The Washington Post's "Germany and France Driving EU, to Distraction of Other Members" is a good review of the ties and tensions that exist between France and Germany and gives them some historic perspective.
From the UK, The Daily Telegrap in an article titled "Blair must not blow his European triumph" presents the meeting as a great victory for Blair (France and Germany have failed in their politics towards Iraq, and in reforming their economy) but is worried by what they view as a temptation to "get into bed with two countries whose recent record has been so retrogarade," and that are trying "to build a defence capability to rival NATO's."
The Portuguese Diario de Noticias, in a story titled "Uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades" considers that the existence of a so-called Directory is now a fact. It concedes that the three men who recently met in Germany may very well has the good of Europe as a goal, but it underlines the loss of credibility suffered by France and Germany for their no compliance of the stability pact.
In what appears to be an editorial from The International Herald Tribune "Europe's Big Three," the European version of the New York Times favors the summit for several reasons among which, "the main reason why the trilateral meeting makes sense is that unless Britain, France and Germany see eye to eye, little gets done in the EU."
La Vanguardia from Barcelona in Spain tries to keep a balance between those who see the meeting as a "mistake" as in the story "El tripartito" and those who consider as in "Un directorio europeo?" that anything that can contribute to moving forward is good. Many stories one can find in the Spanish press point out the fact that Blair, Chirac and Schr? are politically weak at this point.
The Washington Post - Germany and France Driving EU, to Distraction of Other Members
Two Say Close Relationship Does Not Harm Europe's Interests
By John Burgess
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, February 22, 2004; Page A25
GENSHAGEN, Germany -- Every six weeks or so, the leaders of Germany and France drop everything and get together for a meal.
This month, the place was this tidy village 10 miles south of Berlin. French President Jacques Chirac arrived by helicopter, then rode through the streets in a black Mercedes, waving to the locals. Ahead, up the cobblestone drive of a mansion that houses a French-German cooperation institute, his counterpart Gerhard Schroeder was waiting. Beaming, the two men embraced, bantered for a moment by the car, then disappeared inside amid a clutch of aides for lunch and private talk.
From the start of European integration a half-century ago, French-German cooperation has been the driving engine. Today the tie is so close, at both the personal and national levels, that elsewhere in Europe some people see too much of a good thing. In their view, France and Germany are sometimes crafting the new Europe on the principle that what's good for them is good for everyone.
In the past year, the two countries have stood firm against the United States in the Iraq war, ignoring sentiment in other European capitals. In efforts to restart their stalled economies, they have violated the fundamental pact of the five-year-old euro common currency. Now they are helping hold up the drafting of the first European Union constitution by insisting on a voting system weighted in their favor.
"The two cooks come from the kitchen and say they have already prepared the dinner . . . You can either eat it or not eat it, but this is what the dinner is," said Jan Truszczynski, who represents Poland, an incoming European Union member, in negotiations. Too often, he said, that's the unpleasant taste the two leave behind.
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, another critic, recently summed up the constitutional deadlock: "There's one issue being debated -- who's going to be the boss in the Europe of the future?" he told Washington Post reporters and editors last month.
In Berlin and Paris, officials concede that such tensions exist, but they say that whatever others may say, Europe's interests remain at the heart of the cooperation. Hans Martin Bury, Schroeder's coordinator for relations with Europe, depicts agreement between France and Germany, countries that have vastly different cultures and a history of animosity, as a natural starting point for any decision to be made in the 15-country EU as a whole.
"If we can't get together, there won't be a consensus in Europe," he said in an interview in his Berlin office. "We bring different interests and traditions together. Our interest is not to dominate Europe but to create new solutions."
The partnership is overseeing a future that includes admission of 10 new member countries on May 1, strengthened rule of law, human rights and environmental protection and a progressive pooling of money and decision-making. The union sometimes functions as a counterbalance to U.S. influence in the world, though in foreign policy the two big partners don't always prevail. During the Iraq war, Britain, Spain and Italy led a faction siding with Washington.
