According to this story European media have reacted with cynicism and "a collective snort" to David Kay's testimony on WMD in Iraq.
You might want to check if it is true and/or find some examples from different countries.
We'll have our third class on Tuesday and I have not seen much blogging yet...
The New York Times - Much of Europe Is Derisive About Report on Iraqi Arms
January 31, 2004
Much of Europe Is Derisive About Report on Iraqi Arms
By CRAIG S. SMITH
PARIS, Jan. 30 — Much of Europe has given a collective snort to the testimony by David Kay, the former chief United States weapons inspector, that there probably were no illicit weapons in Iraq before the United States-led war there.
"There is a kind of cynicism here," said Dominique Moïsi, a political analyst in Paris. "So the Americans lied to their people and to us and maybe to themselves. That's exactly what we already thought."
Similar sentiments rippled across the Continent, where debate on the war was split between those who believed and those who doubted American and British contentions that Iraq posed an imminent threat.
Mr. Kay's testimony on Wednesday created less derision in countries like Poland, which supported the United States in going to war. "It doesn't change our position," said Boguslaw Majewski, a spokesman for Poland's Foreign Ministry. "When the decision was reached, all the warning signals were there."
There was greater bemusement in Europe over Britain's seemingly contradictory report that chastised the British Broadcasting Corporation for suggesting that Prime Minister Tony Blair's administration had hyped intelligence reports of weapons in Iraq.
"Especially in France, there is a feeling that if the David Kay report is right," Mr. Moïsi said. "How can the BBC be so severely punished for revealing what was ultimately true?"
Some German media scoffed at the purported independence of the Hutton report, which led to the resignations of the BBC's board chairman, Gavyn Davies its director general, Greg Dyke, and Andrew Gilligan, the reporter of the original account.
"Hutton has been a servant to the crown all his life; he always knows what his duty is," read an editorial in Friday's Die Tageszeitung, a national newspaper published in Berlin. It likened Lord Hutton's role to "a football team putting up their own manager as referee and then celebrating a win on dubious penalties."
The debate over whether Iraq posed enough of a threat to justify military action revealed deep divisions within Europe, which has worked hard for decades to forge a unified polity that would eventually be able to speak with a single voice on foreign affairs. France and Germany led the opposition to the American initiative. But Spain and most of Eastern Europe's former Soviet bloc countries took the United States and Britain's side.
Most galling to France and Germany was the allegiance to the United States expressed by Eastern European countries that will join the European Union this year.
Some people in the United States and Britain have called for independent inquiries into the quality of intelligence used to justify the war and whether that intelligence was unduly manipulated. But such calls are rarely heard on the Continent.
An exception is Spain, where the government supported the American-led invasion despite popular discontent. The opposition Socialist Party has taken Mr. Kay's testimony as an opportunity to demand such an inquiry at home. So far, the government has ignored the requests.
In general, though, far less energy has been spent in continental Europe on re-examining prewar intelligence or decisions than has been expended in Britain or the United States.
Europe, it appears, would happily forget the matter and move on.
This comes from Stratfor.com a private company that "provides strategic intelligence" (for a price), and is described by some as a "quasi private-CIA." Most of the time they express tough unilateralist views of American Power. They tend to be well informed and smart.
Summary
An Italian court has ruled in favor of a coffee-drinker who sued because he said an Italian bistro "price-gouged" in the switchover from the lira to the euro in January 2002. The precedent will snarl European courts with thousands of similar cases until there is some sort of broad price amnesty or some government-enforced price adjustment. That is, of course, unless the Italian government spills the issue into someone else's lap.
Stratfor.com - Euro Backlash: Would You Like Cream With Your Lawsuit?
Analysis
A regional Italian court on Jan. 16 ruled that a bistro in the Italian town of Ladispoli overcharged a customer 0.23 euro (28
cents) for a cappuccino on Jan. 1, 2002.
The ruling, relating to widely reviled price rises that followed the introduction of the euro in 2002, is the first of its kind.
Barring an overturning of the Jan. 16 ruling, Europe is about to be hit with a wave of legal cases that will end with either a broad unpopular price amnesty or a broad (and equally unpopular) mandatory price adjustment.
The case in question was facilitated by Codacons, a leading Italian consumer advocacy group. Codacons President Carlo Rienzi, knowing a public relations coup when he saw one, ordered a cappuccino from the offending bistro -- at pre-euro prices, of course -- the day after the ruling. He proudly waved the receipt in front of reporters, celebrating "the cappuccino's vendetta."
What should be little more than an amusing historical footnote, however, could explode into a much larger issue.
On Dec. 31, 2001, the day before the euro became Europe's common currency, the offending cup of coffee cost 1,500 lire, or 0.77 euros. One day later the price was rounded up to 1 euro, approximately a 30 percent increase.
Similar price "round-ups" occurred throughout the 12 states that adopted the euro as a common currency, leading to a broad price increase throughout inflation-sensitive Europe. Particularly galling to most Europeans was the fact that most of the adjustments hit small-price items that impacted aspects of everyday life: parking meters, small food items and coffee.
More than a few cents are at stake. In addition to the 23 euro cents refund, the court ordered the convicted gouger to cover the plaintiff's legal costs of 1,200 euros ($1,480).
Now that the legal precedent has been set, Italian courts are bracing for a deluge of petty lawsuits that could drown the system if left unchecked. Other European justice systems, concerned about spillover, are casting a wary eye toward Rome.
The Italian government has three choices. First, it could enact a broad price amnesty, forgiving businesses for their "round-up"
strategies. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is particularly fond of such heavy-handed, retroactive solutions. After all, he rammed a similar amnesty through Parliament in 2003 in order to cover his own political hindquarters. The problem is that this "solution" would throw stale grounds into the brew of Italian politics just as new elections appear to be on the horizon.
The second option would be to couple the amnesty with an equally broad price rollback, forcing businesses to reduce their prices to pre-euro levels, albeit still denominated in euros, while forgiving them for past indiscretions. Such a price cut would please an electorate that is increasingly disenchanted with Italy's pro-U.S. government, but at the cost of brewing rage in Italy's small business community.
The final possibility is quintessentially Italian. A staple joke in European circles is that Italy always has supported European integration because Brussels eurocrats have longer attention spans than Italian bureaucrats and therefore do a better job of ruling Italy than the natives. Berlusconi's best bet probably is to drop this problem into someone else's lap. Appealing the case to a European court -- in effect, booting the issue upstairs -- would deflect criticism away from the government and onto "Europe" while creating a Europe-wide precedent that would bury the issue.
Such a development would appeal to European sensibilities, which often involve taking exception to the foibles of Italian governance, making the likelihood of a European solution quite likely.
Codacons is probably dreading just such a solution. After all, a cup of joe still costs 1 euro in Ladispoli. The price of Rienzi's cappuccino was only adjusted downward to pre-euro prices for the photo-op.
Several questions come to mind, namely the motive of creating an alliance within an alliance. For regardless of their intentions, the "Big Three" appear arrogant. Is it a message to New Europe? Or is it only natural that these nations take the helm, as they've implied? What do you think?
Britain, France and Germany will meet next month to co-ordinate policy across an unprecedented range of areas, heightening fears among smaller states that the European Union is being dominated by the "big three".
From the Financial Times. Includes reactions from small EU partners.
Big Three summit heightens fear in EU
By Hugh Williamson in Berlin and George Parker in Brussels
Britain, France and Germany will meet next month to co-ordinate policy across an unprecedented range of areas, heightening fears among smaller states that the European Union is being dominated by the "big three".
Less than a year after the Iraq war, the leaders of Europe's three most powerful nations and senior cabinet ministers - members of the so-called "directorate" - will meet at a summit in Berlin in a striking display of reconciliation.
The February 18 meeting will involve five or six ministers from each country, in addition to the national leaders, covering employment, the economy, education, finance, social affairs and foreign policy, British and German officials said.
Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, Jacques Chirac, the French president, and Tony Blair, UK prime minister, have held several informal get-togethers in recent years but next month's summit will have a more formal agenda and structure.
The meeting is scheduled to last at least half a day whereas previous meetings usually took an hour or two. The ministers will meet their counterparts in working groups. The foreign ministers are expected to attend the summit dinner.
Jack Straw, UK foreign minister, this month said it was "logical" for the three countries to work together to steer the EU when it expands to 25 members on May 1.
British diplomats believe the Franco-German motor, which traditionally drove the EU, is no longer strong enough to propel a larger union, which includes many Atlanticist countries from central and eastern Europe. Last year the three leaders laid the groundwork for an agreement on a common EU defence policy while their foreign ministers took a joint initiative on Iran.
Last week Franco Frattini, Italian foreign minister, said in reference to the trilateral co-operation: "There can be no directorate, no divisive nucleus that risks putting European integration in danger".
Diplomats in Berlin admitted there was a danger of "irritation" in other capitals. However, they stressed that the summit would focus on promoting economic reforms in the three countries and was therefore in the interest of the wider EU. They said ministers could be involved in future summits if next month's event were a success.
Wolfgang Clement, German economy and labour minister, said this week the summit would reinforce recent co-operation between the three countries on strengthening EU industrial policy and on competitiveness initiatives, as part of the EU's Lisbon agenda of economic priorities.
Two policy papers drawn up jointly late last year by the French and British governments on promoting innovation and enterprise would feed into the discussions, diplomats said.
The papers, seen by the Financial Times, argue for a strengthening of the "innovation action plan" under preparation within the European Commission. The issue of state aid to industry is also expected to be raised, although this remains contentious.
The meeting is expected to prepare common positions for the March EU leaders' summit, due to focus on economic reforms.
Additional reporting by Robert Graham in Paris
Small partners fret as Europe's 'Big Three' unite
The opaque working methods of the London-Paris-Berlin axis has spawned worries among other EU members, reports Judy Dempsey
Published: January 29 2004 21:17 | Last Updated: January 29 2004 21:17
When Britain, France and Germany agreed last month to work more closely together on security issues, there was relief among the European Union's other member states and those about to join the union.
Many had feared that Paris and Berlin were more interested in pursuing their own special relationship at the expense of supporting the EU's enlargement or reviving the transatlantic relationship.
So it was with some enthusiasm that they greeted London's move closer to Paris and Berlin on defence, with Britain promising that any "enhanced co-operation" would be inclusive.
One month on, several countries, particularly Italy, Poland and Nordic member states, are watching with mounting concern the opaque working methods of the "Big Three".
One concern is how they will influence broader issues on future EU foreign policy and whether other countries could be excluded from decision-making. The other concern is that nobody knows quite what agenda Britain, France and Germany are pursuing.
"There is no transparency from the Big Three," said Janusz Onyskiewicz, director of the Warsaw-based Centre for International Relations in Poland. "Transparency is a must. The EU's foreign policy has always been based on consensus among all member states. Some issues are being initiated without debate."
Poland insisted it would not remain passive over how the Big Three made decisions, hoping Italy and Spain would also challenge the London-Paris-Berlin axis, but diplomats say that is unlikely. José María Aznar, Spain's prime minister, steps down from the political front line in March after domestic elections and Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, is not seen as a reliable partner.
But other countries say that does not excuse the Big Three for bypassing Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, on wider policy issues. "If you take a pessimistic view of what the Big Three are doing, it is a slap in the face for Solana," said a Scandinavian diplomat.
Iran is a case in point. Last year the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany together put pressure on Tehran to accept stringent inspections of nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Italy, in the EU presidency chair, resented being excluded and, even though Mr Solana put a brave face on it, diplomats said he was being undermined. "When the three foreign ministers went to Iran last month, it would not have hurt them to take Solana. It would have given the EU a profile and the pressure on Iran would not have diminished," said Mr Onyskiewicz.
All three capitals deny they are undermining attempts to build a common EU foreign policy.
Instead, they argue that because the regular meetings of foreign ministers have become almost unmanageable with 25 countries, it has become inevitable that a few capitals should take the lead on some policy issues.
"That's all very well," said another Scandinavian diplomat. "But EU countries are not even being informed of the issues or decisions made, just when we are supposed to be finding ways of creating a foreign minister for Europe."
Senegal is moving closer to the United States, and gaining more space in its relationship with France. France, for its part, has a hard time maintaining the level of aid and cooperation it implemented in the past, the kind that allowed it to "punch above its weight in the world," as the author writes. This is obviously a smart move made by Abdoulaye Wade's government and it could prove excellent for Senegal, even if it "produces peanuts, not oil," a harder commodity to catch Washington's flickering interest.
This story illustrates one of the main Paris resentments. There is certainly a "different view of the world" as Chirac or Villepin like to say. The Gaullist search for France's and Europe's independence is real. Nevertheless, nobody could deny the French nostalgia for its waning power and influence and the resentment towards those that occupy the spaces it is forced to leave. Unsurprisingly, there is more bitterness if the new comer is a close friend, and if it is as arrogant as the French use to be.
