Li Liang, Visiting Scholar ‘06

The restart of the Six-Party Talks scheduled for December looks now like a lengthy soap opera. After over one year’s boycott, North Korea finally returns to negotiations, but the U.S. representative’s talk with a North Korean counterpart in Beijing in November offers little hope for future engagement. The most positive sign is not the resumption of talks but U.S. President Bush’s hint during his recent trip to Vietnam that America would still consider a peace treaty with North Korea to mark the formal end of the Korean War. That means the U.S. would take an important step toward regarding North Korea as a normal country.

But a genuine understanding between the two countries is yet to come. North Korea’s image as a hooligan country and ‘axis of evil’ state has not changed. But who can believe that a nation of 22 million people struggling for more than a decade on the edge of starvation is really a ferocious hooligan? Partly true, but maybe too simplified.

North Korea’s bankrupt economy can be traced back only to the 1990s. Before that the economy remained strong, thanks largely to the Soviet Union and East European markets. Ordinary North Koreans then enjoyed better living conditions than Chinese.

When the Soviet Union and the East European communist bloc collapsed, North Korea lost its main market as well as its nuclear umbrella. China, its only patron, was undergoing dramatic social change and unable to provide the security guarantee North Korea desperately needed. North Korea had to survive alongside powerful South Korea, home to 37,000 U.S. troops, and confront economic sanctions from western countries.

What North Korea has long wanted is a security guarantee from the U.S. For Kim Jong Il’s regime, nuclear power is to a significant degree a political card in pursuit of this aim. Residing on a narrow peninsula, North Korea has nowhere to retreat if war happens. Unlike South Koreans who live under a U.S. nuclear umbrella, North Koreans’ deep anxiety and distrust can easily be triggered.

According to the stereotyped reporting of most western media, North Korea is a rogue nation and its leader Kim Jong Il is an evil dictator, a crazy man pursuing nuclear power while leaving millions of people starving to death. But North Korea is not crazy.

It has designed a careful strategy to step out of its dilemma. Kim launched economic reforms in 2002, adopting such measures as establishing economic zones, opening to tourism, and loosening price controls. Those initiatives have a ‘revolutionary’ meaning when compared to the doctrines of his father Kim Il Sung.

But the heavy burden of keeping one million troops restrains Kim Jong Il from taking more dramatic steps. And in Kim’s bold game with America, every decision he makes is based on extremely cautious political calculation.

In 1994, Kim Jong Il pushed Americans into a compromise only through playing the ‘nuclear’ card even though it had no realistic meaning. In 2000 his meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung helped his impoverished nation gain $200 million in aid. Given the North Korean perspective, Kim should perhaps be recognized as an adroit politician.

From the 1994 ‘Agreed Framework’ to U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000, step by step Kim seemed to achieve his aims. But he never expected that Republican leaders would criticize Albright for the visit and depict his country as a blackmailer soon after Albright returned to the U.S. American democratic politics seem beyond Kim’s understanding.

And he never knew why Mr. Bush in March 2001 changed his attitude so sharply from Mr. Clinton’s. After September 11, Mr. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld changed their minds and began to advocate regime change. Kim had to play a most dangerous game, using a real nuclear bomb to seek America’s security guarantee and protect his regime.

Of course Kim in 2006 may ask a high price to accomplish some form of economic rehabilitation, but don’t forget his basic purpose. This is really not an interesting game. Kim shows concern about his regime’s future under heavy domestic and international pressure. And he believes that only nuclear power can protect his country from possible invasion.

Thanks to Mr. Bush’s hawkish mind, the situation has now escalated. This is a crucial moment with North Korea on the edge of being a true nuclear power. No more time is left, and each side must make a significant compromise.

For Mr. Bush, the idea of overthrowing Kim’s regime should be given up in exchange for the denuclearization of North Korea. Iraq provides a bad example for promoting the ideal of democracy in a rushed way. Americans may see many reasons to topple Kim’s regime, but they should follow realistic logic. Giving North Korea space to survive and talking with Kim in a mutually respectful way will make it much easier for the U.S. to accomplish urgent goals.

Actually North Korea’s nuclear power poses more danger to China and South Korea than to the U.S. Even if Kim possesses nuclear power, America is protected by distance. Kim knows clearly that any use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. or Japan would bring his last day. And if terrorist groups caused huge world-shaking damage to the U.S. with nuclear weapons obtained from North Korea, his regime would surely disappear overnight.

But for China and South Korea, Kim’s actions threaten to precipitate a nuclear-armed East Asia, a nightmare for China’s ‘Harmonious Society.’ Denuclearization of the Korea peninsula remains a far more serious concern for China than for the U.S.

Beijing’s priority is to prevent Kim’s regime from collapse while seducing it into developing its economy, following the example of Vietnam. Two tough tasks remain. China must press Kim to give up being a nuclear power in exchange for a peaceful international environment and at the same time dissuade the U.S. from the idea of regime change.

The reopened Six-Party Talks are not a gift China gives to America. Beijing must take a more active role for its own sake.