The union is creating closer ties between all members, but nowhere are they closer than between Germany and France. Their cabinets hold joint meetings twice a year. Ministers meet to work on "road maps" on issues of mutual interest. French officials are stationed in ministries in Berlin, and Germans serve with their counterpart agencies in Paris. In a few countries, the governments have joint diplomatic offices and cultural institutes.
The heads of German states and French regional governments met in October to approve the exchange of more students and teachers and generally enhance people-to-people links; about 150,000 people already take part in youth exchange programs each year. Plans call for a 50 percent rise in the number of students studying the other country's language. Historians from both sides are meeting in an effort to draft a common textbook for use in French and German high schools.
As the war generation dies out, ordinary people on the both sides of the long-disputed border are acquiring warmer feelings toward each other. In a November 2002 survey of people aged 15-30, 88 percent of Germans described relations as rather good or very good; 94 percent of French respondents did.
French and German officials contend that each day that things go so smoothly is a miracle, in view of the rivalries and wars between the two peoples stretching back to the Middle Ages.
Preventing yet another armed conflict between France and Germany was the vision underlying the EU's founding in 1951 as a six-country common market for coal and steel. In subsequent years, President Charles de Gaulle acted as Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's patron in readmitting Germany to respectability in the postwar period.
National needs have often helped smooth over personal differences between German and French leaders in the past, as is happening today. Chirac is a highly cultured man who attended France's elite schools and leads a right-of-center government. Schroeder has blue-collar roots and governs from the left. But by all outward signs, there is a personal rapport, and officials on both sides say it is real.
Relations between the two leaders were not always smooth. At an EU summit in Nice in December 2000, France and Germany clashed over a new framework for governance of an expanded EU. But a month later the two met for dinner at a restaurant in the French village of Blaesheim, on territory that had changed hands four times in 130 years. They decided to meet every six weeks or so, just to keep up. The lunch in Genshagen on Feb. 9 was the 17th such get-together.
The first big sign of parallel thinking came in 2002, when France and Germany reached a deal on restructuring EU farm programs, the largest single drain on the EU's $120 billion annual budget.
As the Iraq war approached, the two leaders again stood together, in opposition. Their reasons were different. Chirac sought to assert France's independence in the world, political analysts say, while Schroeder found he could save a failing reelection campaign by playing to antiwar sentiments among German voters. But the positions were the same: no support at the United Nations, no troops.
In the meantime, both countries' economies were stagnating as part of the global slowdown that followed the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Both governments tried to stimulate their economies through deficit spending, at levels supposedly outlawed by a pact that laid down rules for countries using the euro.
In theory, they became liable for fines equivalent to billions of dollars. In November, finance ministers from the euro countries voted 8 to 4 to forgive the transgression. Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm, a dissenter, complained that other ministers "had been intimidated by these two big countries."
France and Germany have also stood firm in the unsuccessful negotiations on the EU's first constitution. They and other countries say that to pass, a measure must have the backing of a majority of countries that represent at least 60 percent of the expanded EU's population of nearly 500 million people. That would make it hard for smaller countries to gang up against the big ones.
People in other countries sometimes see hints of coercion in statements from Germany, the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, that without agreement on the constitution it will be hard to settle on budgets.
The new style of business has also drawn criticism at home. In Germany, a debate broke out last year on whether the country was squandering trust and friendships built at great effort since 1945. "There is less willingness by people to think that France and Germany act in the interests of Europe," said Christoph Bertram, chairman of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "The Germans have lost something very important."
In France, said Jean-Luc Parodi, an analyst at the IFOP polling institute, the political elite is committed to the German ties. But among ordinary citizens, feelings can differ. Some "see a little risk in giving too much importance to this alliance and not enough to the total European alliance."
Officials in the two countries promise to try harder to consult, but some say that at times there's just no pleasing the critics. At the constitutional convention, said a senior French official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, delegates from other countries frequently asked: " 'What will France and Germany do?' They were waiting for the initiative from France and Germany . . . In other cases, they said, 'be careful, we don't want you to impose your views.' "
Bury said that Germany and France work hard to include other nations in consultations. British Prime Minister Tony Blair periodically attends three-way summits with Chirac and Schroeder, most recently Wednesday in Berlin. In addition, Germany and France are developing European military policy with Belgium and Luxembourg, and strengthening ties with Poland.