The New York Times - America Tugs at French-Accented Lands: It's Not Peanuts
China and the US, "the Empires of the XXIst century" have a "very great alliance" according to which the US buys products made in China, while China keeps the yuan low. This contributes to US growth and allows a low dollar while China industrializes.
Europe's, and Japan's export suffer from this situation. It takes away growth and jobs from their economies. But the US say that with 8% growth in China and 4% in the US it's important to keep the two engines of the worlds economy at full speed.
According to the author "while the midjets further divide, the giants unite."
The coming G7 meeting should be interesting.
Le Monde - La très grande alliance entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine contre le reste du monde
La très grande alliance entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine contre le reste du monde
par Eric Le Boucher
LE MONDE | 24.01.04 | 15h39 • MIS A JOUR LE 24.01.04 | 17h31
Les Chinois s'apprêtent à engranger une nouvelle année de croissance à 8 %. Les Américains ont trouvé la stratégie pour réatteindre les 4 % annuels, comme dans la seconde partie des années 1990, sous Clinton.
"Vous m'achetez mes produits", dit la Chine. "Oui, mais vous me financez", répliquent les Etats-Unis. C'est la TGA, la très grande alliance, des deux empires du XXIe siècle. L'accord explicite entre 1 milliard 300 millions d'individus qui se ruent vers les usines de la côte chinoise pour sortir de la misère agricole et les 280 millions les plus riches de la planète qui veulent continuer à consommer comme des fous.
Un jour, cela changera. Dans vingt ans, dans trente ans, les premiers en voudront à mort aux seconds de n'être que leurs ouvriers. Mais, pour l'heure, l'agriculteur loqueteux est content de fuir les rizières façon Mao, et le consommateur américain est ravi de changer de chemise, de téléviseur et, demain, de voiture pour pas cher. Top là pour la TGA !
NAINS EUROPÉENS
L'euphorie des signataires éclatait à Davos, au Forum économique mondial. Les Chinois s'apprêtent à engranger une nouvelle année de croissance à 8 %. Les Américains ont trouvé la stratégie pour réatteindre les 4 % annuels, comme dans la seconde partie des années 1990, sous Clinton. Chine et Amérique mènent le monde, fort d'une TGA qui, selon la banque Morgan Stanley, n'est pas "circonstancielle mais stratégique", "qui durera longtemps" et qui constitue "une zone économique commune de facto couplée à une union monétaire". Bref, tandis que les nains européens se divisent, les géants s'associent très étroitement... S'associent contre eux. Ou, sinon "contre" eux, en tout cas égoïstement, suivant leurs seuls intérêts liés, écrasant au besoin ceux des vieux pays d'Europe et ceux du Japon.
Reprenons. L'Amérique, après l'éclatement de la bulle en 2000, est tombée en récession. Pour relancer la machine, les autorités n'ont pas mégoté : baisses massives des impôts par George W. Bush, baisse massive des taux d'intérêt par Alan Greenspan, patron de la Réserve fédérale (Fed). Dopée aux stéroïdes, la croissance est repartie. Cette stratégie a des conséquences qui, selon certains économistes, menacent la durabilité du rebond. En gros, leur critique consiste à dire que ce sont les étrangers qui financent cette reprise et que cela ne peut durer.
Les comptes du budget fédéral sont passés d'un excédent de 3 % à un déficit de 4 %, même Chirac est battu ! Il faut financer ce trou. Or, parallèlement, la soif du consommateur américain a provoqué un afflux d'importations. Les firmes américaines se sont elles-mêmes délocalisées pour réimporter leurs produits à prix réduit. D'où un deuxième déficit, celui des comptes courants, qui ne date pas de Bush mais qui s'est creusé jusqu'à 5 % du PIB.
Ce trou-là signifie que les pays exportateurs aux Etats-Unis accumulent des montagnes de dollars. Et qui dit abondance dit baisse de prix : d'où le recul de la monnaie américaine. Si le dollar baisse, les bons du Trésor nécessaires au financement budgétaire vont trouver de moins en moins d'acheteurs. Sauf à en monter les taux, ce qui pourrait étouffer la reprise.
LES DEUX DÉFICITS
Il était frappant à Davos de voir que la majorité des américains, industriels, banquiers, y compris les économistes, repoussent ce scénario noir qui est, au contraire, adopté par une majorité des européens présents. les américains croient à un scénario rose du règlement en douceur des deux déficits "jumeaux", budgétaire et commercial. L'arme en est la baisse du dollar. Son recul va favoriser les exportations américaines, contrebalançant les importations et réduisant ainsi le déficit courant.
Quant au trou budgétaire, pas de panique. Il se trouve que ce sont les Asiatiques qui le financent pour presque la moitié : la banque centrale du Japon achète des bons du Trésor américains, par tonnes, pour éviter que le yen ne monte (trop) ; la banque centrale de Chine, aux ordres du gouvernement, acquiert ces mêmes bons du Trésor dans le cadre que l'on sait, celui de la TGA, qui permet à Pékin d'ouvrir chaque jour de nouvelles usines de biens exportables aux Etats-Unis.
La baisse du dollar revient à prendre de la croissance et des emplois chez les autres. Chez qui ? Le 20 septembre 2003, lors de la réunion du G7, Américains et Européens s'étaient entendus pour que les Asiatiques, gros exportateurs vers les Etats-Unis, acceptent de réévaluer leur monnaie et de prendre donc une part du fardeau. Les Européens, qui venaient de voir l'euro gagner 20 % sur le dollar, trouvaient qu'ils faisaient seuls les frais du rééquilibrage américain. Le Japon a refusé, il achète au contraire des dollars sur le marché des changes, comme on l'a vu.
UN G7 SANGLANT EN FÉVRIER
La Chine aussi a refusé. Pour ne pas avoir de souci monétaire, elle a collé sa monnaie sur le cours du dollar, s'incluant dans une union monétaire de facto avec l'Amérique, son premier client, contre lequel elle ne veut pas de perte de compétitivité. Pour l'instant, elle estime qu'il n'est pas dans son intérêt de se décoller du dollar. Autrement dit, les Européens risquent de continuer à payer la facture. La prochaine réunion du G7, le 7 février, risque d'être sanglante.
Comment mieux équilibrer les efforts mondiaux ? Européens et Japonais ne trouvent pas logique de voir que ce sont eux, pays à faible croissance, qui voient leurs monnaies réévaluées. "Ils ont raison", soulignait à Davos Jean-Philippe Cotis, économiste en chef de l'OCDE, qui réclame, côté chinois, une réévaluation du yuan et, côté américain, "des mesures rapides et fortes de réduction du déficit budgétaire".
Pourtant, les Américains ont un argument de poids à faire valoir. En substance : "Nous sommes, avec la Chine, les seules locomotives mondiales. Les reprises, chez vous, n'ont pas de ressort interne ; elles viennent de chez nous, de nos importations. Alors, pourquoi vouloir ralentir les locomotives ? Tout le monde y perdra."
Nous sommes prévenus : Amérique et Chine ne céderont rien. Le seul espoir pour les Européens qui veulent arrêter la destructrice chute du dollar viendra des Etats-Unis eux-mêmes. Quarante députés républicains se plaignent des déficits de Bush, qui commencent à inquiéter les électeurs américains.
Eric Le Boucher
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 25.01.04
The right of center Dutch Government decided to limit the intake of migrants coming from the 10 new members of the EU. The fear of a huge flow of immigrants runs high among today's members. Some countries, like the UK and Ireland are in favor of a free flow while Finland, Belgium and others want a certain control.
In this story we learn that the right favors the free circulation of labor. 19% of the population of the Netetherlands was born elsewhere (mainly Turkey, Marocco and the Caribbean). Migrants who will be sent back to their countries of origin will receive a plane ticket and a certain amount of money.
Le Monde - Les Pays-Bas limitent l'entrée des travailleurs européens
Les Pays-Bas limitent l'entrée des travailleurs européens
LE MONDE | 27.01.04 | 13h17 • MIS A JOUR LE 27.01.04 | 13h40
Le gouvernement de centre-droit a fixé à 22 000 maximum le nombre de ressortissants des dix nouveaux Etats membres de l'UE qui seront autorisés à s'installer dans le royaume. Cette "soupape de sécurité" vise d'abord les ouvriers polonais.
Après des mois de discussions, le gouvernement néerlandais a décidé, vendredi 23 janvier, de limiter à 22 000 au maximum le nombre de travailleurs issus des dix nouveaux Etats membres de l'Union européenne (UE) qui pourront s'installer dans le royaume. "Il ne s'agit pas de poissons et nous ne parlons donc pas de quotas" a indiqué, non sans une certaine hypocrisie, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, le ministre des affaires économiques du gouvernement de centre-droit dirigé par Jan Peter Balkenende.
M. Brinkhorst, membre du parti D 66 (libéral réformateur) affirme aussi que la libre-circulation des travailleurs, principe de base du marché intérieur européen, s'appliquera bel et bien aux ressortissants des dix pays qui intègreront l'Union le 1er mai. Le ministre était auparavant défavorable à cette mesure de limitation, réclamée en revanche par son collègue Gerrit Zalm, ministre des affaires économiques (VVD, libéral), qui avait évoqué le risque de voir les frontières néerlandaises "submergées" par un nouvel afflux de travailleurs étrangers.
Aujourd'hui le gouvernement de La Haye affirme seulement avoir installé une "soupape de sécurité" et il évite de parler ouvertement de sa véritable intention : se prémunir contre l'arrivée massive d'ouvriers polonais sur un marché de travail dont la situation s'est fortement détériorée au cours des derniers mois. Le taux de chômage atteint 5,5 % aujourd'hui alors qu'il n'a pas dépassé 3 % ces dix dernières années. Le Bureau central du Plan (CPB) a ajouté à la crainte des dirigeants en estimant que, faute de mesures de limitation, de 5 000 à 10 000 travailleurs d'Europe centrale et orientale tenteraient de s'installer chaque année aux Pays-Bas.
CONTRÔLE TEMPORAIRE
Cela a achevé de convaincre le premier ministre, qui avait rejeté antérieurement toute idée de "quotas" pour les nouveaux Etats membres de l'Union. D'abord calquée sur la position de la Grande-Bretagne, l'Irlande ou la Suède, hostiles à toute mesure de limitation, l'attitude de M. Balkenende est désormais proche de celle de la Belgique, l'Espagne, la Grèce et la Finlande, favorables à une politique temporaire de contrôle, afin de ne pas déstabiliser les marchés nationaux du travail, conformément à des dispositions négociées entre les Quinze et qui promettent d'être appliquées de manière inégale selon les pays.
La mesure décidée aux Pays-Bas sera appliquée, en principe, pendant deux ans, avant d'être éventuellement corrigée. D'ici là, les ressortissants des nouveaux Etats membres devront réclamer un permis de travail qui leur sera accordé sans condition, sauf si le quota de 22 000 travailleurs était atteint. Quelque 10 000 travailleurs saisonniers sont déjà recrutés chaque année, notamment par le secteur horticole. A l'heure actuelle, les ressortissants de pays non européens qui espèrent obtenir un permis ne se le voient octroyé que si un "besoin réel" de travailleurs étrangers est démontré.
Si le gouvernement est, comme l'opposition, divisé sur la politique à suivre, des organisations patronales se déclarent, à l'instar des courants les plus libéraux, hostiles à la mesure adoptée la semaine dernière, que l'une d'elles dépeint comme "un compromis typiquement politicien". Pour le groupement patronal VNO-NCW, la libre-circulation des travailleurs ne doit souffrir aucune restriction. "Nous avons besoin de ces travailleurs immigrés pour faire tourner l'économie", a expliqué un porte-parole de cette organisation. S'inspirant des chiffres du Bureau du plan, les patrons soulignent que l'accueil des nouveaux arrivants n'entraînera, à l'horizon 2006, qu'un surcoût annuel de 70 millions d'euros pour les dépenses publiques. Entre 2000 et 2002, les PME ont embauché plus de 60 000 travailleurs étrangers.
Le débat sur "l'immigration de travail" relance, en tout cas, la polémique sur la présence des étrangers dans le pays. Sur les 16 millions de Néerlandais quelque 19 % sont d'origine immigrée, essentiellement turque, marocaine et antillaise. Saluée récemment par une étude officielle, la capacité d'intégration de la société néerlandaise a pourtant été fortement remise en cause au cours des dernières années, notamment par le parti du tribun populiste, feu Pim Fortuyn - la LPF. Cette formation a pesé sur l'évolution politique du royaume, le gouvernement Balkenende prônant une politique plus dure en matière de droit d'asile. En même temps qu'il annonçait, la semaine dernière, sa décision pour les travailleurs des nouveaux Etats membres de l'UE, le gouvernement indiquait qu'il procèderait à l'éloignement de quelque 26 000 demandeurs d'asile d'ici à 2007. La situation de 2 300 demandeurs devrait, en revanche, être prochainement régularisée en vertu d'une mesure d'amnistie.
