again. And they risk promoting acceptance of these deaths among ourselves and our children, all in the name of maintaining control over entry.
We are not only paying a price for those who die on our soil; we are also paying a price for those who are smuggled into our countries alive. The price we pay for allowing the abuse that is human smuggling is much higher than the "price" we pay for accommodating these people who just want a chance to work-and work they do. Indeed, much research suggests that we actually gain from the presence of these immigrants. For instance, 17 per cent of entrepreneurs in London belong to ethnic communities, a far higher share than their population share.
Continuing to use policies that make possible the brutalization of would-be migrants and the profit-making of criminal smugglers is a cancer deep inside our states and societies. It is the price we pay for criminalizing undocumented immigrants and, more generally, for resorting to policing and militarization as the way of regulating immigration. The US illustrates this to some extent. In the name of effective control, the new US 1996 Immigration Act strengthened policing by reducing judiciary review of immigration police actions. A crucial issue here is the object of the expanded policing: It is not known criminals or firms suspected of violating environmental regulations or drug dealers. It is a population sector, not even select individuals, but a fairly broad spectrum of men, women and children.
There are consequences to this tension between, on the one hand, the strenghtening of police approaches to immigrant regulation and, on the other, the strengthening of civil and human rights and the civic empowerment associated with a stronger sense of civil society. Sooner or later this policing will get caught in the expanding web of civil and human rights. And these rights will include those of citizens. Policing, when unchecked by civil review, can easily violate such rights and interfere with the functioning of civil society.
If my son decided to go write the great American novel by spending time with farm workers or in garment sweatshops, and there were an INS (Immigration and Naturalization Services) raid he could well be part of the suspects-because I know he would not be carrying his US passport with him. Or worse, if he were among the farmworkers in California running away from the INS police and pushed towards jumping in one of the water levies, as has happened a number of times over the last few years, he might have been one of those who drowned. The most dramatic account of these incidents has it that the turbulent waters seemed less threatening than the INS police with their guns and shouting, and that, indeed, these farmworkers may have been pressured in terror into the waters and drowned. After the new 1996 law, many of these INS actions can escape review and accountability in front of a judge if the persecuted were merely suspected of being undocumented. Sooner or later abusive or excess policing and the weakening of judicial review of such police actions will interfere with the aspiration towards the rule of law that is such a deep part of our inheritance and our lived reality. Sooner or later, this type of police action will touch us, the documented. We need to find another way of regulating entry: now we are strengthening modes of regulation that carry a high cost not only in immigrant deaths but also to the rule of law.
The Guardian, UK to join rapid reaction force
The wheels are in motion to create small "battle groups" of German, French and British soldiers for deployment to world "hotspots" by 2007. The troops would only be sent to areas where the U.S. has "no direct interest." The plan appears heavily symbolic in the wake of EU failure to create a larger and broader defense apparatus. The Guardian piece touches on the reasons why: EU members are not spending enough to modernize their armies and they won't combine resources in order to save money.
It's clear that the EU wants to be a political and military counterweight to the US, but it won't realistically be able to compete with US funding of its armed forces, even if member states share equipment. It seems the EU will have to make a tough choice: stick closely to Nato or build its own forces at the risk of jeopardizing the Alliance and being a weak military power in the region. Can the EU be a strong institution without a joint armed forces to back its political reach? More food for an identity crisis thought.
UK to join rapid reaction force
New EU battle groups for deployment to 'failing states'
Richard Norton-Taylor
Wednesday February 11, 2004
The Guardian
Britain, France and Germany, are to set up a joint military force in a ground-breaking initiative expected to be approved by senior EU officials today.
Under the ambitious plan, the three countries will create battle groups of well-trained troops ready to be deployed at a moment's notice to prevent fighting or restore peace around the world.
The battle groups, each of 1,500 troops, will be capable of being deployed within 15 days. They will be active initially for 30 days, but, with a turnaround of troops, could stay at a location for up to 220 days.
Their missions are to be "appropiate for, but not limited to, use in failed or failing states (of which most are in Africa)", according to the draft proposal.
The force will operate under the mandate of chapter seven of the UN charter, which covers peacemaking and peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the UN security council. The plan is the outcome of the British-French summit, held in November, when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, the French president, agreed it was time the EU "pulled its weight", and bolstered its influence, by intervening early on and with force in conflicts.