But in their public words and body language, Chirac and Schroeder seem to try to show there is no relationship like theirs. At news conferences, they talk about holding identical views. At times, each publicly grants the other a sort of political power of attorney -- the right to speak for both.
In Genshagen, dressed in similar gray suits, they stepped into a ballroom to deliver that message again to reporters.
Schroeder said: "The close, friendly French-German cooperation that has brought very, very pleasant personal experiences is truly fit to make progress for both countries, to make progress for Europe and to let the weight that we have together be clearly known in international discussions."
Chirac chimed in: "On the European topics that we have discussed our positions are absolutely identical. We have the same views." He went on to say that later in the day Schroeder would present those views on behalf of both men to Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the EU.
But one French reporter managed to zero in on discord. France wants to lower the EU-regulated value-added tax that restaurants collect; Germany is opposed. Chirac replied that France understands Germany's position, and Germany understands France's. Smiling, he added that on this issue France will not budge.
The Daily Telegraph - Blair must not blow his European triumph
(Filed: 19/02/2004)
Never did Britain appear more at the heart of Europe than at yesterday's trilateral summit in Berlin. Tony Blair is being courted by France and Germany because they realise that on their own they cannot remain the driving force in a union shortly to expand to 25 members. In addition, they are having second thoughts about having alienated the United States, and a large part of Europe, by their opposition to last year's invasion of Iraq. They hope that Britain can provide the impetus for new moves towards integration, and at the same time act as a bridge to Washington.
For his part, the Prime Minister seeks to convince a sceptical domestic electorate that his "passionate" commitment to both the transatlantic relationship and the union is paying off. Events of the past year - the invasion of Iraq, the imminence of enlargement - have handed him a diplomatic coup.
The kudos of Berlin, however, raises more questions than it answers. Will not France and Germany seek to exploit Mr Blair's delight at being at the heart of Europe for their own ends, the first to build a defence capability to rival Nato's, the second to advance a federal agenda? Do we want to get into bed with two countries whose recent record has been so retrograde, initially over reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, then in breaching the guidelines of the stability and growth pact?
What of our relationships with other European allies, notably Italy, Poland and Spain, which fear that the Berlin triumvirate is an embryonic directory designed to present European summits with faits accomplis, thus excluding them from decision-making? And can a country which remains outside the euro zone really claim to belong to the core?
The seismic shifts which are taking place offer Britain an opportunity to reassert Europe's vocation as a union of nation states rather than a would-be federation. France and Germany, the old motors of integration, have alienated many of their partners by their behaviour over Iraq and the stability pact.
The Commission has rarely been weaker. Differences over voting rights have prevented adoption of a European constitution. The new entrants are looking for liberal economic policies which will allow them to make the most of membership. As a champion of transatlantic unity and free trade, Britain has the potential to be the continent's pace-maker.
The problem is Mr Blair's ambivalence. He is a close ally of Washington, yet has accepted the union's acquiring an autonomous defence capability outside Nato. Despite domestic opposition, he still dreams of taking Britain into the euro zone. His attitude towards the new European constitution remains confusing: he talks of red lines that cannot be crossed, yet appears ready to accept a document which would radically alter the union's status.
This may be the hour of Britain within European councils, but it is far from certain that he is the man to match it.
Diario de Noticias - Uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades
O chanceler alem㯠tentou ontem minimizar a import⮣ia da cimeira tripartida de Berlim, onde participaram, alé do pr󰲩o Gerhard Schroeder, o Presidente franc곬 Jacques Chirac, e o primeiro-ministro ingl곬 Tony Blair. O que alguns paí³¥s europeus temiam - recorde-se a carta de seis lí¤¥res de outros tantos paí³¥s (Portugal, Espanha, Itᬩa, Holanda, Poló®©¡ e Estó®©¡) ao primeiro-ministro irland곬 que este semestre preside à •ni㯠Europeia, em defesa do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento e do princí°©o da igualdade para todos - acabou por acontecer: a cria磯 de um direct󲩯 europeu.