Les personnes devant être expulsées se verront offrir un billet d'avion et une somme d'argent, dont le montant n'est pas déterminé, pour se réinstaller dans leur pays d'origine. En l'attente, elles pourront intégrer des "centres de départ" a indiqué le ministère de l'immigration. Quelque 13 000 demandes d'asile ont été enregistrées en 2003, ce qui marque une forte diminution : 19 000 demandes avaient été introduites en 2002 et 32 000 en 2001.
Jean-Pierre Stroobants
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 28.01.04
A story from the New York Times on a new biography of British PM Tony Blair. An example of how national rivalries stand on the way of a common EU foreign policy.
January 27, 2004
By PATRICK E. TYLER
LONDON, Jan. 26 — Strong opposition by the French president, Jacques Chirac, to the war in Iraq last spring was in part motivated by a desire to undermine Prime Minister Tony Blair in a struggle for leadership of Europe, a new book asserts.
The book is based in part on reports from British intelligence in which Mr. Blair was said to have concluded and to have told close aides in confidence that Mr. Chirac was "out to get him" by opposing the American- and British-led military campaign and thus seeking to isolate Mr. Blair in Europe. Mr. Blair came to believe that "the dispute over Iraq was in fact a proxy for a much more serious contest," the account states.
The book, "Tony Blair," by Philip Stephens, will be published next month by Viking, a division of Penguin Group in the United States. Excerpts were printed Monday in The Financial Times, for which Mr. Stephens is a political columnist with access to Mr. Blair and his senior aides. The assertions excerpted from the book are not attributed, however, either to Mr. Blair or his aides.
The intelligence reports informed the prime minister that Mr. Chirac had decided that "Blair had usurped" Mr. Chirac's position "as the natural leader of Europe," the book states.
Reacting to the publication on Monday, the prime minister's official spokesman declined to address the specific assertions in the book and said instead that it was "not the government's policy to do book reviews." The spokesman said Mr. Blair and Mr. Chirac had a "very good relationship" and would be meeting in February with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany.
In Paris, Mr. Chirac's spokeswoman, Catherine Colonna, said in an e-mail message: "There will be no comment on our side."
Mr. Stephens's biography of Mr. Blair reports on the intricate nature of the triangle of power among Britain, France and Germany. It also characterizes the role of Vice President Dick Cheney as "implacably opposed" to British efforts to persuade President Bush to work through the United Nations in confronting Iraq.
Mr. Cheney scorned the notion that the United States needed international approval to remove Mr. Hussein. "Once we have victory in Baghdad, all the critics will look like fools," Mr. Cheney told a high ranking British official in mid-2002, the book says.
When Mr. Chirac appeared to favor Mr. Schröder's opponent in German elections in 2002, Mr. Schröder traveled to London in his first postelection trip, snubbing Mr. Chirac.
"The slight was not missed by Chirac," Mr. Stephens wrote. Mr. Blair "enraged" the French leader by assaulting protectionist farm policies on the Continent at the European summit meeting in October 2002.
But Mr. Stephens reported that Mr. Blair missed the signals of Mr. Chirac's gathering anger. In December 2002, as the United Nations was giving Iraq a final opportunity to declare its illicit weapons, Mr. Blair met with one of Mr. Chirac's ministers in London and told him that the "good cop, bad cop" cooperation of the United States and Europe had succeeded at the United Nations in getting inspectors back into Iraq.
"The hawks in Washington had been obliged to compromise, and Bush had been kept in the multilateral game," Mr. Stephens wrote, adding that Mr. Blair urged the French to "more closely" coordinate with Britain as the war debate advanced.
But Mr. Chirac chose a path of strong opposition. Mr. Blair regarded the French leader's strategy as an attempt to re-cement German-French cooperation and isolate Mr. Blair, Mr. Stephens wrote.
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
Le Monde agrees on the "conciliatory tone" of Dick Cheney's speach at Davos. Less anti-American than last year, the participants were, according to the French newspaper, prone to "impotence and resignation". Rather than analyzing in depth the Vice-President of the United States intentions, the journalists quote four famous crtiques of globalization who, from the World Economic Forum, suggested interesting links with the Mumbai World Social Forum.
Beyond "tone", and biases of different kinds our "comparative media studies" exercice raises more trivial issues that cannot be ignored: the fact that French newspapers are not published on Sunday, for instance, or some problems of translation like "libéralisation", and "altermondialistes".
Previous entry - Cheney heard from several angles
Le Monde - Au Forum de Davos, Dick Cheney tente de réconcilier les Etats-Unis avec le reste du monde
Au Forum de Davos, Dick Cheney tente de réconcilier les Etats-Unis avec le reste du monde
LE MONDE | 26.01.04 | 16h16
Davos (Suisse) de nos envoyées spéciales
Le Forum économique mondial qui s'est achevé dimanche 25 janvier à Davos, a tenté la carte de la réconciliation : les Etats-Unis avec le reste du monde, l'Islam avec l'Occident, l'économique avec le social, le public avec le privé. Le bilan est mitigé. Après le mauvais accueil reçu en 2003, les Américains ont voulu renouer avec leurs partenaires des liens mis à mal par la guerre en Irak.
Le ministre américain de la justice, John Ashcroft, a ainsi affirmé que l'Amérique "n'était pas un agresseur" et qu'elle ne "cherchait pas à se tailler un empire". De son côté, le vice-président américain, Dick Cheney, a exhorté les grandes démocraties à se joindre à la guerre contre le terrorisme. "La coopération entre nos gouvernements, ainsi que des institutions internationales plus efficaces ont plus d'importance aujourd'hui que par le passé", a-t-il déclaré.
Dans un discours présenté comme réconciliateur, le vice-président a décrit la vision américaine du monde. "Notre choix n'est pas un monde unipolaire ou multipolaire mais un monde libre et démocratique", a-t-il assuré avant d'ajouter : "Quand la diplomatie échoue, on doit être prêt à prendre nos responsabilités et à utiliser la force."
Dick Cheney a souhaité une Europe "la plus forte possible", c'est-à-dire une Europe "capable de déployer plus de troupes" dans le cadre de l'OTAN. Il a appelé les Européens "à soutenir les réformes démocratiques en Iran" ainsi que "les aspirations européennes de la Turquie".
"Il faut connaître Dick Cheney pour comprendre qu'il s'agit d'un discours modéré", commentait le sénateur démocrate Joseph Biden. Dans les couloirs du Forum, on restait perplexe sur la réelle volonté de rapprochement des Etats-Unis, telle qu'énoncée par deux des personnalités les plus dures de l'administration Bush. L'humeur anti-américaine qui dominait l'année dernière ne s'est pas estompée, elle est seulement tempérée par un sentiment "d'impuissance et de résignation", selon un participant.
PASSERELLES
Le choix de mettre en présence Dick Cheney, le président iranien, Mohammad Khatami, qui fait partie de l'"axe du mal" et le président Pakistanais, Pervez Moucharraf, faisait partie de l'idée des organisateurs de créer des passerelles entre l'Islam et l'Occident. L'élite politique et économique a ainsi eu l'occasion d'entendre le premier s'exprimer sur "le dialogue entre civilisations" et de poser directement à M. Moucharraf des questions sur les attentats dont il a été victime.
Plusieurs débats ont été organisés où se sont confrontés des responsables politiques et religieux du monde arabo-musulman et judéo-chrétien. Le Forum a également mis en évidence le lien entre l'économie et le social. A Davos, la "globalisation responsable" et le partenariat public-privé ont fait leur apparition. Les patrons ont pris conscience que la "prospérité et la sécurité", thème du Forum, ont un lien direct avec la bonne marche de leurs entreprises, menacées notamment par les ravages du sida.
"Nous avons créé le Global business coalition pour inciter les entreprises à verser de l'argent au Fond mondial du sida, mais également à investir directement dans les infrastructures", explique le secrétaire d'Etat américain à la santé, Tommy Thompson. Cette organisation, présidée par l'ancien ambassadeur américain à l'ONU, Richard Holbrooke, rassemble environ 130 entreprises du monde entier, dont Coca-Cola, Nike, Total, Daimler, l'Oréal et Lafarge. "Un partenariat entre la société civile, les gouvernements et les entreprises est indispensable pour lutter contre le sida", dit Mark Moody-Stuart, patron du géant minier sud-africain Anglo-American.
"L'argent est là, le prix des rétroviraux ont baissé, mais nous n'avons pas les moyens de livrer les médicaments aux gens qui en ont besoin", a assuré Bill Gates, pour qui la lutte contre le sida est "une véritable guerre". Le président de Microsoft a annoncé, au côté de Mark Malloch-Brown, le patron du PNUD, que sa compagnie allait donner 1 milliard de dollars sur cinq ans en argent et en matériel informatique aux pays en développement. Bill Clinton, un fidèle de Davos, a mis en garde les "global leaders" contre l'éparpillement de leurs efforts. "Pour qu'elles soient durables, les initiatives doivent être systématisées", a-t-il dit.
Cette évolution du Forum économique vers des préoccupations exprimées par les altermondialistes a été soulignée par la présence à Davos de quatre célèbres pourfendeurs de la mondialisation libérale : Mary Robinson, ex-haut commissaire aux droits de l'homme, le prix Nobel d'économie, Joseph Stiglitz, le recteur de l'université de Delhi, Deepak Nayyar, et le directeur général du BIT (Bureau international du travail), Juan Somavia, ont fait le "trait d'union" entre Bombay et Davos. Pour eux l'"axe du mal" est la pauvreté, le sida et la guerre.
"Il existe deux visions de la prospérité", explique M. Somavia, "là-bas, la prospérité, c'est le prochain repas ; ici c'est la croissance économique ; là-bas, la sécurité veut dire avoir un emploi, ici c'et le terrorisme". Mary Robinson ne se fait pas trop d'illusions sur les changements de Davos. "Ce qui me préoccupe, dit-elle, c'est l'accumulation de tant pouvoir dans si peu de mains."
Afsane Bassir Pour et Babette Stern
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 27.01.04
London seems to get closer to Berlin and Paris on some issues related to the construction of Europe. Foreign Ministers and Presidents meet more often and try to promote common solutions. Blair's participation gives strengh to the now traditional "duo" Chirac-Schröder, and could contribute to smooth some rough angles within Europe (with Spain and Poland for instance), and with the U.S.. Not everybody is pleased, though: Italy, a founder of the EU, and one of the four most important countries, because it has not been invited, Spain, and others because they fear that positions assumed by the "directory" might look very much like diktats.
El País - Londres se suma al eje franco-alemán en el diseño de la nueva UE
Londres se suma al eje franco-alemán en el diseño de la nueva UE La idea de un directorio europeo despierta recelos en Italia y otros socios comunitarios
CARLOS YÁRNOZ - Bruselas
EL PAÍS | Internacional - 26-01-2004
El eje franco-alemán ya no es suficiente para liderar el proceso de construcción europea. A las puertas de la histórica ampliación de la UE al Este el próximo 1 de mayo, París y Berlín han incorporado al grupo de cabeza, también llamado directorio con tono despectivo, a Londres, la tercera gran potencia europea, que hoy puede reflejar una sensibilidad trasatlántica y proestadounidense mucho más próxima a los nuevos socios que la mantenida por Alemania y Francia. Italia, por ser excluida; España, por temer el diktat de los tres, y otros países del club ya han expresado sus recelos y temores ante la nueva situación.
"Más que de trío, resulta más apropiado hablar de dos más uno", señalan fuentes diplomáticas del Consejo de la Unión, que restan dramatismo al hecho porque "siempre ha habido grupos de países en la UE". Recuerdan, por ejemplo, alianzas más o menos permanentes entre los países del Benelux, el Grupo de Visegrado (Polonia, Chequia, Hungría y Eslovaquia), los nórdicos... y los que se agrupan por intereses comunes (contribuyentes netos al presupuesto de la UE frente a receptores de fondos) o por proyectos globales (el euro, el espacio Shengen).
La consistencia del eje franco-alemán, plasmada en reuniones periódicas conjuntas de ambos Gobiernos, tuvo su imagen más elocuente el pasado otoño, cuando el presidente francés, Jacques Chirac, llegó a hablar en una cumbre europea en nombre del canciller alemán, Gerhard Schröder, ausente de la reunión. Pero el tramo final de las frustradas negociaciones para pactar una primera Constitución Europea, en el que Berlín y París actuaron codo con codo, contó con la incorporación al grupo dirigente del primer ministro británico, Tony Blair.
La primera concreción del trabajo en equipo del trío fue su pacto para definir el espinoso capítulo de la Europa de la Defensa. Frente a los aireados deseos franco-alemanes de crear una defensa europea de espaldas a Washington, la imprescindible participación directa de Londres en el proyecto amainó las iras de EE UU e hizo posible el acuerdo. En la cumbre de diciembre, en los últimos intentos por desbloquear la Constitución, fue Blair quien hizo de intermediario y puente entre Chirac y Schröder, de un lado, y el español José María Aznar y el polaco Leszek Miller, de otro.