British defence sources say the plan will be subject to approval by the EU's military committee and also by the union's political and security committee. It is expected to be discussed by Mr Blair, Mr Chirac, and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, at their trilateral summit in Berlin next week.
The aim is for the the joint battle groups, capable of air, land and amphibious missions, to be ready by 2007. It is likely the troops would be used only in limited, regional, crises in which the United States had no direct interest.
The move reflects frustration at the inability of the EU to realise its original aim of setting up a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops, and the failure of European countries to modernise their armed forces and save money by sharing equipment - failures which have been having a serious impact on Nato, as most EU members are also members of the US-led military alliance.
Nato's new secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, told an international security conference in Munich last weekend that the alliance could soon find itself unable to deploy troops to hotspots around the world unless it tackled serious shortcomings in its armed forces.
"If this shortfall is left unaddressed we will soon reach a point where our political reach goes beyond our military grasp," Mr Scheffer said.
He was referring in particular to Afghanistan. Despite the severe budgetary problems facing his department, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has offered British troops as leaders in an expanded Nato peacekeeping mission in northern Afghanistan.
Mr Scheffer also said Nato should not rule out a role in Iraq. "If a legitimate Iraqi government asks for our assistance, and if we have the support of the UN, Nato should not abdicate from its responsibilities."
However, Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, expressed what he called "deep scepticism" about the US proposal for Nato to play a role in Iraq, warning that such missions could threaten the cohesion of Nato. "The risk of failure and the potentially very serious, possibly fatal consequences for the alliance, absolutely must be taken into consideration," he told the Munich conference.
According to this piece, it looks like even with the cooling of hostility over the war in Iraq, solidarity doesn't have a sunny forecast in 2004 for trans-Atlantic relations.
It is interesting to see the incipient divide between Germany and France regarding NATO involvement in Europe's defense. Of course the US would like to see expansion of NATO and NATO forces in Europe and Iraq, including Turkey. It still maintains US military power in the region while diffusing the interests of the EU (not to mention US military costs) and affords the US more leverage in Europe, particularly if the US endorses "fringe" candidates, like Turkey.
The German defense minister, Peter Struck, supports Brent Scowcroft's (who was actually the adviser to GHWB, not GWB himself as stated), assertion that, "unless NATO was Europe's explicit court of first resort in a crisis, 'we're on the road to destruction.'"
I find it curious that the article doesn't peek into this aspect and what may precipitate it.
In response to Roya's earlier posting about Germany and France's seemingly unavoidable involvement in Iraq, this piece speaks to that, with Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, offering the idea of a European-American plan for the Middle East. It sounds like he wants the European brain to kill Islamic fundamentalist terrorism with kindness while American brawn can strangle them with war.
But the U.S. still doesn't want its troops to die alone.
International Herald Tribune - News Analysis: For allies, well-tempered sparring
News Analysis: For allies, well-tempered sparring
John Vinocur/IHT
Monday, February 9, 2004
MUNICH A master of excess, Donald Rumsfeld sought this time to be resoundingly lukewarm. Asked just before the opening of the Munich Conference on Security Policy to describe the current state of trans-Atlantic relations, he said, smiley-faced, "fairly normal."
It was the moderate/cautious/mildly consensual public approach to Europe of the U.S. secretary of defense over the weekend. In an election year, a new round of insults and shrillness with old allies like France and Germany over Iraq and how to deal with the dangers of the world would not do the Bush administration much good with American voters, however little they may really care.
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany, who emotionally battled Rumsfeld in the same hotel conference room a year ago, reciprocated with non-hysterics, saying, "We have to look forward."
Finished was the environmentalist peace-guardian binding himself to a tree of virtue. Twelve months later, for Fischer, the apparent futility of the French and German effort to turn Europe against the Americans on the Iraq war seemed to be a lesson well taken on board, if never to be acknowledged in confessional terms.
But all the willful moderation at the conference Saturday could not hide the mutual skepticism, or the degrees of mistrust and contempt, and plain disagreement running inches below the surface.
The doggedly civil exchange between security officials and experts about how the allies and NATO could combat Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and help install security and modernity in the Middle East came down to a tacit reconsecration of the Alliance's split between those who want to do and those who want to talk.