Schroeder afirmou que a iniciativa n㯠visava o domí®©o de ningué e muito menos da Europa. O chanceler alem㯠sublinhou que os trê³ pretendiam apenas resolver os problemas comuns e aumentar a eficᣩa da UE. A afirma磯 é ¶erdadeira, já ±ue os trê³ procuram fugir aos problemas internos dos seus paí³¥s e, por isso, querem assumir a imagem de estadistas que resolvem os problemas da UE. A questã¯ é ±ue os outros paí³¥s olham com desconfianç¡ para Franç¡ e Alemanha, que foram durante anos o motor da Europa, sobretudo na concretiza磯 de projectos como a Uni㯠Econó©£a e MonetᲩa e o pr󰲩o euro. O facto de n㯠cumprirem as regras do PEC sem serem alvo de qualquer san磯 retirou-lhes credibilidade. Agora precisam do Reino Unido para voltarem a poder reunir consensos e ditar regras na Constitui磯 europeia. Tony Blair, debilitado internamente pela morte de David Kelly e pela inexistꮣia de armas de destrui磯 maciç¡ no Iraque, també procura apoios que há µm ano eram impensᶥis.
Uma locomotiva anglo-franco-alemã §era grandes apreens?aos restantes 12 paí³¥s da UE, a que se juntam os 10 do alargamento, marcado para Maio. Os condenados a viajar nas carruagens de trá³ já ®ã¯ tê d?s de que vai passar a existir uma Europa a vᲩas velocidades. Só ¦¡lta saber quem vai ficar nas carruagens de trá³ e se se vai perder o princí°©o de um comissᲩo por paí³ ou as presidꮣias rotativas da UE.
El tripartito
FRANCIA VUELVE a poner en peligro la construcció® ¤e Europa
MIQUEL ROCA I JUNYENT - 24/02/2004
El tí´µlo se presta a engañ¯º hoy, no só¬¯ en Catalunya, sino en toda Españ¡ ¬a menció® ¤e ?tripartito? se atribuye en exclusiva al Gobierno de Catalunya. En esta ocasió®¬ no obstante, se está ¨aciendo referencia a la pretensió® ¤e Chirac, Schr? y Blair de constituir, de hecho, un poder tripartito para conducir la nueva etapa polí´©ca de la Unió® …uropea. Cansados de intentar alcanzar un consenso que no llegan a conseguir con los demá³ estados miembros, singularmente con Españ¡ ¹ los paí³¥s recientemente incorporados procedentes de la Europa del Este, pretenden gobernar Europa prescindiendo de ellos.
?Es un ejercicio de prepotencia? No, simplemente es ignorar que la UE o se construye desde el consenso o va a refugiarse en una triste y limitada realidad como mercado econó©£o, sin proyecció® °olí´©ca ni capacidad de influencia en la escena internacional. Francia vuelve de nuevo a poner en peligro la construcció® °olí´©ca de Europa. Lo hizo con Mendes France en 1953, cuando lo que se pretendí¡ era la comunidad europea de defensa, y lo vuelve a hacer ahora, antes que aceptar que Europa pueda constituirse sin hegemoní¡ francesa.
Y lo pretende hacer de la mano de Alemania, pieza clave de la Europa de futuro, pero que no puede olvidar que su nombre inspira a muchos paí³¥s del Este el mismo recelo que despierta el vecino ruso. Unos y otros, germanos y rusos, se han pasado los dos ?os siglos de nuestra historia ocupando sucesiva y alternativamente el escenario del centro de Europa, dejando tras de sí µn reguero de ví£´imas y agresiones.
Y, por si fuera poco, la compañ¡ se culmina con la presencia de Gran Bretañ¡¬ que ha ido siempre a remolque en la construcció® ¥uropea y que, hoy por hoy, todaví¡ no ha aceptado el euro como moneda com?ste tripartito só¬¯ tiene de com?n el de Catalunya, que tambié® atribuye la culpa de todos los males a Aznar. Pero, igual que aquí¬ en Europa deberí¡ decirse qué ³e propone, có¯ se quiere avanzar, en qué ¤irecció®® No basta con definir el adversario, ademá³ debe saberse proponer cuᬠserá ¥l futuro que espera a los europeos.