El apoyo británico a Berlín y París para que éstos evitaran en noviembre los castigos por incumplir el Pacto de Estabilidad o el anuncio de que Reino Unido y Francia se repartirán la dirección de la Agencia Europea de Armamento que hoy se pone en marcha son otros evidentes ejemplos del nuevo entendimiento tripartito.
La crisis europea a raíz de la guerra de Irak, donde Londres se asoció con polacos y españoles, junto a la mayoría de candidatos, fue el precedente que ha desembocado en este nuevo papel que juega Blair. El trío "corresponde a la lógica" de una Europa que pasa de 15 socios a 25, ha declarado el ministro británico de Exteriores, Jack Straw, al diario francés Le Figaro. "Hay una verdadera voluntad de acuerdo entre Alemania, Reino Unido y Francia para crear un verdadero motor para la Europa de mañana", ha afirmado Chirac.
Próxima reunión en Berlín
Los ministros de Exteriores de los tres países ya se han reunido discretamente esta pasada semana y probablemente vuelvan a hacerlo hoy otra vez en Bruselas. Chirac, Schröder y Blair ya han anunciado que también se verán por separado el próximo día 18 en Berlín para preparar la cumbre europea de marzo y decidir si ya se da o no el ambiente adecuado para reactivar las negociaciones sobre la primera Constitución Europea.
Sin embargo, el equipo directivo formado por las tres grandes potencias de la Unión es mal visto en otras importantes capitales. Aznar dijo días atrás en Lisboa que hay que respetar "las pautas de funcionamiento interno" de la UE, receloso sin duda de que su aliado Blair se aproxime a sus clásicos adversarios Schröder y Chirac. La idea del directorio "es un pésimo camino", le coreó el portugués José Manuel Durão, temeroso de que cualquier pacto del trío se convierta en decisión indiscutida de la UE.
Con todo, el país más desairado es Italia, el único de los cuatro grandes, y encima socio fundador, excluido del equipo director. " pueden poner en peligro la unidad de Europa", ha clamado en el Senado italiano el ministro de Exteriores, Franco Frattini, quien, junto con el primer ministro, Silvio Berlusconi, fue incapaz el semestre anterior, durante la presidencia italiana de la UE, de consensuar el proyecto constitucional.
Desde España, el Gobierno, consciente de las animadversiones que ha levantado y de su debilidad negociadora ante el trío Berlín-París-Londres, advierte de que el vigente Tratado de Niza ya facilita las cooperaciones reforzadas (grupos de países que quieran avanzar más rápido en algunas áreas), pero que deben ser abiertas a todos los países. También desde Italia, el ministro Franco Frattini dice ser "totalmente contrario" a la creación de grupos de vanguardia. Dos muestras de cómo está variando el equilibrio de poder en Europa y, sobre todo, de cómo va a cambiar tras la ampliación.
Evitar un nuevo fracaso
El canciller alemán, Gerhard Schröder, y el presidente francés, Jacques Chirac, ya lanzaron en diciembre el mensaje de que, a la vista del fracaso de los Veinticinco (los Quince más los diez candidatos) para pactar la primera Constitución para Europa, la UE no podría permitirse un segundo fracaso porque, de lo contrario, habría una Unión a dos velocidades. Los dos han lanzado estos días similares advertencias.
Schröder insiste en que quiere una Constitución antes de concluir el año y su ministro de Exteriores, Joschka Fischer, añade que, "cuanto más rápido se avance en Europa, mejor para todos". Pero las heridas están aún abiertas y Bertie Ahern, el primer ministro de Irlanda, el país que preside la UE este semestre, es consciente de que "hace falta tiempo". Consciente de que el principal problema está en España y Polonia, los dos países que no aceptaron el nuevo reparto de poder previsto en el proyecto constitucional y provocaron su bloqueo, Ahern irá esta semana a Madrid para entrevistarse con José María Aznar y ya ha mantenido encuentros con dirigentes polacos.
La disposición en los dos países díscolos parece estar cambiando. "Nuestra disposición es abierta y práctica", ha dicho el ministro polaco de Exteriores, Wlodmierz Cimosevic, tras hablar con Fischer. "Estamos de acuerdo en encontrar una solución, pero que sea aceptada por los Veinticinco", ha declarado la española Ana Palacio, tras hablar esta semana con su homólogo irlandés, Brian Cowen.
Hoy, los ministros de Exteriores de los Veinticinco tendrán en Bruselas la primera oportunidad para reanudar las negociaciones, aunque sean conscientes de que se necesitan meses para presentar avances concretos pese a las prisas franco-alemanas, apoyadas por el Parlamento Europeo. Los socialistas españoles ya han dicho que debe haber acuerdos "antes del 1 de mayo". Bélgica, Luxemburgo y hasta la Comisión no ven mal que se abra el camino a una Europa de dos velocidades. "No podemos avanzar al paso del más lento", dice el presidente de la Comisión, Romano Prodi.
As an exercise in comparative media studies, I suggest a reading of the stories published in several European and American media sites about Cheney's speach in Davos.
You may suggest more.
The Guardian - Farewell to the axis of weasel
The Washingto Post - Cheney Reaches Out To Iraq War Critics
The New York Times - Cheney Calls for More Unity in Fight Against Terrorism
El País - EE UU pide a Europa un esfuerzo militar
EE UU pide a Europa un esfuerzo militar
El vicepresidente Cheney insta a los aliados a que se impliquen más en la lucha contra el terrorismo
ANDRÉS ORTEGA (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Davos
EL PAÍS | Internacional - 25-01-2004
El esperado vicepresidente de Estados Unidos, Dick Cheney, trajo ayer un mensaje conciliador al Foro Económico de Davos, donde el año pasado, en vísperas de la guerra de Irak, se vivió un vivo enfrentamiento transatlántico. Pero trajo una lista de la compra, pues pidió más esfuerzo a los europeos en la guerra contra el terrorismo; en la reconstrucción de Irak -donde "España ha realizado una importante aportación de fuerzas"-, condonando la deuda iraquí, logrando una mayor capacidad de despliegue de tropas; en la democratización de Irán y del "Gran Oriente Próximo", y en la incorporación de Turquía a la Unión Europea. Y reiteró que ante situaciones de peligro, si la diplomacia falla, los Estados democráticos deben estar dispuestos a usar la fuerza.
Éste ha sido su segundo viaje al extranjero desde que asumió el cargo (que implica también la presidencia del Senado) tres años atrás para un discurso con pocas aristas, y poco aplaudido porque, lleno de cinismo, no coincidió con el tono dominante, entre pesimista y resignado, de esta edición del Foro.
Si el vicepresidente de EE UU afirmó que "amenazas directas requieren acciones decisivas", la importancia de su mensaje reside tanto en lo que dijo como en lo que no dijo. La libertad y la democracia son condiciones para la seguridad, y no sólo a la inversa; el término "preventivo", referido al uso de la fuerza, ha desaparecido de este vocabulario, pero no su concepto.
Lo más preocupante para los europeos que apuestan por un "multilateralismo eficaz" es que, en la visión de futuro que desgranó, Cheney, no hizo referencia a la ONU, citada únicamente en el contexto de 1945. Sólo cuando el presidente del Foro, Klaus Schwab, le preguntó al respecto, Cheney soltó una risita y comentó que en esta materia "me puedo meter en líos", para seguir explicando que la estructura de Naciones Unidas ya no concuerda con el mundo actual.
No obstante, poco después un funcionario estadounidense se apresuró a declarar a la agencia Reuters que EE UU propugna un papel significativo de la ONU en Irak, que podría incluir la supervisión de la creación de un Gobierno transitorio y la interlocución con la comunidad chií.
En otro debate en Davos, el experto francés Thierry de Montbrial apostó por una participación militar en los próximos meses francesa y alemana en la estabilización de Irak, y un senador aseguró que lo había oído de boca del presidente Jacques Chirac.
Para el alto representante de la UE, Javier Solana, según el cual, "2003 ha sido un año complicado" para unas relaciones transatlánticas que son fundamentales, Estados Unidos y los europeos son socios y aliados, "y como socios, no quieren ser una caja de herramientas, sino actuar juntos". Es, además, una "obligación moral, la de no seguir dando la impresión de que acordamos más importancia a los síntomas que a las causas de los problemas".
El 11-S, "cuando vimos la cara del peligro en nuestra era", según Cheney, ha sido mucho más prominente en todos los debates sobre las relaciones transatlánticas que la guerra de Irak. Si el año pasado se dieron unas agrias recriminaciones mutuas, en esta edición de Davos se ha pasado a un cierto escepticismo, pero la confianza no se ha recuperado. Lo que ha cambiado es que doce meses atrás la guerra era inminente, y ahora es necesario gestionar la situación creada, pues en Irak "se ha dejado salir el genio de la botella", como señaló el francés Olivier Roy.
¿Hegemonía? ¿Imperio? Para Cheney, Estados Unidos "no se ve a sí mismo como un imperio", pues si lo fuera presidiría un trozo mucho más grande de la superficie de la Tierra de la actual. Pero al recordarle que en su felicitación navideña había usado una cita de Benjamín Franklin -"¿Si un gorrión no se puede caer sin que Él lo note, es posible que surja un imperio sin Su ayuda?"-, afirmó que la había elegido su mujer.
Para el senador demócrata Joseph Biden, los ciudadanos de EE UU no se sienten cómodos como "única superpotencia", pero tampoco querrían que lo fuera otro país. Cheney se olvidó de la democracia al alabar la decisión de Muammar el Gaddafi de renunciar a toda arma de destrucción masiva y comprometerse con el Tratado de No Proliferación nuclear , lo que permitirá a Libia reintegrarse en la comunidad internacional. Pero escurrió el bulto sobre otras cuestiones que le planteó un asistente, como los presos de Guantánamo.
Detrás del intento de reconstruir las relaciones transatlánticas hay también un impulso empresarial. En Davos se ha reactivado el Diálogo Transatlántico Empresarial, bajo la co-presidencia de los máximos directivos de Unilever y de Coca-Cola. Del comercio entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea (dos billones de dólares) y de las inversiones mutuas (60% de las inversiones en el extranjero de empresas estadounidenses van a Europa y un 40% en sentido inverso) dependen 13 millones de empleos en una y otra parte, pese a las diferencias y contenciosos, preocupaciones a las que hay que añadir la devaluación de dólar. Pues los empresarios europeos no se quejan sólo de la caída de la moneda estadounidense, sino de que le han acompañado las de las economías emergentes asiáticas, a comenzar por China. Es por ello que el peso del ajuste en los tipos de cambio recae casi exclusivamente sobre los europeos.
A correspondence from the World Economic Forum in Davos, in the German newswire Deutsche Welle. US asks for help in Iraq, Europeans speak out their fears about the euro/dollar exchange rate and the US deficit.
The World Economic Forum wrapped up Sunday after five days of talks focusing on cooperation and conciliation. Washington appealed to Europe to lend a hand in bringing democracy to the greater Middle East.
Compared to last year’s talkfest in the Swiss mountain retreat, the 2004 World Economic Forum in Davos took place in a positive atmosphere. Rather than exchanging war rhetoric, political leaders focused on negotiation and cooperation. Led by Vice President Dick Cheney, the U.S. delegation worked hard to set a conciliatory tone.
"Cooperation among our governments and effective international institutions are even more important today then they have been in the past," said Cheney, considered one of Washington’s biggest hawks and proponents of the Bush administration's go-it-alone stance.
U.S. turns to EU
In a high profile speech on Saturday, the vice president appealed to Europe, especially France and Germany who had faced off against the U.S. in last year’s war, urging EU member states to take an active role in rebuilding Iraq, helping to defuse Iran’s nuclear ambitions and promoting international security.
Referring to Europe’s experience in overcoming age-old antagonisms, fascism and communism, Cheney called on the EU to help bring freedom to the greater Middle East from Iran to Mauritania. "
Our forward strategy for freedom commits us to support those who work and sacrifice for reform across the greater Middle East. We call upon our democratic friends and allies everywhere, and in Europe in particular, to join us in this effort," he said.
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, while welcoming the invitation to dialogue with Washington on the greater Middle East, cautioned about getting carried away with illusionary grand structures. "To think that from Morocco to Afghanistan we’re going to have something structured is a bit of a chimera," he told Reuters news service.
Solana also pointed out that the EU already had agreements and cooperation with a dozen Mediterranean partners offering trade and aid in return for economic reform and human rights. In a veiled criticism of Washington’s foreign policy goals, Solana said it would be hard to get the Arab world behind a collective democratization initiative "without putting the same energy into the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process."
Europe focuses on economy
Most European leaders, however, were more preoccupied with the U.S. dollar’s plunge against the euro, which is jeopardizing economic recovery in the euro zone by making European exports more expensive in international markets. European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said Europe was "concerned about excessive exchange rate moves," and he called for more "stability" in the foreign exchange market.
Germany's deputy finance minister, Caio Koch-Weser, told AFP news service that there was "complete consensus" among the 12 finance ministers of the euro zone for stability in currency markets.