On the German side, there was an unusually open acknowledgment about "destructive jihadist terrorism with its totalitarian ideology" as the greatest global threat - but by American definition at least, no "do" on Iraq. Zero troops from us, said Fischer. After all, Germany's antiwar position, he insisted three paragraphs into a keynote speech, had been proven right by events.
Rather than offering antiterrorist fighters for the front lines, Fischer called for a joint European-American plan for the Middle East. Elevating talk to complete equality with doing, Fischer claimed that alongside security matters it was "of almost even greater importance" that "social and cultural modernization issues, as well as democracy, the rule of law, women's rights and good governance" get full attention.
Applause (moderate, in keeping with the conference tonality) and mumbling in the audience. Ulrich Weisser, a retired German vice admiral, leaned toward a neighbor and said, "That speech was from Venus," reworking the caricature of Robert Kagan's remark comparing American Martians with European Venusians.
Was Fischer prescribing a division of labor among the allies where the Americans went after the killers and the Europeans spread the peace and re-painted schoolrooms?
Former Senator William Cohen of Maine, a secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, formulated this thought more indirectly and elegantly by wondering, in a question asked of Fischer, how come Germany was not furnishing military assistance in Iraq if stabilization there was the obvious prerequisite to modernization, democracy and Mediterranean free trade zones. Another American asked rhetorically how the allies were to install dialogue and détente with a security threat that is clearly not open to them.
But the Germans were intent on appearing active and full of gabby initiative. While Rumsfeld stuck to saying that NATO showed "a good deal of life," promising that a Mediterranean dialogue would find a place high on the NATO summit meeting in Istanbul in June (and with a little more heat, remembering out loud that his audience in Munich last year included people from countries who said they did not care who won in Iraq), Defense Minister Peter Struck proposed that the Alliance commission a statement on its future at Istanbul.
He called it a "new Harmel report," a reference to a 1967 document that the then West Germany considered a legitimization of its policy of détente toward the Soviet Union. In a sense, Struck seemed to be interested in a reworked mission statement that would bring soft diplomacy an official and respectable place alongside search-and-destroy missions as NATO's zone of geographic preoccupation spread into the Middle East.
Without any elaboration, Struck also advocated "sensible complementarity" between NATO and the European Union's projected military units and coordination between the two concerning their "level of ambition."
What? For Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to President George W. Bush, that seemed to sound like very willful ambiguity. He said that it was nice to talk about complementarity and Harmel reports, but that unless NATO was Europe's explicit court of first resort in a crisis, "we're on the road to destruction."
Struck gave Scowcroft one of the clearest responses of the weekend. It rivaled Rumsfeld's remark in response to a Palestinian's question about Israel's atomic weapons: that if the Israelis had them it was because they alone had to deal with forces in the Middle East that sought their country's extinction.
"NATO is first choice for me," Struck said. "There's no doubt that NATO is in the forefront."
But that was the German defense minister. A high NATO official said that nothing of like clarity could be expected from France. Indeed, the French defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, in talking about the EU's defense efforts, succeeded rhetorically and without harshness in placing a larval European notion and NATO on exactly the same plane, mighty coequals in a world known only to the imagineers, in Walt Disney's phrase, of France's security-policy think tanks.
All these exchanges - their moderation and their more jagged subtext - wound up without discussion of at least three potentially raw and critical areas of trans-Atlantic disagreement.
In recent weeks, both Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac have said they would like to consider arms sales to China. The U.S. State Department responded disapprovingly, calling this a very poor idea. The EU will probably be asked to consider lifting a ban on weapons deals soon.
At the same time, many in Europe, including a big segment of the Bush administration's conservative friends, do not like the United States' open pressure on the EU to accept Turkey as a candidate member.
They say American involvement feeds the arguments of those who describe U.S. policy as seeking to foil European integration. And they fear that with American strategic goals in the Middle East being of greater interest than pleasing Europe, the Americans will not find a way to back off from aggressive support of the Turks.
Most important, the willful courtesies of the well-mannered sparring in Munich left out the enormous implications of the administration's $401.7 billion defense budget for next year. Senator John McCain did mention in passing that of more than two million Europeans under arms, some 5 percent of them were deployable on really tough assignments.
But this was a weekend when contentiousness was not the intent. Considering the virtually unbridgeable gap in capabilities, nobody had the heart to smudge the occasion by saying that trans-Atlantic solidarity in 2004, to use the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's words, is just no longer a given.