En todo caso, en este momento el tripartito europeo huele a retroceso, a volver muy atrá³® La ampliació® ±ueda en entredicho y la construcció® °olí´©ca de la Unió® …uropea en ví¡ muerta. Lo que franceses, alemanes y britᮩcos se proponen no es só¬¯ una respuesta a la oposició® ¤e otros paí³¥s, es sacar provecho de é³´a para retroceder a muchos añ¯³ atrá³ y volver a construir la Europa de los potentes, recelosos del protagonismo de los nuevos. A los euroescé°´icos se suma ahora una nueva categorí¡º los de ?Europa sí¬ pero nunca a costa de nosotros?. ?Ad󮤥 vas, Europa?
?Un directorio europeo?
QUE CHIRAC, SCHRÖ„ER y Blair concierten un proyecto para revitalizar la economí¡ no debe rechazarse sin má³ por supuesto hegemonismo
CARLOS NADAL - 22/02/2004
La reunió® ¤e Chirac, Schr? y Blair celebrada en Berlí® el pasado mié²£oles la han tomado a mal los gobiernos de Españ¡¬ Italia, Portugal, Holanda, Polonia y Estonia. Sobre todo el de Aznar, quien, al parecer, puso el asunto sobre la mesa en la reunió® ²eciente de la internacional del Partido Popular Europeo con el resultado del redactado de una carta que estos seis paí³¥s enviaron al presidente semestral de la Unió® …uropea, el primer ministro irland鳬 Bertie Ahern. Una misiva en la cual se expresaba el temor a que Alemania, Gran Bretañ¡ ¹ Francia pretendan constituirse en algo así £omo un directorio dispuesto a marcar las pautas que seguir por la UE, en ví³°eras y despué³ de que se amplí¥ con diez estados má³ a partir del 1 de mayo de este añ¯®
El recelo de los gobiernos españ¯¬ y polaco a todo tipo de iniciativa de los paí³¥s de mayor peso demogrᦩco, territorial y econó©£o de la UE en el sentido de querer imponer los criterios a ellos má³ favorables y en detrimento de los miembros medianos o pequeñ¯³ ha ocasionado ya má³ de una diferencia comunitaria. Ocurrió ¡³í ¡ raíº de que los ministros de Economí¡ resolvieran no aplicar a Francia y Alemania las penalizaciones que merecí¡® por no cumplir el pacto de contenció® ¤el d馩cit y, anteriormente, cuando la guerra de Iraq creó µ®a escisió® §rave entre los gobiernos de la UE que se alinearon con Estados Unidos y los que, encabezados por Alemania y Francia, mostraron su disconformidad con la iniciativa norteamericana. Tambié® entonces Españ¡ ¹ Polonia encabezaron agrupaciones de estados proamericanos. Concretamente, Españ¡ £on un documento firmado por ocho gobiernos. Estos desentendimientos crearon el ambiente enrarecido que condujo a la reunió® ¤e Bruselas en que el proyecto de Constitució® ¥uropea elaborada por una Convenció® ¢ajo la presidencia de Valé²¹ Giscard d'Estaing quedó ¡²rinconado en espera de una mejor oportunidad.
La susceptibilidad españ¯¬¡ se apoya en el rechazo de que haya en la UE distintos grados de autoridad y capacidad de decidir. Pero al mismo tiempo responde a la hipersensibilidad de la soberaní¡ nacional, el temor a que Españ¡ ³e vea arrastrada a cumplir decisiones polí´©cas que perjudiquen sus intereses, no só¬¯ en el seno de la Comunidad Europea, sino tambié® en polí´©ca exterior. Esto ?o se puso claramente de manifiesto respecto a Iraq. Es decir, al distanciamiento de la polí´©ca francesa y alemana en beneficio de un acercamiento preferencial a Estados Unidos como principal gestor de la polí´©ca en el escenario mundial.