"If I am concerned about something it is that the euro alone has to bear the brunt of the fall of the dollar because many areas of the world are de facto linked to the dollar, be it through pegs or intervention," he said.
The ECB’s Trichet also expressed worry over a ballooning U.S. budget deficit, which if unchecked could become a source of international contention when it effects interest and exchange rates across the globe.
U.S. Commerce Secretary Donald Evans attempted to calm European fears by saying the situation was both "very manageable" and "affordable." He said the deficit would be brought down by some "very, very tough decisions on spending." Neither Cheney nor Evans seemed especially concerned about the weak dollar.
DW staff (ktz)
This in an excerpt from the New York Times Books Supplement, Sunday, January 25, 2004. Serge Schmemann reviews, among other books, a recent essay published by the French historian Emmanuell Todd: "After the Empire. The Breakdown of the American Order", Columbia University Press, 233 pp., $ 29,95 (you may add it to the recommended readins list).
Emmanuel Todd's ''After the Empire'' is the view of an outsider, and a highly troubling view at that. I have been living in France for the past six months, and I often wonder whether Americans are aware of the depth of the dread and revulsion in which Bush's United States is held by many foreigners. In Todd's study, translated by C. Jon Delogu, a relentless condemnation of everything American arises from an acute sense of betrayal.
A French historian and anthropologist trained at Cambridge University in England and descended from Jews who were refugees in America, Todd says he used to see the United States as a model, as his ''subconscious safety net.'' Now, he declares, it is solely a ''predator,'' living way beyond its means, racking up video-game victories over defenseless nations and undermining human rights. Nobody escapes Todd's jilted fury -- not the American woman, ''a castrating, threatening figure,'' and not American Jews, who have ''fallen into the disturbing, not to say neurotic, cult of the Holocaust.'' Todd's solace is also his main thesis, that American power is fast waning because of the country's profligate spending: ''Let the present America expend what remains of its energy, if that is what it wants to do, on 'war on terrorism' -- a substitute battle for the perpetuation of a hegemony that it has already lost.'' This is easy to dismiss as the rant of Old Europe (surprise: Todd's book was a best seller in France). But that would miss the point: his sense of betrayal is widely shared around the world, even in places the White House likes to portray as friends. Alas, I have heard too many people of good will express profound disappointment with the United States to reject Todd as an extreme or isolated voice.
Serge Schmemann is the editorial page editor of The International Herald Tribune.
January 25, 2004
U.S. and Europe Must Mend Rift Over Iraq, Cheney Says
By ERIC SCHMITT and MARK LANDLER
The VP is attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Here is his message to the European allies.
DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan. 24 — Vice President Dick Cheney called Saturday for greater global unity to fight terrorism, halt the spread of illicit weapons and promote democratic trends in the Middle East, in the Bush administration's most significant outreach yet to disaffected allies who opposed the Iraq war.
Mr. Cheney, one of President Bush's most influential senior advisers, defended the administration's decision to topple Saddam Hussein. But in a rare trip outside the United States, he also sought to mend rifts over the war, striking a conciliatory tone in seeking help from Europeans and other traditional allies to strengthen the global partnership against an array of security threats.
In a wide-ranging address to about 1,000 political, business and religious leaders at an international conference here in the Alps, Mr. Cheney asked European allies to join with the United States to promote democratic movements in Iran, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and to combat the root cause of terrorism by helping to overcome what he called the "freedom deficit" in many Middle Eastern countries.
"We must meet the dangers together," Mr. Cheney said in his 30-minute speech to the gathering, the annual World Economic Forum. "Cooperation among our governments, and effective international institutions, are even more important than they have been in the past."
Mr. Cheney continued, "Working cooperatively against the dangers of a new era will place demands on us all, and there will be occasional differences, even among allies who have great respect for one another."
The administration's choice of Mr. Cheney to lead its delegation here may seem improbable, given his low profile and hard-line reputation. Mr. Cheney was making only his second international trip in three years as vice president, and remains an enigma to many Europeans and other foreigners. The White House also generally avoids the kinds of issues this conference champions, like globalization and multilateral diplomacy.
But aides to Mr. Cheney said he was eager to come, both out of an interest in meeting with world political and business leaders, including King Abdullah of Jordan, and to soften Mr. Bush's international image and to reassure allies that the United States is not pursuing a unilateral security strategy.
Responding to a question after his speech, Mr. Cheney sought to dispel perceptions that the United States was empire-building. "If we were a true empire, we would currently preside over a much greater piece of the earth's surface than we do," he said. "That's not the way we operate."
Last year, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell spoke at the conference, drawing a skeptical response when he laid out the case for military action in Iraq, even without a United Nations mandate. Mr. Cheney received polite, but perfunctory, applause on Saturday as he sought to patch up strains with European allies over the Iraq war, stricter visa requirements and the treatment of suspected Al Qaeda members or other suspects in detention at the United States Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Klaus Zumwinkel, chairman of the German postal service, Deutsche Post, said afterward that Mr. Cheney "increased the market share of positive sentiment toward the United States."
While other listeners took note of Mr. Cheney's conciliatory tone, some were suspicious of his motives.
"This overture comes during an election year," said Carel N. Van Der Spek, a Dutch banker. "The Bush administration wants to draw down its troops in Iraq, and to do that, it needs helps from Europe."
Dominique Borde, a French law firm partner, praised Mr. Cheney's tone. But he said the vice president offered little evidence that the United States planned to pay more heed to France or other allies in formulating its foreign policy.
"This is a world where economic might prevails," Mr. Borde said. "We're not run by an empire. We're run by a democracy."
In his remarks, Mr. Cheney offered no new specific initiatives, instead proposing democratic reforms like greater political participation and the rule of law as a broad prescription for "confronting the ideologies of violence" and addressing the root causes of terrorism. "Helping the peoples of the greater Middle East to overcome the freedom deficit is, ultimately, the key to winning the broader war on terror," he said.
Even as Mr. Cheney proposed a rhetorical truce in the trans-Atlantic feud over Iraq and new courses of action ahead, he offered an unapologetic defense of the administration's threat to use military force, if necessary, whenever diplomacy fails to resolve these threats.
Mr. Cheney, echoing themes in Mr. Bush's State of the Union address last Tuesday, cited the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan and end of Mr. Hussein's rule in Iraq as examples of the strategy's success.
The recent decision by the Libyan president, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, to give up his nation's illicit weapons programs, was the result of quiet diplomacy backed up by the threat of force, Mr. Cheney said. "Our diplomacy with Libya was successful only because our word was credible," he said.
He did not address the issue of Iraq's elusive unconventional weapons, and was not asked about them during a brief question-and-answer period after his remarks. David Kay, who led the American effort to find banned weapons in Iraq, said Friday after stepping down from his post that he had concluded that Iraq had no stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons at the start of the war.
Mr. Cheney's remarks appeared to build on themes Mr. Bush voiced in a speech on Nov. 21 in Britain, when he said France and Germany, which have been reluctant to take part in stabilizing Iraq, should recall the lessons of World War II, when a united Allied effort defeated Nazi tyranny in Europe and paved the way there for postwar security and prosperity.
Mr. Cheney again invoked World War II, and noted that American and European intelligence and law enforcement agencies were working together to hunt down terrorists, dry up their financing and tighten border security.
"Through six decades and 12 American presidents, the United States and Europe have faced monumental challenges and have overcome them together," he declared. He added that 21 of 34 countries contributing to the Iraq campaign are NATO allies and partners.
But he called on Europe to do more: "Europeans know that their great experiment in building peace, unity and prosperity cannot survive as a privileged enclave, surrounded on its outskirts by breeding grounds of hatred and fanatics."
Mr. Cheney listed several positive security developments, including Mr. Hussein's capture, the new democratic Constitution in Afghanistan, and the easing of tensions between India and Pakistan.
But he said terrorist groups still posed a long-term threat, given their determination to develop or acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
"Were they to gain those weapons either by their own efforts or with the help from an outlaw regime, no appeal to reason or morality would prevent them from committing the worst of terrors," he said.
Mr. Cheney put a new emphasis on promoting democratic values as a way to defeat terrorism. This appeared to answer criticisms from foreign officials that the administration's strategy for combating terrorism was too narrow.
"Democracies do not breed the anger and radicalism that drag down whole societies or export violence," Mr. Cheney said. "Terrorists do not find fertile recruiting grounds in societies where young people have the right to guide their own destinies and to choose their own leaders."
The notion that democratic values could never take root in the Middle East was "condescending" and "false," he said. He cited broader women's rights in Morocco, as well as reduced state controls on news organizations in Jordan and increased opportunities for women to run for public office in Bahrain.
Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, applauded Mr. Cheney for pressing for democracy in the Arab world, though he said he was disappointed by most of the speech, which he said was notable for its "complete lack of reference to international law."
Some Arab members of the audience said the United States must step in more forcefully to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, if it wants to hasten the development of democracy in the Middle East.
"Reform is like a seed you plant," said Nadim Y. Muasher, the chairman of the Arab International Hotels Company in Jordan. "If you plant it between two rocks — Israel and Palestine — it won't grow."
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The New York Times
January 24, 2004
A Tougher War for the U.S. Is One of Legitimacy
By ROBERT KAGAN
This is the author of "Paradise and Power" (suggested reading) and the author of the quote "Americans are from Mars. Europeans from Venus" Here is his most recent analysys on US-EU relationships.
What kind of world order do we want?" That question, posed by Germany's foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has been on the minds of many Europeans these days.
Indeed, the great trans-Atlantic debate over the Iraq war was rooted in profound disagreement over "world order." Yes, Americans and Europeans differed on the specific question of what to do about Iraq. They debated whether Saddam Hussein posed a serious threat, and whether war was the right answer. A solid majority of Americans answered yes to both questions; even larger majorities of Europeans answered no.
But these disagreements reflected more than simple tactical and analytical assessments of the situation in Iraq. As the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, put it, the struggle was not so much about Iraq as it was about "two visions of the world." The differences were not only about policy. They were also about first principles.
Opinion polls taken before, during and after the war have shown two peoples living on separate strategic and ideological planets. More than 80 percent of Americans believe that war may achieve justice; less than half of Europeans believe that a war — any war — can ever be just. Americans and Europeans disagree about the role of international law and international institutions, and about the nebulous and abstract yet powerful question of international legitimacy.
These different worldviews predate the Iraq war and the presidency of George W. Bush, although both the war and the Bush administration's conduct of international affairs have deepened and perhaps hardened this trans-Atlantic rift into an enduring feature of the international landscape. "America is different from Europe," Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany declared matter-of-factly months before the war. Who any longer can deny it?
Today a darker possibility looms. A great philosophical schism has opened within the West, and instead of mutual indifference, mutual antagonism threatens to debilitate both sides of the trans-Atlantic community. Coming at a time in history when new dangers and crises are proliferating, this schism could have serious consequences. For Europe and the United States to decouple strategically has been bad enough. But what if the schism over "world order" infects the rest of what we have known as the liberal West? Will the West still be the West?
It is the legitimacy of American power and American global leadership that has come to be doubted by a majority of Europeans. America, for the first time since World War II, is suffering a crisis of international legitimacy.
Americans will find that they cannot ignore this problem. The struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be among the critical contests of our time, in some ways as significant in determining the future of the international system and America's place in it as any purely material measure of power and influence.
Americans for much of the past three centuries have considered themselves the vanguard of a worldwide liberal revolution. Their foreign policy from the beginning has not been only about defending and promoting their material national interests. "We fight not just for ourselves but for all mankind," Benjamin Franklin declared of the American Revolution, and whether or not that has always been true, most Americans have always wanted to believe that it is true. There can be no clear dividing line between the domestic and the foreign, therefore, and no clear distinction between what the democratic world thinks about America and what Americans think about themselves.
Every profound foreign policy debate in America's history, from the time when Jefferson squared off against Hamilton, has ultimately been a debate about the nation's identity and has posed for Americans the primal question "Who are we?" Because Americans do care, the steady denial of international legitimacy by fellow democracies will over time become debilitating and perhaps even paralyzing.
Americans therefore cannot ignore the unipolar predicament. Perhaps the singular failure of the Bush administration is that it has been too slow to recognize this. Mr. Bush and his advisers came to office guided by the narrow realism that dominated in Republican foreign policy circles during the Clinton years. The Clinton administration, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, wrote in a famous essay in January 2000, had failed to focus on the "national interest" and instead had addressed itself to "humanitarian interests" or the interests of "the international community." The Bush administration, by contrast, would take a fresh look at all treaties, obligations and alliances and re-evaluate them in terms of America's "national interest."
The notion that the United States could take such a narrow view of its "national interest" has always been mistaken. But besides being an analytical error, the enunciation of this "realist" approach by the sole superpower in a unipolar era was a serious foreign policy error. The global hegemon cannot proclaim to the world that it will be guided only by its own definition of its "national interest."