International Herald Tribune
The new Secretary General of NATO wants the organization to get involved in Iraq. Powell and Rumsfeld are very much in favor. The problem, according to this article, is to find the political will. France, Germany, and even Russia have to agree. It seems, according to a European diplomat, that it would require a special resolution from the UN.
In the mean time, Poland would like Spain to take charge of the multinational division that operates in Southern Iraq. That would imply an increase in the number of Spanish soldiers, and the public opinion might not like that. Did you know that they flew there from Santiago de Compostela, a historical Christian center, and that they wore symbols reminding the crusades? It was the source of a scandal in Spain last year, and it shows how Empires' histories can be interwoven in today's world.
El País - La OTAN desea asumir un papel relevante en Irak
La OTAN desea asumir un papel relevante en Irak
BOSCO ESTERUELAS - Bruselas
EL PAÍS | Internacional - 04-02-2004
La OTAN está preparada para, y desea, asumir un papel de gran relevancia en Irak, según señala su nuevo secretario general, el holandés Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, así como dirigentes militares y funcionarios de la organización. La Alianza, cuya prioridad se fija ahora en Afganistán, asumiría a finales de 2004 o principios de 2005 el mando de la división multinacional que dirige Polonia en el centro-sur del territorio -y que probablemente pasará a manos de España en julio-, una vez que la devolución de soberanía se completara con la celebración de elecciones.
De Hoop Scheffer, que desde que llegó al cargo en enero no ceja en insistir que la prioridad de la OTAN "ahora está en Afganistán" dirigiendo las labores de la ISAF, la fuerza multinacional de unos 5.500 soldados, ha sido mucho más explícito durante la primera visita oficial a EE UU, la semana pasada. El ex ministro de Exteriores holandés comparte la tesis de la Casa Blanca de que la OTAN "debe desempeñar una función más importante en Irak
[que la de prestar ayuda logística] si se le pide". "Podemos suministrar las capacidades necesarias si existe voluntad política", ha afirmado a Reuters el general alemán Harald Kujat, presidente del comité militar de la Alianza.
El interrogante es esclarecer si hay voluntad política para que la organización se implique en Irak como desea el Pentágono, deseoso de relevar parte de su contingente de más de 120.000 soldados. Colin Powell y Donald Rumsfeld así lo aseguraron cuando estuvieron el pasado diciembre en Bruselas. "Algunos países quieren que la organización asuma un mayor papel llegado el momento", afirmó ayer en un encuentro con la prensa una alta fuente diplomática. "Es inconcebible, no obstante, que se plantee antes de que haya un Gobierno soberano", precisó.
Bush quiere salir del avispero iraquí cuanto antes mejor para evitar dañar las esperanzas de ganar la reelección presidencial el próximo noviembre. Habrá que convencer antes a dos aliados claves, Francia y Alemania, así como a Rusia, opuestos desde el primer instante a la guerra por entender que se alejaba de los planteamientos de la ONU, y recabar más apoyo de los países árabes para poner en marcha una fuerza de estabilización aliada. "La presencia de la OTAN exigirá probablemente una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad a fin de darle mayor legitimidad", vaticina un diplomático europeo. "Estoy convencido de que la Alianza reaccionaría positivamente si el futuro Gobierno soberano iraquí presentara una petición", dijo De Hoop Scheffer en Washington.
El Pentágono baraja tres posibilidades: 1) que la OTAN asuma el mando de todo el territorio, algo que a corto o medio plazo no parece verosímil; 2) que releve a los norteamericanos en la parte norte, una opción sumamente peligrosa; o 3) que desempeñe la misión que polacos y españoles tienen en el centro-sur del país. Ésta es la hipótesis que hoy por hoy se presenta como más lógica. Washington querría que sus estrechos aliados dentro de la organización -Reino Unido, España y Polonia- presentaran sobre la mesa tal iniciativa y que fuera refrendada en la próxima cumbre atlántica, en Estambul en junio. Las autoridades militares polacas ya han manifestado que quieren pasar a España el testigo del mando de la división multinacional este verano. El ministro español Federico Trillo dijo en diciembre en la última reunión de ministros de Defensa estar preparado para asumir el mando. "Eso implicará incrementar en cerca de un millar el contingente de 1.300 soldados que España tiene en la zona, lo cual no será ciertamente fácil de vender a la opinión pública", avisa una fuente diplomática.