Pero entre tanto se han producido cambios en el contexto europeo. El má³ notable ha sido el acercamiento progresivo de Gran Bretañ¡ ¡ Francia y Alemania. El deseo del ?premier? britᮩco Blair de reequilibrar su postura acentuadamente proamericana mediante la aproximació® £ontinental a Francia y Alemania. Como si entendiera la necesidad de borrar el efecto de la reunió® ´ripartita con Bush y Aznar en las Azores.
Este paso progresivo del eje Parí³Berlí® al triᮧulo Parí³Berlí®Londres establece relaciones especiales entre los tres paí³¥s miembros de la UE que suman el mayor peso demogrᦩco y econó©£o. Y, sin duda, militar, sobre todo por la aportació® ¢ritᮩca, que en este terreno tiene una superioridad indiscutible. Precisamente la que le convirtió ¥® el ? aliado de peso en la guerra y ocupació® ¤e Iraq. No en vano es en las cuestiones militares donde se comenzó ¡ forjar este entendimiento tripartito europeo, mediante instrumentos de una defensa com?rimer paso en la direcció® ¤e establecer ?convergencias aceleradas?.
Y ahora esta nueva realidad se ha consolidado en la reunió® ¥n Berlí® del pasado mié²£oles, de la cual ha surgido un acuerdo muy amplio para que la UE dé µn paso adelante en su potencialidad industrial, tecnol󧩣a, de investigació®¬ de creació® ¤e infraestructuras, de actualizació® ¹ ampliació® ¤e la educació®¬ de ajuste de la polí´©ca social y sanitaria. Un conjunto de iniciativas que tienen su vertiente polí´©ca, por ejemplo, con el proyecto de crear una especie de superministro europeo encargado de poner en prᣴica estos objetivos. Los reunidos en Berlí® lo han considerado como la figura de un vicepresidente de la Comisió® …uropea con amplios poderes.
Las denuncias de que los acuerdos tomados en Berlí® son la manifestació® ¤e una voluntad hegemó®©£a inaceptable no parecen en principio la respuesta má³ adecuada. Es comprensible que levanten recelos. Pero Chirac, Schr? y Blair han procurado desvanecerlos, advirtiendo de que no se trata de imposiciones, sino de propuestas que plantear, sobre todo, cara a la cumbre comunitaria que ha de celebrarse el 25 y el 26 de marzo.
Si es verdad que puede sospecharse la creació® ¤e una especie de triunvirato, de la aplicació® ¤el principio de la ?convergencia acelerada?, tambié® lo es que se trata de un proyecto que má³ bien está ¥ncaminado a evitar las ?geometrí¡³ variables? en la participació® ¥n la UE. Porque, habida cuenta de las circunstancias actuales, lo ocurrido en Berlí® má³ parece responder al temor de un desfase econó©£o general de la UE respecto a las grandes y poderosas unidades macroeconó©£as como Estados Unidos y Japó® ¹ al avance hacia el primer plano de potencias en crecimiento acelerado como China e India que a la voluntad de predominio triangular en el seno de la UE. Es la conciencia de que Alemania y Francia está® a punto de quedarse peligrosamente atrá³ y de que Gran Bretañ¡¬ pese a encontrarse en condiciones algo mejores, tampoco da la medida del gran desafí¯ econó©£o y por tanto polí´©co que está °lanteado o planteᮤose a escala global.
Los gobiernos de Parí³¬ Berlí® y Londres han comprendido la urgencia de conjuntar esfuerzos si no quieren quedarse atrá³® Y esto, l󧩣amente, han de resolverlo teniendo muy en cuenta el marco comunitario en el que está® inscritos de manera irreversible. Que algunas potencias medias o pequeñ¡³ hagan interpretaciones peyorativas de las propuestas elaboradas en la reunió® ¤e Berlí® en vez de disponerse a estudiarlas y comprenderlas como una iniciativa con la que es conveniente colaborar no les ayudará® Es natural que los estados miembros procuren no salir perjudicados por las decisiones comunitarias, pero un puntilloso nacionalismo por sistema cada vez será enos rentable en una UE que só¬¯ va a ser verdaderamente viable si acrecienta la interdependencia.