This is precisely what even America's closest friends fear: that the United States will wield its unprecedented vast power only for itself. In her essay, Ms. Rice derided "the belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of someone or something else." But for the rest of the world, what other source of legitimacy can there be? When the United States acts in its own interests, Ms. Rice claimed, as would many Americans, it necessarily serves the interests of everyone.
"To be sure," she argued, "there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect."
But could even America's closest friends ever be persuaded that an America always pursuing its self-interest could be relied upon to serve their interests, too, as some kind of "second-order effect"?
Both the unipolar predicament and the American character require a much more expansive definition of American interests. The United States can neither appear to be acting only in its self-interest, nor can it in fact act as if its own national interest were all that mattered. Even at times of dire emergency, and perhaps especially at those times, the world's sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it wields its great power on behalf of its principles and all who share them.
The manner in which the United States conducts itself in Iraq today is especially important in this regard. At stake is not only the future of Iraq and the Middle East more generally, but also the future of America's reputation, its reliability and its legitimacy as a world leader. The United States will be judged, and should be judged, by the care and commitment it takes to secure a democratic peace in Iraq. It will be judged by whether it really advances the cause of liberalism, in Iraq and elsewhere, or whether it merely defends its own interests.
No one has made this argument more powerfully, and more presciently, than that quintessential realist, Henry A. Kissinger.
The task in Iraq, Mr. Kissinger argued in an essay, was not just to win the war but to convey "to the rest of the world that our first pre-emptive war has been imposed by necessity and that we seek the world's interests, not exclusively our own." America's "special responsibility, as the most powerful nation in the world," he said, "is to work toward an international system that rests on more than military power — indeed, that strives to translate power into cooperation. Any other attitude will gradually isolate and exhaust us."
The United States, in short, must pursue legitimacy in the manner truest to its nature, by promoting the principles of liberal democracy, not only as a means to greater security, but as an end in itself. Success in such endeavors will provide the United States a measure of legitimacy in the liberal, democratic world, and even in Europe.
The United States should try to fulfill its part of a new trans-Atlantic bargain by granting Europeans some influence over the exercise of American power — if, that is, the Europeans in turn will wield that influence wisely. The NATO alliance — an alliance of and for liberal democracies — could be the locus of such a bargain. NATO is where the United States has already ceded influence to Europeans, who vote on an equal footing with the American superpower in all the alliance's deliberations. Indeed, NATO has for decades been the one organization capable of reconciling American hegemony with European autonomy and influence. And even today NATO retains a sentimental attraction for Americans, more potent than the attraction they feel for the United Nations.
But can the United States cede some power to Europe without putting American security, and indeed Europe's and the entire liberal democratic world's security, at risk in the process? Here lies the rub. For even with the best of intentions, the United States cannot enlist the cooperation of Europeans if there is no common assessment of the nature of global threats today, and of the means that must be employed to meet them. But it is precisely this gap in perception that has driven the United States and Europe apart in the post-cold-war world.
If it is true, as the British diplomat Robert Cooper suggests, that international legitimacy stems from shared values and a shared history, does such commonality still exist within the West now that the cold war has ended? For while the liberal trans-Atlantic community still shares much in common, the philosophical schism on the fundamental questions of world order may now be overwhelming those commonalities. It is hard to imagine the crisis of legitimacy being resolved as long as this schism persists. For even if the United States were to fulfill its part of the bargain, and grant the Europeans the influence they crave, would the Europeans, with their very different perception of the world, fulfill theirs?
As long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, they will not join in a common strategy. Nor will Europeans accord the United States legitimacy when it seeks to address those threats by itself, and by what it regards as sometimes the only means possible, force.
And what, then, is the United States to do? Should Americans, in the interest of trans-Atlantic harmony, try to alter their perceptions of global threats to match that of their European friends? To do so would be irresponsible. Not only American security but the security of the liberal democratic world depends today, as it has depended for the past half-century, on American power. Even Europeans, in moments of clarity, know that is true.
"The U.S. is the only truly global player," Joschka Fischer has declared, "and I must warn against underestimating its importance for peace and stability in the world. And beware, too, of underestimating what the U.S. means for our own security."
But the United States has played that role not by adopting Europe's postmodern worldview, but by seeing the world through its own eyes. Today most Europeans believe that the United States exaggerates the dangers in the world. After Sept. 11, most Americans fear that they haven't taken those dangers seriously enough.
Herein lies the tragedy. To address today's global threats, Americans will need the legitimacy that Europe can provide. But Europeans may well fail to provide it. In their effort to constrain the superpower, they will lose sight of the mounting dangers in the world. In their nervousness about unipolarity, they may forget the dangers of a multipolarity in which nonliberal and nondemocratic powers come to outweigh Europe in the global competition.
Europeans thus may succeed in debilitating the United States, but since they have no intention of supplementing American power with their own, the net result will be a diminution of the total amount of power that the liberal democratic world can bring to bear in its defense — and in defense of liberalism itself.
Right now many Europeans are betting that the risks from the "axis of evil," from terrorism and tyrants, will never be as great as the risk of an American Leviathan unbound. Perhaps it is in the nature of a postmodern Europe to make such a judgment. But now may be the time for the wisest heads in Europe, including those living in the birthplace of Pascal, to begin asking what will result if that wager proves wrong.
Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is adapted from the afterword to his book "Of Paradise and Power," republished this month in paperback by Vintage Books. A longer excerpt will appear in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs.
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Editorial of The New York Times
Playing Politics With D-Day
Published: January 19, 2004
Why the most authoritative liberal newspaper in the US thinks that inviting a German Chancellor to the D-Day celebration is not a good idea.
This June, for the first time, a German chancellor will attend ceremonies in Normandy marking the anniversary of D-Day. Gerhard Schröder has declared himself "very pleased" at the invitation he received from President Jacques Chirac of France to join other leaders for the 60th anniversary of the Allied landings. On the face of it, this appears to be a welcome signal that Europe has put its last great war behind it, and that the Germans are now viewed as an integral part of the European family. Ten years ago, Helmut Kohl, then chancellor of Germany, was frustrated in his efforts to secure just such an invitation.
Still, there's something not quite right with this picture. It's not that the Germans need to be ceaselessly reminded of their Nazi past. Few nations in history have so sincerely and deeply looked into the evils of their past and worked as hard to come to terms with them. Germany is, and deserves to be, a full and equal partner in everything Europe does, without being made to feel that it bears a permanent taint. The trouble is that Mr. Chirac's invitation smacks more of politics than reconciliation. France and Germany have found common cause on a number of issues of late, ranging from the invasion of Iraq to the future of the European Union, and Mr. Chirac was apparently anxious to parade this alliance.
The ceremonies in Normandy are meant to honor the Americans, British and Canadians who stormed the beaches on June 6, 1944, dying by the thousands to liberate France and the rest of Europe from a German yoke. No one who has visited the Allied cemeteries in Normandy, row after row of graves, can fail to be moved by this sacrifice. This is therefore not the place for France and Germany to play a political duet, any more than the anniversary of the terror attacks of Sept. 11 is an event for the Republican Party to co-opt for its political convention.
Apart from the obvious fact that playing politics with such anniversaries is an insult to their heroes and victims, doing so is counterproductive. There are plenty of venues where Mr. Chirac could demonstrate, and has demonstrated, his rapport with Mr. Schröder. At the D-Day commemorations, the German chancellor will only prompt the sort of commentaries and reactions so memorably spoofed in the "Fawlty Towers" television show: "Just don't mention the war!" However admirable Germany's soul searching, World War II still hangs heavily over all European activities. It was painfully obvious in the outcry when Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, referred to a German heckler as a concentration-camp guard, and when Poland reacted angrily to Germany's objections to the size of Poland's vote in the E.U.
Such tensions are rare these days. But it does no good to force the issue through unnecessary political charades. Disinviting Mr. Schröder is unthinkable, and the dwindling organizations of World War II veterans have been wise not to make an issue of his coming. It is time to move on. What is important now is to make sure that the commemorations keep their focus on the nobility and tragedy of what happened 60 years ago, and not on the maneuverings of tone-deaf politicians.
European unity
The history of an idea
Jan 3rd 2004
From The Economist print edition
The idea of a united Europe stretches back thousands of years. The early enthusiasts were seldom as high-minded as their modern successors
(This is a good background reading on the history of the European Union and its more ancient origins)
A FEW months ago, George Bush gave a lunch at the White House for Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission. Mr Prodi, keen to impress upon his host the grandeur of the European project, launched into a description of the enlargement of the European Union. By 2004, he pointed out, the EU would have 450m citizens and its territory would stretch from the Atlantic to the borders of Russia. “Sounds like the Roman empire, Romano,” remarked Mr Bush. Other lunchers guessed that the American president was being gently satirical. But Mr Bush, wittingly or not, had touched upon a serious point. The drive for “European unity”, which will proceed further next year when the EU's membership expands to 25 countries, has deep historical origins. Indeed, they do stretch back to the dissolution of the Roman empire.
Ever since the fall of Rome, a strain in European thought has longed for the re-creation of an over-arching political structure for Europe, and used the Roman empire as a model. In 800AD—more than three centuries after the fall of Rome—Charlemagne, the king of the Franks, had himself crowned in Rome by the pope. His new empire stretched from the Pyrenees to the Danube and from Hamburg to Sicily; and his imperial seal bore the words Renovatio Imperii Romani, “the Renewal of the Roman Empire”.
Charlemagne's empire fell apart fairly swiftly after his death. But the memory of Charlemagne—and of the empire that he wished to renew—continued to inspire those who sought to unify Europe by fair means or foul. Napoleon created the Legion of Honour, an order of distinction, in 1802 on the model of the Roman Legio Honoratorum and invoked Charlemagne at his imperial coronation in 1804. Hitler's loyalists gave the Roman salute and their cry “Heil Hitler!” was modelled on “Hail Caesar!” When the Nazis formed a new SS division for French volunteers they called it the Charlemagne division.
Of course, the Romans have inspired not only despots but also democrats, among them the architects of the Capitol in Washington, DC. And the Romans and Charlemagne also inspired the fathers of the EU, whose objectives were the exact opposite of war. The founding treaty of their creation was signed in Rome in 1957 and their successors were hoping—until this month'st failed summit—to return to the eternal city in 2004 to put their names to a new constitution. Meanwhile the expansion of the club is being managed from the Charlemagne building in Brussels.
It is easy to see common elements in the Roman and the Carolingian empires that might appeal to modern-day builders of Europe. Most obvious is sheer territorial expanse. To that may be added the creation of a common legal code, the issuance of a common currency as a symbol of imperial rule, the building of roads linking the empire (or trans-European networks, as they are unsmilingly called in Brussels). And all this is based upon a new, and supposedly lasting, peace within the empire—for the Romans, the Pax Romana.
Unity, fraternity, creativity
The notion that unity and peace in Europe are two sides of the same coin is an article of faith for modern pro-Europeans. A large exhibition about the history of the idea of European unity was staged in 2003 at the German History Museum in Berlin. Marie-Louise von Plessen, the exhibition's curator, argues that the “idea of unification and peace are completely linked.” The political sympathies of the exhibition's organisers were barely disguised.
The Berlin exhibition emphasised the intellectual origins of the idea of European unity. Miss von Plessen's plan was to show that “Behind the shifting alliances between nations, there were always people who thought and wrote about the utopia of a united Europe, even though they were never really taken seriously until after the second world war.” The thousands of people trooping through the galleries were treated to tableaux bearing quotes from philosophers and thinkers promoting the idea of European unity.
There was Pierre Dubois, a counsellor for the Duke of Burgundy, who called for a European federation in 1306; Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who made a celebrated call for “perpetual peace”; William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, and an early advocate of a European parliament; and Victor Hugo, the French 19th-century novelist who proclaimed in 1849 that “A day will come when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, Germany, you, all nations of the continent, without losing your distinctive qualities and glorious individuality, will be merged within a superior unit.” Lest any utterly dim-witted visitor miss the political moral, the exhibition closed with a quotation from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the chairman of the convention that drafted the disputed constitution for the EU, urging his listeners to “Dream of Europe. Let us imagine a continent at peace, freed of its barriers and obstacles, where history and geography are finally reconciled.”
A tableau of crimes and misfortunes
It is not just museum curators and elderly politicians who hold fast to the idea that European unity is both the best way of guaranteeing peace in Europe and a natural historical progression. The idea is also cherished among serious historians in France and Germany. Hagen Schulze, a professor of history at the Free University of Berlin, ends his scholarly study of the evolution of the European nation-state, “States, Nations and Nationalism”, with the thought that the “ancient states and nations” of Europe “may gradually fade away and recede into the background to make way for one united Europe.” This, he avers, is likely to be a considerable improvement on previous efforts to “restore the former unity of this continent by elevating one of its major powers” to a position of hegemony—first Spain, then France, then Germany. The horrors of the fighting in Yugoslavia—he was writing in the mid-1990s—bring forth more lamentations about the warlike tendencies of nation-states. “The baleful principle of a nation united by bonds of blood is still capable of threatening democracy and plunging Europe into fresh...trials of strength.”
