What we're looking at here is global energy policy and security. The US, as recognized, is reaping the benefits of "rebuilding" Afghanistan and Iraq, with the potential for a greater harvest of energy reserves in the region after its "preventive" action in the latter country and manhunt in the former.
The author outlines how Germany has remained more or less on the sidelines, which is potentially troubling. But now, the constant political instability in the region is perceived as an underestimated threat to energy supplies. Perhaps it's time to get more involved.
Quoting a couple of academics, the writer lists that German dependence on foreign oil is increasing, and there is a need to diversify imports. But what is most curious about one of the academics suggestions is how it follows U.S. policy on foreign oil.
The author tucks this at the bottom of the piece, but it stuck out the most to me: linking energy and security policy. Putatively these are disparate and seperate realms. It also reminds me of a recent New Yorker article that examines Dick Cheney's involvement with Halliburton and defense contracts.
According to this piece, written by Jane Meyer in the Feb. 16 & 23 issue, a high level National Security Council official wrote a memo in Feb. 2001 that "directed NSC staff to cooperate fully with [Cheney's] Energy Task Force as it considered the 'melding' of two seemingly unrelated areas of policy: 'the review of operational policies towards rogue states,' such as Iraq, and 'actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.'"
As dependence on foreign oil increases, and oil exports go more and more to China and expanding economies, will this 'melding' become a commom policy practice? Will the west dispose more and more "authoritarian" rulers who happen to sit on "exploitable" energy reserves?
Of course, many suspect that invasions and regime change have something to do with energy supplies and lining pockets, but will this become explicit policy?
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - An ever more dangerous dependency
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An ever more dangerous dependency
By Nikolas Busse
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led the United States into the region with the bulk of the world's energy reserves, and Washington has been quick to start exploiting the economic advantages of its position. American companies are active in the Gulf and central Asian regions; in such countries as Azerbaijan (oil reserves) and Georgia (oil pipeline to Turkey) the old regional superpower Russia is being forced to watch as the United States secures its strategic interest.
Germany has so far shown little interest in this game of influence and oil, believing that a well-functioning world market offers the best guarantee of reliable supplies. It considers additional political or military efforts unnecessary; after all, the German Economics Ministry says, the oil-producing countries are keen to sell.
Past experience seems to confirm that view. Even the oil crisis of the mid-1970s was basically a price crisis; the basic supply was not threatened. Throughout all political crises in recent decades, oil and gas imports have never subsided, whether they are from the Middle East or Russia. Even the Soviet Union was a reliable supplier.
Nonetheless, a debate over the future of German energy provision has been started in Berlin's foreign policy institutions. Such researchers as Friedemann Müller of the Science and Politics Foundation and Frank Umbach of the German Society for Foreign Policy see the persistent political instability in the Middle East as an underestimated threat.
The two academics are above all concerned by statistics showing that in 30 years Europe will be far more dependent on energy imports than it is today. In 2000, the European members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development still produced 48 percent of their own oil, thanks mostly to the North Sea reserves, but the International Energy Agency estimates that this share will drop to 15 percent by 2030. Most of the shortfall will have to come from the Middle East.
Given the latest political turbulence in this region, this is worrying. Since Sept. 11, 2001 caused new disruptions, perhaps even a war of cultures between the Western world and the Islamic world, oil has begun to look more like a potential political weapon. The authoritarian rulers in the Gulf region could be tempted to ward off Western attempts at political intervention - and democratization - by raising prices or reducing supplies, and if Islamists came to power in one of these countries, oil supplies would be seriously threatened. What's more, the Gulf states are no longer as dependent on the West as a buyer; already, 60 percent of Gulf oil is sold to Asia, a share that is likely to increase further, given the rapid economic growth of southeast and east Asia.
Dependence on imported gas, Germany's second most important source of energy, is also increasing. In 2000, the European OECD countries bought 36 percent of their gas abroad, a share that will rise to 63 percent by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency. Europe currently buys 66 percent of its gas imports in Russia and the rest from Africa. This gives Moscow, in particular, substantial political leverage. Müller argues that the Russian government is already trying to channel gas supplies from other countries, such as Turkmenistan or Kazakstan, to Europe across its own territory so as to gain influence on volumes and prices. “There's a clear conflict of interest here between Russia and Europe,“ Müller says.
Windmills won't be able to change all of this. Even the German Economics Ministry says that alternative sources of energy will account for no more than 7 percent of German energy provision in the medium term. The planned abandonment of nuclear energy will worsen the problem, which is why people like Umbach believe it is time for Germany to link energy and security policy. The United States did this quite a while ago, diversifying imports so that the United States today is less dependent on individual supplier countries. Müller's conclusion: The Europeans should buy more oil from the Caspian region and more gas from Iran.
Feb. 27
Oil (energy) and security have been linked for a very long time. You should try Google and get a sense of how many sites and pages are dedicated to this issue.
As for explicit policy, I think that Reagan and Kissinger, when they formulated their Caribbean Basin strategy, mentionned very clearly the fact that it is a region where oil is extracted, transported and refined, and therefore of strategic importance for the US. Only one example among many.
If you want another example, you might want to read the speaches made after Saddam invaded Kuwait and triggered the first Gulf War.