Ni Chirac ni Schr? ni Blair está® en sus mejores dí¡³ polí´©camente. Lo cual les empuja a apoyarse mutuamente en lo que puede ser una empresa com?paz de devolverles el cr餩to popular del que no van sobrados. Si esta merma les lleva de verdad a ser creativos con una perspectiva europeí³´a, no parece razonable acusarles de hegemonismo sin esperar a estudiar sus propuestas y hacer las aportaciones crí´©cas o participativas que se estimen oportunas y legí´©mas.
No es Berlusconi la persona má³ indicada para despacharse sobre el asunto afirmando que Europa no necesita ning?rectorio que cree confusió®® Y parece exagerado que la ministra españ¯¬¡ Ana Palacio diga que ?nadie deberí¡ estar autorizado a secuestrar el interé³ general de Europa?. De momento mejor serí¡ darle un margen de confianza a Blair cuando dice: ?No tenemos por qué °resentar excusas a nadie. Estamos buscando có¯ deberí¡os hacer para hacer funcionar a Europa de una manera má³ eficiente en interé³ de nuestros pueblos?.
Europe's Big Three
The International Herald Tribune
The meeting of the leaders of Britain, France and Germany on Wednesday was guaranteed to get other Europeans grumbling anxiously about a "big three" directorate. The fears are understandable, especially with the approach of the expansion of the EU, and it was right for six nervous European prime ministers to issue a joint statement effectively reminding Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schr? that they have no monopoly on EU policy-making.
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That said, there is nothing wrong in a separate get-together of the three, especially after the bitter disputes over Iraq. In fact, it is critical for the heads of Europe's three biggest economies to be talking. What is important is that Blair, Chirac and Schr? come up with concrete ideas in advance of the next EU summit meeting on March 25 about getting Europe over some of the toughest times in its history and delivering real benefits to the people of Europe. And it is equally important that they present their decisions in a way that does not rouse new anxieties, in Europe or the United States, and avoids any talk of a "two-speed Europe" or patronizing lectures to new members.
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The conventional wisdom about the big three is that the French-German "motor" is no longer powerful enough to drive European integration and needs the added horsepower of Britain. So Blair's trip to Berlin should be good news for all Europeans, all the more so since Britain, a trusted friend of many new entrants and Europe's leading Atlanticist, will temper French-German tendencies to go it alone. It should also be welcomed by Washington, which will be less suspicious of French and German intentions for Europe if America's British ally is in on their talks.
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In the end, though, the main reason why the trilateral meeting makes sense is that unless Britain, France and Germany see eye to eye, little gets done in the EU. When they do pull together, they can often achieve more, and more quickly, than the cumbersome bureaucratic beast of Brussels in full battle armor. Recent examples of trilateral success include the mission to Tehran last year that persuaded Iran to allow inspection of its nuclear program, and burgeoning defense cooperation, notably the agreement last week by Germany to join the Franco-British plan for rapid reaction forces.
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Such cooperation, of course, can easily strain the nerves of those left out; hence the warning letter from Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Estonia. But fears of a trilateral directorate are exaggerated; Britain, France and Germany have very differing national agendas, and the three men are hardly bosom buddies, however chummy they may try to appear over their beer and w?
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The greater fear is that their separate ambitions will deflect them from the responsibility they bear for all Europe. The EU on the eve of enlargement is a fragile thing, as demonstrated by the debacle in December over the Union's draft constitution. A compromise proposed by Blair, Chirac and Schr? - or even just an agreement to compromise - could go along way toward solving the constitution wrangle; bulldozing by the big three, on the other hand, could do enormous damage to Europe's big house.
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The most promising thing about the Berlin meeting is that social and economic reform is high on the agenda. The EU has worked so far, most of the time, because it is an economic union; and globalization's success stories worldwide show that economic progress is the best recipe for stability. Settling on the best ways to tackle unemployment, social security and health care, and to improve the business environment, would not only help Europe through its current rough patch, but also give Europeans some evidence that the EU is not such a bad thing.