French historians tend to be a little less eager to wish away la patrie. But many of them also almost instinctively link the idea of European unity with notions of peace and progress. Jacques Boussard in “The Civilisation of Charlemagne” (1968) asserts that “Charlemagne's achievement was the realisation of a united Europe. There were no wars except at the frontiers.” (This is an important qualification, given that the great man fought some 53 military campaigns expanding the boundaries of his empire.) In Boussard's view it was only the “stable society created by Charlemagne” that allowed for an “extraordinary outpouring of cultural, artistic and intellectual activity.”
It is sometimes observed that places that once formed part of Charlemagne's empire—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands—have been much more at ease with the modern-day drive for European unity than areas that fell outside it, notably Britain and Scandinavia. Perhaps as a consequence, British historians are less likely than their French or German counterparts to assume that European unity is necessarily synonymous with peace and cultural progress. In the “Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe”, for example, George Holmes argues that one of the lessons of the period is the “extraordinary vigour and creativity which derive from the fragmentation of power and wealth”, and that “the places where political fragmentation was most complete, such as Tuscany, the Low Countries and the Rhineland, were perhaps the most creative.”
Arguments about the connections between creativity and culture on the one hand and political unity and fragmentation on the other are reassuringly abstract—particularly when safely placed in the Middle Ages. Historical debate becomes a lot rougher when it moves into the modern era. In 1997 John Laughland published “The Tainted Source”, whose subtitle—“The undemocratic origins of the European idea”—summarises its general thesis. Mr Laughland, who helps to run a Eurosceptical lobby group called the European Foundation, argues that it is not just the familiar figures in the pro-European pantheon—Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and the like—who preached the virtues of European unity. Similar sentiments had been expressed by Hitler and the architects of fascist Italy and Vichy France.
Hitler, for example, told the Reichstag in 1936, “It is not very intelligent to imagine that in such a cramped house like that of Europe, a community of peoples can maintain different legal systems and different concepts of law for long.” Mussolini urged in 1933 that, “Europe may once again grasp the helm of world civilisation if it can develop a modicum of political unity.” Oswald Mosley, the leading British fascist of the 1930s, was also a champion of the idea of European union.
Partly as a result of Mr Laughland's work, many British Eurosceptics are inclined to see the modern promoters of European unity not as idealistic peaceniks, but as the heirs of Hitler who have simply devised a new and subtler plan for taking over Britain. Bonkers? Perhaps. They certainly forget the speech of Winston Churchill in Zurich in 1946, in which he called for a United States of Europe. But the conquest-by-stealth view is popular in Britain. When Mr Giscard d'Estaing published his draft constitution this year, the Sun, Britain's bestselling newspaper, greeted it with a cartoon showing Hitler and Napoleon squabbling over a copy of the document, each claiming, “I thought of it first.”
A DNA test for Europe's real father?
Hitler does not feature very prominently either in Mr Giscard d'Estaing's works or in the recent Berlin exhibition on ideas of European unity. In the German exhibition, the Nazi contribution to the debate on European unity is dismissed thus: “Hitler seeks to subjugate the European continent to the Third Reich in the name of ‘New Europe'.” Miss von Plessen, the exhibition's organiser, says that she used Mr Laughland's book as a source for the Berlin show. But she argues that it is unfair to link Hitler to the modern movement for European unity because “Hitler based his ideas on notions of the superiority of the Germanic race and conquest, whereas modern Europe is being built on the idea of equality between peoples.”
She is not much keener on the idea that Napoleon was a “builder of Europe”. The exhibition catalogue refers to the French emperor as “seeking to use national sentiments for his own ends” and implies that it was the monarchical alliance that defeated him, and this was the true promoter of European co-operation and peace.
Some French historians, however, are much less bashful about claiming Napoleon to the cause of European Unity. Since the French still generally regard Napoleon as a “good thing”—he was a hero to Churchill, too—they are less likely to fear that the cause of European unity will suffer by association with the emperor.
On the contrary. In 2002 Historia, a monthly French magazine, published an article under the title “Napoleon—the real father of Europe”, with a cover illustration of the great man crossing the Alps wearing a hat decorated with the insignia of today's EU. According to the article, many of the EU's features—federal law, the common market, the dismantling of frontiers, the promotion of the idea of the rights of man—can be traced to the Napoleonic heritage. Why, even the Grand Army brought together 20 nations. And such musings are not confined to popular history magazines. Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, recently published a book on Napoleon in which he argued, “History has vindicated Napoleon's vision of a ‘great European family' of the future.”
Napoleon himself had little doubt that he deserved to be counted as a great European. In his memoirs, he lamented that had he only won his war in Russia, “Europe would soon have been...but one people, and anyone who travelled anywhere would have found himself always in the common fatherland.” Moreover, “Paris would have been the capital of the world, and the French the envy of the nations.”
O, for an empire like America's
Should anyone really be disturbed by the less savoury antecedents of Europhilia? Even Mr Laughland, the Eurosceptic polemicist, notes in a fit of fairness that “drawing attention to the detail of Nazi propaganda about Europe is not to imply that modern pro-Europeans are fascists. That would be absurd.” If the modern makers of European union are constructing an empire, it is of a new and strange variety—reliant on persuasion, example and regulation, rather than force of arms.
Naturally, it has ambitions. If pressed, few of the architects of the modern Europe venture would deny that they hope that one day the EU will be a great power—a peaceable, liberal, law-based and generous great power, no doubt, but one capable of looking the United States or China in the eye. Mr Bush caught an authentic whiff of this ambition when he teased Mr Prodi about the new Roman empire. Perhaps, nursing some imperial ambitions of his own, he recognised it. Not long before their lunch, Joseph Nye, a Harvard professor, was writing of the United States, “Not since Rome has any one nation loomed so large above the others.” The Roman empire has indeed been re-created, it seems, but its capital is Washington, DC—for the time being, anyway. Maybe, after a while, the new division of the West will mirror the old division of the Roman empire, with Rome and Constantinople replaced by Washington and Brussels.
Copyright © 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
Charlemagne
Of wars and weighted votes
Jan 3rd 2004
From The Economist print edition
(How the history of conflicts between Germany and Poland has played an important role in the failure of the EU summit that should have approved the new Constitution)
The history and future of the German-Polish relationship
THE European Union was founded in reaction to the second world war. In many ways, its greatest triumph is that European leaders now spend their time arguing about fish quotas, not disputed frontiers. Yet occasionally memories of war bubble back to the surface. The recent deadlocked European Union summit in Brussels was just such an occasion.
That the central confrontation came between Germany and Poland was bound to stir up memories. But despite the tension, the EU could still claim to be exercising its civilising influence. This was not, after all, an argument about national survival. Rather it was a dispute between two democratic governments over voting rights, one to be settled by multilateral negotiations, not force of arms. The Germans want EU votes to reflect population size, giving them twice as much weight as the Poles. The Poles are leading the defence of the current system, which gives them almost as much clout as the Germans.
Berlin
Germany, Poland
The European Union
EU enlargement
The EU has information on the summit.
Poles usually make a point of not mentioning the war explicitly in any dealings with Germany. But they barely need to. It is implicit in their insistence that they will not be intimidated by demands from their bigger and more powerful neighbour. Asked by the BBC whether he was worried that Germany might make his country suffer for its obduracy, President Alexander Kwasniewski of Poland exploded that his country was not afraid of suffering: Polish history was about suffering.
These days, the German approach to Poland seems slightly less weighed down by memories of the war. This is new. In the tortuous negotiations over the enlargement of the EU, which took up much of the 1990s, Germany championed the Polish cause, making much of its need for an historic reconciliation with its eastern neighbour. When other countries mused that Poland might not be ready to join the first wave of new entrants, the Germans were always the first to insist that any EU expansion without Poland was not worth having.
Now that Poland's entry is secure, though, the Germans seem to feel that past debts have been settled in full. Indeed the new German refrain is that the Poles are being unreasonable and arrogant in blocking the adoption of a new constitution, even before they are officially inside the Union's pearly gates. (Poland, along with nine other countries, mostly from central and eastern Europe, will formally join the EU only in May, but all have been included in the constitutional debate as they will be full members when any new constitution comes into force.) Günter Verheugen, a European commissioner from Germany who handled the enlargement negotiations, recently fumed to the European Parliament that he now almost regrets all the efforts that he made on Poland's behalf. In the corridors of the Brussels summit one German diplomat was even heard to say, without apparent irony: “How can the Poles behave like this, after everything we have done for them?”
It is not just the Poles who are acutely aware of the weight of history. There was a distinct whiff of 1939 and all that in the reaction of British Conservatives to the way the plucky Poles had scuppered the EU constitution and “stood up to the Germans”. Perhaps the most tasteless comment in the summit's corridors came from a Swedish diplomat, who remarked: “Maybe the Poles could claim equal voting weight with Germany, by counting all the Poles that the Germans killed in the war.”
Not terribly funny, perhaps—but not entirely frivolous, either. Consider the reconciliation between France and Germany on which the EU was founded. The principle of absolute equality between aggressor and victim was clearly fundamental to the bargain. For over a decade after German reunification had boosted that country's population well beyond France's, the French continued to insist that the two should retain precisely equal voting weights. France formally abandoned this position only in 2002. “In the end you have to accommodate yourself to reality,” explains a French diplomat. “The Poles will have to do the same, eventually.”
Think national, speak Europe
The closeness of today's Franco-German relationship is often cited as a model for the future of German-Polish relations. But, whereas France and Germany have now had 50 years of working together in which to overcome old fears and hatreds, for most of that time Poland was locked away behind the Iron Curtain. The French and German leaderships like to argue that, partly as a result, Polish politicians are still fixated on old ideas of national sovereignty, while their two countries have moved on to a new sort of relationship, based on a fresh way of thinking that transcends such old categories as the “national interest” or “national security”.
To make the point that Germany is thinking of European rather than national interests in pressing for the new constitution, German diplomats are now recounting a key moment in the Brussels summit. Searching for a compromise, Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister who was chairing the talks, suggested to Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, that rather than moving to a voting system linked to population, Germany could simply have more votes within the current system: perhaps three more votes, giving Germany 32 votes, against 29 each for France, Britain and Italy, and 27 each for Poland and Spain. Mr Schröder dismissed this angrily: the point, he said, was not to increase German power, but to give the EU a more rational system of government.
Maybe so. But then a population-based voting system is even more advantageous to Germany. And, as one distinguished German chancellor, Bismarck, once put it: “I have always found the word Europe in the mouth of those politicians who were demanding from other powers something that they did not dare demand in their own name.”
Copyright © The Economist Newspaper Limited 2004. All rights reserved.
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The two most prestigious German newspapers are in crisis. It has to do with lagging advertising revenues, population aging and the difficulties to find new readers, and, according to this story, the German version of capitalism "that is more socially conscious and less Darwinian than the Anglo-Saxon version."
I would add the fact that print newspapers are threatened everywhere by deep changes in media ecology shaken by the advent of the internet and other new technologies.
This is a situation that we will find in many European countries.
The New York Times - Woes at Two Pillars of German Journalism
English edition of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (weekly)
Woes at Two Pillars of German Journalism
By MARK LANDLER
FRANKFURT, Jan. 18 - The parking lot next to the headquarters of Frankfurt's largest newspaper could be mistaken for that of a Silicon Valley software firm in the late 1990's. Mercedes-Benzes, BMW's, and the odd Volkswagen sit in rows, although, unlike their California counterparts, they all bear license plates with the letters "F-AZ."
That is an abbreviation for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, perhaps Germany's most august paper, and certainly one of its most generous employers. Until this year, a job at the paper came with a company car: entry-level reporters got a VW Golf, senior editors a top-of-the-line BMW.
Now, though, the cars are limited to senior editors, and they must pay a monthly fee for them. Like most German newspapers, including its Munich rival, Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung suffered mightily in the recent recession. Its lush perks, and nearly a quarter of its staff, have vanished with its ad revenue.
While Germany's economy rumbles back to life, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the country's other newspapers have enjoyed little of the recovery. With ad revenue down nearly 40 percent since its peak in 2000, and once-lucrative help-wanted ads off by 75 percent, the leading publishers are being forced to confront fundamental questions about the viability of their business.
Nowhere has the pain been more acute than at Germany's two most celebrated dailies, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Both expanded pell-mell during the Internet boom. At the Süddeutsche, the reversal in ad sales was so severe that it brought the paper to the brink of bankruptcy in October 2002.
With national distribution, far-flung foreign bureaus, and well-honed political positions - the Allgemeine tilts right, the Süddeutsche left - these papers are the twin pillars of Germany's fourth estate.
"It would be the equivalent of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times being in critical financial trouble at the same time," said Adam Bird, leader of the media practice at Booz Allen Hamilton in Munich.
More than respected editorial voices, the two papers are quintessentially German institutions, with complex ownership structures, consensus-driven management, and business philosophies - particularly at the Allgemeine Zeitung - that emphasize long-term values over short-term profits.
They exemplify what economists sometimes describe as Rhenish capitalism, a German style of business that is more socially conscious and less Darwinian than the Anglo-Saxon version. In Germany's brutal media marketplace, such a model may no longer be sustainable.
"These papers were isolated from normal market forces," said Josef Joffe, editor of the weekly paper Die Zeit and a former foreign editor at Süddeutsche Zeitung. "They went on a spending spree while the guillotine was coming down. They need to cut back to where they were before."
In the last three years, Hans Werner Kilz, editor in chief of Süddeutsche Zeitung, has presided over a reduction in his staff to 307, from 425, the closing of a regional edition in Düsseldorf, and the scrapping of a section devoted to news from Berlin. He has preserved the paper's 22 overseas news bureaus, but has slashed travel budgets.
Ask Mr. Kilz whether his paper can preserve its editorial quality, and he shrugs. "I'm an optimist by nature, but . . ." he said, the words trailing off.
The Süddeutsche survived a scrape with insolvency in late 2002 through a 150 million euro investment by a new shareholder. The investor, a regional newspaper chain called Südwestdeutsche Medien, joined the five Bavarian families that started the paper in October 1945.
Although the new investor has only an 18.75 percent stake in the parent company, Süddeutscher Verlag, several insiders said it was determined to extract a higher return on investment, even if that meant deep cuts.
Süddeutsche Verlag, which also publishes professional books, lost 76.6 million euros in 2002. The company estimates that it broke even last year, though the final figures, which will not be published until summer, may show a small loss.
Hanswilli Jenke, one of two relatively new managing directors, said the paper was still in the midst of a two-year turnaround.
"The boulder was rolling down the mountain," said Mr. Jenke, a former television executive. "We stopped it in the middle of the slope, and now we have to push it back up the mountain."
Advertising is showing the first glimmerings of a recovery, he said. As in the United States, the rebound in Germany's media business has been led by broadcasting, with magazines and newspapers behind.
To grab its share, Mr. Jenke said, the company had strengthened its advertising sales staff. He hopes eventually to sell ancillary products, like books, CD's, and digital video discs, to Süddeutsche's 310,000 subscribers. Adding single-copy sales, the paper's total circulation is 437,000 copies.
Mr. Jenke said Süddeutsche had also streamlined its management, once known for its slow pace because all major decisions were subject to the approval of the five founding families. It now has a three-member operating committee that represents the owners.
Mr. Jenke denied that the company, or its new co-owner, would sacrifice quality in a rush for profits. "The challenge is to maintain the quality," he said. "Editorial quality is the basis of our economic model."
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which is majority-owned by a nonprofit foundation, does not face quite the same pressures. But its parent, F.A.Z. group, suffered a loss of 60.6 million euros in 2002 and is expected to report another loss for 2003 (the paper's circulation is 388,000).
At the peak of the Internet boom in 1999 and early 2000, when companies bought half-page ads to recruit executives, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung turned away advertising. On Saturdays, when it carries help-wanted ads, it had 234 pages at its peak. On a recent Saturday, it ran 44 pages.
"My question was: did our whole business model work anymore?" said Frank Schirrmacher, one of the five publishers, who oversees the culture and ideas section.
Like the Süddeutsche, the Frankfurter Allgemeine had expanded aggressively, with customized sections for Berlin and Munich, and a six-day-a-week English-language edition distributed as an insert in The International Herald Tribune, which is owned by The New York Times Company.
The customized sections were scrapped. The English edition shrank to a tabloid published once a week. The paper curtailed its benefits - not just the company cars, but also its generous pensions.
The ownership structure of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung insulates its publishers - who function more like American top editors - from pressure. Because of the structure of the business, it is difficult for the managers of the parent company to dismiss these five men. Still, Mr. Schirrmacher said he and his colleagues recognized that unless they stabilized the paper's finances, they risked losing their independence.
Despite his questions about the paper's viability, Mr. Schirrmacher said he believed there was a place for a high-quality, nationally distributed paper in Germany. The preliminary results for 2003 do not look as grim as in earlier years. And the paper, which had been losing readers since 2001, picked up a few in the most recent industry survey, while the Süddeutsche lost some.
In Munich, Hans Werner Kilz is also trying to look on the bright side. He noted that the Süddeutsche had widened its circulation lead over the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in recent years.
Both papers, and most of their competitors, are fighting a long downward trend in readers, as the population in Germany ages and newspapers fail to replace older readers with young ones.
A courtly 60-year-old, Mr. Kilz knows about the vagaries of journalism. He edited Germany's top news magazine, Der Spiegel, for eight years, leaving after a clash with its publisher, Rudolf Augstein.
Now, as he faces a new owner and an uncertain future, Mr. Kilz can only hope his paper's values will prevail.
"We publish this paper with a piece of our hearts," he said, as the last rays of the afternoon sun flickered outside his window. "The people here love this paper. One must not do anything to take away this love."
A report written by two economists and whose content is presented by Le Monde states that the situation of French Universities is so dire that it paralyzes the growth of the country. It is due both to the lack of adequate funding (1.1% of GDP vs. 2.3% in the U.S.) and to a bad organization of the system. "Today's France has no future," commented Elie Cohen, one of the authors of the report.
The authors make an interesting distinction between "countries of imitation" (like France) and "countries of innovation" (like the US, Finland or Denmark). They show that good primary schools and high-schools form people able to adopt technologies invented elsewhere while Universities hold the key to innovation and growth in productivity.
This new document is only the latest argument for the growing body of analysts for whom France has entered a period of crisis and shows no capacity to adapt to changing times: a typical feature of French history that has lead to some of its cyclic upheavals.
Le système français d'enseignement supérieur handicape la croissance, selon deux chercheurs
LE MONDE | 20.01.04 | 13h52
Un rapport du Conseil d'analyse économique démontre que la France a privilégié l'enseignement primaire et secondaire, comme les "pays imitateurs", quand seule l'innovation porte la croissance.
L'économie française a "décroché" et elle ne saurait retrouver une croissance revigorée avec le système d'enseignement supérieur qui est le sien : Elie Cohen, directeur de recherche au CNRS, et Philippe Aghion, professeur à l'université Harvard, sont formels. Les deux auteurs ne cachent pas leurs inquiétudes dans le rapport Education et croissance qu'ils ont réalisé pour le Conseil d'analyse économique (CAE), qui rassemble des économistes de tous bords autour du premier ministre, et qui devait être rendu public mardi 20 janvier.
A l'heure où la réforme de l'université a été ajournée sine die par le gouvernement et où les moyens consacrés à la recherche souffrent des restrictions budgétaires, il est pourtant urgent d'agir, estiment MM. Cohen et Aghion, si on veut éviter un "scénario catastrophe" : "difficultés de recrutement ; désertion de l'université française par les meilleurs chercheurs ; attirés par le secteur privé ou l'étranger, suivis de près par leurs meilleurs étudiants ; baisse continue du niveau. L'université, non sélective, ne serait plus alors qu'une voie de garage où ne s'agglutineraient plus que les mauvais bacheliers".
"La France d'aujourd'hui n'a aucun avenir. Nicolas Baverez a raison", assène M. Cohen. Pour lui, comme pour son coauteur, la France d'aujourd'hui est un "pays d'imitation", dont la croissance dépend d'abord de l'utilisation de technologies inventées ailleurs. Mais, compte tenu de ses "structures sociales, elle n'a pas les moyens de lutter avec la Chine" et se condamne à mourir, estime M. Cohen. Pour survivre, elle doit donc rejoindre le club de ce que les deux économistes appellent les "pays d'innovation", où l'innovation "tend à devenir le principal moteur de la croissance", comme les Etats-Unis, la Finlande, la Suède ou le Danemark.
Seulement voilà, l'innovation est très dépendante de la qualité de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche d'un pays. Et ces derniers, en France, ne sont pas à la hauteur. Ils interdisent cette métamorphose, de l'imitation à l'innovation. Et empêchent donc, de ce fait, la croissance française de décoller. Car - et c'est là la grande originalité de leur travail -, MM. Cohen et Aghion montrent que l'éducation est créatrice de croissance, dans une proportion qui dépend à la fois de la manière dont elle est organisée, des moyens qui y sont affectés mais aussi du degré de développement du pays.
Leur théorie, qu'ils valident par de nombreux résultats empiriques, est la suivante : pour les pays d'imitation, les enseignements primaire et secondaire sont primordiaux, alors que pour les pays d'innovation, c'est l'enseignement supérieur qui est moteur.
Une économie d'imitation doit assurer une large alphabétisation de la population qui peut ainsi s'approprier les outils techniques et productifs qui viennent d'ailleurs. Tel est le rôle du primaire et du secondaire. "Un système privilégiant le supérieur est plus à même de stimuler la croissance lorsque l'économie devient suffisamment proche de la frontière technologique", définie par le modèle américain, poursuivent MM. Cohen et Aghion.
Où se situe la France aujourd'hui ? Entre 1945 et 1970, elle a réussi à réduire son retard de productivité par rapport aux Etats-Unis, notamment "parce que son système primaire et secondaire a accru sa capacité à assimiler les techniques déjà appliquées aux Etats-Unis". Mais petit à petit, l'importance de l'innovation comme source de croissance s'est accrue, un phénomène renforcé par l'émergence des technologies de l'information. A la fin des années 1970, estiment les auteurs du rapport, la France aurait franchi "le cap où l'efficacité de l'investissement dans l'enseignement supérieur devenait supérieur à celle de l'investissement dans l'enseignement secondaire".
Mais tel n'a justement pas été le choix des pouvoirs publics, qui ont continué à privilégier le secondaire, avec comme objectif d'amener 80 % d'une classe d'âge au bac. Un élève du secondaire coûte 36 % de plus en France qu'en moyenne dans l'OCDE alors qu'un élève de l'enseignement supérieur coûte 11 % de moins en France que dans la moyenne de l'OCDE. Rapportées au PIB de 1999, les dépenses d'éducation pour le supérieur représentaient 1,1 % (1 % en investissements publics, 0,1 % en privés) en France et 2,3 % aux Etats-Unis (1,1 % en investissements publics, 1,2 % en investissements privés).
Il faut "un effort vigoureux et des moyens nouveaux significatifs", concluent MM. Cohen et Aghion. Mais ce n'est pas qu'une question d'argent. "Les traits institutionnels propres à notre enseignement supérieur créent des difficultés supplémentaires. Notre système souffre en effet de la double coupure entre universités et grandes écoles d'une part, formation et recherche d'autre part", nuancent-ils cependant.
Dans ce contexte, en termes d'innovation, la position française, mesurée par le nombre de brevets déposés ou encore l'impact de ses publications scientifiques, se détériore. Une dégradation qui va de pair, pour les auteurs, avec celle de la productivité française : depuis dix ans, le PIB par employé a perdu environ 10 % en termes relatifs par rapport à celui des Etats-Unis, du Japon, de l'Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni.
"La conclusion logique de notre diagnostic serait qu'il faut mettre à terre le système d'enseignement supérieur français. Et en reconstruire un nouveau", reconnaît Elie Cohen. Mais ce n'est pas ce que proposent les deux économistes dans leur rapport. "L'échec de la réforme Allègre est là pour nous rappeler qu'une réforme globale est d'autant plus impossible qu'elle est audacieuse ou au moins présentée comme telle", expliquent les auteurs, qui renoncent donc à puiser dans la "boîte à outils de la réforme radicale" (sélection, différenciation salariale, autonomie des universités, suppression du CNRS pour intégrer la formation et la recherche, université payante...).
MM. Cohen et Aghion proposent donc d'accorder des moyens supplémentaires à l'enseignement supérieur, à hauteur de 0,5 % du PIB, mais de manière ciblée, sur "des petits dispositifs qui permettront sans trop provoquer de remous d'introduire de vraies évolutions dans le système actuel". Procéder par création, donc, sans supprimer ce qui existe déjà. En espérant que les innovations se propagent...
Virginie Malingre
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 21.01.04
King Juan Carlos dissolved Spain's parliament last night, ending eight years of rightwing government by the prime minister, José María Aznar, and sounding the starting gun for a March general election.
The exit of Mr Aznar, who has kept his promise not to run for more than two consecutive terms of office, will be a loss to both Tony Blair and George Bush, for whom he has been a close European ally.
The Guardian - Aznar hangs up his legislative boots
Germany's Defense Minister, Peter Struck's plans a massive overhaul of the German military to prepare it for “operations all over the world,“ which he presented on Tuesday, still include an estimated 50,000 draftees. According to the plan, the total number of soldiers would be cut by 35,000 to a maximum of 250,000. The Bundeswehr would be reorganized into three new categories with different missions and equipment - an “intervention force“ focusing on combat operations, a “stability force“ that would support military operations like those in Afghanistan, and a general “support force,“ Struck said.
F.A.Z - Struck plans massive overhaul of Bundeswehr